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The Living Body of the Lord:  
E.B. Pusey’s ‘Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’ 
George Westhaver 
 
In his ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecy’ (1836-7), E. B. Pusey urges the 
recovery of a patristic and ‘Apostolic’ approach to the interpretation of 
the Old Testament. This thesis will argue that for Pusey finding types and 
‘typical’ prophecies of Christ and his Church in the whole of the Old 
Testament is not an exegetical curiosity or option, but rather a necessary 
expression of doctrine and spiritual discipline. For Pusey, the 
unwillingness of interpreters guided by the apologetic and evidentialist 
approach to theology in his day to follow the Fathers’ example manifests 
important theological differences. He advocates both the recovery of 
patristic exegesis and the theological vision in which it makes sense. 
‘Every thing is a type’, in the books of God’s works and words, because 
all created things bear the impress of their creator. Moreover, all types or 
images, in Scripture, in nature, and in the human soul, seek a fulfilment 
in a salvific return to the Trinity in Unity. Drawing on both patristic and 
Romantic sources, Pusey describes knowledge as a form of participation 
in the divine life in opposition to the rationalistic and procedural 
presuppositions he finds implicit in the apologetic approach. For Pusey, 
epistemology must be treated alongside sanctification and typology 
reflects Christology; a sacramental or ‘typical’ reading of prophecy 
transforms people made in the image of God to become more like God 
and hence able to know God and to read with understanding. Articulating 
these ideas was a project which occupied Pusey and his Tractarian 
colleagues during the most creative years of the Oxford Movement. 
While in many ways they gave voice to important High Church ideals, 
the puzzled response which greeted this part of their work reveals its 
radicalism and suggests possibilities for the contemporary search for the 
re-integration of theology and spirituality. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The Theological Vision of the ‘Lectures’ 
In his ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’, E. B. Pusey 
investigates prophecy and the prophetic character of the Old Testament. They 
exist in a handsomely bound red leather volume in the collection of the library 
of Pusey House, Oxford. Pusey gave the ‘Lectures’ in the ordinary course of 
his duties as Regius Professor of Hebrew, a post to which he had been 
appointed in November, 1828. Pusey prepared the ‘Lectures on Types and 
Prophecies’ during the summer of 1836 and began to deliver them in 
Michaelmas Term that autumn. Pusey’s biographer H. P. Liddon judges 1836 
to be ‘the most important year in the history of the Oxford Movement’, in a 
large part due to the very aspirations and conflicts which shaped Pusey’s 
arguments in the ‘Lectures’.1 On the first day of the year, Pusey’s three Tracts 
on ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’ were published.2 J. H. Newman 
emphasized the importance of this contribution to the Tracts for the Times, ‘not 
as an enquiry into one single or isolated doctrine, but as a delineation and 
serious examination of a modern system of theology’.3 It was the dangers 
posed, in Pusey’s assessment, by this same ‘modern system’ which led him to 
play a significant role in the controversy surrounding the appointment of R. D. 
Hampden* as Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford in the winter and spring 
of 1836.4 Also in 1836, during the long vacation and into the autumn, Pusey 
began to plan the Library of the Fathers with Newman and J. Keble, a project 
which represented both a recovery and a search for first principles distinct from 
the modern approach. It was in this context that the ‘Lectures’ were conceived 
and took shape. In them, Pusey compares what he considers to be the 
                                                 
1 Life, 359. 
2 See Life, 324-5, on the importance of the publication of these Tracts. 
3 ‘Advertisement’ for Part II, of Vol. II of Tracts for the Times, Newman, 1839c, vi. 
4 For names marked with an asterisk in this thesis there is brief biographical information in the 
footnote noted at the end of the sentence. 
*Hampden, Renn Dickson (1783-1868). Fellow and tutor at Oriel College, Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Oxford from 1834 and Bp of Hereford from 1848.  
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characteristics of examinations of prophecy in his day with the way in which 
the Church Fathers understood the Old Testament to be prophetic. He shows 
that the Fathers found types and prophecies in places where eighteenth century 
and early nineteenth century apologists denied that any were to be found. 
Pusey seeks to uncover the ideas and presuppositions that lay behind these 
differences. On the basis of this analysis, he puts forward a theological 
argument for the importance of interpreting the Scriptures according to the 
principles of ‘typical interpretation’ or typology that one finds in the ‘antient 
Church’ to which he directs our attention.5 
This thesis will argue that for Pusey a typological or ‘typical’ reading of 
the Old Testament is necessary both as the exegetical expression of orthodox 
belief and practice, and as a means of furthering the goal of communion with 
Christ who is the subject of prophecy. Pusey’s discussion of types and 
prophecy takes him beyond Old Testament exegesis to consider the character 
and possibilities of theological knowledge. This thesis will show how Pusey’s 
understanding of typology is inextricably connected with his understanding of 
the Incarnation, the sacraments and the sacramental character of the Bible, 
theological anthropology and sanctification, and creation and redemption. 
Whatever the weaknesses in his argument, Pusey is doing more than 
advocating the merits of a sacred deposit of authorized interpretations which 
are free from the contamination of the modern age. Rather, he seeks to bring to 
light the principles which make the Fathers’ interpretations more in tune with 
the character of the Bible and the conditions of religious knowledge than those 
of many modern interpreters. Pusey makes the investigation of types the forum 
for discussing the character of theology and Christian life. It is an all-
encompassing investigation. 
Although the ‘Lectures’ are not particularly well-known, they occupy an 
important place in the history of the Oxford Movement. An attendance list for 
the ‘Lectures’ in Pusey’s hand-writing has survived.6 Under the inscription, 
                                                 
5 Pusey appeals to the ‘antient Church’, to ‘the antients’, and to ‘antient interpretation’ 
throughout the ‘Lectures’, e.g. L3, 9, 38, 55, 81, 110, 120, 138, 168.  
6 ‘Attendance, Hebrew Lectures, 1829-1837’, in ‘Pusey Papers: Various’. 
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‘Lectures delivered on prophecy, Monday – Friday at ten minutes past one’, 
the forty-eight names include John Henry Newman, Walter Kerr Hamilton*, 
Charles Marriott*, and W. E. Jelf*.7 Donald Allchin comments that, in the 
‘Lectures’, ‘we seem to hear a younger and more hopeful Pusey speaking than 
is familiar to us from his later writings’.8 Not intended for public 
dissemination, at least in the form we have them, the ‘Lectures’ are more 
speculative and creative than the work which Pusey produced for the more 
unforgiving forum of public controversy. One has the sense in reading them 
that Pusey is wrestling with complex theological questions without always 
bringing to the surface all that is implied in his own arguments, perhaps 
approximating to his description in the ‘Lectures’ of how ‘words we often utter 
are fuller than we ourselves are at the time fully aware; we feel only that we 
have uttered truths beyond ourselves’. (L19)9 Pusey conveyed this sense of 
inspiration to F. W. Faber*, who was present at the first lecture of Lent Term, 
1837: 
Pusey commenced his lectures yesterday with Noah, and I really was so 
carried away by the majesty of his interpretations, that I could scarcely 
conceive him uninspired. It seemed as if a live coal from the altar had 
been placed upon his lips, and that the words he spoke were not his 
own.10 
                                                 
7 Liddon writes that ‘twenty-nine seems to have been the total number of listeners at the 
beginning of term’. Life, 399. The attendance sheet has a small ‘29’ written on the left side 
which Liddon may have known to indicate the number present at the first lecture. One of the 
names on the attendance sheet has ‘Lecture 7’ written beside it (‘Tripp’, of Exeter College), 
suggesting that some attended only one or more lectures. These differences probably suggest 
nothing more than that irregular attendance at lectures has remained a consistent part of 
University life. No separate record of attendance survives for Lent and Easter Terms. 
*Hamilton, Walter Kerr (1808–1869). Fellow of Merton from 1830, a High Church supporter 
of the Oxford Movement, he was consecrated Bp of Salisbury in 1854 and later founded 
Salisbury Theological College. 
*Marriott, Charles (1811–1858). Fellow of Oriel, a friend of John Henry Newman, and a close 
associate of Pusey. Briefly principal of the Diocesan Theological College in Chichester, and 
later vicar of St Mary the Virgin, the University Church, from 1850. From 1841 to 1855 he was 
the primary editor of the Library of the Fathers (Pusey in Augustine 1857, iii). 
*Jelf, William Edward (1811–1875). Tutor in Classics at Christ Church (1836 to 1849) where 
he had been elected a student in 1829 on Pusey’s nomination. He was an old-fashioned High 
Churchman and brother of Pusey’s lifelong friend, R. W. Jelf (1798–1871). 
8 Allchin 1967, 56. 
9 Page numbers of the ‘Lectures’ in this thesis will be given in parentheses in the text preceded 
by an upper case ‘L’. For example, (L8) will refer to page 8 of the manuscript. 
10 F. W. Faber to J. B. Morris, 31 January, 1837, quoted in Härdelin 1965, 17 n. 52. 
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While all who read the ‘Lectures’ may not agree with Faber’s exalted view of 
‘the majesty of his interpretations’, their creative and exploratory character 
invites further investigation.  
Despite their relative obscurity, not having ever been published, Pusey’s 
‘Lectures’ were one instance of a foundational undertaking for the Tractarians. 
In the early years of the Oxford Movement, the question of the interpretation of 
the Bible, and the significance of the sort of typological and allegorical 
interpretation of the Scriptures that one finds in the Fathers, was a question that 
occupied not only Pusey, but also Newman and Keble. Apart from their 
sermons, Newman’s consideration of the allegorical exegesis of the Fathers in 
Arians on the Fourth Century (1833), Keble’s Tract 89, ‘On the Mysticism 
attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’ (1841), and Isaac Williams’ 
Tracts 80 and 87, ‘On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge’ (1838 
and 1840), are only the best known examples of this shared endeavour. To 
neglect this subject would be to neglect what served as the fertile soil in which 
the Tractarians’ ideas germinated and grew. The importance of this endeavour 
to return to the Fathers as guides in interpreting the Scriptures is described by 
Geoffrey Rowell: 
The theological vision of the Oxford Movement was in large measure a 
rediscovery and reinterpretation of patristic theology. The typological 
exegesis of Scripture and the strong sacramentalism of the Fathers 
commended themselves to men who already had begun to criticize the 
evidence theology of the eighteenth century.11 
The elements which Rowell describes as central to the theological vision of the 
Oxford Movement are the same elements which one finds in Pusey’s 
‘Lectures’ – a consideration of the importance of typology or of a symbolic 
reading of the Bible, a criticism of the apologetic theology of the empirical 
tradition, and a sacramental understanding of both reading the Scriptures and 
of Christian life. The combination of subjects is also significant. Pusey’s 
investigation of prophecy is not a narrow argument about exegetical technique 
                                                 
*Faber, Frederick William (1814-1863). A scholar and later fellow of University College who 
collaborated with the Library of the Fathers. He was received into the Roman Catholic Church 
in November, 1845, some weeks after Newman. 
11 Rowell 1983, 9.  
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or contested points of interpretation. Rather, it is a part of a far-reaching project 
which involved the working out of basic theological principles.  
The focus in the ‘Lectures’ of Pusey’s work of retrieval is the 
consideration of type and prophecy in the Old Testament. A type is commonly 
understood to be an event, person, or ceremony in the Old Testament that 
corresponds to, or prefigures, similar events, people, or things in the New 
Testament, often referred to as the antitype. Pusey’s view of typology includes 
this notion of type, but broadens it in significant ways. For Pusey, types 
include not only things or people, but also words or prophetic sayings in the 
Old Testament. We will see that for Pusey a type can have many different 
kinds of fulfilments, not only in the New Testament, but also in the history of 
the Church or in eternity; a type may correspond not only to an event in the life 
of Christ described in the Gospels, but may also represent or picture some truth 
or reality pertaining to Him. Moreover, the term ‘type’ describes not only 
figures in the Old Testament but also symbols in the natural world or historical 
characters who represent certain ideals. The Passover Lamb, a bird soaring 
heavenward, and the notorious dictator are all types: ‘The world is full of 
types; and it were probably true to say, ‘“every thing is a type”, if we could see 
it’. (L14)  
Pusey’s understanding of prophecy reflects this expansive notion of type. 
For Pusey, a prophecy is primarily a revelation of God and his ways, and only 
secondarily a prediction. Fundamental to his understanding of type and 
prophecy is the idea that these are not distinct categories. For Pusey, types are 
prophetic and prophecy is primarily typological. The adjective which he most 
often uses to describe this kind of prophecy is ‘typical’, which is both a 
synonym for ‘typological’ and the word he uses to emphasize the ‘type’-
character of all prophecy. Pusey argues that however clear an Old Testament 
prophecy may appear initially or on the surface, it will also include some 
element that is hidden and elusive. Types and typical prophecy are necessarily 
veiled. Perhaps most significantly of all, in Pusey’s analysis, the study of 
typology extends further than the consideration of historical correspondences 
or the relationship of the two Testaments. When he describes the symbolical, 
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or typical, character of numbers, Pusey writes that ‘The principles seem to lie 
in the very Being of God Himself’. (L152) The typical character of the Old 
Testament corresponds to the character of God’s manifestation in the world 
and therefore expresses fundamental theological and even divine principles. 
Pusey differentiates the Fathers’ willingness to explore the types of the 
Old Testament from a ‘modern’ or ‘apologetic’ approach, which views such 
readings as arbitrary, ahistorical, or subjective. Chapter 2 considers Pusey’s 
assessment of the apologetic approach and his response to it. Pusey finds in the 
apologetic and evidentialist theology of his age a superficial empiricism which 
narrows not only the prophetic witness of the Old Testament but also 
encourages scepticism about theological or spiritual knowledge more 
generally. Pusey seeks to bring to light and to challenge the rationalistic 
principles which he thinks animate this approach. Both the Tractarians’ 
assessment of the moralistic and dry theology of the eighteenth century and, 
more immediately, the appointment of R. D. Hampden as Regius Professor of 
Divinity in Oxford shaped Pusey’s sense of the dangers of rationalism. Pusey’s 
concern that rationalism posed an imminent threat to the Church of England 
was also informed by two periods of extended study in Germany between 1825 
and 1827 and his examination of post-reformation German theology.  
As Chapter 3 investigates, Pusey’s analysis of the apologetic approach 
raises broader theological questions about the kind of knowledge which 
prophecy reveals and how that knowledge is grasped – questions of 
epistemology and theological anthropology. Pusey describes the knowledge of 
prophecy and of spiritual things more generally in terms of communion with 
God or participation in the life or knowledge of God. Religious knowledge has 
a fundamentally moral character and comes with its own kind of moral trial. 
Pusey’s repeated criticism of superficial reason and his emphasis on the role of 
faith over demonstration might suggest that his argument is a pietistic and 
reactionary rejection of theological liberalism. In order to assess if this 
criticism of Pusey applies to the ‘Lectures’, it will be necessary to distinguish 
the different kinds of reason which he describes, and to consider how the soul 
made in the image of God discerns spiritual things in images and types. We 
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will see that Pusey’s description of the spiritual faculties offers an account of 
religious knowledge as the response of the whole person to God, feelings as 
well as the intellect, the moral sense as well as the mind, awe and wonder as 
well as careful deliberation.  
Pusey’s understanding of type and typical prophecy will be considered in 
Chapter 4. Since he appeals to the expositions of the Fathers, the way in which 
Pusey understands their guidance and authority will be discussed here. 
Contrary to the apologetic approach which isolates or singles out prophecies, 
Pusey argues that the whole of the Old Testament prophesies Christ, the focus 
and interpretative centre of all revelation. Pusey challenges views which limit 
types to those authorized by the New Testament explicitly and argues that such 
examples of fulfilled prophecy serve as guides which teach the Church how to 
recognize types more broadly, and to discover the minute character of typical 
correspondences. In dialogue with his German friend and colleague F. G. A. 
Tholuck*, Pusey elaborates his understanding of divine intention and the 
‘fullest’ sense of prophecy. In addition to the historical or horizontal 
correspondences between Old Testament types and their New Testament 
fulfilment, Pusey emphasizes a vertical dimension, the way in which types 
participate in the reality of the eternal Archetype, the Son of God, in whom all 
types are fulfilled.12 
Elucidating the incarnational, sacramental, and ecclesiastical elements of 
Pusey’s view of type is the focus of Chapter 5. Pusey understands the 
Incarnation, the union of Christ with the Church through the sacraments, and a 
sacramental or typical reading of the Old Testament as parts of the same 
mystery. For Pusey, types and prophecy not only declare that union with Christ 
is the goal or fulfilment which the Old Testament prophesies, but reading the 
Old Testament typically is part of the way by which that sanctifying union is 
accomplished. Considering Pusey’s argument through the lens of modern-day 
                                                 
12 This idea of the vertical is borrowed from Crouzel 1989, 81: ‘Christian time has both 
dimensions, the vertical as well as the horizontal’. 
*Tholuck, Friedrich August (1790-1877). A friend of Pusey and a German Protestant 
theologian who was profoundly influenced by the pietists and became a lecturer in Berlin and 
then professor at Halle from 1826 to his death. 
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discussions about typology and allegory helps to show why, for Pusey, the 
typical sense is synonymous with the Christian sense, and typical prophecies 
offer different levels of meaning which terminate in an eschatological or 
eternal fulfilment when the sense is most completely filled up or exhausted.  
Pusey’s evocative statement that the principles of typology ‘seem to lie 
in the very Being of God Himself’ suggests the all-encompassing character of 
his study of types and prophecy. (L152) Chapter 6 will consider how Pusey 
situates his account of typology within an understanding of creation as an 
emanation or efflux from the divine unity and redemption as the return of all 
things to God who made them. Pusey can say that ‘“every thing is a type”, if 
we could see it’, because all the works of God bear some stamp or impress of 
their Creator. The book of God’s works corresponds to the book of God’s 
words because both are written and spoken by the same Word of God. The 
multiple meanings of typical things and words are not the fabrications of 
fanciful interpreters, but the necessary consequence of the web of relationships 
by which all the offspring of God partake, each in their degree and measure, of 
the same divine qualities. Even the imperfections of a type point to the 
perfection which it reveals. Reading the Bible typically, searching for the 
Archetype Christ in all types, in word and work, is a means by which we share 
in the longing of the whole creation to return to its Creator and to the ‘Zion of 
eternal and heavenly blessedness’, an eternal world which is both anticipated 
and remembered. (L131) 
In conclusion, Chapter 7 will consider how the ‘Lectures’ were part of a 
shared project which both emerged from the High Church tradition and 
challenged that tradition. Like Pusey, Keble and Newman also described 
typical or allegorical interpretation as an expression of orthodox belief and 
criticised rationalistic or evidence-based approaches to religion. Earlier 
representatives of the High Church tradition had kept alive an understanding of 
the natural world as symbolic of the spiritual world, and an appreciation of a 
figurative or allegorical interpretation of the Bible. This tradition also 
emphasized a holy life, faith, and reserve as necessary components of religious 
knowledge. However, we will see that many High Church supporters of the 
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Tractarians were also suspicious of the project embodied in the ‘Lectures’. 
There was a radicalism in the ideas of Keble, Newman and Pusey, and in the 
way their appropriation of the Fathers was connected to an understanding of 
theology very much at odds with the spirit of the age. This radicalism 
challenged not only self-conscious exponents of the modern system, but also 
the allies and the heirs of the Oxford Movement, and witnessed to an integrated 
view of theology and spirituality which many today seek to recover. 
1.2 The ‘Lectures’ as a Document 
Pusey’s ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecies of the Old Testament’ offer a rich 
field for study, but have received relatively little attention in academic circles. 
Only small selections from the ‘Lectures’ are in print, in the articles and books 
which will be referred to in this thesis. The bound manuscript contains 169 
leaves in Pusey’s difficult hand-writing, totalling more than 125,000 words. 
The first forty pages of the ‘Lectures’ offer a general Introduction or 
Prolegomenon, giving an overview of the subject and setting forth the 
principles by which Pusey will proceed. In the last one hundred and thirty 
pages, Pusey offers a treatment of prophecy according to what he calls a ‘direct 
Chronological order’, eschewing any questions of the kind he had encountered 
in Germany about the order of the history or the authorship of the books of the 
Old Testament: ‘The absolute certainty of their genuineness is given into our 
hands; and when our Lord has referred us to what is written in Moses, the 
prophets, and the Psalms concerning Him’. (L41) References in this thesis 
come from the transcript of the ‘Lectures’ which I have produced, and page 
numbers in this transcript follow the manuscript.13 Pusey’s spelling is usually 
followed, but the punctuation is sometimes changed to conform with generally 
                                                 
13 The first 124 pages of the manuscript are numbered, but two different pages are annotated 
‘42’ (hence 42A and 42B in the transcript) and there is one page interpolated between 124A 
and 125, numbered 124B in the transcript. Page 40 is out of sequence, and appears to belong 
after page 57.  
The unpublished transcript of the greatest part of pp. 1-63, 70-71, and page 91 of the ‘Lectures’ 
which was produced by the Revd. Michael Silver was a great help to me in becoming familiar 
with Pusey’s difficult hand-writing and in considering different readings of messy passages. I 
am also grateful to Ms. Cathy Larsson for assistance in transcribing pages 65-90 of the 
manuscript. 
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accepted practice, especially when this makes it easier to understand Pusey’s 
sense.14 
The ‘Lectures’ present both practical and literary challenges to the 
reader. While in some sections the presentation is polished, in others the 
manuscript appears incomplete or fragmentary. There are missing sections and 
pages, and the way in which Pusey interpolates copious notes from the facing 
page, or crosses out and re-arranges material, occasionally resorting to cutting 
and pasting, can make the text difficult to follow. This unfinished form 
contributes to the literary challenges of the ‘Lectures’ and what one writer 
describes as their ‘awkward and repetitive’ structure, perhaps unsurprising in a 
text not prepared for the public eye.15 Pusey seems to have been aware that the 
‘Lectures’ needed refinement. Even six years after he delivered them, from 
July to December, 1842, Pusey wrote a number of letters to his fellow 
Tractarian Isaac Williams about his ongoing work on the ‘Lectures’. After 
sending Williams what he had ‘recently written on numbers’ and their typical 
character, Pusey commented that it seemed ‘disproportioned and out of 
keeping’ with the rest, and that he was keen to ‘illustrate it further from the 
Fathers’.16 At the same time he was reviewing the ‘Lectures’ as a whole: 
‘Partly also I have been reviewing my lectures on types which I do not know 
how to bring into shape’.17 Although he continued to draw on the material in 
sermons and other writing, he never put them in order to publish them. 
One particularly helpful aid to understanding the argument and structure 
of the ‘Lectures’ comes in the form of the detailed lecture notes of Edward 
Marshall (1815-1899), scholar and fellow of Corpus Christi College. On 
Pusey’s attendance list, he is the fourth name from the top, recorded as 
                                                 
14 Abbreviations are given in their full form (e.g. ‘wld.’ becomes ‘would’, ‘OT’ becomes ‘Old 
Testament’). 
15 Silver (unpublished), 8. 
16 Pusey to Williams, 29 July and 13 Sept. 1842. ‘Isaac William Papers’, MSS 4475, 217, 270. 
17 Pusey to Williams, ‘Isaac William Papers’, MS 4475, 257. Williams’ biographer, O. W. 
Jones, dates this letter to December, 1842. Some of the letter is quoted in Jones 1971, 257 n. 
15. Pusey’s comment in the letter that he is reading Williams’ book the Baptistery (1842) ‘with 
my children and a companion of theirs’ also suggests this date, as do Pusey’s quotations from 
the same book in the section on numerology. 
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‘Marshall, CCC’.18 Marshall describes the 103 pages of his notebook as 
containing ‘notes and observations taken by the writer at the lectures of Dr. 
Pusey in 1836-7, as far as possible in the words of the lecturer, without any 
attempt at reordering them’.19 The many places where Marshall’s notes follow 
the exact wording of the manuscript of the lectures suggest that this is an 
accurate description.20 Marshall’s original notebook contains his notes for the 
first fourteen lectures. These divisions and the lecture titles which Marshall 
gives suggest how Pusey organized almost half the material in the manuscript 
and how different sections fit together. For example, according the Marshall’s 
notes, the eleventh lecture was a detailed consideration of ‘Quotations from the 
Fathers in support of the interpretations above given of Genesis III:22’.21 In 
this lecture, Pusey considers how patristic interpretation of Genesis 1:26 
describing humankind as made in God’s image and likeness illuminates the 
enigmatic description in Genesis 3:22 of man becoming ‘as one of us’, in some 
way ‘as’ or ‘like’ God. This arrangement fits with Pusey’s generally 
chronological approach, since he considered the fall and Genesis chapter three 
in the tenth lecture. Marshall’s ‘Notes’ show, therefore, that the section entitled 
‘Patristic Interpretation of Image and Likeness’ (L139-148) was used out of 
sequence following the conclusion of the tenth lecture. (L51) At the same time, 
Marshall’s notes imply that this material in some sense stood alone, since after 
the discussion of image and likeness in the eleventh lecture, Marshall describes 
‘Lecture the Twelfth’, as ‘A Continuation of Lecture X’.22 This suggests how 
other apparently separate sections in the last half of the manuscript fit with the 
earlier material. For example, the section entitled ‘Numerology’ (L150-162) 
                                                 
18 ‘Attendance, Hebrew Lectures, 1829-1837’, in ‘Pusey Papers: Various’. 
19 M-Obs., preface. 
20 It appears that Marshall only took notes of a small portion of what Pusey said, or that Pusey 
abbreviated his written material very considerably, or some combination of the two. For the 
eleventh lecture, Marshall’s notes are just more than one-fifth the length of the material. In the 
fourth lecture, they are more than one-third. Michael Silver’s assessment that Marshall’s text is 
about one-third the length of Pusey’s for each lecture seems generally accurate (Silver, 
unpublished). 
21 M73-83. ‘And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and 
evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for 
ever.’ (Gen. 3.22) 
22 M83. 
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which Pusey discussed with Williams appears to develop Pusey’s brief 
comments on numerology in the third lecture. (L18)23 After ‘Numerology’, a 
section ‘On Prophecy’ focuses on the typical or prophetic character of the 
psalms. (L127-137) This appears to develop the principles discussed in the 
Prolegomenon on the prophetic character of sayings and words. (L19-20, 28) 
Marshall’s ‘Notes’ also offer important additional material that is not in 
the manuscript of the lectures and which sheds light on Pusey’s argument. For 
example, in what appears to be a question and answer session at the beginning 
of the fifth lecture, Pusey describes the objective and subjective elements in 
typical interpretations of Scripture.24 Another section of the ‘Notes’ records 
how Pusey drew on S. T. Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1825) to illustrate the 
problem with evidence writing, both supporting Pusey’s criticisms of the 
apologetic approach and suggesting the importance of Coleridge as a 
background to the ‘Lectures’.25 Finally, Marshall chronicles Pusey’s objections 
to Augustine’s allegorical method in On Genesis against the Manichees. 
Marshall’s ‘Notes’ help to clarify Pusey’s view of the inter-connection of the 
different senses of Scripture and how a typical approach to prophecy relates to 
allegory.  
In addition to Marshall’s ‘Notes’, a folder labelled ‘Pusey: Types and 
Prophecies’ in the Pusey House Library contains supplemental material which 
belongs with the ‘Lectures’.26 These hand-written pages offer a later draft of 
some sections of the ‘Lectures’ or expand key arguments in the same way that 
the ten-page section ‘Numerology’ expands the few paragraphs on this subject 
in the third lecture. These loose pages are separated into a number of discrete 
portions labelled ‘Book of Nature’, ‘Book of God’s Works’, ‘Emblematic 
Language’, ‘God’s Countenance’, and the longest, ‘Figurative and Typical 
                                                 
23 The tilts of the section headings appear to be in the hand of Pusey’s only son, Philip E. Pusey 
(1830-1880). This is noted in the ‘Index to Liddon Bound Volumes’, Pusey House. 
24 M29. 
25 M53. 
26 ‘Pusey: Types and Prophecies’ in ‘Pusey Papers: EBP Biblical MSS’.  
 24 
Language of Holy Scripture’.27 This material will be drawn on extensively to 
illustrate the ‘Lectures’, especially in the later chapters of this thesis.  
Another source which helps to fill in gaps in the manuscript of Pusey’s 
lectures is his Letter to the Bishop of London (1851), written fifteen years after 
the ‘Lectures’ were first delivered. In the Letter, written in response to the 
criticisms of his friend William Dodsworth*, Pusey discusses his 
understanding of absolution, the Eucharist as a propitiatory sacrifice, and the 
real presence of Christ.28 As we will see in Chapter 3, he explains the patristic 
use of the term ‘inebriated’ to describe the effect of the sacrament of the blood 
of Christ. After stating that he found this word in the ‘fathers of the Church’ to 
whom the formularies of the Church of England directed him, Pusey writes that 
‘it may not be too long a digression to bring forward some part of what I wrote 
eight years ago on the figurative language of the Old Testament, to which I was 
led by the duties of my office’.29 This long quotation of around 4500 words 
bridges a gap in the section ‘On Prophecy’. 30 If they are accurate, Pusey’s 
words that he wrote these pages ‘eight years ago’ suggest that he wrote or 
revised this section of the ‘Lectures’ in 1842 or 1843 when he was also 
working on the section ‘Numerology’. 
Finally, Pusey’s Tracts, ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’, are in many 
ways companion pieces to the ‘Lectures’ and both anticipate and illustrate the 
arguments which Pusey makes there. The first part of this study, Tract 67, 
                                                 
27 This material comprises forty-five pages (including facing pages with references), or 
approximately 15,000 words, about 12% the length of the ‘Lectures’. The labels to these 
sections were given by C. Stephen Finley, Professor of English, Haverford College, who read 
this material in June 1991. Although some pages clearly belong together, others appear to be 
individual sheets. Moreover, the sections into which they are currently divided may not reflect 
the proper order or division of the material. They will be referred to with abbreviations as 
noted in the front-matter. The page numbers follow the order in which they were found. I am 
grateful to Ms. Cathy Larsson for assistance with transcribing the bulk of the supplemental 
material. 
28 *Dodsworth, William (1798-1861). From 1837 the perpetual curate of Christchurch, Albany 
St., London, he worked with Pusey to found the Park Village Sisterhood. Dodsworth’s 
description of Pusey’s views led the Bp of London in his Nov. 1850 charge to his clergy to 
express concerns about the Tractarians’ influence. See Life 297. 
29 Pusey 1851, 194. 
30 The gap is between L135 and 136. When the missing portion is quoted from the Letter, it 
will take the form (L136:214). The first number refers to the page in the ‘Lectures’ where the 
missing section concludes, the second number is the page in Pusey 1851. 
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‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’, was published on St Bartholomew’s Day, 
24 August, 1835. The second and third parts, Tract 68 and Tract 69, followed 
in the autumn, on Michaelmas Day, 29 September, and St Luke’s Day, 18 
October. These three tracts were published together with a preface by Pusey, 
dated 1 January, 1836, the Feast of the Circumcision of Christ, as the second 
part of the then completed Volume II of the Tracts for the Times. The Tracts 
are important in the history of the Oxford Movement as well as for how they 
illustrate the ‘Lectures’. In August, 1835, Newman had intended Pusey’s 
anticipated Tracts, with perhaps one or two more, to conclude the Tracts for 
the Times. Instead, Pusey’s substantial tracts virtually re-launched the Tracts 
for the Times and initiated a new approach with longer and more substantial 
pieces.31 
Like the ‘Lectures’, the Tracts on Holy Baptism attempted to bring to 
light the assumptions which made patristic interpretations of Scripture seem 
fanciful. In them, Pusey argues that a lack of an appreciation of the sacrament 
of Holy Baptism betrays an incipient and dangerous rationalism. To counter 
this view, he brings forward especially the types and typical interpretations 
which the early Church offered on this subject, and seeks to discern the 
principles inherent in these interpretations. The Tracts provided Pusey with 
material for his preparation of the ‘Lectures’ a year later and for his efforts to 
show that ‘our mode of understanding any passage of Holy Scripture is not to 
be considered as something insulated: resulting, as it does, from our general 
frame of mind, our habits of thought and feeling, and the character of our 
religious belief’.32 In the same way that the first edition of his work on baptism 
was a kind of preface to the ‘Lectures’, the ideas he developed in the ‘Lectures’ 
flowed into the later editions of Tract 67, which he expanded from forty-nine 
pages to four hundred in the second edition of 1839.33 While these later 
editions do not offer the same comprehensive approach by which Pusey brings 
                                                 
31 Life, 324. 
32 Scr.HB., 30-31. 
33 The second edition of Tract 67 was virtually identical with the fourth edition which was 
published in 1842 (T67rev.). Second editions of Tracts 68-70 were never published. However, 
some material from Tracts 68-70 and the Appendix, with the exception of much of the material 
about the seriousness of post-baptismal sin, was incorporated into T67rev. 
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together cosmology, anthropology, epistemology, and typology in the 
‘Lectures’, one finds in the Tracts elements of the same argument which seeks 
to perceive in the ‘harmony of Holy Scripture’ a system which is ‘analogous to 
His scheme of Creation, in which the lowest things bear a certain relation to the 
highest’.34 Pusey’s summary of the ‘system of the Ancient Church’ in the 
fourth edition of Tract 67 suggests the comprehensive character of his 
argument in the ‘Lectures’: 
In the view of the ancient Church, no event recorded in Holy Scripture 
stands insulated and alone. All have bearings every way; all belong to a 
vast system of which we have some glimpses, which we cannot construct 
as a whole, nor, consequently, tell all the bearings of the several parts: 
yet, by reason of this oneness of the whole system, all its parts, as being 
parts of one, have some relation to each other, and we, she believed, have 
principles enough given us, to enable us to understand and interpret some 
of these relations. But, chiefly, they all bear, she was persuaded, in some 
way upon Him, the Sun and centre of the system, our Incarnate LORD; 
and so again, the events of His history gleam with His own effulgence 
upon His body, the Church.35  
The ‘principles enough’ which Pusey evokes and their place in his 
comprehensive theology and theory of type will be the subject of the chapters 
which follow.  
                                                 
34 T67rev., 389 
35 T67rev., 272. 
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Chapter 2 The Apologetic Approach and Rationalism 
2.1 ‘The Spirit of the Age’ 
The ‘Lectures on Types and Prophecy in the Old Testament’ do not begin with 
a direct discussion of types or typical prophecy. Rather, in the prolegomenon 
of the ‘Lectures’, Pusey examines what he calls the ‘apologetic use’ or the 
‘modern treatment’ of prophecy.1 Pusey specifies the problem in his 
introduction to the first lecture: 
The modern systems of interpretation are attended with many 
disadvantages … our views of Prophecy have been much narrowed by 
the Apologetic character of our Theology and this is not so much the 
fault of the writers themselves as of the Laws of Interpretation which 
they have adopted in accordance with the Spirit of the Age.2  
The emphasis on prophecy as prediction, and the goal of using prophecy as a 
form of evidence to convince outsiders leads to a focus on the form of 
prophecy and the neglect of its content or substance. Pusey suggests that, 
paradoxically, a treatment of prophecy which is meant to establish its veracity 
undermines the capacity of readers or seekers to see what prophecy reveals. 
Pusey follows S. T. Coleridge in drawing attention to William Paley* as the 
representative of the confusions and dangers of this approach.3 This chapter 
will investigate Pusey’s analysis of the ‘Apologetic character’ of theology in 
his day in order to show how this assessment contributes to his view that a 
typical reading of prophecy is necessary, both as an expression of doctrine and 
as a spiritual discipline. Pusey not only criticizes an exegetical technique but 
seeks to expose the way in which rationalistic and empiricist principles have 
distorted the study of prophecy and theology more generally. 
Pusey’s writing from the same period in which he wrote the ‘Lectures’ 
illuminates both the basic principles and the nuances of Pusey’s argument. In 
addition to his Tracts, ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’, more helpful still 
                                                 
1 L4, 35; L7. The ‘modern way’ (L4), or, more pejoratively still, ‘modern unbelief’. L36. 
2 M2-3. 
3 *Paley, William (1743-1805). Fellow at Christ’s College, Cambridge from 1766 until he took 
up a parish post in the diocese of Carlisle in 1776. 
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are the pamphlets which Pusey wrote in response to the appointment of Renn 
Dickson Hampden to the post of Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford in 
February, 1836. Hampden’s appointment raised an uproar in Oxford, focusing 
on his 1832 Bampton Lectures, and resulting in the production of ‘upwards of 
forty-five books and pamphlets’.4 Many in Oxford opposed Hampden’s views 
so strongly that in May of that year Convocation, which did not have the 
authority to revoke the appointment, nonetheless censured Hampden by a vote 
of 474 to 94, depriving him of the right to sit on those boards which chose 
select preachers and evaluated questions of doctrine on behalf of the 
university.5  
Pusey took a leading role first in challenging Hampden’s appointment 
and then in describing and publicising what he saw to be the serious errors and 
dangers of Hampden’s opinions. The most significant of these in terms of 
complementing the argument of the ‘Lectures’ is Pusey’s pamphlet, Dr. 
Hampden’s Theological Statements and The Thirty-Nine Articles Compared, 
which he published in March, just a few months before he began to prepare the 
‘Lectures’. A fortnight later, Pusey published a second pamphlet, Dr. 
Hampden’s Past and Present Statements Compared: A Sequel to ‘Dr. 
Hampden’s Theological Statements and the XXXIX Articles compared’. There 
Pusey examines the way in which Hampden responded to his critics in his 
inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Divinity on 17 March, 1836. In 
addition, Pusey was probably the author of the Declaration protesting against 
Hampden’s appointment signed by a group of eighty resident members of 
Convocation (including Pusey) and of the Report which was published with it.6 
These writings illuminate important ideas which Pusey sketches without 
developing in the ‘Lectures’ and suggest how they connect to broader 
theological and philosophical matters.  
                                                 
4 Sch.Phil. and Richard Brent, ‘Hampden, Renn Dickson (1793–1868)’, ODNB. 
5 Brent, ‘Hampden’, ODNB and Life, 386. See Nockles 1997, 222-29 on the Hampden 
controversy, 229-31 on ‘doubts about Hampden’s orthodoxy’. 
6 While the Declaration and Report do not indicate which of the signatories is their author, 
Liddon says that they ‘betray Pusey’s hand’ (Life, 372). The way in which the Report repeats 
Pusey’s assessment of Johann Semler’s role in the propagation of rationalism as Pusey 
describes it both in the Theology of Germany and in the pamphlets which he authored during 
the controversy supports Liddon’s judgement. 
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 2.2 The Context of Crisis: ‘The contest of faith and unbelief’ 
2.2.1 The ‘Sæculum tepidum’ 
The arguments of the ‘Lectures’ were forged in a context of crisis and 
controversy. The reader of the ‘Lectures’ quickly becomes aware of Pusey’s 
sense of urgency. He begins by reminding his listeners about the perils even of 
theological study and what is ‘to be feared … from the history of a 
neighbouring country’. The reference to Germany, where Pusey studied the 
rise of unbelief, is a warning in itself. His hope that ‘no evil’ will come from 
the ‘Lectures’ makes it clear that he is not simply addressing controversial 
academic questions.7 The Tractarians’ assessment of the religious life of the 
previous century as one which was characterized by cold formalism and 
moralistic or latitudinarian teaching is well known. Liddon argues that the 
Oxford Movement, like the Evangelical revival ‘was provoked by the 
prevalence of a latitudinarian theology in the last century, and by a dry and 
cold preaching of morality, often only of natural morality, which left out of 
view, or, at least, failed to assign its rightful place to the Person and Work of 
our Divine Redeemer’.8 In his book, Ethos and the Oxford Movement, James 
Pereiro describes the way in which this standard early assessment of the 
Movement amongst supporters came to be questioned and revised by those 
who emphasize the continuity between the old High Church party and the 
Tractarians.9 For example, Peter Nockles, in The Oxford Movement in Context, 
affirms that the Tractarians exaggerated both the unspiritual or moralistic 
elements of Georgian religion, and the supposed High Church neglect of basic 
catholic principles such as apostolic succession, the role of tradition in 
interpreting Scripture, and the sacramental life.10 Despite the exaggeration he 
attributes to them, Nockles nonetheless supports the Tractarian assessment that 
an emphasis on intellectual religion characterized the religious life of the 
previous century: ‘Hanoverian Anglican apologetic, as set forth by Warburton* 
                                                 
7 M1. 
8 Life, 254. 
9 Pereiro 2008, 42-43. 
10 Nockles 1994, 190-7. 
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and Paley, was an emphasis on the reasonableness of Christianity, and an 
exaltation of the claims of human reason and intellect in the discernment of 
divine truth.’11 For many in England, the excesses of the French Revolution 
reinforced the dangers of expressing any kind of belief, religious or political, 
with too much enthusiasm. This meant that Tractarian criticisms of the ‘High 
and Dry’ school were especially pertinent in the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century.12  
Pereiro argues that studies of the period tend to focus on the accuracy of 
these different assessments, on ‘evidence for vitality or decline in the Anglican 
Church during the pre-Tractarian period’, rather than on contemporary 
perceptions of the need for reform. He demonstrates that when the state of the 
Church of England was described by Pusey’s contemporaries, ‘the language of 
crisis and decline was widespread’, whatever the fairness or validity of such 
opinions. Both Evangelicals and High Churchman criticized ‘the doctrinal 
heterodoxy of Latitudinarian and dry Arminian orthodoxy, and professed the 
need for reform’.13  
In his study of the Victorian Church, Owen Chadwick describes the sense 
of crisis from a more political perspective. Government action which directly 
or indirectly affected the Church of England, whether pertaining to Roman 
Catholic Emancipation (1829), the first Reform Act (1832), the reorganization 
of the Church in Ireland (1833), and other proposed legislation, meant that 
many believed the Church of England was under attack by a Parliament which 
was forgetting its religious vocation. Describing the aftermath of the 
suppression of ten bishoprics in Ireland, Chadwick writes: ‘Without consulting 
church authorities a government which leaned on Catholic and dissenting votes 
abolished bishoprics and arranged endowments. What might such a 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 201. See also Nockles 1997, 197-201, for a sketch of religious life in Oxford in decades 
preceeding the Oxford Movement. 
*Warburton, William (1698-1779). Bp of Gloucester from 1759, known especially for his 
dislike of Methodist enthusiasm. 
12 Ibid. 196-7. Liddon uses ‘high and dry’ to describe Pusey’s assessment of a weakness in the 
High Church party. Life, 164. 
13 Pereiro 2008, 47-48, 48, 49. See Pereiro pp. 49-52 for examples of this sense of crisis.  
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government do to the Church of England?’14 Keble’s Assize sermon displays 
this grave concern: ‘if it be true anywhere, that such enactments are forced 
upon the Legislature by public opinion, is APOSTASY too hard a word to 
describe the temper of that nation?’15 Newman’s view that Keble’s sermon was 
‘the start of the religious movement of 1833’ also suggests the importance of 
the context of crisis and the sense of imminent danger for the ‘Lectures’.16 
The ‘Lectures’ are part of what Pusey describes in his Theology of 
Germany as ‘the vast contest, which … forms the only and deepest theme of 
the history of the world and of man, the contest of faith and unbelief’.17 As we 
will see below, Pusey argues that his ‘over-practical, over-reasoning age’ 
displays a ‘dry, hard way’ and a ‘Pharisaic and Sadducaic spirit’ in religion and 
theology, encouraging in its representatives an idolatrous spirit and ‘the 
disposition … of the unbeliever’. (L37, 117, 38, 5). A decade later, Pusey 
expressed succinctly this sense of crisis, describing ‘the last dreary century’ as 
a ‘Sæculum tepidum’ characterized by ‘lukewarmness of life and degeneracy 
of faith’ and as a time when Christian truth was confounded by ‘a dry and stiff 
system which existed among us’.18 In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey finds in commonly 
held views about the interpretation of the Old Testament signs of this 
confusion and degeneracy, and he attempts to wake up his compatriots to 
dangers of which, in his view, they were not aware. 
 2.2.2 The ‘philosophy of Rationalism’ 
When Pusey criticizes the apologetic use of prophecy, he criticizes what he 
sees as elements of the system of rationalism, ‘the assumption that 
uncontrolled human reason in its present degraded form is the primary 
                                                 
14 Chadwick 1966, 60. See also Chapter 1, ‘Church in Danger’, 7-100, especially 57, 60, 64. 
15 Keble 1833, 16, see also 8-11, 18-19. ‘National Apostasy’ was preached in the University 
Church on 14 July 1833. 
16 Newman 1967, 41 and Life, 276. Peter Nockles dates the beginning of the Movement to the 
rejection in 1829 of Sir Robert Peel as the MP representing the University of Oxford over his 
support or acquiescence in the government’s bill for Roman Catholic emancipation. See 
Nockles 1997, 202.  
17 TG-I , 5. 
18 PS-I vi, vii. The preface is dated ‘Christ Church, Lent, 1848’. Similarly, ‘the eighteenth 
century was comparatively a stagnant period of the Church’. T67rev., 16.  
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interpreter of God's Word’.19 Pusey viewed the influence of this principle as 
pervasive and destructive in his day: 
Our daily habits, our philosophy, our morals, our politics, our theories of 
education, or national improvement, are founded upon a low and carnal 
basis, and are at direct variance with the principles of the faith: one must 
give way; a more vivid faith must penetrate our social, domestic, 
intellectual system, or it must itself be stifled.20  
In his contribution to Essays and Reviews (1860), ‘Tendencies of Religious 
Thought in England, 1688-1750’, Pusey’s disaffected former colleague Mark 
Pattison* offers a similar assessment of the ubiquitous influence of rationalism 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century.21 Describing the course of English 
theology from ‘the Revolution of 1688’ to ‘the commencement of the Tracts 
for the Times’, Pattison argues that ‘throughout all discussions, underneath all 
controversies, and common to all parties, lies the assumption of the supremacy 
of reason in matters of religion’.22 In the years leading up to 1836 Pusey 
perceived a growing rather than waning influence of rationalism in Oxford. 
From the time Pusey won a fellowship at Oriel College in 1823, he was closely 
associated with the group of Oriel dons who came to be called ‘Noetics’ from 
their emphasis on ‘exactness in thought’ and the reasonableness of 
Christianity.23 The early representatives of the Noetics, including John 
Davison*, the author of the Discourses on Prophecy (1824) which will be 
discussed below, Edward Copleston*, provost of Oriel, and Edward Hawkins*, 
his successor, were considered to be defenders of orthodox Christianity against 
latitudinarianism and Socinianism in the 1820s.24 However, by the 1830s, 
                                                 
19 Report. 
20 Scr.HB., ix. 
21 *Pattison, Mark (1813-1884). Matriculated at Oriel in 1832, fellow of Lincoln College from 
1839 and rector from 1861. In 1838 he lived in the house on St Aldate’s which Pusey had 
taken for young men assisting with the Library of the Fathers. See Life, ii, 139. 
22 Pattison 1861, 259, 257. For a contemporary assessment supporting this view, see Dyson 
1982, 53. 
23 Life, 58. On the Noetic influence on Tractarian ideals see Nockles 1991, 145-6. 
24 See Richard Brent, ‘Note: The Oriel Noetics’, in Brock 1997, 73, 75, and Nockles 1991, 
149-151. 
*Davison, John (1777-1834). A fellow of Oriel College from 1800, he was a tutor from 1810-
17, during which time he was the tutor of R. D. Hampden. Davison was both associated with 
the Noetics and admired by John Henry Newman. W. G. Blaikie, ‘Davison, John (1777–
1834)’, rev. Richard Brent, in ODNB. 
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Pusey along with Keble and Newman, came to see the frame of mind 
encouraged by Noetics such as Richard Whately*, Thomas Arnold*, and R. D. 
Hampden himself, as representing ‘the tendency of undisciplined intellect to 
different forms of unbelief or misbelief, to exalt self by modifying what God 
has given’.25 
 The appointment of Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity confirmed 
Pusey’s fears about the increasing prominence of rationalistic and heterodox 
views in the University. For Pusey, Hampden’s appointment meant that the 
same rationalism ‘which, after corrupting all soundness of Christianity in other 
countries, has at length appeared among us, and for the first time been invested 
with authority in the University of Oxford’. The Report which supported the 
Declaration protesting against Hampden’s appointment describes the 
controversy as ‘not so much concerned with an individual or a book, or even an 
ordinary system of false doctrine, as with a Principle’, i.e. ‘the philosophy of 
Rationalism’. Hampden’s appointment was so serious because it tacitly 
approved this philosophy: ‘It is the Theory of Rationalism, (as set forth 
systematically in the Bampton Lectures of 1832, and still more recently in 
Lectures addressed to Students,) which is to be considered the root of all the 
errors of Dr. Hampden’s system.’26 For Pusey, rationalism combines a 
confidence in autonomous reason with the empiricist view that knowledge is 
limited to the experience of the senses and reflection upon it. Newman shared 
Pusey’s concerns. Newman offered the same assessment that year in Tract 73, 
‘On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Religion’ (1836), 
criticising ‘its love of systematizing, and its basing its system upon personal 
                                                 
*Hawkins, Edward (1789–1882). Chosen over John Keble to be the Provost of Oriel in 1828 
with the support of Pusey and Newman, which support they later regretted. As will be 
discussed below, Hawkins’ 1818 sermon, ‘A Dissertation upon the Use and Importance of 
Unauthoritative Tradition’ influenced Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’. 
*Copleston, Edward (1776 – 1849). Provost of Oriel from 1814 to 1827, Bp of Llandaff from 
1827. 
25 Nockles 1994, 201-202. See also Nockles 1991, 149-151. 
*Whately, Richard (1787-1863). Fellow at Oriel from 1811, Anglican Abp of Dublin from 
1831.  
*Arnold, Thomas (1795-1845). Fellow at Oriel from 1815-9, and from 1829 Headmaster of 
Rugby. 
26 Rep. 
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experience, on the evidence of sense’.27 Although Pusey does not use the term 
‘Rationalism’ once in the ‘Lectures’, the general concern with rationalism in 
High Church and Tractarian circles means that he did not need to name the 
elephant in the room. We will see that Pusey finds the characteristics he 
assigns to rationalism at the root of the errors of the apologetic treatment of 
prophecy: a belief in the possibility of establishing the reliability of prophecy 
by reason alone, the treatment of prophecy as a kind of evidence, and 
especially what Pusey calls the ‘superficial rationalizing character’ of an 
approach which will only accept what can be demonstrably proven. (L9)28  
2.2.3 German ‘Orthodoxism’ as a Warning to England 
Pusey’s view of the dangers of the age and the threat posed by rationalism was 
profoundly shaped by his two extended trips to Germany in 1825 and 1826, 
and by his extensive study of post-Reformation German theology. In 
Göttingen, Pusey studied with J. G. Eichhorn (1752-1827), Professor of 
Oriental Languages from 1788 to 1827 and one of the most influential 
representatives of the new criticism in Germany at that time. In Berlin he met 
and developed an acquaintance with the philosopher and theologian Frederich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834). He also renewed his friendship with the more 
conservative pietistic theologian Friedrich A. Tholuck, and studied with the 
ecclesiastical historian Johann Neander (1780-1850).29 Pusey published the 
fruit of his study of German theology as An Historical Enquiry into the causes 
of the Rationalistic Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany 
(1828).30 While the book was generally well received in Germany, it caused 
controversy in England due to Pusey’s allowance for slight historical errors in 
Scripture and his implied criticism of the influential High Churchman Hugh 
James Rose. Rose* had emphasized the importance of the episcopate and 
subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles in maintaining orthodox belief in 
                                                 
27 Newman, 1839b, 2. 
28 This quotation describes the ‘school of Antioch’, which Pusey describes as ‘the natural birth-
place of Nestorianism, the receptacle of Pelagianism’, and as the only precedent for the 
apologetic use or system in the ancient Church. 
29 For an account of Pusey’s German studies, see Life, 70-114. 
30 TG-I. 
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England in The state of the Protestant religion in Germany (1825), a view that 
did not accord with Pusey’s thesis.31 To respond to criticism and clarify his 
argument, Pusey wrote and published in 1830 a second and longer Part II of the 
Theology of Germany.32 Together, these books constitute an in-depth and 
detailed study of German theology and philosophy from the end of the 
sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Echoing the more 
predictable accolades of Liddon, Stephen Neil describes Pusey’s work as ‘a 
most remarkable production to have come from the pen of a young man of 
twenty-seven’ and comments that he ‘must have been possessed of amazing 
powers of concentration to have attained in so short a time to such a mastery of 
the history of German theology since the Reformation’.33  
 The English audience which Pusey addressed in the Theology of 
Germany may have imagined the rise of rationalism in Germany to be the 
result of polemical attacks on Christian doctrine or life, some kind of 
equivalent of the deist controversy in England. Those aware of the rise of 
critical studies in Germany may have expected Pusey to focus on challenges to 
Old Testament history or the denial of miracles by some German scholars. 
Pusey’s analysis is both more subtle and, from the perspective of the English 
Church, more unsettling. Drawing on the ideas of Neander and Tholuck, Pusey 
argued that one of the principal causes of the rise of rationalism in Germany 
was a ‘dead orthodoxism’, a defective orthodoxy which treats Christianity as ‘a 
sum of  credenda’.34 This ‘abstract and unpractical system’ presents the truths 
of Christianity ‘in a dry  dialectic form, destructive of their life and 
                                                 
31 Rose, Hugh James (1795-1838). In 1832 he founded the British Magazine, which promoted 
High Church ideas and writers. In 1833 he hosted a meeting in Hadleigh, Suffolk where the 
project which became the Tracts for the Times was proposed. That same year he became 
Divinity Professor at Durham, and in 1836 Principal of King’s College, London. 
32 TG-II. 
33 Neil 1964, 10-11. See also Life, 155-9.  
34 TG-I, 42, 119. For Neander and Tholuck, see Life, 154, 160-2. Orthodoxism is a technical 
term for Pusey. The OED defines orthodoxism to mean, ‘The quality of being orthodox; 
orthodoxy’, or, in a negative sense, ‘the treating of orthodoxy of creed or doctrine as the 
important feature of religion; unquestioning adherence to orthodoxy’. Although Pusey is 
quoted to illustrate this definition, the sense in which he uses the word in the Theology of 
Germany is different from the OED. It is not ‘unquestioning adherence to orthodoxy’ which 
characterizes ‘orthodoxism’ for Pusey, but rather it is a rigid over-emphasis on the intellect and 
the neglect of both feeling and moral sensibility.  
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influence’.35 Orthodoxism ‘substitutes a barren intellectual adherence to certain 
truths, or certain modes of stating those truths … for the effects which those 
truths were intended to produce upon the heart and life’.36 Pusey traces the rise 
of orthodoxism to the way in which the Formula of Concord of 1577 was 
received by the Lutheran Church in Germany. According to Pusey, the 
‘enforcement of the letter’ of the Formula led to ‘the establishment of mere 
Scholastic opinion as articles of faith, the substitution of human technicalities 
for the free spirit of the Gospel, a logical formalism for the Scriptural and 
living expression of revealed truth’.37 While ‘Orthodoxism’ still assents to 
orthodox belief, this ‘spurious orthodoxy or formularism’ is a more serious 
problem even than explicit unbelief: ‘unbelief is more reclaimable than a dead 
and contented orthodoxism’.38 The argument that rationalism grew through the 
development of the inherent tendencies of ‘orthodoxism’, a kind of proceeding 
‘onward in the groove’, distinguished Pusey’s analysis from that offered by 
Rose.39  
The Theology of Germany was not a disinterested study of the problems 
of another place: ‘The experience furnished by Evangelical Germany is to us as 
the biography of an individual to one of similar character, temperament, and 
circumstances.’40 Pusey’s analysis of German theology and orthodoxism lies 
behind his criticism of an evidence-based approach to prophecy in the 
‘Lectures’. The rigid insistence that prophecy must conform to analytic 
categories and serve as evidence is also a ‘dry dialectic system’. Looking back 
on the situation in Germany almost thirty years after his trips there, Pusey 
wrote: 
I could not but see some things in England which corresponded in their 
degree to that former condition of Germany. I could not help owning a 
certain stiffness among some who maintained what I believed to be the 
                                                 
35 TG-I, 119. See also pp. 134-135. 
36 TG-II, 392. 
37 TG-I, 20, 21. See also Dyson 1982, 47, for A. O. Dyson’s portrayal of the ‘wastes of a 
narrow, smug, and sterile Aristotelian scholasticism’ in Germany at this time. 
38 TG-II, 392, TG-I, 80 n. 2.  
39 TG-I, 23. Forrester discusses the difference between Pusey’s analysis and that offered by 
Rose. Forrester 1989, 211-16. For German criticisms of Rose, see Life, 151-2. 
40 TG-I, 2. 
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truth; one-sidedness in those who corresponded with the pietists … Being 
only twenty-seven (and as yet a layman) when I wrote my ‘Enquiry’ into 
the causes of German Rationalism, I did not venture to speak more 
plainly. I hoped that the picture might speak for itself to the hearts and 
minds of those whom I wished to see awakened to threatened danger.41 
In the same way that defects in the way that Christian faith was held or 
expressed contributed more to the rise of rationalism in Germany than direct 
attacks on Christian principles, Pusey was concerned that the defects of the 
apologetic approach to theology in England would have a similar corrosive 
effect. It was his sense of this imminent danger – ‘This will all come upon us in 
England’ – which led him to devote himself ‘more earnestly to the Old 
Testament, as the field in which Rationalism seemed to be most successful’.42 
2.2.4 The Spectre of Socinianism 
The destination to which rationalism tended, and the form of explicit unbelief 
which the Tractarians believed threatened the Church of England, was 
Socinianism. The appeal of Socinianism was an important factor in the sense of 
crisis and urgency which helped to inspire Pusey’s approach in the ‘Lectures’. 
Newman concludes Tract 73 by arguing that rationalism, in principle, ‘tends to 
Socinianism’, however ‘individual supporters of it will act’.43 This is a view 
which Pusey shares and which is an important background to the ‘Lectures’. 
Socinianism was virtually a synonym for what would now be called 
Unitarianism. When Pusey or his contemporaries invoked the perils of 
Socinianism, they referred to a loose family of rationalist and anti-dogmatic 
ideas which trace their roots back to the sixteenth century founders of this 
school, Lelio Sozini (1525-62) and his nephew Fausto Sozini (1539-1604). In 
his discussion of the origins of Socinianism and its influence in England, 
                                                 
41 Pusey 1854, 54. For Pusey’s assessment of the defects of German pietism as superficiality 
and hypocrisy, and their contribution to the rise of rationalism, see TG-I, 101-104, 109-10. He 
describes this danger in the ‘Lectures’, arguing that those who, ‘in some degree’, have lost 
their faith, ‘must beware how they take it up in their mouth, simply because they are convinced 
that it ought to be in the heart. For this forced reassumption of it, will be unreal and hollow and 
is but self-deceit’. (L42B) For Pusey’s criticism of some English evangelicals as those ‘who 
corresponded with the pietists’, see Life, 164 and 254-6. 
42 Life, 77. 
43 Newman 1839b, 53. 
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Stephen Hampton describes its character as a form of rationalism: ‘Since the 
Socinians held reason to be the arbiter of all human thought, they rejected all 
doctrine that did not seem to square with either human reason or natural 
ethics.’44 For them, Christ was an exalted and anointed man who could be 
called God only in an honorific way. Socinians rejected the doctrine of the 
Trinity, original sin, the Atonement, the need for infant baptism, and that the 
sacraments conferred grace. When Pusey and his contemporaries evoked 
Socinianism, they described not so much a strict system as a general or implied 
adherence to some combination of these tenets. They believed that some form 
of Socinianism was the inevitable result of rationalism. 
The spectre of Socinianism took a personal form for Pusey and his 
colleagues. In January, 1835, Blanco White*, a man who was once a close 
associate of Newman and Pusey, converted to Socinianism.45 For Pusey, 
Blanco White’s apostasy displays the logical outcome of Hampden’s ideas: ‘by 
comparing the teaching of a frank Unitarian with that of Hampden, liberalism 
could be shown up for the crypto-Socinianism that it was’.46 Evoking the 
example of White, ‘who of late used the same language, and now is an avowed 
Socinian’, Pusey comments that ‘it is fearful to think what may be the result’ of 
Hampden’s views.47 Perhaps Pusey’s most serious charge against Hampden is 
that his work contains ‘the major and minor premiss of Socinianism’.48 In Tract 
69, part three of ‘Scriptural Views on Holy Baptism’, Pusey takes pains to 
show that what he sees as the anti-sacramental and rationalistic views of the 
reformed or Calvinistic schools had historical and theological roots in 
Socinianism.49 He describes Socinianism as ‘the deadly, stupefying heresy’, 
                                                 
44 Hampton 2008, 73. Hampton offers an excellent summary of Socinian origins and the 
reception of Socinian doctrine in England (71-73). See also Blunt, 1874, ‘Socinianism’, 567-8, 
and Dixon 2003, 43 and 208. 
45 White, Joseph Blanco (1775-1841). A former Roman Catholic priest who entered the Church 
of England and became an associate of both the Noetics and the Tractarians. 
46 Thomas 1991, 81. This describes Stephen Thomas’ assessment of Newman’s response of 
Blanco White’s conversion (see pp. 80-87). See also Life, 313. On Socinianism as ‘a 
particularly potent force in English theology’ in Pusey’s day, see Hedley 1996, 242.  
47 HPP, 34.  
48 DrH, vi. For Newman’s similar assessment, see his letter to Hampden, 28 Nov. 1835 , in 
Life, 302. See also Pusey to W. E. Gladstone, April 25, 1834, in Life, 294. 
49 Scr.HB., 143, 281-295. 
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and argues that it is the power of unavowed Socinian principles among his 
fellow Churchman which secured the acceptance of impoverished views of 
baptism, views which deny that baptism conveys an ‘actual gift from above’ 
and incorporation into Christ.50 When Pusey prepared the ‘Lectures’ the 
possibility that the tenets of Socinianism could corrupt the faith of the Church 
of England seemed to him a real threat. In the arguments of those who he 
criticizes in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey finds elements, more or less explicit, of a 
faith-destroying rationalism and the seeds of Socinianism. 
2.3 The Apologetic Approach 
2.3.1 Prophecy as Prediction 
Pusey begins the ‘Lectures’ by identifying a problem which displays ‘the Spirit 
of the Age’: ‘The notion and uses of prophecy have, in these latter days, been 
much narrowed and obscured by the apologetic character which our theology 
has so largely assumed.’ (L1) The emphasis on prophecy as foretelling or 
prediction is one of the features of this narrow approach. Pusey acknowledges 
that prophecy includes the office of displaying divine foreknowledge and so 
revealing some aspect of God’s dispensation as yet unfulfilled; prophecy is ‘a 
signification of some future dispensation of God, whether in word or in act’. 
(L33). However, by over-emphasizing this function of prophecy, modern 
authors have created confusion about the nature and purpose of prophecy:  
The fact is, of course, true, that prophecies were miracles of the Divine 
wisdom: the objection to this mode of handling them lies rather in its 
exclusiveness. For first it limited prophecy to the office of ‘foretelling,’ 
abstracted from the subject foretold. The object was to show a more than 
human prescience: and for this purpose, it was indifferent, what was the 
subject. A prediction which related to Pagan Rome or the discovery of 
America, was, in this point of view, as much a prediction, as one relating 
to the Redeemer of the world. (L1) 
Pusey argues that exaggerating the role of prophecy as foretelling makes the 
mere fact that something was predicted correctly seem more significant than 
what is predicted; it emphasizes form over content. Echoing Pusey’s criticism, 
                                                 
50 Scr.HB., 193. See also pp. 47-8. 
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Pattison writes: ‘The orthodox school no longer dared to scrutinize the contents 
of revelation.’51  
Pusey maintains that what prophecy reveals is as significant as the 
miracle of prediction: ‘It is remarkable accordingly how in Holy Scripture, 
other feelings are, throughout prophecy, enlisted, beyond and above 
contemplation of Divine fore-knowledge … Not time, but the eternal truth 
contained, is the subject which is alleged’. (L6) Pusey argues that the Bible 
presents the prophet as one who sees or interprets God’s will: 
In like manner, the words principally used in the Old Testament for the 
most part declare, that what was uttered was the word of God, dĕbar [of 
the LORD], nĕʾūm [of the LORD], maśśāʾ , or the mode in which it was 
conveyed to the human organ, and perhaps also its certainty, as a thing 
actually seen ḥzwn [vision], marĕʾeh [appearance, likeness] … while 
there is no simple word which conveys our notion of ‘prediction’. And 
so, in this way also, if we follow the guidance of the very words of Holy 
Scripture, our minds will be principally directed to the religious 
instruction and impressiveness, rather than to the direct evidence 
furnished by prophecy. (L33-34)52 
The Old Testament does foretell in the sense that it shows what will be more 
fully revealed later. However, our attention is directed primarily to ‘the 
religious instruction and impressiveness’ which the prophet receives and 
declares: 
In this view of prophecy also we must keep in mind that its predictive 
character is not marked out as its main function; it is doubtless one part 
of God’s plan that salvation through Christ should be declared 
‘beforehand’ by the mouths of ‘all his holy prophets, which have been 
since the world began’; and since it was so, we accept its predictiveness 
as part of God’s goodness, and not to them only to whom it was given 
but to us also to whom it is continued; but equally essential is that other 
part of its office, ‘declaration of God’s purpose and will’ indeed the 
words προφητευω, προφητης, not in their original Heathen signification 
only, but in their actual use in the New Testament, relates to the 
‘declaration of the will of God to man’ generally not simply to the fact of 
‘declaring His passion beforehand’. (L33) 
                                                 
51 Pattison 1861, 261. 
52 The SBL style guide for the transliteration of Hebrew has been followed as closely as 
Pusey’s text allows. Vocalizations are included when Pusey has them, and simple consonantal 
transliteration has been used when he does not. 
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Since the predictive element of prophecy is part of God’s gift, it is not to be 
neglected. However, while Pusey describes the office of the ‘declaration of 
God’s purpose and will’ as only ‘equally essential’ to the office of foretelling, 
his argument taken as a whole makes it clear that the office of declaration or 
revelation is the more important purpose of prophecy: ‘the highest character of 
prophecy is the “relation of those things which before lay hid in God”’. (L33) 
2.3.2 The Substance of Prophecy and Historical Interpretation  
Pusey looks at how the New Testament describes the prophetic witness of the 
Old to argue that prophecy reveals ‘eternal truth’, the things which pertain to 
God and to the divine ordering of things: 
The Old Testament, as cited in the New, might mostly, for the purposes 
for which it is alleged, have been a contemporary document. When time 
is alluded to, it is not to magnify God's prescience, but to illustrate the 
harmony and unity of His dispensations. Who is ‘the same yesterday and 
today and forever’ and as ‘in time past’ He ‘at sundry times and in divers 
manners spake unto the fathers through the prophets,’ so ‘in these last 
days hath He by His Son spoken unto us’ one and the same Truth. It [is] 
the substance which is dwelt upon not the mode of its delivery. (L6) 
This quotation and Pusey’s reference to Hebrews 1:1, to God who ‘at sundry 
times and in divers manners spake unto the fathers through the prophets’, 
offers a good example of how Pusey sees his criticism of the apologetic 
approach to be connected with more general and serious problems. Months 
before he made these observations, he had challenged Hampden’s 
interpretation of the same passage. The problem with Hampden’s approach was 
that it elevates questions about the circumstances in which the message was 
given from the ‘substance’. Hampden had emphasized the importance of 
studying ‘the facts recorded in the Scripture in their real historical place’.53 He 
argued that philosophical or doctrinal presuppositions led the ‘schoolmen’ to 
read meanings into the words of the Bible that are not there: 
When a Theology of this à priori character was established, it nullified 
the use of the Scripture as a record of the divine dealings with the 
successive generations of mankind. The voice of God was no longer 
                                                 
53 Sch.Phil., 90. 
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heard as it spoke ‘in sundry times and in divers manners’ to holy men of 
old; but simply as the hallowed symbols of an oracular wisdom. The 
whole of Revelation was treated as one contemporaneous production; of 
which the several parts might be expounded, without reference to the 
circumstances in which each was delivered.54 
Perhaps with some irony, Pusey argues on the basis of context that the words 
‘in sundry times and in divers manners’ (Heb. 1:1) do more than direct our 
attention to the different circumstances and times in which the prophets spoke. 
Rather, he maintains that St Paul’s words offer ‘an argument against the à 
priori notions of the Jews, as if God must reveal himself uniformly’ as well as 
contrasting ‘the dignity of this last revelation through His Son, with His former 
discoveries of Himself through the Prophets’. ‘But’, Pusey continues, 
‘assuredly they do not convey a notion of a difference in the substance of 
revelation’.55 This is the same way he presents the passage in the ‘Lectures’, 
emphasizing that the Son has spoken ‘one and the same Truth’ as the Prophets. 
Pusey’s analysis of Hampden’s view of historical interpretation shows 
how his criticism of the apologetic school is connected to the defects he saw in 
German scholarship: 
On the theory, however, of an ‘historical interpretation,’ wherein 
passages are to be interpreted not as the words in themselves would 
mean, but ‘relatively to particular periods,’ wherein revelation is not to 
be looked upon as one contemporaneous production, nor its sayings as 
‘oracular wisdom,’ a passage e.g. in Genesis, or in the Psalms, or Isaiah, 
is not to be expounded in the same way as if it occurred in the New 
Testament, the whole instruction of the Old Testament is lowered. This 
was the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of the ‘historical interpretation’ as it was 
partially embraced by Semler, viz. that a passage was to be understood 
not as the Holy Spirit wrote it, but as it would appear to them to whom it 
was addressed.56 On this principle, the meaning of our Lord’s hallowed 
words would also soon be lowered, i.e. if they ‘may not be expounded, 
without reference to the circumstances in which they were delivered.’ 
For however these attending circumstances may occasionally illustrate 
His words, an over-attention to these circumstances is sure to limit and 
restrain the depth and largeness of their meaning. An ‘historical 
theology’ continually changes His words from being the fountains of 
                                                 
54 Ibid. Also quoted in HPP, 21.  
55 HPP, 21. 
56 The πρῶτον ψεῦδος is the ‘beginning of errors’ or ‘first falsehood’.  
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Divine Truths, springing up unto everlasting life, unto those of a teacher 
sent from God in Judea and for Judea only.57 
 In Chapter 4 we will see how Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’ offer a 
theological foundation for his idea that the meaning of the words of Scripture is 
not limited by the context in which they were delivered and may serve as 
‘fountains of Divine Truths, springing up unto everlasting life’. For now, it is 
important to see what kind of ‘historical theology’ Pusey criticizes and why. 
Even when he discussed the problems to which a misuse of it had led, Pusey 
argued that the benefits of ‘Historical Interpretation’ could not be doubted:  
The principle, that an historical religion cannot be understood without the 
history of the era of its introduction, that no writing can be fully 
understood without a knowledge of other contemporary writings, which 
fully develop [sic] the ideas, to which itself occasionally alludes, which it 
modifies or corrects, nor without a clear view, whether collected from 
itself or from exterior sources, of the persons with reference to whom it 
was originally written, and the circumstances which immediately 
occasions it, is so obviously correct, that in this country … the contest 
about the ‘Historical Interpretation’ must be matter of surprise.58  
While it is unlikely that he would describe the obvious benefits of historical 
interpretation with the same sanguine confidence in the ‘Lectures’, even in the 
Theology of Germany Pusey argued that the historical principle could lead to 
serious confusion unless this study were guided by theological principles.59 In 
the Theology of Germany also he foreshadowed his later description of Johann 
Semler* as responsible for the ‘πρῶτον ψεῦδος’, or beginning of errors, of 
historical interpretation: ‘The rival of historical interpretation by Semler 
became the most extensive instrument of the degradation of Christianity’.60 
                                                 
57 HPP, 21-22. Newman also connects the lowering of ‘the meaning of our Lord’s hallowed 
words’ to the apologetic approach and ‘the study of the “Evidences” now popular (such as 
Paley’s)’. Life, 301. 
58 TG-I, 142. See also TG-I, 154, 176. 
59 While Pusey’s views changed and developed between his trips to Germany and his writing 
of the ‘Lectures’, the argument of Leighton Frappell against H. C. G. Matthew and D. Forrester 
that this difference ‘is by no means the gulf depicted by those who write in reaction to Liddon’ 
appears more accurate (Frappell 1983, 3). The arguments of this thesis suggest both elements 
of continuity and change. See Forrester 1989, xvii, 14-18, 65, and 103, Matthew 1981, 101-
124, and Frappell 1983, 2-3. 
60 *Semler, Johann Salomo (1725-91). Professor of Theology at Halle from 1753-91. Although 
he was raised in the pietist tradition, Semler is often call the father of rationalism. Pusey 
describes him as ‘the most direct founder of the innovating school’ (TG-I, 131). 
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Semler’s fault resulted from his inability to ‘perceive the connection of the 
Christian with the Jewish revelation’ and ‘the unity of the same spirit 
manifesting itself in various forms according to the character of the individuals 
through whom it was conveyed’.61 For Semler, the historical character of the 
Bible meant that much of the history and teaching of the Old Testament was of 
local and temporary value only. In his classic study, Old Testament Criticism 
in the Nineteenth Century: England and Germany, John Rogerson describes 
Semler’s position:  
[He] distinguished between the Bible and the word of God, and 
understood by the latter those parts of the Bible that spoke to him of 
salvation through Jesus Christ. This resulted in dividing the Bible, 
especially the Old Testament, into two categories: that which witnessed 
to salvation in Christ, and that which did not. Much of the Old Testament 
came into this second category, and was regarded as Jewish national 
history.62  
Pusey argues that these conclusions were not the inevitable result of a sober 
and objective view of the historical details but of Semler’s ‘inability to 
discriminate between what was principally intended for contemporaries, and 
what is directly also of eternal value’.63 Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’ 
suggests that he finds the ‘πρῶτον ψεῦδος’ of a merely historical interpretation 
lurking in the apologetic approach. The emphasis on prediction takes one’s 
attention away from what is of eternal value: ‘The facts were considered apart 
from their religious meaning’. (L1) The neglect of the religious meaning of 
prophecy gives a false understanding of the relationship of the Old Testament 
to the New and impairs one’s capacity to see how the same Spirit manifests 
itself in different forms at different times. The study of types and prophecy is 
an investigation of how the same substance is communicated in different 
historical and literary forms.64  
                                                 
61 TG-I, 142-145. 
62 Rogerson 1984, 17.  
63 TG-I, 143. 
64 For a discussion of the different emphases modern and early Christian exegetes place on 
‘reconstructing the world within which the author wrote’, see Ayres 2004, 33. 
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2.3.3 ‘The testimony to Jesus is the Spirit of Prophecy’ 
Pusey argues that the most important part of the prophetic witness, the 
‘substance’ of prophecy, is ‘eternal truth’. (L6) An example of this is Pusey’s 
description of ‘God’s mercy’ as the ‘eternal truth’ which is part of the 
‘substance’ of prophecy: 
It is mercy, as in the announcement of the Gospel in Paradise, or reward 
of faith, to Abraham, or terror to the disobedient; or, to come nearer to 
our own case, when the prophecy is completed, the burden is still the 
same, God’s mercy in ‘visiting and redeeming His people, as He had 
promised by the mouth of His holy prophets, which had been since the 
world began’ and in ‘performing His oath to Abraham’. (L6)  
God’s mercy is not only predicted in the Old Testament but it is manifest in the 
promise made to Abraham even before that promise and prophecy were 
fulfilled. More fundamentally, to say that eternal truth or God’s mercy are the 
substance and subject of prophecy leads one to the more basic formulation that 
the substance and subject of prophecy is the Son of God, Jesus Christ.65 The 
mercy prophesied and offered to Abraham is ‘completed’ in Christ: 
The heart and centre of it is ‘the Gospel of God which He had promised 
afore by His prophets in the Holy Scripture concerning His Son Jesus 
Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the 
flesh and declared to be the Son of God with power’ (Rom. 1:2-4). The 
centre of the Gospel is the Redeemer; ‘the testimony to Jesus is the Spirit 
of prophecy’ (ἡ µαρτυρία τοῦ Ἰησου ἐστιν τὸ πνεῦµα τῆς προφητείας, 
Rev. 19:10). (L34)  
For Pusey, the Old Testament is ‘one vast prophetic system, veiling, but full of 
the New Testament’, and, more specifically, ‘of the One whose presence is 
stored up within it’. (L8)  
Pusey argues that the ‘modern treatment’ offers a limited appreciation of 
what constitutes a prophecy of Christ. In contrast, patristic writers found 
prophecies of Christ in the details or apparently incidental circumstances of 
historic narratives, or in hints or allusions in the Psalms, as well as in clear and 
distinct prophetic utterances:  
                                                 
65 Perhaps drawing on Augustine 1853, 282. 
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They had Christ always in their thoughts, and so with the full persuasion 
that the whole of the Old Testament, the Law, the Prophets and the 
Psalms, shewed before of Him, they read and understood of Christ 
therein, whatever naturally harmonized with His dispensation, whether it 
would approve itself to a more rigid understanding or no. (L10) 
In adopting this approach the Fathers were following the teaching of the New 
Testament and, more specifically, of the Risen Lord himself: 
Rather, since our Lord directs us to the Old Testament to look for Him 
and even made it a part of His last teaching to the Apostles after His 
Resurrection, to unfold to them what was contained in the Law, the 
Prophets and the Psalms concerning Him, we might think that He 
intended His Church there to seek Him. [Luke 24:44] (L12) 
In addition to being the one who is the subject of prophecy, Christ is also the 
paradigmatic prophet: ‘where the title is given to our blessed Lord, it 
manifestly belongs to Him, rather as “the interpreter and discloser of the 
Father” (ὁ ων εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πάτρος ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο [John 1:18])’. 
(L33)66 In his study of the ‘Lectures’ alongside Augustine’s On Christian 
Doctrine, Duane Arnold writes that Pusey understood the Fathers to teach ‘that 
Christ as the Incarnate Word was placed at the centre of their interpretive rules, 
rather than themselves’.67 Pusey’s view accords with the assessment of John 
O’Keefe and R. R. Reno about early Christian interpretation of the Bible: 
‘Jesus Christ is the crucial, recapitulating figure, and for that reason he 
discloses the logic of the divine economy and functions as the hub of 
interpretation around which the other figures revolve.’68  
To say that Christ is the centre of prophecy means also that both the 
Church, the body of Christ, and the sacraments, which establish and nourish 
the mystical body of the Church, are the subject of prophecy as well. Pusey 
argues that this extension is implied in any careful consideration of what it 
means to describe the centre of the Gospel and the main subject of prophecy as 
the Redeemer, Christ, ‘the Word of Life’:  
                                                 
66 John 1:18: ‘which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him’. For ‘the title’ of 
prophet applied to Christ see Matt. 13:57, 21:11, John, 6:14, Acts 3:22-26. 
67 Arnold 1995, 211. 
68 O’Keefe 2005, 81. 
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With this the main subject of prophecy is included that of His Church, 
since a Redeemer implies persons ‘redeemed’, the head His members, the 
king His subjects; the subjects are united in Holy Scripture; and it adds to 
the profit of the consideration of our Redemption to consider what is said 
of those of ourselves, in whom the Redemption is to be realised. (L35) 
In the same way that a Redeemer implies persons redeemed, so this redemption 
implies the means of redemption, the sacraments. Speaking of the way in 
which Christ is prophesied in the institutions, the rites and offices of the Old 
Testament, Pusey writes, ‘And these institutions partly represent the Redeemer 
Himself, partly the way in which that redemption is appropriated to us, as the 
sacraments are in the passage of the Red Sea and the Manna’. (L26) For Pusey, 
the prophecies of the Old Testament not only reveal or point to Christ, they 
also are correctly ‘applied to the Church, which is the Body of our Lord, or to 
the means of union with Himself which He has deposited in it, – His 
sacraments’. (L12) The original title under which the course of lectures was 
advertised in Michaelmas term, 1836, ‘Prophecies and Types relating to our 
Lord and His Church’, emphasized that Old Testament prophecies of Christ 
include the Church and the sacraments.69 The way in which these different 
subjects are part of the same mystery will be the focus of Chapter 5. 
2.3.4 Prophecy as Evidence (Davison and Paley) 
A second characteristic of the modern and apologetic approach, after the 
emphasis on prophecy as prediction, is the use of prophecy as a form of 
evidence to secure belief. This is a corollary of the emphasis on prophecy as 
prediction. The miracle of divine foreknowledge emphasized in modern 
treatments of prophecy becomes one of the forms of evidence which is meant 
to demonstrate or prove the tenets of Christian faith: ‘the apologetic use … 
would produce belief by the abstract argument that an event, not cognizable by 
human foresight, could only have been predicted by God, and that 
consequently the system wherein such predictions were found, came from 
God’. (L4) Since only God can see events before they happen, prophetic 
                                                 
69 See the hand-bill announcing the course of lectures to be given by the Regius Professor of 
Hebrew dated 18 Oct. 1836 in Papers Relating to the Proceedings of the University, 1836, 
Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
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predictions must come from God, ‘Si divinatio est, Dei sunt’. (L4)70 As Pusey 
points out, apologetic writers then used this evidence to argue for the veracity 
of other Christian claims, making the fulfilment of prophecy a form of 
evidence which proves or buttresses the whole edifice of Christian doctrine. 
Pusey argues that if prophecy is to be used as evidence, then it must be 
capable of satisfying standards of veracity which can be demonstrated 
definitively by argument. According to the apologetic approach true prophecy 
needs to be distinguished from chance or fanciful interpretation by the 
application of strict standards: 
For in pressing the force of prophecy as a species of evidence in a 
narrow sense (i.e. as that which might not be felt only, but tangibly and 
strictly proved demonstrably to be evidence) it became necessary to 
exhibit it in as compact a form as possible, baring it of all, which might 
not be certainly apprehended, or which to one, not already a believer nor 
of a believing spirit might not have the form of proof. (L1) 
In order to offer such proof, prophecy must also be clear and undeniable: ‘We 
are anxious indeed, to trace the fulfilments of prophecy, but in a way wholly 
distinct; we wish to find predictions clear, apparent and undeniable, which we 
may sort with the events, and which on the very surface shall indisputably 
correspond.’ (L10) Furthermore, whether or not prophecy meets these 
standards must be assessed by accepted and objective criteria: ‘With this view 
certain criteria were laid down whereby true prophecy might be distinguished 
from chance coincidence or unusual foresight; and thus it was shown, that 
written scriptural predictions corresponded with these criteria.’ (L2) 
Pusey finds an example of the influence of evidence writing and an 
apologetic approach on the study of prophecy in the work of John Davison, the 
author of Discourses on Prophecy (1824). Pusey says that Davison ‘has 
reopened a better and deeper way of handling prophecy’ and refers to him as 
an ‘able writer on Prophecy’. (L3, L32) Nonetheless, Pusey argues that the 
criteria to assess what counts as a genuine prophecy which Davison proposes – 
‘clear, apparent and undeniable’ (L10) – are typical of the modern apologetic 
                                                 
70 Pusey refers here to Cicero’s book De Divinatione (44 BC) or Concerning Divination, I.6: ‘If 
there be such an art as divination, then there are Gods.’ 
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school. Davison’s criteria for recognizing a true prophecy include, first, ‘the 
known promulgation of the Prophecy prior to the event’, second, the ‘clear and 
palpable fulfilment’ of the prophecy in question, and third, the ‘remoteness of 
the event from human view’. (L3)71 According to Pusey, standards or criteria 
such as these effectively exclude a significant portion of what the Church has 
understood to be prophecy. 
The work of William Paley offers a good example of how criteria like 
those which Davison offers and which Pusey criticizes can be used to evaluate 
prophecy. Paley had a profound influence in English theological circles during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. In his study of Biblical interpretation 
during this period, Peter Addinall argues that Paley ‘exercised an almost 
mesmeric influence over British religious figures, directly or indirectly 
reinforcing the appeal of a long-established natural theology’.72 Likewise, Peter 
Nockles argues that ‘Paley remained something of a model in much Orthodox 
theological discourse, and it took the Oxford Movement to finally dethrone 
him’.73 For Pusey, Paley represents those who ‘make conviction their professed 
object’, but who inevitably fail in their goal because they do not properly 
understand how conviction is formed. (L6)  
In A View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794), Paley offers an 
analysis of the prophecy of the sufferings of the Messiah in Isaiah, chapter 53, 
that is characteristic of the approach Pusey criticizes. Paley emphasizes that 
Davison’s first criterion, that ‘the known promulgation of the Prophecy prior to 
the event’, is characteristic of genuine prophecy. Paley argues that it is clear to 
all that Isaiah is making a prophecy because ‘it is taken from a writing 
declaredly prophetic’: ‘The words of Isaiah were delivered by him in a 
prophetic character … and what he so delivered, was all along understood by 
the Jewish reader to refer to something that was to take place after the time of 
the author’.74 Paley affirms also that Isaiah’s prophecy has what Davison calls 
                                                 
71 Pusey summarizes Davison 1824, 500. 
72 Addinall 1991, 218. See also the chapter on Paley, 35-55. 
73 Nockles 1994, 204.  
74 A View of the Evidences of Christianity, Chapter 1, ‘Prophecy’ in Paley 1856, 81. 
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a ‘clear and palpable fulfilment’. It is obvious how the prophecy is fulfilled in 
the ‘evangelic history’ of the Gospels:  
The application of the prophecy to the evangelic history is plain and 
appropriate. Here is no double sense; no figurative language but what is 
sufficiently intelligible to every reader of every country. The obscurities 
(by which I mean the expressions that require a knowledge of local 
diction, and of local allusion) are few, and not of great importance.75 
Finally, Paley argues that the prediction of an unknown future is of the essence, 
the ‘material part’, of any argument based on prophecy: 
That material part of every argument from prophecy, namely, that the 
words alleged were actually spoken or written before the fact to which 
they are applied took place, or could by any natural means be foreseen, 
is, in the present instance, incontestable.76  
Paley’s description of the prediction of an event which could not ‘by any 
natural means be foreseen’ fits with Davison’s criterion of the ‘remoteness of 
the event from human view’. As we have seen, for Pusey, the trouble with this 
is not the acknowledgement of the miracle of divine foreknowledge, but rather 
the inevitable superficiality which results from making prediction the primary 
characteristic of prophecy.  
2.4 Apologetic Diminishment 
2.4.1 The Narrowing of Prophecy 
Pusey argues that the approach of the evidence writers radically limits the 
prophetic witness of the Old Testament. Insisting upon prophecy as ‘a species 
of evidence’ that might be ‘tangibly and strictly proved’ leads to the removal 
from the category of prophecy of all ‘which might not be certainly 
apprehended, or which to one, not already a believer nor of a believing spirit 
might not have the form of proof’. (L1) Paley’s assertion that a genuine 
prophecy comes in a form which is ‘sufficiently intelligible to every reader of 
every country’ assumes this kind of standard of proof and clarity: ‘in becoming 
clear, it became also shallow. Men wished to grasp the whole evidence of 
prophecy and to collect it into one focus, and so narrowed their own 
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conceptions of it; or omitted whatever they could not gather into this one 
point.’ (L2) This limits both what can be counted as prophecy and the purpose 
of prophecy; ‘brought within the compass of a system, all those parts were lost, 
which lay to the right or to the left beyond the circle which men had drawn’. 
(L3) 
The evidentialist or apologetic treatment is at odds with what the Bible 
discloses about the character of prophecy: ‘precisely those prophecies which 
were most insisted upon by our Lord and His Apostles were the least dwelt 
upon; they not only ceased to be brought forward, but became difficulties 
rather than evidences’. (L2) Old Testament sayings like ‘He shall be called a 
Nazarene’, ‘Not a bone of Him shall be broken’, ‘In Ramah shall a voice be 
heard’, are quoted in the New Testament as being fulfilled in the earthly life of 
Christ.77 However, according to Davison and Paley, these sayings could not be 
called genuine or certain prophecies; in the first two of these cases it is not 
even clear to which Old Testament passage they refer, nor that they would 
have been understood to be prophecies. Nonetheless, while these prophecies 
fail the test of the evidence writers, they pass that of the New Testament: 
One should not speak, then, of one prophecy being more a prophecy or 
more evidently a prophecy than another; at least, this is not the teaching 
of the New Testament, wherein what we should esteem the clearest, are 
quoted side by side with those which we should regard the obscurest (as 
the birth at Bethlehem with the call out of Egypt) and are set forth to us 
in the same manner … and so having all the force of proofs, and all the 
same force, while some of those on which we are in the habit of laying 
great stress are scarcely quoted at all, or are quoted so, as on this narrow 
system to be rather matters of perplexity. Rather, should we, at most, 
speak of this one, as having more evidence to us, i.e. we understand it 
more easily, as lying upon the surface; whereas could we penetrate a 
little deeper, or lift up the veil a little, the whole institution, as being in 
itself prophetic, would have perhaps even the greater force, (as being a 
large system) and the same clearness … The greater or less clearness 
turns not on the things in themselves, but on our knowledge of them. 
(L8) 
                                                 
77 Marshall gives these examples, from Matt. 2:23, John 19:36 and Matt. 2:18 respectively. 
M4-5.  
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For Pusey, the New Testament witnesses to the deficiencies of an evidentialist 
notion of ‘clearness’. Making what counts as ‘evidence to us’ to be the 
standard by which prophecy is determined effectively judges revelation by the 
spiritual capacities of imperfect students of the Bible. 
Pusey argues that the apologetic school fails to take seriously the biblical 
witness to the obscurity of prophecy: ‘It is an integral part of the prophetic 
notice’, Pusey writes, ‘that a part, yea the larger part should not believe, “who 
hath believed our report and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?”’78 (L5) 
The very prophet who points so directly to Christ that Augustine suggested that 
he should be called an evangelist communicates God’s emphatic revelation that 
prophecy will not be clear: ‘Hear ye, indeed, but understand not; and see ye 
indeed but perceive not, Make the heart of this people fat’ (Isa. 6:9-10).79 
Pusey calls this ‘the inaugural commission of the Evangelic Prophet’ and 
comments that it ‘is more quoted than any other in the New Testament’. (L5, 
13)80 Ironically, the evidence writers neglect the clear evidence of the 
Scriptures about the obscurity of prophecy, and that error contributes to their 
diminished sense of prophecy.  
2.4.2 The Narrowing of the Whole Creed 
Pusey argues that an approach which radically limits the conception of 
prophecy also limits what can be accepted or understood more generally as part 
of revelation: ‘This is the case with regard to our whole creed; by striving 
overmuch at clearness, and practically admitting only what they could make, as 
they thought, intelligible to themselves, men have narrowed it far below that of 
the ancient Church or our own in former days.’ (L2-3) The apologetic approach 
diminishes ‘our whole creed’. This shows why the errors of the apologetic 
approach are so serious for Pusey: ‘God and His ways and His Nature we can, 
of course, know but in part; and our highest knowledge must be our 
indistinctest; for that which is most elevated must most surpass our 
                                                 
78 Pusey refers to Isa. 53:1, Rom. 10:16, John 12:38. 
79 See Augustine, The City of God, XVIII.29. 
80 Pusey refers to Matt. 13:14. Mark 4:12. Luke 8:l0, John 12:40, Acts 26:26, Rom. 11:8. 
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comprehension’. (L2) It is this element of mystery, of the knowledge of what is 
partially hidden, that the apologetic use excludes: 
… as we acquiesce not, or ought not to rest in, those parts of the divine 
Economy of which we can form to ourselves clear conceptions, as e.g. 
we should not limit our thoughts of the mystery of our sonship to God, to 
His Fatherly Goodness and reconciled love to us, but follow out those 
other hints which have been traced out for us, of an actual, not a mere 
relative or figurative sonship, an actual factitious inherent, Sonship, as 
being actual not figurative parts of His blessed Son, by means of His 
actual life imparted to us, whereby and wherein we live. (L70-1) 
Christian faith cannot be reduced to assent to those doctrines about which we 
can form precise conceptions. Rather, Pusey insists on the importance of 
seeking a fuller apprehension and appreciation of the substance, which, as we 
will see in Chapter 3, can only be perceived imperfectly. For Pusey, ‘the things 
which we know unclearly, are our highest birth-right’. (L70) 
Evoking the example both of the ‘antient Church’ and of the Caroline 
bishop George Bull*, Pusey argues that the apologetic treatment of prophecy 
obscures our capacity to perceive spiritual truth and to understand revelation: 
This is well to be observed in the whole of theology. Let any one 
compare our theology at the present day with that of Bishop Bull and the 
antient Church, and he will find that we have altogether lost sight of and 
forgotten out of mind, much which they dwelt on habitually as part of the 
Catholic Faith: we have the outline of the truth, but have lost much which 
gives to it substance and reality, and opens to us a safe and deepening 
range for our contemplation. (L9)81 
The approach which restricts prophecy also restricts what can be accounted for 
as an article of faith. In a similar way, Pattison argued that the failure of the 
‘evidential school’ to establish ‘the supernatural or speculative part’ of 
Christianity offered ‘a complete refutation of that method as an instrument of 
theological investigation’.82 For Pusey, this is also a divine verdict: ‘And 
hence, perhaps, it may be, that God has often embarrassed formal proof with so 
many difficulties, that man might not attempt it or might disuse it.’ (L5) 
                                                 
81 Bull, George (1634-1710). Bp of St Davids from 1705. In Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (1685) 
he argued that the Trinitarian teaching of the ante-Nicene Fathers was the same in essential 
matters as that of the orthodox post-Nicene Fathers.  
82 Pattison 1861, 297. 
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The fault which Pusey describes here is not only the one of drawing the 
circle too narrowly. The errors of the apologetic approach cannot be corrected 
by simply adopting new criteria. Rather, these mistakes are so serious because 
they weaken our capacity to see or understand both prophecy and spiritual truth 
more generally. It is a problem of perception, not just a mistake. ‘The religious 
element of prophecy was of necessity withdrawn from their sight, for although 
it has more persuasiveness, it has less of demonstration.’ (L1) The apologetic 
approach ‘narrows and obscures’ our understanding or ‘notion’ of prophecy. 
(L1) Pusey argues that if we focus our attention only on those prophecies 
which appear to us to be most clear and convincing we may ‘lose continually 
more and more our very perception of the force and character of the rest’. (L8) 
While the apologetic approach exercises one kind of vision, it allows our more 
religious faculties to atrophy: ‘Our intellectual, religious and moral perceptions 
are continually enlarging or contracting; and if we allow them uniformly to run 
within the narrower channel, they will gradually adapt themselves to it and be 
restrained within it’. (L9) The result is that our ‘highest knowledge’ is not 
simply excluded, it is lost out of mind or rendered unintelligible. 
This loss of spiritual perception is the result of a kind of division in the 
mind or soul which evidentialist theology encourages: ‘The mind, in that it 
weighs the proof must, in its own despite, occupy the disposition of one to 
whom it is not proved, i.e. of the unbeliever: it must have a compound 
character, as it were, in part believing from previous conviction, in part 
unbelieving or doubting.’ (L5)83 Taking the ground of the unbeliever is not a 
stance of neutrality, but one which obstructs the perception of spiritual things; 
‘the sort of suspension of belief which is implied by the seeking of formal 
evidence is unnatural and pernicious’. (L5) Because the problems with the 
apologetic use are as much those of discernment and sensibility as of method, 
correcting the fault which Pusey identifies is not as simple as pointing out an 
error. It involves the re-education of sensibility. This will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.  
                                                 
83 L4: ‘In the apologetic use, prophecy is addressed to those who believe not, or, as if men 
believed not’. 
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2.5 The Dangers of Rationalism 
2.5.1 Evidences and the Apologetic Trojan Horse 
Given the authority and prevalence of evidence writing in Pusey’s day, his 
criticisms of the apologetic school and evidence writing would have appeared 
to many like an ill-conceived attack on one of the bulwarks of Christian 
orthodoxy. The deist controversy was the first occasion of the evidentialist 
approach, but by the second half of the eighteenth century it had taken on the 
character of a theological convention. In Essays and Reviews, Pattison 
described the dominance of this approach: ‘Every one who had anything to say 
on sacred subjects drilled it into an array of argument against a supposed 
objector. Christianity appeared made for nothing else but to be proved.’84 In his 
essay in the same collection, ‘On the study of the evidences of Christianity’, 
Baden Powell (1796-1860), one of the progressive Oriel Noetics and a natural 
scientist, concurred: ‘There is scarcely one, perhaps, of our more eminent 
divines, who has not, in a greater or less degree, distinguished himself in this 
department.’85 Before his departure for Germany, Pusey thought to do the same 
and hoped that his studies would be of assistance if he were ‘to write anything 
on the Evidences’.86 Instead, these very studies led Pusey to a view of the 
dangers inherent in apologetic orthodoxism.87  
A letter from the High Churchman Hugh James Rose to Newman 
suggests the radical character of Pusey’s criticisms of evidentialist theology. 
During the year following his appointment as principal of King’s College in 
October, 1836, i.e. at the same time that Pusey was criticizing evidences in his 
course of lectures in Oxford, Rose offered a series of lectures on ‘Evidences of 
Christian Religion’.88 Despite his disagreement with Pusey over the Theology 
of Germany, Rose had become a cautious, but not uncritical, supporter of the 
                                                 
84 Pattison 1861, 259-260. 
85 Powell 1861, 94. 
86 Pusey to John Parker, May, 1825, in Life, 71. See also Pusey’s advice to his fiancée Maria 
Barker (4 Oct. 1827) that she should study the evidences (Forrester 1989, 59). 
87 See also Pusey to Maria Barker, 4 Nov. 1835, in Forrester 1989, 74: ‘I studied evidences, 
when I should have been studying the Bible.’ 
88 Nockles 1994, 205. 
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Tractarians and of those ‘labouring in the good cause at Oxford’.89 
Nonetheless, he wrote Newman in October, 1838, just a few months before his 
early death in Florence, to raise concerns with Newman about the ‘new number 
of the British Critic’. Rose maintains that ‘the vehement rejection of all 
evidence, except the Testimony of the Church, and of all appeals to reason … 
excludes wholly all consideration of unbelievers, and of faint believers’.90 
James Ernest and Gerard Tracey’s reflections on Newman’s views of 
evidential theology suggest how Rose’s criticisms would apply to Pusey and 
the use he made of his position as Regius Professor of Hebrew: ‘To question 
the value of the labours of evidential theologians, however respectfully, was in 
itself suspect. Doing so from the university pulpit at Oxford was a direct 
challenge to university tradition and authority, especially in the context of the 
Movement.’91 Apparently with a keen awareness of the challenge which faced 
him, Pusey sought to show why his criticisms were necessary, and why the use 
of evidences to establish faith was both a risky and theologically destructive 
enterprise. 
For Pusey, the evidence writers effectively put both the Bible and God on 
trial. In Paley’s approach, it is the verifiable fulfilment of a prediction which 
enables a clear and certain prophecy to serve as evidence to prove the veracity 
of Christian claims. Douglas Hedley calls Paley’s approach to Scripture 
‘forensic’: for Paley, ‘the Christian Scriptures can be treated like legal 
documents’, whose prophecies and miracles are not so much signs which 
reveal but bits of data which prove the truth of Christian doctrine.92 However, 
reasoned arguments for the veracity or reliability of prophecy do not convince 
all people. When this approach inevitably fails, the problem is transferred from 
the argument about prophecy to prophecy itself: ‘the stress being laid upon the 
                                                 
89 H. J. Rose to J. H. Newman, 11 Oct. 1838, ‘Newman Papers: “British Critic”, 1836 – 1841’) 
See also Life, 176. 
90 Ibid. Rose refers to the writer ‘on magnetism’, who writes: ‘Do not good men grasp far too 
eagerly and gladly at the concurrence of philosophy with revelation … as if evidence to the 
Word of God were a thing to be tolerated by a Christian’ (Anon. 1838a, 304). See Nockles 
1997, 200, for ‘the bias of Cambridge theology’ towards ‘evidential divinity’ and Paley. 
91 Newman 2006, lxxvii. 
92 Hedley 2000, 136. 
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clearness of prophecy, when men remained unconvinced, its inherent value 
came to be disparaged. The failure was not unnaturally cast on prophecy itself’. 
(L5) Paradoxically, attempting to use prophecy as evidence raises questions 
about its veracity and usefulness rather than securing them. Moreover, any 
approach which puts revelation on trial inevitably suggests the superiority of 
the human judge:  
By His Providence, He has so ordered it, that Belief should be every 
where His own gift, we by this process would make it our own action, 
and so it makes men in some cases seem independent, the creature of our 
own hands, not of His. In others, it were not too much to say that it sets 
men above God. (L5) 
The very way of proceeding which is meant to authenticate prophecy actually 
encourages a sense of radical autonomy which is inimical to the belief which 
the evidence writers wish to secure. 
Pusey argues that the apologetic or modern approach does not only 
diminish or narrow faith, as we saw above, but that this approach conceals a 
trajectory toward unbelief. The contrast between the criteria of the apologetic 
school and the way New Testament writers refer to the Old Testament reveals 
not only an error but a threat: ‘And this is full of danger. We must bend our 
minds and conform them to the teaching of Holy Scripture, or men will end in 
bending Holy Scripture to their own minds, and when it will not bend, will part 
with it.’ (L8-9) Pusey connects this trend with the ‘apologetic character of the 
day’ in his writing during the Hampden controversy: 
Men have now inured themselves, in all parts of theology, to look to 
what they can maintain against a rigid opponent, a sceptic within or 
without Christianity. The next step is to abandon what they cannot so 
maintain. First, grounds or reasons are given up; then, truths are thrown 
into the shade; then, forgotten; lastly, denied.93 
Any approach which neglects some portion of revelation will end in opposing 
it: ‘that, wherein Scripture differs, becomes distasteful, then neglected, then set 
aside or opposed’. (L9) 
                                                 
93 DrH., xv. Pusey also emphasizes the danger of ‘straining of the letter of Holy Scripture in 
conformity with preconceived notions, and the requisitions of human reason’ in T67rev., 201. 
 58 
Lurking in the kind of approach followed by Paley and Davison, Pusey 
finds the rationalistic principle that autonomous reason is the foundation of 
faith. The Church of Scotland minister Alexander Keith, to whom Pusey refers 
as another representative of the apologetic school, offers an example of this 
view. Pusey describes Keith’s book, Evidence of the Truth of the Christian 
Religion derived from the literal fulfilment of Prophecy (1823), as ‘a modern 
popular book on prophecy’. (L2) It had run to thirteen editions by the time 
Pusey wrote the ‘Lectures’. In it, Keith argues that in order to authenticate a 
true prophecy, ‘a patient and impartial inquiry alone is requisite; reason alone 
is appealed to, and no other faith is here necessary but that which arises as the 
natural and spontaneous fruit of rational conviction’.94 This states succinctly 
what Pusey sees to be one of the problems of the apologetic use of prophecy: 
‘In this handling of prophecy … the argument was rather so set forth, as 
though, its own intellectual power of conviction had been such, that, but for 
some blindness a man could [not] escape it’. (L4) In a sermon which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Pusey makes the same point: 
‘Thus, it is almost a received formula on the evidences of the Gospel, that the 
province of reason is antecedent to that of faith; that we are on grounds of 
reason to believe in Revelation’.95 Pusey does not discuss when the search for 
reasons, which is part of faith seeking understanding (an approach which, as 
we will see in Chapter 3, he did approve), crosses the line to become an 
argument which makes evidence and discursive reason sufficient grounds for 
faith. That the evidence writers had crossed this line accords with Pattison’s 
assessment: ‘Reason was at first offered as the basis of faith, but gradually 
became its substitute.’96  
Pusey viewed the apologetic approach and evidence writing as forms of 
rationalism that were all the more dangerous because their destructive and 
heterodox tendencies were veiled by their putative role to defend and buttress 
Christian faith. The way in which Pusey points to the worst possible outcomes 
                                                 
94 Keith 1835, 12. 
95 AFai., 16. In section 3.3.2 we will see how Pusey draws on this sermon to distinguish 
different kinds of reason (‘But then, what Reason?’). 
96 Pattison 1861, 260. 
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is not simply a kind of pessimism or polemical exaggeration, but another 
example of the historical element of Pusey’s argument. In the Theology of 
Germany he had argued that those who attempted to refute the English deists 
adopted a way of proceeding that proved to be more destructive to Christian 
doctrine and revelation than the direct attacks which they tried to rebuff: 
‘Translations of our earlier English Apologists opposed to these works did but 
aggravate the evil and increase the rationalist tendency; partly because they had 
themselves been in some degree tacitly acted upon by the systems which they 
opposed.’97 Looking back on the situation in Germany thirty years later, Pusey 
repeated his view that apologetic writers contributed to the rise of rationalism:  
Yet the most startling and instructive fact was that the reign of 
Rationalism was not the direct triumph of unbelief, but the result of the 
decay of belief. The Rationalists, as they existed at last, were the lineal 
descendants, not of the assailants of Christianity, but of its defenders. 
Translations of our English Apologists had but aggravated the evil … I 
saw weak points in our Apologetic writers, and it was alarming to see, as 
a fact, that they had been arrayed against the infidel writers, and had 
failed, or had even aggravated the evil. I felt that, as to the Old Testament 
especially, we were not (in 1825) as yet prepared for the conflict with 
Rationalism.98 
Pusey seeks to expose the faults of an evidentialist or apologetic approach to 
theology because this approach allowed erroneous principles inside the citadel 
of faith where they caused more harm than the more obvious attacks from 
those outside the walls. Pusey’s arguments are so pointed, and sometimes 
repetitive, because he believed that people were generally unaware of the 
danger.99 His study of Germany convinced him that the danger of rationalist 
ideas was concealed by the way in which they could co-exist for a period with 
the expressions of faith: ‘For a time a person or a generation may go on with 
this discrepancy unsettled … Yet although God may thus save individuals from 
the result of their own principles, it is obviously a dangerous state’. (L9) The 
                                                 
97 TG-I, 127. On the significant influence of English deist writers in Germany, see TG-I, 124-7 
and 134-137, Dyson 1982, 55 and Rogerson 1984, 153. 
98 Pusey 1854, 54-55. 
99 For Pusey’s most succinct discussion of this danger, in relation to Germany and England, see 
DrH, iii-vi. 
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year before he wrote the ‘Lectures’, in his first Tract on baptism, Pusey 
described the danger as he saw it: 
Meanwhile, Rationalism is taking a subtle turn, or rather its author, the 
author of evil, has been subtly applying it: in the days of our Deists, it 
openly attacked Christianity, and was defeated; now it appears as the ally 
and supporter of the faith, which it would undermine: it supports our 
Evidences; reconciles our difficulties; smoothes down the ‘hard sayings’ 
of the Word of God, and steals away our treasure.100 
The great danger of the form which rationalism takes in the apologetic school 
is that it appears as an ally of faith, apparently establishing the veracity of 
prophecy or of faith on rational grounds. However, for Pusey, rationalistic 
principles act as a solvent on Christian doctrine whether they appear in the 
arguments of the supporters or antagonists of faith.  
2.5.2 The Deistic Roots of the Apologetic Approach 
In the remainder of this chapter, two important components in Pusey’s 
assessment of the rationalism which he finds in the apologetic approach will be 
analyzed. First, contrary to the idea that the reason and criteria to which 
evidence writers appeal are impartial or universal, he seeks to show that they 
belong to a definite school with historical roots and presuppositions. Pusey 
would make the same argument in later editions of Tract 67, arguing that it is 
not because of their objectivity that modern writers do not find the doctrine of 
baptismal regeneration in Scripture but because of the ‘forced interpretations’ 
that they learned ‘in their own school’.101 Secondly, he argues that this kind of 
rationalism is also a form of empiricism or materialism which promotes a 
radical scepticism about Christian revelation and spiritual knowledge. 
Although he does not offer the same kind of detailed historical study that 
he did in the Theology of Germany, there are clues that Pusey works out his 
argument in the ‘Lectures’ against the backdrop of a similar kind of theological 
genealogy, a study of the family tree which casts light on ‘the biography’ of his 
subject.102 In particular, he suggests that in seeking to defend the legitimacy of 
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101 T67rev., 66. 
102 TG-I, 2. 
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supernatural revelation against the backdrop or memory of deism, the 
apologists have accepted deist principles.103 According to Pusey, the 
supremacy of reason which was assumed by the deists also guided the 
apologetic writers who responded to their arguments. Pusey finds an implicit 
acceptance of the autonomy of analytical reason in the way the evidence 
writers treated Old Testament prophecy: 
Its actual clearness had also in fact been misrepresented: the à priori 
principle of the Deist, that ‘divine prophecy must be delivered with the 
utmost clearness and perspicuity, and fulfilled with irresistible evidence’, 
though not admitted as à priori necessary, was in reality sanctioned as 
being à posteriori true. (L5) 
Here Pusey quotes a sermon by the eighteenth century divine and Bishop of 
Worcester, Richard Hurd, entitled ‘False ideas of Prophecy’ (1772).104 In the 
sermon, Hurd criticizes those who insist that ‘divine prophecy must be 
delivered with the utmost clearness and perspicuity, and fulfilled with 
irresistible evidence’. Hurd claims that deist criticisms of unreasonable 
revelation is nothing new, tracing this kind of criticism to the second century 
pagan philosopher Celsus and his assessment of Jewish and Christian 
prophecies as ‘fanatical, uncertain, and obscure’.105 Pusey argues that those 
who insist that no reasonable ends can be served by obscurely-expressed 
prophecies display the same error attributed to both Semler and Hampden of 
being able to discern the religious element in Old Testament prophecy. The 
modern school is unable to discern the Word in the words or the eternal in the 
                                                 
103 In the Theology of Germany, Pusey described the deist ideas by summarizing the views of 
some of its well-known English proponents. Lord Herbert of Cherbery (1582-1648) converted 
Christianity ‘into a mere scheme of Ethics’. John Toland (1670-1722), the author of 
Christianity not Mysterious (1696), was led ‘to deny all higher truths of revelation’. Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) in the Leviathan (1651) was inclined ‘to transform Christianity into a 
mere instrument of state policy’. Pusey also argued that ‘the constant appeal to the rationality 
of the system of Christianity’ led Matthew Tindal (1655-1763) in his book Christianity as old 
as the Creation (1730) to describe Christianity ‘as a mere ‘republication of the Religion of 
Nature’. See TG-I, 125. Pusey was willing to see the positive in the deists and even suggests 
that the apologists lacked both the moral earnestness and the intellectual acuteness of some of 
the deists. TG-I, 126-7. 
104 ‘Sermon I: False ideas of Prophecy’, in Hurd 1811, 22. The sermons are those he gave as 
the first Warburtonian Lectures. 
105 Hurd 1811, 21 n. Italics in Hurd.  
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temporal; theirs is a failure to read the Scriptures according to the principles of 
typical or typological interpretation.  
In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey points to an example in the Gospels to illustrate 
this point. Christ criticizes the Sadducees for failing to understand the full 
meaning of the passage, ‘I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and 
the God of Jacob’. ‘No one,’ Pusey writes, ‘I think, can doubt that He blames 
the Sadducees (Mark 12.26) for not having understood the life after death to be 
contained in the only title, which God gave to Himself, “the God of Abraham, 
of Isaac, and of Jacob”’. (L38) However, the use of this obscure passage as a 
witness to the gift of eternal life does not accord with the apologetic approach 
to prophecy: 
Now this passage is one of the last which a modern would have 
employed for this purpose, and even now while they admit it upon our 
Lord's authority, they are perplexed how to account for the selection, or 
even to see its validity. And this might in itself show us that our system 
of interpretation which finds such difficulty in that of our Lord, must 
needs have something fundamentally defective about it. Writers seem 
agreed that it must have been the clearest passage which could have been 
adduced, because they would in like case have produced the clearest, 
which they could find. (L39) 
When John Davison described ‘our Saviour in his refutation of the Sadducees’, 
he maintained that ‘we must suppose that he selected this text as one of the 
most forcible and clearest of the book of the law’.106 In contrast, Pusey uses 
this example to argue that the obscurities of Scripture serve a purpose. The title 
which God gives himself is a typical prophecy revealing ‘that He, the self-
communicating, the fountain of life, did not leave those with whom He deigned 
to stand in so close communion, without some portion of His life… and that 
they who lived by Him could not die’. (L38). He continues, finding a spiritual 
exercise in seeking the treasure concealed below the surface and revelation in 
an obscure prophecy:  
And yet, it must be admitted on the other side, that this truth, which our 
Lord declares to be in these words is not their obvious historical sense … 
And on this very account it follows that a sense is to be sought and found 
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in words and phrases, deeper than that which is required for the mere 
context, and not only so, but that the neglect to do this was blameable, 
and neglecting a treasure which God had deposited in Scripture below 
the surface, and burying that talent committed to them in the earth. This 
is clean contrary to the boasted discovery of modern times, the so-called 
historico-grammatical interpretation, yet I see not what short of this will 
satisfy our Lord's meaning, or on what other ground the Sadducees were 
to blame. (L39) 
This in an example of how ‘the à priori principle of the Deist’ which insists on 
the ‘clearness and perspicuity’ of prophecy can rather render prophecy opaque.  
2.5.3 Joseph Butler on Analogy and Obscurity 
Looking at Pusey’s writings during the Hampden controversy shows that, in 
challenging the apologetic search for perspicuity, Pusey draws on Bishop 
Joseph Butler’s Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed (1736). Whereas in 
the ‘Lectures’ Pusey criticized ‘the à priori principle of the Deist’, in his 
analysis of Hampden’s theological arguments he ascribed that task to Bishop 
Butler: ‘That great Divine silenced, as is well known, the à priori arguments of 
the Deist, by shewing that he must, if consistent, become an Atheist, since the 
facts of Christianity, to which he objected, were analogous to other facts in the 
ordinary government of God’.107 Butler’s* works were a standard part of the 
Oxford syllabus in the first decades of the nineteenth century, ‘the central 
modern authority alongside the classical authors for the Greats course’, and a 
particularly important figure for Pusey and the Tractarians.108 In the Analogy, 
Butler argues that deist criticisms of the supposedly unreasonable or arbitrary 
character of revelation are themselves based on unreasonable and arbitrary 
assumptions. Butler establishes the principle of analogy by arguing that one 
would expect to find correspondences between the character of the Bible and 
the character of the natural world because they have a common creator. 
Therefore, according to the principle of analogy, the study of supernatural 
revelation must encounter the same kind of difficulties or obscurities which 
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one encounters in any investigation of the natural world: ‘Origen with singular 
sagacity has observed, that he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded 
from him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of 
difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of Nature.’109 Pusey’s 
consideration of the Sadducees’ inability to understand the prophecy implicit in 
God’s title offers a practical application of Butler’s argument. With regard to 
‘the true sense’, he writes, ‘we are not competent judges, as we are in common 
books, how plainly it were to have been expected’, i.e. how ‘determinately or 
accurately it might have been expressed’.110 During the Hampden controversy, 
Pusey uses the principle of analogy to emphasize over-confidence which he 
saw in the apologetic approach:  
But if we, who know not the use of all the portions of our gross material 
bodies, or of the elements around us, or why the air is so attempered, or 
how our food nourishes us, presume to say, that we understand how 
every portion of revealed truth affects our souls, or that we could 
dispense with portions thereof, or, which is the same thing, that they 
could not be portions of revealed truth, that they must be human theories 
because we see not their use, we lay ourselves open surely to the 
Apostle’s rebuke, ‘professing themselves to be wise, they became 
fools’.111  
In Pusey’s argument, accepting Butler’s principle that ‘we have no principles 
of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be expected 
revelation should have been left’, is not a form of self-imposed ignorance but 
the principle which clears away the presuppositions which prevent those in the 
grip of the rationalistic ‘Spirit of the Age’ from finding the treasure which 
prophecy offers.112  
                                                 
109 Anal., Intro. 5. Italics in text. See also Anal., II.3, 182-3: ‘the acknowledged constitution 
and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have 
been expected’. 
110 Anal., II.3, 186. 
111 DrH, xviii. 
112 Anal., II.3, 184. 
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2.5.4 Rationalism and Empiricism: Dr. Hampden and Mr. Locke  
For Pusey, the rationalism he finds in the apologetic approach is not simply a 
confidence in the sufficiency of reason, but also a form of empiricism which 
effectively denies the possibility of spiritual or supernatural knowledge: 
Our general habits of mind are rationalizing; we live in the world of 
sense; the knowledge which we acquire, is matter of sense; what we call 
‘science’ is the knowledge of things tangible to sense: a truly common-
sense, or rather a common-place sense, is our rule in all things; and of all 
this we make our boast. This is an unhealthy atmosphere for faith, which 
has to do entirely with things unseen, not of sense.113 
Pusey’s argument is not that the modern school lacked divines intelligent 
enough to formulate a compelling argument. Rather, he argues that the attempt 
to prove or define prophecy must fail because the knowledge which prophecy 
offers, religious knowledge, the revelation of supernatural truth cannot be 
proved or discovered strictly by evidence or argument: ‘The religious element 
of prophecy was of necessity withdrawn from their sight, for although it has 
more persuasiveness, it has less of demonstration.’ (L1) To focus on prophecy 
as a kind of evidence is to focus ‘upon the surface’ (L8) and to neglect the 
‘treasure which God had deposited in Scripture below the surface’. (L39, 85) 
This approach displays ‘our matter-of-fact way’. (L9, 10) Pusey seeks to 
uncover the philosophical and theological principles which explain this 
confusion. 
 Pusey traces Hampden’s confusions to an empiricist equation of 
revelation with a collection of facts, ‘that the Christian revelation is matter of 
fact … that the substance of the revelation is the doings and actions of God; 
some event in the history of God’s providences’.114 Pusey argues that for 
Hampden, ‘We can know nothing of God, except in His manifestations upon 
this our earth. This is not to be regarded as an insulated or accidental 
circumstance, but rather as indicative of the whole theory to which it 
                                                 
113 Scr.HB., ix (‘matter of sense’ is Pusey’s wording). 
114 Hampden quoted in HPP, 26 
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belongs.’115 Hampden’s writings promote the theory that ‘whatever in the 
teaching even of the early and universal Church goes beyond the words of holy 
Scripture is to be regarded as mere human speculation’.116 To demonstrate this, 
Pusey quotes Hampden’s statement that ‘All the differences of opinion, which 
have ever prevailed upon the doctrine of the Trinity, relate to the history of the 
human mind as much as to theology; and do not affect the Catholic Faith.’117 In 
another place Hampden went even further, and suggested that the doctrinal 
formulations of the Church, including not only the Thirty-Nine Articles, but 
also the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, offer a description of the logical 
processes of human reasoning, ‘a map of the human mind’, rather than an 
accurate picture of the realities they purport to describe.118 For Hampden, the 
articles and creeds are expressed in philosophical forms that distort the 
message of the Bible: ‘The orthodox language, declaring the Son “begotten 
before all worlds, of one substance (sic) with the Father,” was settled by a 
philosophy, wherein the principles of different sciences were confounded.’119 
The best that can be said of such doctrinal formulations is that they are ‘only 
less obviously injurious’ than the more serious confusions which they exclude, 
implying that the language of the creeds is in some way injurious.120 For Pusey, 
Hampden’s ideas encourage a radical scepticism about any doctrine that goes 
beyond a simple restatement of ‘Scripture facts’.121  
Pusey attributes Hampden’s radical scepticism on doctrinal matters to the 
misapplication of empiricist principles which he learned from the philosopher 
John Locke: 
                                                 
115 HPP, 7. Although Hampden in his inaugural lecture responded to this criticism by stating 
that ‘Fact means whatever is, and is not in philosophical language restricted to something 
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116 DrH., vi. 
117 Sch.Phil., 149 quoted in DrH., xxxvii. 
118 Sch.Phil., 87.  
119 Sch.Phil., 137, quoted in DrH., xxxvii. Pusey criticizes Hampden’s ‘unsound ignorance or 
indifference to the importance’ of the word ‘substance’ in Trinitarian doctrine. HPP, 6-7. 
120 Sch.Phil., 378, quoted in DrH., xxxix. 
121 DrH., xiii. 
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Into this he has been betrayed by the shallow philosophy of Mr. Locke. 
Dr. Hampden assumes two points; first, since for the (ordinary) 
emergencies of life, the knowledge furnished by experience is alone 
fitted, and our faculties must accordingly be framed to learn by 
experience, therefore, we can have no other faculties, which not being to 
be [sic] exercised upon this ordinary business, need not to be formed by 
experience: – that because we know things of this earth by experience, 
therefore, we cannot apprehend things not of this earth intuitively; and 
therefore God cannot impart to us any knowledge, except by the way of 
experience in this sensible world. Secondly, since words are signs of 
ideas only, and all our ideas (as before assumed) are only relative, or 
formed by our own experience, therefore God, in that He employs human 
language, can only impart to us knowledge founded upon our previous 
ideas, and the same in kind with those ideas.122  
Pusey describes Hampden’s theological principles as a version of Locke’s 
philosophy. For Locke the mind is a tabula rasa which is furnished with ideas 
which are imprinted on the mind from experience and reflection upon 
experience: ‘Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I 
answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is found, and 
from that it ultimately derives itself.’ 123 Hampden’s argument that ‘words are 
signs of ideas only’ is a version of Locke’s theory that ‘Words in their primary 
Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses 
them.’124 These ideas also help to explain Pusey’s concern for Hampden’s 
Socinianism. Douglas Hedley describes Socinianism as ‘marked by a curious 
mixture of scriptural positivism and empiricism’.125 This is what Pusey found 
in Hampden, both the positivist view that revelation is a collection of facts, and 
the empiricist principle which limits knowledge to sensory experience and 
reflection upon it, i.e. ‘the major and minor premiss of Socinianism’.126 
Hampden is guilty of a basic category error – just because we learn about 
the world of sense from the senses does not prove that human beings have no 
faculty or power by which to discern things beyond sense. According to the 
theory which Hampden derives from Locke, even God is constrained by the 
                                                 
122 DrH., xxii. 
123 Locke 1975, II.1.2, 104. See also Woolhouse 1994, 149. 
124 Locke 1975, III.2.2, 405. 
125 Hedley 1996, 241. 
126 DrH, vi. 
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limitations of human understanding, God can only impart knowledge that is 
based on our experience. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, Pusey’s 
basic principle is that ‘spiritual things’ or spiritual truths ‘can only be 
spiritually understood’. (L37) According to this view, spiritual knowledge must 
have another source than that permitted by Hampden and Locke: ‘We can form 
no idea, from experience, of spirit separate from matter, and it is only by 
Revelation that we know that “God is a Spirit:” it is only by implicitly 
believing revelation, or by a “salutis mortalis” of the human intellect, that we 
can receive it.’127 Yet this ‘fatal leap’, which is a leap beyond discursive 
knowledge, an immediate intuition and also a death to any claim of self-
sufficiency, is precisely what Hampden denies: ‘A light from heaven [i.e. 
Almighty God, from whom the light cometh] cannot introduce to the mind 
ideas concerning divine things, essentially different from all that it ever entered 
into the heart of man to conceive.’128 For Pusey, Hampden essentially denies 
the possibility of revelation and of knowledge that extends beyond the sensible 
world.  
 The connection Pusey makes between Hampden and Locke also casts 
light on Pusey’s criticism of our ‘rationalizing’ habits of mind and his 
comment that ‘a truly common-sense, or rather a common-place sense, is our 
rule in all things’.129 ‘Common-place’ is one of the terms which Pusey uses in 
the ‘Lectures’ to describe the inadequate character of the modern approach to 
prophecy. (L39, L145) Emphasizing the meaningfulness of the apparently 
incidental details in a study of types and typical prophecy, Pusey writes: 
‘The “common sense” view, that such things were “by chance” so and so, is a 
naked Epicureism [sic]’.130 Pusey seems to evoke here the ‘Common-Sense’ 
school associated especially with the work of the Scottish philosopher Thomas 
                                                 
127 DrH., xxii-xxiii. 
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Reid and his book An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
Common Sense (1764). Reid* adopted an empirical approach to the study of 
the mind and used the Newtonian method to challenge John Locke’s theory of 
ideas, which he believed contributed to David Hume’s scepticism.131 The 
philosopher Dugald Stewart, a student of Reid, developed his teacher’s 
common-sense philosophy. In Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind 
(Parts I-III, 1792-1827), Stewart* applied an empirical and inductive approach 
based on the natural scientific theories of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton to 
questions of metaphysics, psychology, and moral obligation.132 Despite the 
objections of both men to Humean scepticism and elements of Locke’s 
theories, the way they made empirical observation the basis for addressing 
metaphysical or religious questions appears to be at the root of Pusey’s 
objections to this school. In a letter to Newman in 1829, Pusey, wrote about the 
importance of reviving the study of genuine ‘Metaphysics’ at Oriel, ‘not the 
modern trash which in Messrs Stewart and Reid has assumed the name’.133 A 
genuine metaphysics is one that considers not only ‘the knowledge of things 
tangible to sense’ but also the communication imparted by the ‘light from 
heaven’.134 
The ‘Lectures’ furnish more evidence that Pusey’s criticisms of the 
apologetic school are a criticism of this Lockean empiricism. Locke represents 
for him the ‘tendency of undisciplined intellect to different forms of unbelief or 
misbelief, to exalt self by modifying what God has given, and if it reject not 
revelation altogether, to become heresiarchs or schismatics’. (L60A-61) Pusey 
adds: ‘For one Plato one has many Diogenes; for one Berkeley many Lockes, 
for one Athanasius many Arius’. (L61) Pusey groups Locke with the 
prototypical empiricist and a Christian heretic who was incapable of seeing 
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beyond the veil of the flesh to the eternal and divine Word.135 For Pusey, 
Locke’s denial of the possibility of spiritual knowledge, a mistake repeated and 
amplified in Hampden, corrupts Christian faith and promotes heresy. Pattison 
also linked the rise of rationalism with the influence of Locke: ‘The title of 
Locke’s treatise, The Reasonableness of Christianity [1695], may be said to 
have been the solitary thesis of Christian theology in England for [the] great 
part of a century.’136 Pusey’s analysis of Hampden and the connection he 
makes between Hampden and Locke also show what is at stake in the 
confusions of the apologetic school and the promotion of a patristic 
understanding of prophecy. Whatever the origins of a distrust of typology, in 
the ‘Lectures’ Pusey connects this distrust with a rationalism which judges 
revelation according to the abilities of autonomous and limited human reason 
and which imports an empiricist epistemology into theology. Pusey’s critique 
of evidence-writing and the apologetic approach is also a criticism of the 
influence of utilitarianism in theology: ‘an over-practical, over-reasoning age, 
which from having developed these qualities at the expense of the rest, has at 
last no sense for that, which must be perceived, not demonstrated’. (L37) 
While this suggests another way of approaching the problems of rationalism, 
the criticism of the reduction of truth to its ‘so-called practical application’ 
plays a more significant part in Pusey’s writings against Hampden than it does 
in the ‘Lectures’.137 
2.5.5 Rationalism and Scientism: ‘The operation of the anatomist’ 
Pusey uses images of anatomy and dissection to emphasize the destructive 
effects of an empirical or evidence-based approach to prophecy. He argues that 
treating the contents of the Old Testament like evidence in order to establish its 
meaning or to prove the truth of prophecy is like dissecting a dead body in 
order to find the life which once animated it: ‘But if the Christian enquire 
scientifically how much the Jew may have understood, he is entering upon an 
                                                 
135 Describing Diogenes as a ‘staunch empiricist’, Megan Mustain writes: ‘Put in metaphysical 
terms, Diogenes’ philosophy rejected the notion that anything unexperienced might be real.’ 
Mustain 2011, 106. 
136 Pattison 1861, 258. 
137 DrH., xv-xvi. See also HPP, 33.  
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examination for which he is not qualified … He is anatomizing a, to him, 
lifeless body in order to discover the seat of life.’ (L30) Elsewhere Pusey 
speaks of the ‘patronizing air (so to speak) which natural science takes when 
used as evidence’, as, for example, when ‘the main stress of the argument is 
made to rest on the discoveries of modern travellers with regard to the physical 
state of Edom, Moab and the like’. (L4, 2) This kind of approach cannot 
uncover the ‘living God’, but rather produces a ‘dead idol’. (L5) The 
‘demonstrations’ of the modern approach compared to the ‘unlaboured 
persuasion’ of the ancient Church ‘are much what the operation of the 
anatomist, in detaching the several sinews and muscles, is to their action in 
life’.138 
Pusey challenges the reduction of knowledge to what can be grasped and 
studied by the senses. This theme is connected to the sacramental rather than 
mechanistic view of the natural world which one finds in the Tractarians more 
generally. When Pusey seeks to expose empiricist principles in theology, he 
resists what Donald Allchin calls ‘scientism’, a view which denies ‘the 
necessity of other forms of knowing and thinking than those employed in the 
investigation of natural phenomena’.139 The contemporary philosopher Charles 
Taylor calls this bias ‘naturalism’, a term which for Taylor describes both the 
‘temper’ and ‘the epistemological assumptions’ which ‘tend to allow the 
natural sciences a paradigm status for all forms of knowledge’.140 Pusey refers 
to this same two-fold aspect of the apologetic use – it expresses both a kind of 
sensibility, a temper, and epistemological assumptions about what counts as 
clear and certain knowledge. In his opposition to evidentialist theology, Pusey 
opposes not science, but naturalism or scientism.141 Taylor’s assessment of the 
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problem described by Allchin and Pusey is significant because it is part of the 
approach which, as will be argued later, makes it possible for Taylor’s 
examination of John Locke to illuminate Pusey’s arguments in the ‘Lectures’. 
2.5.6 Rationalism and Idolatry: Paley and Pantheism 
One can get a better sense of the scope of Pusey’s theological and 
epistemological project by returning to his criticisms of Paley and considering 
them through the lens of Pusey’s critique of rationalism and empiricism. Pusey 
directs attention not only to Paley’s forensic approach to prophecy and 
evidence, but also to his version of natural theology which Pusey styles as 
‘artificial reasoning from final causes’. (L6) Pusey seems to have in mind 
Paley’s well-known argument from design in the first paragraph of his Natural 
Theology (1802). Since a watch displays both purpose and design, one can 
therefore infer the existence of a watch-maker. According to Paley’s argument, 
the world is like a watch in that it also shows evidence of purpose and design. 
By examining, for example, the way in which the organs and body parts of a 
person or of different animals serve to promote their preservation and well-
being, one can infer the existence of a wise, almighty, and good creator.142 The 
final cause which explains what we see in the natural world is the wisdom of 
God who ensures that all things work together to achieve their purposes: 
It is only by the display of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the 
wisdom of the Deity, could be testified to his rational creatures. This is 
the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which 
we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena, or the works of 
nature.143 
 In a passage which offers what seems like a paraphrase of Paley’s 
conclusion, Pusey writes: ‘So far from that being true that such study of 
“nature leads up to nature’s God” it rather brings down nature’s God into 
Nature, or identifies Him with it.’ (L5) Pusey describes Paley’s principles as 
leading inevitably to Pantheism, which for Pusey was the ultimate destination 
of rationalism and Socinianism: ‘All unbelief and heresy will probably sooner 
                                                 
142 For a sympathetic appraisal of Paley’s approach see LeMahieu 1976, 52-5. 
143 Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from 
the Appearances of Nature, Chapter 3, ‘Application of the Argument’, in Paley 1856, 10. 
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or later be resolved into it, and it will be the deadliest antagonist of the 
Church’.144 The only kind of god which Paley’s approach can prove is either an 
idol, a human creation, or ‘an anima mundi’: ‘one cannot but see that the Deity 
or Divinity, which men prove to themselves, by such means, if very little better 
than a dead idol and “work of men's hands”, or an anima mundi, very different 
from the “living God” who is “a consuming fire”’. (L5) Pusey does not accuse 
Paley of idolatry simply because it is the best way to emphasize what he sees to 
be the dangers of the apologetic approach. Rather, he is saying that idolatry or 
Pantheism is the only form of religion consistent with the most extreme forms 
of empiricism: ‘Pantheism assumes that “God is whatever thou seest”’.145 
Pusey sees Pantheism as a kind of theistic empiricism that Hampden 
unwittingly promoted. Since ‘we can form no idea, from experience, of spirit 
separate from matter’, the denial of divine illumination, of revelation not 
limited to the materials ‘of experience in this sensible world’, leads to 
Pantheism and materialism: ‘How then, on the way of analogy or experience, 
are we to arrive at the idea of any thing so high as even the ‘anima mundi’ of 
Spinozism? Rather men must stop in a materialist-Pantheism, wherein not only 
the world is a part of God, but is God.’146 Autonomous human reason alone 
cannot bridge the gap between an argument from nature and the existence of a 
God beyond or apart from nature.  
Echoing Pusey’s view that Paley’s argument from design identifies God 
with nature, Leslie Stephen remarks that Paley leaves us with ‘an 
anthropomorphic deity’, a deity who is ‘almost a material part of the universe’, 
and who ‘has all but become an object of scientific investigation’.147 In the 
‘Lectures’ and associated papers, Pusey argues that the natural world, ‘the 
works of God’, both by their creation and ongoing existence, ‘must reflect 
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God’.148 However, Pusey distinguishes sharply between the ‘reasoning about 
the wisdom of contrivances and the like’ and the kind of vision which 
perceives the divine or spiritual truths that the works of God symbolize. (L16) 
For him, Paley replaces the life-giving sacrament with a divine mechanism.  
Pusey’s discussion of the problems with Paley’s approach to natural 
theology shows once again the broader context of Pusey’s analysis of the 
apologetic school and its approach to prophecy and displays his attempt to shed 
light on unnoticed problems implicit in the theological conventions of his day. 
Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785) was part of the 
Cambridge syllabus from 1787 to the early nineteenth century, and all second 
year undergraduates were examined on his Evidences of Christianity from 
1822 to 1920.149 Douglas Hedley sums up Paley’s reputation: ‘Paley was a 
highly esteemed defender of Christian theology against the learned despisers of 
Christianity amongst the figures of the British Enlightenment.’150 Nonetheless 
for Pusey, Paley especially embodied the principles of rationalism and 
scientism that lead through Socinianism to Pantheism. It is likely that both 
Paley’s close association with Locke and his suspected heterodoxy would have 
influenced Pusey’s judgement. While a fellow at Christ’s College, Cambridge, 
Paley based his lectures primarily on Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding and his Reasonableness of Christianity.151 Hedley describes this 
Lockean heritage in a way that shows why Pusey points to Paley as 
representing the worst tendencies of the apologetic school: ‘As a pupil of 
Locke, Paley was very much a conventional Englishmen of the eighteenth 
century, and because of the Socinian roots of Locke’s theology Paley seems 
not just an empiricist but doctrinally close to Unitarianism.’152 Hedley 
acknowledges that Paley’s ‘doctrinal minimalism’ may have expressed a 
latitudinarian desire for comprehensiveness rather than an avowed 
Socinianism. However, Paley evokes Hampden’s anti-dogmatic and empiricist 
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principles by his insistence that ‘The truth of Christianity depends upon its 
leading facts and upon them alone’.153 The influence of Paley even in High 
Church or orthodox circles would have made the errors perceived in his 
approach and ideas seem even more dangerous to Pusey.154 Paley’s wariness 
about dogma and his close association with the group of Cambridge dons who 
sought to reform subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, an endeavour which 
Hampden later promoted in Oxford, would probably have linked Paley closely 
to Hampden in Pusey’s mind, and made him a representative of the 
Socinianism of which Pusey accused Hampden.155  
2.6 Pusey and the ‘higher philosophy’ of S. T. Coleridge 
One of the most interesting aspects of Pusey’s criticisms of Paley is the way in 
which Pusey drew on the ideas of S. T. Coleridge. Marshall records that near 
the beginning of the eighth lecture Pusey quoted Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection 
to show that the kind of evidence writing that collects together tokens of the 
authenticity of the Scriptures often fails to produce the expected results. The 
words in italics follow Coleridge’s text very closely: 
This shews that we must not look for conviction in the way of Reason – 
Coleridge, in his Aids to Reflection says that the great fundamentals of 
our Religion, in Christian countries are taught so early and with such 
associations that the words ever after bring to us Realities, not thoughts 
or sensations. […] We hear in after life the Proofs of these with the same 
feelings that a Prince at a Coronation listens to the Champion as he is 
calling upon non-existent opponents. Doubts may be driven out at first by 
our Lord’s words. The looking for Proof only tends to encourage doubts. 
A man’s implicit belief as it is not founded on the understanding cannot 
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be spared by that. The belief arising from Reason is like unbelief. What 
will overcome the belief of a child, who has not learnt to doubt?156 
Coleridge compares arguments meant to prove religious faith to the Champion 
who pretends to guarantee the Prince’s coronation. However, it is only 
pretending; the Prince’s coronation does not depend on the Champion since 
there are no actual challengers who the Champion must defeat. A person who 
reads Paley or other evidences may come to think that his faith rests on the 
support of rational argument. However, this is a confusion. Rather, it is the 
belief which is already present, ‘the belief of a child’, which accepts the 
arguments of the evidence writers as, at their best, part of a pageant where 
belief is already enthroned. The prior conviction, Coleridge argues, ‘of a 
gracious Creator is the Proof … of the wisdom and benevolence in the 
construction of the Creature’.157 Whereas Paley offers evidence for this 
benevolence, in Coleridge’s argument, as in Pusey, the sense of benevolence is 
the proof. Coleridge’s argument here accords with Pusey’s view that ‘prophecy 
is given to direct and guide faith, not to create it’. (L4) Prophecy can prove or 
offer evidence in that it confirms what one already believes, but it does not 
create or establish that belief: ‘In the Bible, then, Prophecy is as evidence, 
throughout given to believers – i.e. to such as held fast what they had hitherto 
received. The belief is already there in the germ; it has but to be developed or 
expanded.’ (L4)158 
Like Pusey, Coleridge describes Paley as the archetypal representative of 
the evidentialist theology which he opposes: ‘I believe myself bound in 
conscience to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of this 
triumphal Car, on which the tutelary Genius of modern Idolatry is borne, even 
at the risk of being crushed under the wheels!’159 Despite the gravity of 
Coleridge’s concern, and his contention that Paley’s ideas foster scepticism 
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one of the most recent teachers of this principle in his 1818 sermon, A Dissertation upon the 
Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition. See Newman 1967, 20-1. 
159 Aids, 409. 
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about the truth and reality of Christian doctrine, Coleridge is nonetheless 
convinced that it is Paley’s views that will sound ‘plausible and popular … to 
the great majority of Readers’.160 This is the same approach Pusey adopts. He 
seeks to cast light upon the erroneous principles conveyed in popular books, 
almost certainly with the awareness that his concerns will be misunderstood. 
Hedley maintains that ‘Paley represents, for Coleridge, the hegemony of a 
Lockean-Socinian-empiricist tradition within the Church of England’.161 This 
is the same way in which Pusey presents Paley and why he is for Pusey as well 
as for Coleridge the paradigmatic example of the problems and dangers of 
evidence writing.  
 The common line of argument that Coleridge and Pusey adopt against 
Paley and evidence writing points to broader areas of convergence. The way 
Pusey draws on Coleridge corresponds to Newman’s assessment. Comparing 
Coleridge’s role to that of Walter Scott, whose ‘history in prose and verse’ 
responded to ‘the need which was felt both by the hearts and the intellects of 
the nation for a deeper philosophy’, Newman writes: 
While history in prose and verse was thus made the instrument of Church 
feelings and opinions, a philosophical basis for the same was laid in 
England by a very original thinker, who, while he indulged in a liberty of 
speculation which no Christian can tolerate, and advocated conclusions 
which were often heathen rather than Christian, yet after all instilled a 
higher philosophy into inquiring minds, than they had hitherto been 
accustomed to accept. In this way he made trial of his age, and succeeded 
in interesting its genius in the cause of Catholic truth.162 
The ‘Lectures’ suggest that Pusey shared both the positive and negative 
elements of Newman’s assessment. On the one hand, Pusey criticizes as an 
intolerable ‘liberty of speculation’ Coleridge’s view that the references to the 
talking serpent and the tree of life in Genesis 3 show that the account of the 
Fall is an allegory: 
‘No unprejudiced man can pretend to doubt,’ says Mr Coleridge, ‘that, if 
in any other work of Eastern origin he met with Trees of Life and of 
Knowledge: talking and conversable snakes: Inque rei signum serpentum 
                                                 
160 Aids, 410. 
161 Hedley 2000, 48. 
162 Newman 1967, 84, quoting an article in the British Critic, Apr. 1839. 
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serpere jussum; he would want no other proofs, that it was an allegory he 
was reading, and intended to be understood as such.’ But (setting aside 
for the while the flippancy and arrogance of this speech) if we find the 
fragments of this same story in other nations, encircled with different 
accompaniments, but still the same basis, then they could no longer 
doubt that it was a real fact. (L46)163  
On the other hand, Pusey shared Newman’s more positive assessment of 
Coleridge also, that Coleridge ‘instilled a higher philosophy into inquiring 
minds’ and promoted the cause of ‘Catholic truth’. In his Theology of 
Germany, Pusey referred to the Aids to Reflection to correct those ‘who think 
that in the reception of Christianity the intellect alone is concerned’.164 In other 
words, he describes Coleridge’s approach as a necessary antidote to 
orthodoxism. Jasper points to this connection when he argues that by drawing 
on Coleridge in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey ‘provided an alternative to the 
contemporary “Paleyite” apologetic which Pusey designates “orthodoxism”’.165 
In the same vein, Donald Allchin argues that Pusey’s attack ‘on the old 
“orthodoxism” of the previous age’ in the ‘Lectures’ reminds one of 
Coleridge.166 Whatever misgivings Liddon may have had of Coleridge, he 
comments that Coleridge ‘was a great force in making men dissatisfied with 
the superficiality so common a hundred years ago in religion as in other 
matters; and in this, if in no other way, he prepared the English mind to listen 
to the Oxford teachers’.167  
Whether or not specific correspondences between Pusey and Coleridge 
point to direct influences or common sources, or both, we will see in this thesis 
that ‘Coleridge’s ‘higher philosophy’ offers a useful framework with which to 
                                                 
163 Pusey quotes Aids, 258. 
164 TG-I, 52-53 n. 3. 
165 Jasper 1983, 57. 
166 Allchin 1967, 56-7. 
167 Life, 254. Allchin suggests that this resemblance may have been one of the reasons which 
gave Liddon concern about the contents of the ‘Lectures’, a concern that will be discussed in 
Chapter 6 (Allchin 1967, 57 n. 1). Christopher Snook puts forward Tilottama Rajan’s argument 
that ‘the Tractarians’ hesitant acknowledgment of Coleridge’ may be the result of his 
association with urban life, the continent, and a spirit of impropriety. See Snook 2001, 8 and 
Gilley 1983, 228.  
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examine some of Pusey’s key arguments.168 In his study of Pusey’s Sermons on 
Solemn Subjects, Christopher Snook contends ‘that Coleridge offered the 
Movement both a language and a theory of knowledge in which to articulate its 
increasingly sacramental vision of the world, and one which corresponded 
closely with its notion of God’s “reserved” manifestation of Himself in nature, 
the Sacraments, and the Church’.169 We will see the importance of this 
combination of ideas in the following chapters. Hedley argues that the Aids to 
Reflection is, like the ‘Enneads’ of Plotinus, ‘a spiralling ascent of the mind; a 
spiritual exercise aimed at divesting the reader of materialistic assumptions and 
errors, and providing aids to a bending back or “reflection” of the soul to its 
divine source.’170 This is a helpful way in which to approach the ‘Lectures’ 
also, both an argument and, in parts, an ascetic exercise. We have seen already 
that Pusey also seeks to expose the ‘materialistic assumptions and errors’ 
characteristic of the modern approach to theology. Also according to Pusey’s 
argument, the solution is not as simple as correcting an error, it requires the re-
education of sensibility. We will see in Chapter 3 and following that his 
exposition of typology is not only a description of a certain kind of exegesis 
but a sacramental practice meant to restore the image or reflection of God in 
the soul. Hedley describes Coleridge’s project: 
The real conflict, Coleridge insists, is not between religion and 
enlightenment; belief and secularity; reason and ignorance … but 
between a spiritual and a materialistic metaphysics. Once one accepts 
that our organs of sense are framed for a sensory world and our organs of 
spirit for a spiritual (cf. BL i. 242), one can see that the real conflict 
concerns metaphysics and values.171  
Like Coleridge, Pusey seeks to demonstrate that the problem of rationalism or 
empiricism is not confined to those who explicitly attack or disregard Christian 
doctrines. Rather, Pusey seeks to expose and correct the ‘materialistic 
                                                 
168 There is a general consensus that Pusey was influenced by Coleridge. David Jasper 
comments that Pusey ‘drew extensively, if critically, upon his reading of Coleridge’ for the 
‘Lectures’ (Jasper 1985, 154). Martin Roberts finds a ‘Coleridgean ethos’ in Pusey’s concern for 
‘the ascent of consciousness and its concrete ecclesiastical focus or shape’ (Roberts 1983, 45). 
169 Snook, 2001, 8-9. 
170 Hedley 2000, 8. 
171 Ibid. 146.  
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metaphysics’ embodied in the apologetic approach to Scripture. Hedley’s 
description of another concern of Coleridge applies to the ‘Lectures’ directly: 
‘a bad philosophy, i.e. empiricism, will lead to Socinianism or an outright 
hostility towards Christian tenets’.172 Having exposed both the rationalistic 
assumptions and empiricist scepticism which he finds in modern approaches to 
the Old Testament, Pusey will go on to consider the spiritual faculties, ‘our 
organs of the spirit’, by which we may receive spiritual truth. Pusey’s 
discussion of types and prophecy in the Old Testament is not only a discussion 
about exegesis, but a project which offers an alternative approach to theology. 
 
                                                 
172 Ibid. 55. 
 81 
 
Chapter 3 Knowledge as Participation 
3.1 Knowing through what is Divine in Us 
Pusey’s search to uncover the Rationalist principles and assumptions of 
apologetic or evidence-based approaches to prophecy leads him to consider 
broader theological questions about the kind of knowledge which prophecy 
reveals and how that knowledge is grasped. Fundamentally, Pusey understands 
religious knowledge to involve a participation in the divine life. Therefore, this 
knowledge is not only a matter of intellect, but is affected by moral character 
and perception, it is both a frame of mind and a kind of vision. Coming to see 
what Scripture reveals is also a test or trial which is itself a means of 
sanctification. The unsystematic character of Pusey’s account of our spiritual 
faculties makes it difficult to bring together the different aspects of his 
argument. However, despite these complexities there is a necessary connection 
between how he conceives perceiving the meaning of prophecy and the soul 
and character which grasps that meaning. Pusey’s theory of knowledge is 
interwoven with his account of the constitution and powers of the human soul. 
This chapter will investigate the issues of epistemology and theological 
anthropology which belong together in Pusey’s argument. 
For Pusey, how much we can understand what prophecy reveals is a 
particular example of the more general question of how it is possible to know 
God or spiritual things at all. Pusey explains the necessary obscurity of human 
knowledge of God in terms of theological anthropology: 
God and His ways and His Nature we can, of course, know but in part; 
and our highest knowledge must be our indistinctest; for that which is 
most elevated must most surpass our comprehension; it belongs to 
another sphere, and just touches, as it were, upon that wherein we dwell; 
its centre is not in this world, and so we cannot surely it encompass; its 
very proportions we can discern only here and there as we see ‘parts of 
His ways’ bearing one upon another; as a whole we see nothing, can 
judge of nothing; because we are not at the centre whence it can be seen; 
our most spiritual faculties are just allied to it, for we are in the flesh. 
(L2) 
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Pusey argues that we know God as much as we are like God, while conversely 
because we are unlike God our knowledge of Him must be limited:  
Because we are of God and born of God, we have some sense for 
beholding the things of God; but because we are in the flesh, and ‘no 
man can see God and live’, the light but parts from between the clouds 
lest we should be struck down to the earth and blinded. (L2) 
Here Pusey follows the characteristic Platonic idea that like knows like. We 
cannot comprehend fully what we discern of God because we are ‘in the flesh’. 
The focus on empirical forms of knowledge in theology creates the illusion: 
‘Men think that they gain in clearness, but they lose in depth’. (L24) At the 
same time, knowledge of God is accessible to us because there is a likeness or 
similarity between the knower and the object of knowledge, ‘our spiritual 
faculties are just allied to it’. 
Our highest knowledge of God is a participation in knowledge which is 
first and primarily God’s knowledge. The human capacity to know God or the 
things of God is directly related to our share in what belongs to God: ‘The soul, 
through that which is divine in it, just putteth forth itself and half-seeth things 
invisible, but cannot declare them or embody them in words. St Paul’s highest 
revelations and visions were “unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a 
man to utter”’. (L2) Our likeness with God is not merely an accidental 
similarity, but involves a genuine communion, a sharing in the life and 
knowledge of God. We can know God and supernatural revelation because we 
are ‘born of God’ and have something of the divine life in us. However, Pusey 
holds in tension this view of knowledge as participation with an emphasis on 
the distinction between humanity and divinity. Our knowledge of God is 
limited by his transcendence as well as human incapacity to apprehend the 
Divine. In his study of Pusey’s ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin argues that central 
to the ‘Tractarian vision of the world and of God’ is the idea ‘that at the 
moment of recognising the utter transcendence of God we also experience his 
agonising nearness’.1 Both these elements of nearness and transcendence are 
part of Pusey’s account of participation. 
                                                 
1 Allchin 1967, 53-4. 
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Marshall indicates that in addition to patristic sources, Pusey referred to 
Richard Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity V.56.7-8 and V.56.11 to fill 
out the implications of ‘The participation of the divine Nature’.2 In these 
passages, Hooker emphasizes the ‘mystery of our coherence with Jesus Christ’ 
whereby ‘by virtue of this mystical conjunction, we are of him and in him even 
as though our very flesh and bones should be made continuate with his’.3 
Hooker uses the language of participation explicitly: ‘We are therefore adopted 
sons of God to eternal life by participation of the only-begotten Son of God, 
whose life is the well-spring and cause of ours.’4  
What Pusey suggests about knowledge as a kind of participation in other 
writings also helps one to see the importance of this idea in the ‘Lectures’. In 
an Easter sermon in the first volume of his Parochial Sermons (1848) entitled 
‘The Christian’s Life in Christ’, Pusey argues that New Testament references 
to being ‘in Christ’ or ‘dwelling’ in God describe more than the ‘mere lifting 
up of our affections to Him’ or being ‘enwrapt in contemplation of Him’.5 For 
Pusey, humanity’s union with God is the ‘great difference between us and the 
brute creation’: ‘By dwelling in us, He makes us parts of Himself, so that in the 
Ancient Church they could boldly say, “He deifieth me,” that is, He makes me 
part of Him, of His Body, Who is God.’6 This idea is so important that in the 
preface to the volume he vows to return to it again and again: 
The writer, however, rather wishes to remark what sort of repetition he 
did not wish to avoid, the inculcation of the Great Mystery, expressed in 
the words to be ‘in Christ,’ to be ‘Members of Christ,’ ‘Temples of the 
Holy Ghost;’ that Christ doth, through the Holy Ghost Whom He hath 
given to us, dwell really and truly in the hearts of the faithful. This 
                                                 
2 2 Pet. 1:4 quoted in Laws, V.56.7, 249. For Marshall’s references, see M82. 
3 Laws V.56.7, 249-250. Hooker refers to Eph. 5:30. 
4 Laws, V.56.7, 250. 
5 Sermon XVI, ‘The Christian’s Life in Christ’, in PS-I, 234.  
6 Ibid. 233. Pusey quotes Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Cyril of Jerusalem in support 
of this argument. See Allchin 1988, 56-61, for another consideration of the importance of the 
‘patristic understanding of the indwelling of God in man’ (p. 58) both for Pusey and the 
Oxford Movement. See also Rowell 1983, 81-82, and Hedley 1996, 238-51.  
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doctrine he has the more insisted upon, as it is to be feared that it is 
habitually neglected, even by many who do not in words deny it.7  
In his study of the Oxford Movement, Owen Chadwick argues that the 
consideration of a person’s participation or incorporation in the divine life has 
a particular emotional or mystical force in Pusey’s writing when compared to 
other Tractarians:  
Upon the doctrinal plane, Pusey’s language imparted a new note to the 
common language of the Tractarians. The Church is the Body of Christ 
that is common to them all. But Pusey almost feels the individual’s 
incorporation into the Body. His language is more mystical (in the 
modern rather than the contemporary sense) than the language of any 
other Tractarian, and in its dwelling upon the participation of the 
Christian in the divinity of Christ, the union of the soul with its 
Redeemer, can rise to heights of beauty. Brilioth, indeed, named him the 
doctor mysticus of the Movement.8 
We will see in this chapter that this doctrine of participation and the 
understanding of humankind as made in God’s image fundamentally shapes 
Pusey’s understanding of epistemology in the ‘Lectures’.  
In emphasizing the idea that knowledge of God is a kind of participation, 
Pusey understands himself to be challenging the apologetic approach and 
correcting the confusions of rationalism. Ten years after he delivered the 
‘Lectures’, he argued that one of Hampden’s most serious errors was to 
describe as a ‘Pantheistic notion’ the idea of ‘“a participation of Deity”, or an 
actual deification of our nature’.9 Pusey writes: ‘It is then very serious, when 
the doctrine of “the participation of the Divine Nature” (2 S. Pet. i. 4.) is 
represented as Pantheistic; it is directly to prepare the way for error, to 
represent the truth as involving it.’10 For Pusey, the empiricism and pantheistic 
materialism that he criticizes in Paley and Hampden, and which we considered 
in the last chapter, is an attack on the doctrine of participation: ‘This very 
                                                 
7 PS-I, v. See also pp. xix-xxi, especially n. x, where Pusey discusses his understanding of 
participation. 
8 Chadwick 1990, 39. See also Brilioth 1933, 296. On the importance of the doctrine of 
participation for the Oxford Movement, see Louth 1983, 74: ‘it is this realisation that God 
gives us not just His gifts, but Himself, that is the deepest conviction of the Fathers of the 
Oxford Movement’. 
9 Pusey quotes Sch.Phil. in PS-I, xx, in the footnote.  
10 PS-I, i, xix-xx, footnote. 
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narrowness of conception with regard to men’s practical character is tending to 
make them moral or religious machines, instead of realizing their privilege of 
union with God.’11  
Conceiving knowledge as participation assumes a spiritual sense which 
comes not primarily from analysis, but from communion with God. In these 
terms, insisting on the clarity and intelligibility of prophecy is a method which 
seeks to ascertain divine truth from the outside, by reading the surface of 
things. Rather, Pusey describes knowledge as communion by using the image 
of dwelling in a house. Examining the structure or character of truth from the 
outside will not do, one must dwell in the house: ‘It is not the question, 
whether … the design would have given us such or such notions, but now that 
the building is reared and we are dwelling therein … to understand our own 
way in that building’. (L30-31) Or to put it in another way, as he does both in 
the ‘Lectures’ and in the Tracts on baptism, we can only grasp the importance 
and place of any idea or truth in the divine economy from the centre, from 
within the divine life: 
If we imagine that we can assign to each truth its class or place in the 
divine economy, or weigh its value, or measure its importance, then we 
are again forgetting our own relation to God, and from the corner of His 
world in which we are placed, would fain judge of the order and 
correspondences and harmonies of things, which can only be seen or 
judged of, from the centre, which is God Himself.12 
In his study of the ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin describes Pusey’s criticism of 
the apologetic tendencies in prophecy according to the priority he gives to an 
internal apprehension of spiritual truth: 
Clarity and intelligibility are of course in themselves good. Their danger 
in theology is that they should give us an external notion of things, that 
we should gain a wrong sort of objectivity, seeking to grasp divine truths 
from outside, where in fact there are realities which can only be 
understood in so far as we are entering into them and being grasped by 
them.13 
                                                 
11 DrH., xvii. 
12 Scr.HB., 5. See also L2 above. 
13 Allchin 1967, 58.  
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While we ought not to revel in obscurity, we cannot force interpretation and 
reach the centre, ‘which is God Himself’, by work of the human intellect 
alone.14 Rather, the goal of our interpretation must be to see things from within 
the divine life. In the search for ‘the religious element of prophecy’, the 
primary agency is not human but divine. The knowledge which is sought is not 
a lifeless fact but a living truth which grasps the one who knows.  
3.2 The Moral Character of Religious Knowledge 
3.2.1 Unbelief and Rationalism as Moral Problems 
The way in which knowledge of God goes along with likeness to God points to 
a central tenet both of the ‘Lectures’ and of the Tractarian arguments generally. 
Religious knowledge has a moral character. Knowledge and the formation of 
character must go together because in God truth cannot be separated from 
righteousness. Since knowledge is a function of likeness, epistemology and 
theological anthropology cannot be separated, and both are subservient to 
theology. Prophecy reveals the Incarnate Lord, ‘Full of grace and truth’ [John 
1:17]. (L24) When he describes the Son as the true image of God, Pusey draws 
on Origen to emphasize this unity of truth and holiness: ‘the image of God is 
wisdom, the image of God is righteousness, but Divine Wisdom and Eternal 
Righteousness’. (L148)15 What a person knows about God cannot be separated 
from becoming more righteous or holy, sharing in the life of God. A true 
understanding of revelation, the ability to read the Scriptures with 
understanding, is the result of sanctification more than the correct application 
of analytical reason. A good argument will not solve the problem of unbelief 
because the sort of unbelief which darkens our mind is primarily a moral rather 
than an intellectual problem: ‘unbelief originated in moral or religious defects. 
“They could not believe because their hearts were hardened.”’ (L5) It is this 
hardness of heart, the type of unbelief which has the character of sin, which 
                                                 
14 Pusey also warns about the perversity of ignoring what is clear: ‘these flashes, so to speak, 
out of the cloud, impress us often even more with God’s Presence than the noon-day 
brightness. Of course, a very perverted use might be made of this feeling, if persons were to 
look out for passages which should thus strike them, or so prefer them as to lose out of sight 
the depth of God’s direct teaching.’ T67rev., 65. 
15 See Origin, De Principiis, IX.4. 
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prevents us from understanding the words of the prophets or the deep meaning 
of Christ’s parables:  
And accordingly, it is said of prophecy, as of the parables of our Lord – 
as indeed in other respects these mutually bear upon each other, the 
parables being prophetic, the prophecies parabolic – of both it is said, 
that they would be so constructed as to be hidden from those of wrong 
tempers. (L5) 
Pusey argues that the study of Scripture requires not simply certain analytical 
tools and extensive knowledge, but a character which displays likeness with 
God. 
 Pusey’s approach in the ‘Lectures’ develops ideas he put forward in the 
Theology of Germany: 
For it is obvious that if scripture is to be understood from itself, those 
only can rightly and fully understand it who have a mind kindred to that 
of its author … In religious writings it is plain that the spirit required is a 
religious spirit; that none can truly understand St. Paul or St. John, whose 
mind has not been brought into harmony with theirs, has not been 
elevated and purified by the same spirit with which they were filled.16 
Pusey traced the rise of rationalism to moral defects as well as to theological or 
intellectual ones. Pusey saw this exemplified in Johann David Michaelis*, 
Professor of Oriental languages at Göttingen and a teacher of Eichhorn: ‘Deep 
insight into religion were indeed inconsistent  with the intemperate habits and 
low moral character of Michaelis’.17 In order to be able to read and understand 
prophecy, it is this wrong temper and character which must be addressed. In 
Owen Chadwick’s words: ‘Pusey believed that the monster which he termed 
“rationalism” was always due to a failure in morals.’18 
3.2.2 Practical holiness and the formation of right belief 
Pusey’s argument is not just that moral problems prevent one from 
understanding prophecy or religious knowledge more generally, but that a life 
of practical holiness can repair the disordered understanding. Acting on belief 
and training the will offers its own kind of argument and demonstration: 
                                                 
16 TG-I 26-7. See also TG-I, 120, 143, and TG-II, 421. 
17 TG-I, 136.  
18 Chadwick 1960, 59. 
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We are not formed to seek conviction, but to have it. It is brought to us in 
the way of our duty. In all practical matters we live in belief and through 
acting on belief, believe in the things of God, and thereby attain a higher 
kind of belief, and an insight into our belief. (L6) 
Pusey described this approach in a letter to Tholuck in 1839: ‘Our Great 
Divines and we after them say; yes, “crede ut intelligas”’, believe in order that 
you may understand.19 This does not mean only that faith seeks to discern the 
rational truth of Christian doctrine. The Christian seeks understanding by 
acting on what is grasped only imperfectly and by faith, and by this response of 
the whole person, the eye of intellect is turned toward the divine light. 
Pereiro’s description of Keble applies equally well to Pusey:  
The remedy was to strengthen the eyes of the intellect by means of 
repentance, devotion, and self-denial, so as to make them able to stand 
the light of divine truth … Intellectual acuteness and industry, if not 
accompanied by that moral training, would be equivalent to the blind 
leading the blind.20 
According to Pusey, the sanctified life is the organ, the eye, and also the power 
which enables the Christian to perceive the deep truths which prophecy 
reveals. Donald Allchin sees this as characteristic of the Tractarian vision 
which is embodied in Pusey’s ‘Lectures’. In order to appreciate or experience 
God’s revelation, ‘all the resources of the human mind and heart must be 
summoned to its apprehension, in the end no words can express it. It must be 
known in life.’21  
Once again, Coleridge serves as a useful guide in approaching the 
‘Lectures’. Coleridge writes, ‘Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; 
but a Life; – not a Philosophy of Life, but a Life and a living Process.’22 In 
order to prove Christianity, one does not elaborate evidences, rather, one must 
live it. To prove it, says Coleridge, ‘TRY IT.’23 The Christian sees spiritual 
things and divine light only through the lens of his whole life, not by the 
applications of analytical processes. The ‘phantasms’ which were formed by 
                                                 
19 Pusey to Tholuck, 19. Nov. 1839, LBV-127. 
20 Pereiro 2008, 96. 
21 Allchin 1967, 54 
22 Aids, 202 
23 Ibid. 
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walking in darkness or ‘the Bodings inspired by the long habit of selfishness, 
and self-seeking cunning’ are like a mist which veil or confuse the pilgrim’s 
perception of the divine light.24 If bad habits and confused desires can impair a 
person’s ability to grasp religious truth, reformed habits and sanctified desires 
can function as reliable guides. Coleridge argues that the goal of Christianity is 
to ‘moralize the affections’.25 He describes ‘a tranquil habit of inward life’ as 
‘a spiritual Sense’.26 In a phrase that characterizes Pusey’s approach equally 
well, the Cambridge divine F. J. A. Hort describes this as ‘the doctrine of the 
ultimate identity of knowledge and moral excellence, which is latent through 
Coleridge’s philosophy’.27 
The theme that practical holiness goes together with the formation of 
right belief appears in Pusey’s writings throughout his life and in the writings 
of other members of the Oxford movement. Pusey’s first sermon, preached on 
7 September, 1828, was on the text ‘Follow peace with all men, and holiness, 
without which no man shall see the Lord’ (Heb. 12:14). Liddon comments on 
the importance of this idea for Pusey and the Tractarians: ‘It is remarkable that 
the first of Mr. Newman’s published Parochial Sermons is on the same text and 
subject. The movement in which they both took so leading a part was, before 
all things, a call to “holiness.”’28 Peter Nockles argues that the Oxford 
Movement’s emphasis on the importance of the formation of character was a 
reaction to a prevailing emphasis on the power of the intellect exemplified by 
the Oriel Noetics: ‘the Tractarians … reacted against the “presumptuous turn of 
mind, the reliance on intellectual ability, supposed to result from instruction 
addressing itself to the intellect alone”, in favour of “formation of moral 
character by habit” and the inculcation of the deeper ethical and spiritual truths 
of moral philosophy’.29 In his study of Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ and the Tractarian 
use of the Bible, Andrew Louth sees this emphasis on the moral character of 
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28 Life, 144. 
29 Nockles 1994, 202. 
 90 
knowledge as a work of retrieval. The Tractarians shared with the Romantics a 
‘common stress on the moral conditions of real human knowledge, something 
derived from their common indebtedness to Greek wisdom’.30 Both in reaction 
to prevailing trends, and in an effort to recover a way of thinking which they 
believed endangered, the Tractarians emphasized the link between knowledge 
and formation of character. Owen Chadwick writes: ‘it is not likely that any 
sound Christian thinking will again lose the integral connexion between faith 
and the conscience, that essential link between religious propositions and moral 
judgements, which is one contribution of the Oxford Movement to English 
thought’.31 In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey applies a basic Tractarian ideal to the 
interpretation of Old Testament prophecy.  
3.2.3 Reading prophecy as a means of sanctification 
Pusey’s understanding of the moral character of religious knowledge also 
means that understanding prophecy is a way by which one’s character is 
formed and shaped. Pusey argues that prophecy offers a sort of trial or test:  
The marks which God therein gave to His people, as the birth – of a 
virgin – at Bethlehem, were so many tests whereby to distinguish this 
true Messiah: tokens, given to as many as looked and longed for Him 
whereby they should know Him for whom they looked and longed. (L4)  
The nature of a ‘token’ or a ‘test’ is that it is possible to fail to see that which 
they reveal. What prophecy shows is not the type of knowledge which can be 
taught to all equally well, provided only that they have sound cognitive 
abilities.  
Pusey’s argument here appears to be influenced once again by Joseph 
Butler’s Analogy of Religion. From the observation that in day to day situations 
we act on the basis of probability rather than absolute certainty Butler derives 
his famous dictum that ‘probability is the very guide of life’.32 Even though we 
must weigh various kinds of uncertainty in seeking success in any undertaking, 
                                                 
30 Louth 1984, 36. See also Hort 1856, 324, for this idea discussed in relation to Coleridge. 
31 Chadwick 1960, 61. See also, p. 26: ‘The mode of receiving or apprehending doctrine is 
believed, by all these men, as they react against the “merely” intellectual, the school of 
religious philosophy, to be related to moral and spiritual capacity.’  
32 Anal., 3.  
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we are accountable for how we respond to those uncertainties and for what 
kind of choices we make. According to the principle of analogy, ‘There seems 
to be no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral 
probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of 
religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common affairs.’33 
There are two closely related aspects to this which are important to 
identify and distinguish. On the one hand, our moral character affects our 
capacity to receive and understand religious knowledge; it has, in Pereiro’s 
description of Butler, an ‘intellectual dimension’.34 The attentiveness, 
seriousness, impartiality, or concern with which we consider uncertain 
evidence or difficult problems reflects our moral condition: 
And in general, levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice, do hinder us 
from being rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they 
may, in like manner, and perhaps in some further providential manner, 
with respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder evidence from 
being laid before us, and from being seen when it is … that those who are 
desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it; and that honest-
minded persons should.35 
We have seen the importance of these views for Pusey above. Failing the test 
or trial of prophecy reveals our moral condition. 
However, for Butler as for Pusey, our moral or spiritual condition alone 
does not determine how we understand religious knowledge in a straight-
forward or static way, so that a person of such a level of holiness will 
understand the same level of revelation. Rather, the act of reading and seeking 
to understand is a kind of trial, a spiritual or ascetic exercise. How one 
responds to uncertain evidence in matters of religion affects whether or not we 
will change to become more like God: ‘The evidence of Religion not appearing 
obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious 
sense: as it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their 
                                                 
33 Anal. II.6, 234. 
34 Pereiro 2008, 92, offers a helpful summary of Butler’s understanding of how weighing 
evidence is a form of moral probation. 
35 Anal. II.6, 244-5. 
 92 
understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence.’36 We have 
seen the importance of this idea in the ‘Lectures’ in Pusey’s interpretation of 
Christ’s rebuke of the Sadducees and, more generally, in the unwillingness of 
apologetic writers to discern what obscure passages teach. Accepting uncertain 
evidence or an obscure prophecy is a sanctifying trial which requires the 
exercise of virtue so that one does not evade the evidence that a more humble 
or attentive regard would see.  
The idea that the obscurities of Scripture may serve a providential 
purpose which give scope for the exercise of virtue and virtuous interpretation 
extends beyond Butler to the early ages of the Church. One finds this also in 
Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, the influence of which Duane Arnold 
maintains is clearly evident in the ‘Lectures’.37 Augustine writes that the 
‘ambiguities and obscurities’ of Scripture were ‘provided by God to conquer 
pride by work and to combat disdain in our minds, to which those things which 
are easily discovered seem frequently to become worthless’.38 This trial is 
necessary to overcome that pride and disdain ‘by which those things which are 
easily discovered seem frequently to become worthless’.39 The need for a 
‘virtuous exercise’ of the understanding that one finds in both Butler and Pusey 
is articulated by Augustine also. The movement toward God, the ‘journey or 
voyage home’, is not a journey through space, but one of ‘cleansing’: ‘we do 
not come to Him who is everywhere present by moving from place to place, 
but by good endeavour and good habits’.40 This moral and spiritual purpose is 
the primary end served by Scripture: ‘the end or purpose in this and every 
thing, must be instruction, edification, not gratification of our curiosity, or 
indulgence of the imagination’. (L12)  
Pusey argues both that the pursuit of a holy life is necessary in order to 
read prophecy with understanding, and that reading prophecy faithfully 
sanctifies the soul. In their book Sanctified Vision: An Introduction to Early 
                                                 
36 Anal. II.6, 234. 
37 Arnold 1995, 207-16. 
38 Augustine 1958, 2.6.7, 37. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 1.10.10, 13.  
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Christian Interpretation of the Bible, John O’Keefe and R. Reno argue that this 
double emphasis is characteristic of the patristic period: ‘the notion that 
exegesis fosters and flows from a disciplined life’ was ‘universal in the early 
Church’. They find in the first Theological Oration of Gregory of Nazianzus 
the idea that theology is ‘the discipline of thought that emerges from the 
formation of the mind in accordance with scripture’. For Gregory, this 
discipline is ‘only for those who have been tested and have found a sound 
footing in study, and, more importantly, have undergone, or at the very least 
are undergoing, purification of body and soul’.41 In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey turns 
to Gregory of Nazianzus in a similar way, to argue for the need for the priest 
who ministers the Eucharistic Sacrifice to be formed according to the character 
of that sacrifice: 
… no one is worthy of that Great One – God, and Sacrifice, and High 
Priest – who has not first presented himself a living holy sacrifice to God, 
nor has sacrificed to God the sacrifice of praise and a broken heart 
(which sacrifice alone He who giveth all things asketh back from us). 
(L118)42 
An interesting element of this analysis is the insistence of both Pusey and 
Gregory that there is a danger involved in the interpretation of Scripture. Any 
genuine knowledge of God involves entering into the divine presence and thus 
an encounter with a holiness, goodness, and power which is beyond human 
imagining or control. Not only is intimate knowledge of God not possible for 
those who are not becoming like God, it is not safe. Gregory writes that ‘For 
one who is not pure to lay hold of pure things is dangerous, just as it is for 
weak eyes to look at the sun’s brightness’.43 Pusey applies this danger to the 
recovery of a patristic interpretation of Scripture:  
… it may be that all of us are, or have been, too much influenced by the 
atmosphere, with which we have been surrounded, ever to see clearly 
where the antient Fathers enjoyed such undisturbed vision. Nor would 
too hasty a return be safe; and a mere constrained adoption of their 
views, and a determination to see with their eyes, would restore no 
healthful, or clear sight; we cannot make ourselves see. (L38) 
                                                 
41 O’Keefe 2005, 139. 
42 Pusey quotes ‘In Defense of his Flight to Pontus’, 2.95, in Gregory Nazianzen 1994, 223. 
43 Gregory of Nazianzus, Theological Orations, 27.2 in O’Keefe 2005, 139. 
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O’Keefe and Reno’s aptly reflect Pusey’s views: ‘Vision must be sanctified if 
one is to see rather than be blinded by the mystery of God.’44  
3.2.4 Pusey’s Theory of Knowledge and the New Criticism 
Pusey’s account of knowledge as participation helps to explain another 
surprising aspect of his focus in the ‘Lectures’. In the mid-1830s, Pusey was 
one of scholars in England most familiar with the results of the historical-
critical studies which were transforming biblical studies in Germany and 
challenging views about the Bible which Pusey and most self-confessed 
orthodox Churchmen in England, High Church or Evangelical, would share.45 
Since Pusey believed that the Old Testament presented an accurate picture of 
the history of Israel and that miracles were reliable signs and evidences of the 
divinity of Christ, it is significant that in the ‘Lectures’ he did not address 
himself to the most obvious representatives of that ‘tide of scepticism’ which 
he believed was coming to England.46 His description of the Essays and 
Reviews (1860) as containing ‘nothing to which the older of us had not been 
inured for some forty years’ suggests that Pusey’s choice to focus on the 
problems of the evidentialist and apologetic school in the ‘Lectures’ was not 
simply a misjudgement brought about by not seeing where things were headed. 
Rather, for Pusey, defective forms of historical criticism were the fruit of the 
problem of rationalism, not its root.  
Pusey’s assessment of Heinrich Paulus (1761-1851), Professor of 
Exegesis and Church History in Heidelberg from 1811-41, exemplifies Pusey’s 
views. Although knowledge of German scholarship in England was still 
meagre in the 1830s, Rose had already described for English readers Paulus’ 
explanation of the miracle of the drachma in the fish’s mouth (Matt. 17:24-7). 
According to Paulus, the miracle gave an embroidered description of how Peter 
                                                 
44 O’Keefe 2005, 139. 
45 In his classic study, John Rogerson argues that it was not until the 1840s that German Old 
Testament scholarship was regularly reviewed and translated in England. See Rogerson 1984, 
158-79, and Life, 72. Prior to that, knowledge of German biblical scholarship was most 
advanced among Unitarians (pp. 158-9, see also Rose 1825, 67, 82, for this association). 
46 Pusey 1868, iii. 
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paid the tax with the money he earned from catching fish.47 In a similar vein, 
Paulus demythologized the miracle of Christ walking on water (Matt. 14:25-9). 
Christ had not joined the apostles in the boat on that occasion because the 
voyage would have been inconvenient against a contrary wind. Instead, he 
followed the boat on foot, along the water, not on top of it, and lifted Peter 
from the water while he stood on land (a mistake Paulus attributes to a 
mistranslation of ἐπὶ).48 Presumably with such examples in mind, Pusey 
censures ‘the low and vulgar tone of mind, in which Paulus degraded every 
thing spiritual and divine in the Gospels to the sphere of civil every-day life, 
the mean and earthly principles which he attributes to its actors’.49 By this 
approach, ‘far more injury has been produced than by the soon exploded and 
now  almost forgotten explanations of the miracles’.50 For Pusey, the denial of 
miracles was a symptom of rationalism, not its cause. Explaining miracles by 
natural causes can only undermine trust in the Scriptures if faith is already 
weakened: ‘The physical expositions of the Christian miracles again, which 
held in German a very pernicious, although short reign, are too preposterous to 
be received where the mind has not been already weakened’.51  
Pusey’s assessment of J. G. Eichhorn, whose lectures on the books of 
Moses Pusey attended in Göttingen during his first visit to Germany in the 
summer and autumn of 1825, illustrate Pusey’s criticisms of Paulus. 
Eichhorn’s analysis of the Jehovist and Elohist sources that lie behind the 
Pentateuch is similar to the more developed documentary hypothesis put 
forward and popularized later by Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918). However, for 
Pusey, the greatest ‘evils’ of the theories of J. G. Eichhorn did not result from 
his reassessment of Old Testament history, but from his ‘common-place views 
of the persons, actions, institutions,  and doctrines of Scripture’.52 Eichhorn 
treated the opening chapters of Genesis as a genuine account of the experience 
                                                 
47 Rose 1825,153-4. 
48 Rose 1825, 155-6. 
49 TG-I, 137. 
50 TG-I, 137. 
51 TG-II, 421. His comments on the ‘short reign’ of this view indicates that some parts at least 
of his assessment were inaccurate. 
52 TG-I, 137. 
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of primitive human beings, but argued that what was written needed to be 
understood as expressing that experience according to primitive or 
mythological modes of thought: ‘What lay behind Genesis 2-3 was the 
experience of a human couple who had become aware of their sexual 
differences as the result of eating slightly poisonous fruit from a tree. They had 
been driven in fright from their oasis by a thunderstorm, which to them 
indicated divine judgement.’53  
In Pusey’s assessment, theories like this one were ‘constructed on the 
assumed human origin of every phaenomemon in revealed religion’.54 While 
Pusey was impressed with Eichhorn’s extensive grasp of historical and critical 
information, he was shocked by his ‘total insensibility to the real religious 
import of the narrative’, i.e. his inability to interpret it.55 Pusey does not focus 
on the conclusions of Eichhorn’s studies of Old Testament history. Rather, he 
describes him in the same terms as Semler – it is the character of his mind and 
the principles which make his conclusions possible which are the real problem, 
not the simple fact that he draws on the tools of historical study.56 Pusey argues 
that insensibility to the supernatural leads to a ‘common-place’, ‘vulgar’ or 
‘carnal’ approach, an approach he learned from Paulus.57 This is another form 
of Pusey’s criticism of empiricism and its results which we considered in detail 
in the last chapter. The struggle between this empiricist or common-place 
approach and a spiritual one is part of ‘the only and deepest theme of the 
history of the world and man, the contest between faith and unbelief’.58 Pusey 
puts this argument most succinctly thirty years later. In the preface to his 
lectures on the prophet Daniel, published as a response to Essays and Reviews 
(1860), Pusey argues that unbelief is the cause of erroneous forms of historical 
criticism rather than the result:  
                                                 
53 Rogerson 1984, 18. 
54 TG-I, 137. See Life, 74: ‘the supernatural element was treated not as an objective reality but 
as representing an ancient and profoundly interesting phase of mind.’ 
55 Life, 73. 
56 In the same way Pusey criticised Semler’s ‘attempt to conciliate rationalism’ rather than the 
theory of positive accommodation which exercised Pusey’s English contemporaries. See TG-I, 
130, 139-40, 144, Rose 1825, 48, and Blunt 1874, 482. 
57 TG-I, 137, 130. 
58 TG-I, 5. 
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Disbelief of Daniel had become an axiom in the unbelieving critical 
school. Only, they mistook the result of unbelief for the victory of 
criticism. They overlooked the historical fact that the disbelief had been 
antecedent to the criticism. Disbelief had been the parent, not the 
offspring of their criticism; their starting-point, not the winning-post of 
their course.59 
Pusey’s analysis of the apologetic school in the ‘Lectures’ finds the origin of 
this disbelief in a rationalistic and empiricist approach which confused the 
collection of evidence from an understanding of the religious import of the 
narrative. His account of the moral character of knowledge shows why for 
Pusey a recovery of the patristic model of interpretation was the best antidote 
to the root problem. 
3.3 Reason and the Rational Soul in the ‘Lectures’ 
3.3.1 Assessments of the Character of Pusey’s Thought 
Pusey’s line of argument could suggest that his criticism of the apologetic 
school involves a pietistic or conservative reaction to the intellectual trends of 
his day; that he is unable or unwilling to address the theological issues 
involved in the arguments which he criticizes and so labels them as immoral or 
unfaithful. This kind of reading of the ‘Lectures’ would fit with how some 
scholars have characterized Pusey’s later work. In his article, ‘Edward 
Bouverie Pusey: From Scholar to Tractarian’, H. C. G. Matthew argues that 
while in his early work on German theology Pusey showed promise as a 
progressive and insightful scholar, he later retreated into a narrow and 
reactionary authoritarianism: ‘Although spiritually he enlarged the boundaries 
of Anglican devotionalism, intellectually and theologically he led Anglo-
Catholicism, which he himself did so much to establish, into a dead end.’60 
Similarly David Forrester sees Pusey’s contribution to the Oxford Movement 
in pietistic rather than intellectual terms: ‘In joining the Tractarians, therefore, 
it is not unlikely that Pusey hoped to foster an objectivized and 
institutionalized form of pietism such as he had experienced from his reading 
                                                 
59 Pusey 1868, vi. 
60Matthew 1981, 123. 
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of Spener and found practised among his German friends.’61 Forrester’s 
argument seems to find support in the way in which, in the first part of his 
Theology of Germany, Pusey quoted with approval Schleiermacher’s maxim, 
‘The endeavour to introduce philosophical systems into theology is generally at 
variance with a correct interpretation of Scripture.’62 Liddon refers to this as 
one of those maxims of Schleiermacher to which Pusey later referred to as 
‘useful to bear in mind’.63 In his study of Pusey’s appropriation of the ideas of 
the Fathers, Robert Crouse argues that Pusey’s acceptance of Schleiermacher’s 
maxim is indicative of an approach which carried Pusey’s suspicion of 
rationalism to a dogmatic ‘neo-pietism’.64 Crouse argues that Pusey ‘was 
oblivious to the philosophical foundations and character of patristic thought; it 
must stand upon authority alone, and allegiance to it was simply a moral 
question’.65 Crouse sees this as an expression of the Tractarian emphasis on 
piety over critical thought: ‘Characteristic of Pusey’s thought, and, indeed, or 
Tractarian thought in general, was the conviction that critical reason must 
always be subordinated to moral and religious ends.’66  
While these assessments are generally based on works written 
considerably later than the ‘Lectures’, they affect how people approach the 
‘Lectures’ and Pusey’s work more generally. On the basis of the Library of the 
                                                 
61 Forrester 1989,114-5. For Pusey’s view of the importance of Spener, see TG-I, 72-82. 
62 TG-I, 115 n. 1. Pusey quotes Schleiermacher from his Kurze Darstellung des theologischen 
Studiums (1811), later translated as Brief Outline of the Study of Theology.  
63 Life, 84. 
64 Crouse 1983, 147. 
65 Ibid. 146. See also Crouse 1990, 333. Albrecht Geck sees the Hampden controversy in these 
terms, with Pusey taking up an orthodoxist and moralistic position against Hampden’s free 
enquiry (Geck 2009, 95). The argument of Chapter 1 of this thesis suggests that this 
assessment gives insufficient notice to the theological and philosophical issues Pusey raises in 
his pamphlets opposing Hampden’s view. 
66 Ibid. 143. It is not clear how Pusey used the term ‘philosophy’ in the reference to 
Schleiermacher’s maxim. Even in the Theology of Germany, where that quotation appears, 
Pusey praises the Platonist Philo (TG-I, 143). In Tract 67 Pusey uses the term philosophy in 
both negative and positive senses; negatively as a synonym for merely human reasoning, 
positively to describe the knowledge which perceives spiritual realities (T67r, 132, 274). Henry 
Wilberforce, who aligned himself with the Tractarians in arguments about subscription to the 
Thirty-Nine Articles, referred to ‘those elegant and scientific pursuits which in our day … have 
usurped almost exclusively possession of the title of philosophy’ (Pereiro 2008, 89). If 
Wilberforce is articulating a generally held view, then in criticising the application of 
philosophy to the interpretation of the Bible, Pusey would be criticising primarily an empirical 
and rationalistic approach, naturalism or scientism, rather than one which draws on other kinds 
of philosophical reflection. 
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Fathers alone, Nockles argues that ‘to regard the painstaking patristic labours 
of the Tractarians such as Pusey as something of a turning of the back on 
genuine academic scholarship … is less than fair’.67 Rather, ‘the rise of the 
Oxford Movement’, a rise to which Pusey contributed so significantly, ‘was 
partly the product of a spirit of intense intellectual enquiry’.68 Timothy Larsen 
also describes Pusey’s work of retrieval as expansive rather than narrow: 
‘Indeed, Pusey’s commitment to thinking about the contents of Holy Scripture 
along with the voices of the great tradition of Christian thought is positively 
fashionable in our own day … making the claim that Pusey was an obscurantist 
who drove into a dead end ring ever more hollow’.69 Another contemporary 
scholar, Christopher Seitz, also emphasizes Pusey’s theological 
‘comprehensiveness’: ‘Pusey’s defence of Daniel’s authorship engaged “text, 
church, and world” with just as much seriousness as something later to be 
called specialized academic discourse.’70  
Determining the merits of Pusey’s later biblical scholarship is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.71 Nonetheless, despite the importance of sanctification in 
Pusey’s theory of knowledge, the assessment of Pusey’s later work as 
dogmatic and reactionary does not adequately describe Pusey’s argument in the 
‘Lectures’. We have seen already how Pusey’s description of the moral 
character of religious knowledge is closely connected to his understanding of 
knowledge as a kind of participation. His emphasis on the moral and religious 
character of knowledge needs to be seen in this light rather than as a merely 
pietistic emphasis on morality in the face of challenges to traditional mores or 
patterns of education. Andrew Louth’s analysis of William Sanday’s 
assessment of Newman supports the view that Pusey’s approach to patristic 
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71 Some of the scholars referred to already have attempted this. For Timothy Larsen, ‘Daniel 
the Prophet is as direct and thorough and learned an engagement with all the latest findings of 
the higher criticism of the Bible as one could imagine’, ‘so formidable that, in Britain at least, 
it was unanswerable’. Larsen 2009, 506. See also 507 (referring to Livesley 1983, 75–6) and 
513 and Faught 2008, 143. R. W. Moberly supports Matthew’s verdict; while ‘Pusey’s deepest 
instincts were in many ways sound’, he allowed confessional presuppositions to get in the way 
of discovering the best construal of the Hebrew text. Moberly 2002, 182.  
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exegesis and typology reflects his theory of knowledge. When considering the 
‘balance and combination of qualities’ needed to write a classic modern life of 
Christ, Sanday wrote: ‘What is wanted is a Newman, with science and 
adequate knowledge. No one has ever touched the Gospels with so much innate 
kinship of Spirit as he.’72 Louth comments: ‘But the proviso – “with science 
and adequate knowledge” – is significant … For the presuppositions involved 
in filling such a lack as Sanday felt in Newman would have seemed to 
Newman himself, and his fellow Tractarians, as endangering the whole attempt 
to come closer to an understanding of Christ’.73 Louth’s description of the 
problem with Sanday’s assessment of Newman applies equally to Pusey for the 
same reasons. In his rejection of the apologetic method and his advocacy of a 
typological reading of Scripture, Pusey emphasizes precisely the character of 
knowledge and the kind of science which is needed in the interpretation of the 
Bible. As we have seen in this chapter, ‘kinship of spirit’, or like knowing like, 
is a fundamental principle, not a desirable accessory. Pusey was the member of 
the Movement best equipped with the scientific tools of the Biblical 
scholarship of his day, yet he did not think that historical criticism would offer 
the key to unlock the meaning of prophecy. What is important to see is that he 
did not think that the appropriate application of historical or linguistic tools 
alone could unlock the meaning of Scripture, and that Pusey came to this view 
on the basis of theological principles. Pusey’s theory of knowledge and his 
exegesis of Scripture belong to this wider theological vision. 
3.3.2 The Image of God in the Reasonable Soul  
Examining what Pusey says about the soul and the spiritual faculties which 
enable a person to discern spiritual things demonstrates the theological 
character of his approach: ‘the soul, through that which is divine in it, just 
putteth forth itself and half-seeth things invisible’. (L2-3) It is the soul which 
receives or comprehends revelation and comes to know ‘God and His ways and 
His Nature’, which is our ‘highest knowledge’. (L2) What Abraham knew of 
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73 Louth 1984, 30. 
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‘the day of Christ’ he knew because of the light which ‘God poured into his 
soul’, and it was ‘his soul, as being more susceptible to divine truth’ which 
‘understood things unspeakable, above what our thoughts reach to’. (L71) 
Pusey’s explanation of how prophecy is best understood and interpreted is also 
a study of theological anthropology, an examination of the character and 
capacities of the human soul. Pusey also calls these capacities or powers ‘our 
spiritual faculties’. (L2) In Pusey’s argument, the interpretation of Scripture 
goes together with the transformation of the soul which is made in the image of 
God and called to grow in the likeness of God.  
Pusey develops both his doctrine of participation and his understanding 
of the soul through a lengthy consideration of patristic expositions of Genesis 
1:26, ‘And God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.”’74 
Pusey argues that according to the Fathers these words imply an ‘actual 
participation of His Godhead’, and treats them as a prophecy of the New 
Testament understanding of humankind’s communion with God through 
Christ. (L139) Pusey introduced this discussion with an analysis of Adam’s 
creation: 
He was made bĕṣalĕmēnû kidĕmûtĕnu ̂ ‘in Our image, after Our 
Likeness’, or as is repeated bṣlmw ‘in His image’, ‘in the image of God’. 
The words must mean more than a mere external resemblance, of 
authority [as the Socinians say];75 for this very external resemblance does 
but shadow out, and is a result of that internal likeness ‘let us make man 
in Our Image and after Our Likeness, and let him have dominion’; the 
dominion is not the image but the consequence, yea the image of the 
Image. That very emphasis on the words would lead us to more than this; 
but with the light of the New Testament which teaches us Who is ‘the 
Image of the Invisible God’, (εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, Col. 1:15; 
εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, 2 Cor. 4:4), the Impress or Express Image of his Person 
(χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, Heb. 1:3) we can have no doubt that 
he was formed (in what way, we know not) after and in Him, who is the 
Image of God that ‘in His likeness, in the likeness of God’, means ‘in 
                                                 
74 L139-48. In ‘Notes’ Marshall gives the title as ‘Lecture the Eleventh, Quotations from the 
Fathers in support of the interpretations above given of Genesis III:22’. (M73) As discussed in 
the Introduction, Marshall’s ‘Notes’ show that Pusey used this material after the conclusion of 
the tenth lecture on L51. 
75 M69.  
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Him who is the likeness of God’, that dmwt [likeness], and ṣlm [image] 
are no more mere abstract terms than εἰκὼν and χαρακτὴρ. (L49) 
Pusey’s account of the soul and the spiritual faculties begins with a 
consideration of what it means for humanity to be made in the image and 
likeness of God, and in what ‘that internal likeness’ consists.  
An important part of Pusey’s examination of how the Fathers understand 
the image of God in humanity has to do with determining the role of reason 
and the relationship of human reason to the divine reason. In accord with the 
New Testament passages quoted above, Clement of Alexandria describes the 
Son as the primary or true image of the Father. Humankind is the image of this 
true image.76 Clement describes this image in humanity:  
Moses relates that ‘the reasonable (λογικη) soul was from above breathed 
by God into his face: […] wherefore man was formed after the image and 
likeness of God. For the image of God is the Divine and Royal Logos, 
ανθρωπος απαθης [the impassible man], but the image of that image is 
the human mind (νους) [εἰκὼν δʹεἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς]’. (L144)77 
In this quotation, the ‘reasonable’ or rational soul is not the faculty which 
rationalizes, which can only judge things according to sense, but rather the 
image of God in human person. Pusey draws on Clement again to clarify the 
difference between the reason which, in a corrupted form, is manifest in 
rationalism and the image of God in the ‘reasonable’ soul:  
The true image of God is His Word and the true Son of the (Divine) 
Mind is the Divine Word; Light the Archetype of Light; but the image of 
the Word is man; the true mind that which is in man, which is therefore 
said to have been formed after the image and likeness of God, being 
likened to the Logos or Reason on account of the φρονησις κατα καρδιαν 
and thereby itself partaking of the Logos. (L144)78 
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λόγος θεῖος καὶ βασιλικός, ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθὴς, εἰκὼν δʹ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς’. Clement of 
Alexandria 1869, 74. 
78 Pusey here quotes the Exhortation to the Greeks, chap. 10. See Clement of Alexandria 1960, 
214-215. 
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Clement describes the Son as an image of the Divine Mind. The ‘true mind’ of 
humanity is an image of this image which therefore participates in the Reason 
or Logos which is identified with the Son. This ‘true mind’ may refer to the 
whole ‘reasonable’ soul in the previous quotation, or perhaps only to the higher 
part of the reasonable soul, the human reflection of the divine mind 
(‘ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς’). ‘Mind’ is the term which Pusey most often uses in the 
‘Lectures’ to describe the intellect in a positive or neutral way. It is to a right 
‘frame of mind’, that ‘God discloses truth’. (L91)79 There is something wrong 
in the ‘frame of mind’ which would find a kind of ‘self-satisfaction, as sight 
had then substituted for faith’ at the ‘first proposal of evidence’. (L5) 
‘Reasoning,’ Pusey writes, ‘goes directly counter to the frame of mind wherein 
belief is received’. (L6) For Pusey, ‘mind’ appears to describe the higher part 
of the reasonable soul, the restored and enlightened human intellect, where the 
image of God is either being reformed or distorted. The significance of Pusey’s 
description of the ‘true mind’ in terms of an ‘understanding heart’ will be 
considered below, in relation to the spiritual faculties more generally.  
In order to understand the importance of this description of the image of 
God in humanity as the true mind it is important to consider how Pusey 
qualifies or limits this identification:  
But because Clement here speaks of the intelligent (νους) or ruling 
principle in man, as that which is formed after the image of God, let no 
one think that this is said in any modern sense, as if our likeness to God 
consisted (in any common-place way) in our being rational beings among 
the irrational. (L144-5) 
Pusey distinguishes the image of God in humanity, ‘the human mind’ or ‘the 
intelligent (νους) ruling principle in man’, from ‘our being rational among the 
irrational’. The ‘common-place’ error which Pusey wants to avoid is the 
equation of the image of God in the human mind with the merely instrumental 
or analytical powers of reason, however powerful. It is the later kind of reason 
which he criticizes as ‘rationalizing’ in the ‘Lectures’. Paley’s argument from 
design exemplifies ‘artificial reasoning’, and biblical types are hidden from a 
                                                 
79 Pusey refers to this ‘frame of mind’ throughout the ‘Lectures’, including L5, 5, 8, 87, 91, 
112. 
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‘precise and clear and reasoning habit of mind’. (L11) Whereas the sun is a 
symbol for revelation and its warmth, the moon symbolizes the ‘cold light of 
reason which governs the night and ever-changing earthly wisdom’. (L17)80 
Pusey may be drawing here on Johann Hamann (1730-88) and his critique of 
the Enlightenment reason as ‘a cold, unfruitful moonlight’. The equation of all 
reason with this ever-changing power is at the root of the rationalism Pusey 
finds in evidentialist theology. 
3.3.3 Restoration and Sanctification: From Image to Likeness 
Pusey’s account of the moral character of knowledge helps to explain the 
distinction he makes between a common-place notion of rationality and the 
image of God in humanity. He continues to refer to Clement of Alexandria: 
‘“And be not,” he represents our Saviour saying, “be not better than the 
irrational animals in reason only: For to give you the Λογος, the knowledge of 
God, I will give you Myself wholly.’” Knowledge of God is a form of 
participation in the life of God. Therefore, growing in knowledge of God 
involves becoming more like God who is ‘righteous and holy with wisdom’: 
… he alone may be called and must be believed to be ‘the image of God 
with His likeness’, having been made by Christ Jesus righteous and holy 
with wisdom, and so far, already like unto God. And again he says, in the 
more scientific work, Stromata 7: ‘The image most truly divine and like 
to God is the soul of the righteous man, wherein, through obedience to 
the commandments He is enshrined and setup.’(L146)81 
For Clement, the gift of the likeness of God which is also the gift of wisdom is 
a movement from being made in the image of God to sharing the likeness of 
God. Pusey quotes Clement again: ‘ye were of the old image (εἰκόνες) but not 
all like (ἐµφερεῖς), I wish to restore you to that Archetype, that you may also 
be like Me (ἵνα Μοι καὶ ὅµοιοι γνέεσθε)’.82 
In addition to Clement of Alexandria, Pusey draws on the testimony of 
Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyon, and Origen to argue that 
                                                 
80 See Betz 2012, 5. 
81 Pusey quotes Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, Chap. XII, and The 
Stromata, or Miscellanies, VII.4. See Clement of Alexandria 1960, 256-9, and 1994, 527. 
82 See Clement of Alexandria 1960, 258-9. 
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that ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ are not simply synonyms. (L139-148) Rather, the 
image describes the way in which humanity was first made and given a share 
in God’s character by creation. The Fall badly damaged and tarnished this 
image, but it did not destroy it: ‘that fuller likeness, which originally it bore … 
is, in a measure, defaced, it is not effaced’.83 Through the Incarnation, Christ 
restores the image of God in humanity: ‘Now again I will show you how He 
made the second creation (πλάσιν) which relates to us. The Lord says, “Behold 
I make in the last days, the last as the first – Behold then we are again re-
formed.”’ (L139)84 Being made ‘after the likeness of God’ describes the 
process by which a person who has been restored to God’s image is sanctified 
and changed to become an ever more true image, a genuine likeness. 
Commenting on this idea in Clement of Alexandria, Pusey argues that it is an 
insightful distinction in the Fathers more generally: 
Clement also retains the distinction between εἰκόνα and the ὁµοιώσεως, 
and we must needs think that they have done rightly, and faithfully, not 
at once, in a careless way, taking them to be parallel because the 
differences between them does not force itself upon our notice, noticing 
rather that the image or form is at once impressed, the likeness is 
continually and may endlessly deepen, until it could be finally perfected, 
and therewith agrees the Scripture saying that we are formed in the image 
of God but after His likeness, which implies a completion in the one 
case, a gradual conformation in the other. This first formation is in 
Baptism, the heightening of the likeness the subsequent work of the Holy 
Spirit. (L145) 
Interpreting the Bible is not an intellectual process by which verifiable data is 
extracted from the text of the Old Testament through the application of certain 
processes. Recognizing one form of God’s image in the types and prophecies 
of the Old Testament is part of the transformation of the soul, which is also an 
image, into a truer image, i.e. the likeness of God. 
3.3.4 Theological Anthropology and Epistemology 
The connection between theological anthropology and epistemology, 
between an account of the soul and an account of the senses of Scripture, is 
                                                 
83 S-BN, 1. 
84 Pusey quotes the Epistle of Barnabas, VI.13. 
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part of the necessity of a typical reading for Pusey. This argument finds 
support in Lewis Ayres’ article ‘The soul and the reading of scripture: a note 
on Henri De Lubac’. Ayres examines Henri de Lubac’s consideration of ‘the 
plurivocity of the Scriptures’ and argues that ‘De Lubac’s understanding of 
Christian attention to the various senses united under the label “spiritual” 
depends on a robust notion of the soul, its transformation and purification’.85 
For de Lubac, Ayres maintains, ‘At its “highest or “deepest” the soul is 
constituted by a gift which is nevertheless its own and which enables 
contemplation of the Spirit and Christ whose life wells up within and through 
this gift’.86 Similarly, for Pusey, the wisdom by which we know God is super-
added to the soul and completes the soul. Quoting Irenaeus and commenting on 
him, Pusey argues that ‘the perfect man is the union of the soul receiving the 
Spirit of the Father, and united with that flesh, who is formed according to the 
image of God’. The human person made in the image of God remains 
incomplete ‘unless he be continually made like unto Him’ by the effusion of 
the Holy Spirit: ‘But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul (anima ψυχη) who is 
such, is of a truth, animal (ψυχικη) and carnal, and being so left imperfect; 
having indeed the “Image” impressed on his being, but not receiving the 
“likeness” through the Spirit.’ (L143)87 True spiritual knowledge is always a 
form of participation, and the human soul is complete by the sanctifying work 
of the Spirit through which we become more and more like God. In his study 
of de Lubac, Ayres points out that de Lubac has ‘polemical targets in his 
sights’ and that he ‘openly attacks post-Enlightenment accounts which either 
describe human reason and action without reference to the transcendence of the 
human towards the divine, or which assume that the full reality of human 
mental life and experience can be described in purely psychological (or 
psychoanalytic) terms’.88 In the same way, Pusey’s account of the soul 
criticizes both the Enlightenment confidence in the sufficiency of autonomous 
human reason and the Lockean psychological empiricism evident in the 
                                                 
85 Ayres 2008, 174. 
86 Ibid. 181. 
87 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.6.1. Irenaeus 1872, 460-1. 
88 Ayres 2008, 182. 
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apologetic approach. For Pusey, the modern system denies both the necessary 
transcendence and dependence of spiritual knowledge and so impairs the 
transformation of the soul from the image to likeness of God. 
3.3.5 Natural Reason as distinct from ‘a mirror of the Mind of God’ 
Pusey’s examination of the patristic interpretation of image and likeness in the 
‘Lectures’ appears to offer the research with which to begin an argument rather 
than an argument in its final form. One must piece together his views from the 
way he quotes the Fathers and the comments he offers. However, the 
interpretation of Pusey’s argument offered here is supported by other material 
related to the ‘Lectures’. In the same box-file which contains the supplemental 
material which appears to include later drafts of some sections of the 
‘Lectures’, as well as Marshall’s ‘Notes’ and his ‘Notes and Observations’, 
there is a hand-written draft of a sermon on the relationship of reason and 
faith.89 The sermon was preached as ‘All Faith the Gift of God’ at the 
University Church, St Mary the Virgin, on the Twenty Third Sunday after 
Trinity, 1855.90 In the sermon, Pusey describes the relationship of reason to 
faith and the distinction between the ‘true mind’ which is the image of God in 
humanity and merely rational powers in a way that is consistent with the 
‘Lectures’, but more systematically. These arguments are supplemented by a 
second sermon, ‘Real Faith Entire’, published alongside ‘All Faith’ and 
originally preached on the next Sunday at the University Church.91 Although 
one does not find a hand-written version of ‘Real Faith Entire’ with papers 
associated with the ‘Lectures’, this sermon also addresses questions about the 
make-up of the soul and the relationship of reason and faith.  
In ‘All Faith the Gift of God’, Pusey calls the faculty to which evidence 
is proposed by the name of ‘natural reason’:  
If man arrived at faith through the mere use of his natural reason, 
accepting or rejecting what is proposed for his belief according as the 
                                                 
89 ‘Pusey Papers: E.B.P. Biblical MSS’.  
90 AFai., reprinted as Sermon VII in Pusey 1879, where the original preaching date and venue 
is specified. 
91 RFai., also reprinted in Pusey 1879, as Sermon VIII, with the original preaching date and 
venue. 
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evidence is or is not adequate to satisfy his natural reason, then 
undoubtedly it would be through unaided exercise of that same natural 
reason, that his faith must be maintained, strengthened, enlarged, 
defended.92 
This ‘natural reason’ is the ‘unassisted human reason’ of the ‘Lectures’, reason 
which is cold, demonstrative, and superficial, the power which makes us 
‘rational beings among the irrational’. (L35, 145) Pusey argues that the origin 
of the error which treats such reason as the basis of faith is the idea that ‘since 
reason is a gift of God, it will not conflict with His other gift, Revelation or 
Faith’.93 The problem with this argument is that it does not distinguish between 
different kinds of reason:  
But then, what Reason? Reason, such as Adam had it, before the Fall, 
unwarped by prejudices, unswayed by pride, undeafened by passions, 
unallured by self-idolizing, unfettered by love of independence, master of 
itself because subdued to God, enlightened by God, a mirror of the Mind 
of God, reflecting His Image and likeness after which it was created; a 
finite copy of the perfections of the Infinite? Truly, no one would demur 
to the answer of such an oracle as this. A work of God, which remained 
in harmony with God, must be in harmony with every other creation of 
God; for both would be the finite expressions of the one Archetype, the 
Mind of God. But that poor blinded prisoner, majestic in its wreck, 
bearing still the lineaments of its primeval beauty and giant might, yet 
doomed, until it be set free, to grind in the mill of its prison-house and 
make sport for the master to whom it is enslaved, this, which can not 
guide itself, is no guide into the Mind of God. 94 
The argument that the two gifts of God, reason and faith, should support one 
another moves onto uncertain ground when it is assumed, as Pusey had argued 
against Hampden, that because in the ordinary course of things we learn from 
experience in ‘this sensible world’, that we have no other faculty capable of 
knowing truths beyond sense.95 Perhaps drawing on his exposition of Clement 
of Alexandria in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey describes the capacity or faculty in 
humankind which can know truths beyond sense as a ‘mirror of the Mind of 
                                                 
92 AFai., 3-4. 
93 AFai., 16. 
94 AFai., 16. 
95 Pusey, DrH., xxii. 
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God’ and a finite expression of ‘the one Archetype, the Mind of God’.96 In the 
same way that Clement describes wisdom and righteousness united in the 
Archetype, Pusey’s sermon maintains that the reason which Adam had ‘before 
the Fall’ reflects God’s holiness, being ‘unwarped by prejudices, unswayed by 
pride’.  
As a result of the Fall, Pusey says that reason is doomed to ‘grind in the 
mill of its prison-house’. Nonetheless natural reason still has the capacity to 
investigate what we learn by experience or to make arguments based on 
principles or logic: ‘Acuteness and power of combination, inventiveness and 
grasp of intellect are the fit framers of discovers and organizers of human 
science and human philosophy’.97 The powers which reason retains after the 
Fall are ‘the lineaments of its primeval beauty and giant might’. Pusey argues 
in the ‘Lectures’ that the ‘great might’ of natural reason brings with it a sort of 
danger: ‘all might, intellectual as well as physical, is naturally opposed to 
render any service at all, to submit to any, and so to God also’. (61A) This 
opposition is evident in ‘the tendency of undisciplined intellect to different 
forms of unbelief or misbelief, to exalt self by modifying what God has given, 
and if it reject not revelation altogether to become heresiarchs or schismatics’. 
(L60A-61). This is the danger lurking in the apologetic approach which accepts 
implicitly the exaltation of human reason. As we saw above, in the ‘Lectures’ 
and in the tradition represented by Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, one of 
the roles of the obscurities of Scripture is to subdue the powers of reason: ‘All 
human might, whether physical or intellectual, may be brought in the kingdom 
of God, and, in its proportion, render its service unto God … but all needs to be 
subdued’. (61A) Demanding clarity and proof is a kind of rejection of the 
intellect’s necessary dependence on God. In the Theology of Germany, Pusey 
suggested that it was a lack of this sense of dependence which led to the abuse 
of the tools of the theological sciences: ‘Not the pursuit of science in itself, not 
the depth of speculation, but the engrossing power which they exert over the 
                                                 
96 Wisdom 7:26 refers to wisdom as ‘the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted 
mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness’. See also 2 Cor. 3:18. 
97 AFai., 27. 
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unaccustomed mind … interferes with the harmonious and proportionate 
development of the intellectual and religious faculties’.98 Pusey’s view that ‘the 
very first condition of our restoration is entire self-surrender, and prostration of 
our whole selves, our imaginations, our minds, our wills’ may also be 
influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and his understanding of 
faith as a feeling of ‘absolute dependence’.99 The importance of 
Schleiermacher for Pusey’s understanding of the soul will be discussed below. 
Pusey describes human reason before the Fall as participating in or 
mirroring the divine reason, the Mind of God. The consequence of the Fall 
means that it is no longer part of reason’s normal powers to perceive naturally 
or directly the kind of knowledge which is inaccessible by empirical 
investigation or logical reflection: ‘intellect, unenlightened by Divine light 
intuitive as it may be in human things, is blind in Divine … The knowledge 
which pure intellect lacks, is not outward but inward; not natural but 
supernatural’.100 Nonetheless, this inward and supernatural knowledge is 
attainable, at least in part, by the work of grace, by the illumining of the Holy 
Spirit: ‘But reason, healed, restored, guided, enlightened, by the Spirit of God, 
has a power of vision above nature, and can spiritually discern a fitness, and 
correspondence, and harmony in the things of God which, through faith, it has 
received and believed’.101 In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey argues that because we are 
born of God we may have a knowledge of God and His nature. He makes the 
same point in ‘All Faith the Gift of God’, where he argues that ‘God only 
unfolds the things of God; through God only can we understand the things of 
God’.102 What the sermon adds to the ‘Lectures’ is a clearer description in his 
own words of the kind of reason which is part of ‘our most spiritual faculties’ 
                                                 
98 TG-I, 121. 
99 RFai., 70 See Schleiermacher 1968, I.4.1, 4 and I.6.1, 12, 16-17, 26. See also, AFai., 25: ‘It 
is part of the dependence in which God seeth it to be good for the creature to abide, that the 
creature should not know God, except through the Revelation of God.’ For the possible 
influence of Coleridge on Pusey’s sense of dependence, see Roberts 1983, 46 and Snook 2001, 
12. 
100 AFai., 24. 
101 AFai., 17. 
102 AFai., 24. 
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and which ‘half-seeth things invisible’, and how this reason, the image of God 
in the reasonable soul and mind, is distinct from rationalizing. (L2)  
 In the sermon, ‘Real Faith Entire’, published alongside ‘All faith the gift 
of God’ Pusey quotes St Bernard of Clairvaux to argue that ‘the reasonable 
soul’ is the image not simply of the Divine Son or Logos in humankind, but of 
the Trinity: 
That Holy and Eternal Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, One God; 
Supreme Power, Supreme Wisdom, Supreme Goodness, created a certain 
trinity in Their Image and Likeness, to wit, the reasonable soul: which 
therein showeth forth some trace of all the Supreme Trinity, in that it 
consisteth of memory, reason, and will.103  
To explain how the ‘memory, reason, and will’ are an image of the Trinity in 
the human soul, Pusey refers the reader to Book XIII of his translation of 
Augustine’s Confessions: ‘I would that men would consider these three, that 
are in themselves … To Be, to Know, and to Will. For I Am, and Know, and 
Will’.104 Pusey also quotes the City of God: ‘And we recognize in ourselves an 
image of God, that is, of the Supreme Trinity … For we both are, and know 
that we are, and love to be this and to know it’.105 Pusey argues also that the 
soul created in the image of the Trinitarian God seeks a greater conformity or 
likeness to this image, ‘that, abiding in Him, it might be happy in the 
participation of Him’: ‘Man, however fallen, corrupted, decayed, perverted, 
still bears such impress of the image wherein he was created, that he seeks as 
his end something akin to the Attributes of God.’106 In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey 
comments also that the ‘thoughtful Ancients … in Pagan Antiquity’ anticipated 
Christian revelation in their perception that the form of the Trinity, ‘the union 
of Three in One’, was ‘impressed on … man’s mind’. (L154)107 What he says 
in the sermons develops this idea and complements his treatment of the 
character of the human soul which is sanctified by a typical reading of the Old 
Testament. The language Pusey uses to describe the image of God in the soul is 
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not original. What is important to see is how in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey draws on 
this tradition, and how his theological anthropology and his epistemology 
belong together with his treatment of types and prophecy as an antidote to the 
problems of his age. 
3.3.6 ‘In thy light shall we see light’ 
Aside from his consideration of how the mind is made in the image of God, 
Pusey uses the metaphor of light and vision to describe the spiritual faculties 
which both discern divine truth and participate in that truth. The sentences 
from the ‘Lectures’ which describe what we can know about ‘God and His 
ways and His Nature’ which we have considered already are bracketed by 
images of light and vision. The problem with advocates of the apologetic or 
rationalistic approach is that they privilege the wrong kind of light and vision. 
In Pusey’s description different kinds of natural light symbolize different kinds 
of sight – ‘the natural world is an emblem of the spiritual’. The dim light of the 
natural world, the ‘rising and setting light’, symbolizes the inward and spiritual 
vision which can illuminate hidden and spiritual things, but only indistinctly, 
by a spiritual light, ‘those glimpses into a far distant land, which indistinct, 
though they may be, open a wider range of vision’. The ‘mid-day Sun’ enables 
one to see the objects of sense clearly, but the brightness of this light can lead 
the observer to fall into the error of empiricism, forgetting that there are other 
kinds of objects that one can see: ‘whatever then we gain in distinctness and 
precision we lose in depth; our furthest point of vision is just where “light and 
darkness part”’. (L2) Using a similar image, Pusey says that in the apologetic 
approach, ‘an unnatural glare of light had been thrown upon certain 
predictions, and these had been made to stand out unduly’. (L5)108 
In Pusey’s sermon, the light by which the soul perceives spiritual things 
is a spiritual or inward light which we do not simply see, but in which we 
participate: ‘in His light shall we see light. (Ps. 36:9) … Christians are light, as 
indwelt by His Presence, and reflecting His holiness’.109 The intellect which is 
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‘penetrated by the Spirit of God’, is intellect which is ‘irradiated by His Light’ 
and which ‘reflects’ this light: ‘Intellect, penetrated by the Spirit of God, 
irradiated by His Light, kindled by the glow of Divine love, reflects to after-
ages the light which it has caught, illumines mysteries, guards truth, unfolds 
our spiritual nature, orders the whole sum and relations and proportions of 
Divine and human knowledge.’110 As in the ‘Lectures’ Pusey describes Divine 
Light as an attribute of God and the light by which a human person perceives 
the things of God: ‘God alone can comprehend God. Through the brightness of 
the Divine Light in us, shall we, if, by His grace we attain, behold, each in our 
measure and degree, the Infinite, Incomprehensible, Essence of God.’111  
At the same time, Pusey uses the image of light to emphasize the 
distinction which we considered above between divine and human attributes 
and faculties. Based on 1 Timothy 6:16, he writes that God is ‘Light 
inapproachable, whom no man hath seen or can see’. (L23) The light by which 
we see is nonetheless inapproachable, it blinds or conceals as well as 
illuminates and reveals. This emphasis on the apophatic character of theology 
suggests Pusey’s indebtedness to the Greek Fathers in particular.112 With these 
images, Pusey distinguishes ordinary reasoning powers from a higher reason 
and a kind of seeing by the divine light which offers an intuitive understanding 
of divine and invisible things. Once again, we see that in Pusey’s theological 
anthropology, there is no such thing as a complete and independent human 
being, or an autonomous and coherent account of human knowledge. 
3.3.7 Substantial and Procedural Reason 
Pusey’s distinction between a higher kind of reason which offers an intuitive 
vision of spiritual or supra-sensual realities and a lower form of discursive or 
analytical reason is, of course, not unique. Charles Taylor’s account of this 
distinction in Sources of the Self (1999) is particularly helpful in terms of 
understanding Pusey’s argument because Taylor demonstrates the dialectic 
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between the pursuit for knowledge and anthropological considerations. In 
Taylor’s argument, both the goal of knowledge and what can be known are 
inextricably connected with how human nature is understood, with both 
implicit and explicit forms of self-understanding.113 
Taylor describes the way in which the kind of analytical reason which 
Pusey finds in the apologetic approach came to be the primary model for 
reason in the early modern period. According to Taylor, in the tradition 
represented by Plato and Augustine, and which informs the western theological 
tradition, human reason in its highest form was understood to reflect or 
participate in divine reason. According to this view, the truth of a reasoned 
argument is judged by its conformity to the substance of the truth which is 
known. That substance might be conceived of as Platonic Ideas, a divine order, 
the thoughts or the will of God. It is possible to use reason to advance in 
knowledge of the truth only because there is a correspondence between human 
reasoning and the mind of God. Furthermore, this relationship is not one of 
external similarity, as if the two just happened to correspond, but rather an 
organic and internal relationship. Taylor calls this a ‘substantive conception of 
reason’: ‘Rationality is tied to the perception of order; and so to realize our 
capacity for reason is to see the order as it is.’114 In the modern period, in the 
tradition exemplified by René Descartes (1596-1650) and John Locke (1632-
1704), reason came to be viewed as an independent analytical power or 
process. Taylor calls this a ‘procedural’ view of reason: ‘Rationality is above 
all a property of the process of thinking, not of the substantive content of 
thought.’115 Andrew Louth describes in a helpful way this same post-Cartesian 
distinction between a ‘substantial’ and ‘procedural’ view of reason:  
We say, ‘I think therefore I am’, that is, thinking is an activity I engage in 
and there must therefore be an ‘I’ to engage in it; the Greeks would say, 
‘I think, therefore there is that which I think – to noeta’. What I think is 
something going on in my head; what the Greek thinks, to noeta, are the 
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objects of thought that (for example, for Plato) exist in a higher, more 
real world.116  
Louth’s description also suggests the connection between the procedural view 
and human autonomy; ‘thinking is an activity I engage in’ independent of the 
substantial content of thought, ‘to noeta’. 
A recurring theme of the ‘Lectures’ is that the apologetic or modern 
approach to the interpretation of prophecy gives a false priority to the criteria 
or processes by which prophecy is guaranteed over the object of prophecy, 
over the truth that is revealed. In Taylor’s terms, evidentialist theology 
expresses a procedural rather than a substantive view of reason. This is what 
Pusey criticised when he said that the modern approach would make ‘a 
prediction which related to Pagan Rome or the discovery of America’ as 
important as a prediction ‘relating to the Redeemer of the world’. On the other 
hand, the patristic exegesis to which Pusey points embodies a substantive view 
of reason. Understanding prophecy entails seeing the correspondence between 
God’s unchanging purposes, the Divine Mind or Reason, and the manifestation 
of that reason in the Old Testament witness. A proper understanding of 
prophecy both recognizes that correspondence and serves as a guide to draw 
human reason into conformity with the divine pattern.  
Placing Taylor’s analysis of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum alongside 
Pusey’s description of the dangers inherent in the apologetic school of 
prophecy casts light on the wider context of the debate in which Pusey is 
engaged. Of Descartes’ proof of God, Taylor writes:  
The thesis is not that I gain knowledge when turned towards God in faith. 
Rather the certainty of clear and distinct perception is unconditional and 
self-generated. What has happened is rather that God’s existence has 
become a stage in my progress towards science through the methodical 
ordering of evident insight. God’s existence is a theorem in my system of 
perfect science. The centre of gravity has decisively shifted.117  
Taylor acknowledges that Descartes’ cogito is for Descartes inseparable from 
belief in God. Nonetheless, Descartes’ mode of arguing not only opens the 
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possibility that it will be received and understood differently, but that the form 
of argument makes the movement to a disengaged and procedural view of 
reason imaginable and even appealing.118 According to Taylor, after Descartes, 
it begins to be possible to conceive of human rational powers as autonomous 
and to imagine that the appropriate exercise of those powers generates certainty 
or truth. This change undermines the view that human reason is organically and 
substantially related to divine reason: ‘The judgement now turns on properties 
of the activity of thinking rather than on the substantive beliefs which emerge 
from it.’119  
Pusey’s characterization of the ‘modern treatment’ of prophecy has 
striking similarities with Taylor’s description of Descartes and the tradition 
which he helped, perhaps unwittingly, to establish: 
The very office of proving the existence of that which is invisible is not 
far apart from that of creating it; it is a sort of mental creation, though, in 
fact, it is only creating the presumption of that which exists; yet what is a 
cause of the belief of the existence thereof, is so far the cause of its 
existence relatively to us; And whatever may be the case of individuals 
or whatever ought to be the case, man is elevated by this sort of proof, 
not God glorified. (L4) 
Taylor argues that Descartes’ proof makes God ‘a theorem in my system of 
perfect science’, an abstract concept which we give ourselves. Pusey says that 
the apologetics of the modern school turn God into a ‘mental creation’, an 
abstract concept which we give ourselves. Taylor says that for Descartes, 
certainty is ‘self-generated’, while Pusey maintains that the arguments of the 
modern school give the presumption of generating or creating God’s existence, 
in that they are the cause of God’s existence ‘relatively to us’. For Descartes, 
following a careful procedure of reflection and analysis banishes doubt. In 
Pusey’s description, the modern school seeks to drive away doubt and secure 
conviction by adhering to a procedure which generates evidence of genuine 
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prophecy and promises objective validity. Pusey’s description of the ‘self-
satisfaction’ which the ‘seeking of formal evidence’ stirs up also evokes 
Taylor’s argument that what is attractive in instrumental reason is not the 
objective claim of truth only, but the sense of mastery and freedom which it 
offers, ‘the idea of the disengaged self, capable of objectifying … the 
surrounding world’.120 The apologetic approach is a moral appeal which is 
based on our sense of what is good and necessary as well as what is true. 
Pusey finds in the modern school the same trends which Taylor 
describes. Taylor sees the philosophy of John Locke as both exemplifying and 
promoting the procedural understanding of reason which he finds in 
Descartes.121 We have seen Pusey both criticizes Locke directly, and makes the 
arguments of Locke’s disciple Paley the focus of his attacks on the confusions 
and dangers of the apologetic approach. Pusey also blamed Locke for 
Hampden’s empiricism: ‘Into this he has been betrayed by the shallow 
philosophy of Mr. Locke.’122 These connections show the relevance of 
Taylor’s description of procedural reason for Pusey’s analysis. Taylor’s 
argument helps to show that Pusey’s disagreement with the modern school and 
his analysis of patristic interpretation is part of a much more fundamental 
debate about theology, theological anthropology, and the goal and conditions 
of knowledge.123 
3.3.8 Coleridge on Reason and Understanding and the ‘Lectures’ 
Pusey’s understanding of reason involves more than an attempt to retrieve a 
patristic model, reaching back behind intervening developments. The 
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dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment appeal to reason which one finds in the 
‘Lectures’ is a common theme of the Romantic movement. We have already 
seen that Pusey refers explicitly at least twice in the course of the ‘Lectures’ to 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. One of the main tasks which Coleridge sets for 
himself in Aids to Reflection is to distinguish Reason from Understanding. 
Coleridge’s distinction corresponds in significant ways to Pusey’s view of the 
higher mind or illumined sight which perceives spiritual things as distinguished 
from natural reason or rationalizing. This distinction also corresponds to 
Taylor’s view of substantial reason contrasted with procedural reason. 
Coleridge’s account may have influenced Pusey and can, in any case, help us 
both to understand and to see the weaknesses in Pusey’s argument.  
Reason and Understanding are for Coleridge technical terms. 
Understanding is the lower and less spiritual of these two faculties or powers. 
He describes this faculty as ‘natural reason’, the same term which Pusey 
uses.124 Referring to ‘the founder of the Critical Philosophy’, Immanuel 
Kant, Coleridge defines ‘the Understanding’ as ‘the faculty of judging 
according to sense’.125 It is the discursive faculty by which we compare, 
reflect, or generalize.126 Reason, on the other hand, is the faculty of the 
supersensuous or, in Pusey’s terms, the faculty of the spiritual sense: ‘Reason 
is the Power of Universal and necessary Convictions, the Source and Substance 
of Truths above Sense, having their evidence in themselves’.127 In describing 
reason and understanding in a way which reverses normal English usage 
Coleridge appears to be following Kant.  
Reason is both the faculty or power in man which discerns or grasps 
truths which are not accessible to the senses, and the truths which are known. 
In Taylor’s terms, Coleridge is speaking about substantial, not procedural, 
reason. In his study of Coleridge, Douglas Hedley writes that Coleridge uses 
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the term reason to mean ‘both the realm of the ideas transcending the finite 
mind, and the ideas as immanent in human thought’.128 Reason accomplishes 
what the understanding cannot, it sees truths ‘above sense’: ‘what the eldest 
Greek Philosophy entitled the Reason (ΝΟΥΣ) and Ideas, the philosophic 
Apostle names the Spirit and Truths spiritually discerned’.129 Like Pusey, 
Coleridge describes the human faculty which beholds God as a divine power 
and knowledge as participation: ‘Reason is pre-eminently Spiritual, and a 
spirit, even our Spirit, through an effluence of the same grace by which one is 
privileged to say Our Father’.130 The truths of reason are not grasped or 
approached through discursive argument. Rather, they are perceived by ‘an 
Intuition or immediate Beholding, accompanied by a conviction of the 
necessary and universality of the truth so beholden not derived from the 
Senses’.131 Coleridge writes: ‘Reason indeed is much nearer to SENSE than to 
Understanding: for Reason (says our great HOOKER) is a direct aspect of Truth, 
an inward Beholding, having a similar relation to the Intelligible or Spiritual, 
as SENSE has to the Material or Phenomenal.’132 Coleridge’s description of 
Reason as an intuitive power or a kind of sight which perceives spiritual truth 
fits well with Pusey’s account of divine light by which we see light.133  
One thing which Coleridge offers and that is lacking from Pusey’s 
account in the ‘Lectures’ is an explicit description of the relationship of this 
higher form of reason and the understanding or, in Pusey’s terms, natural 
reason. Having stated that understanding is a faculty we share with ‘Beings 
higher or lower than man’, he adds:  
But there is, in this sense, no human Reason. There neither is nor can be 
but one Reason, one and the same: even the Light that lighteth every 
man’s individual Understanding (Discursus), and thus maketh it a 
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reasonable Understanding, Discourse of Reason – ‘one only, yet 
manifold: it goeth through all understanding, and remaining in itself 
regenerateth all other powers.’ (Wisdom of Solomon, c. viii)134 
Coleridge describes the divine light of Reason as the light which enlightens the 
Understanding, or Pusey’s natural reason. Coleridge warns that when the 
Understanding usurps its bounds and ‘is made the measure of spiritual things’ 
it becomes ‘the mind of the flesh’,135 or, in Pusey’s terms the ‘undisciplined 
intellect’, which tends ‘to different forms of unbelief or misbelief’. (L60A-61) 
Nonetheless, Coleridge makes it clear that the discursive powers of the 
Understanding are a ‘Discourse of Reason’, an imperfect and partial expression 
of reason: ‘And yet to the forms of the Understanding all truth must be 
reduced, that is to be fixed as an object of reflection, and to be rendered 
expressible’.136 In one sense, Pusey implies something similar in his 
description of natural reason as ‘bearing still the lineaments of its primeval 
beauty and giant might’. On the other hand, both Pusey’s use of the term 
‘rationalizing’ as a synonym for ‘reason’ and his view that natural reason is 
‘enslaved’ and so ‘no guide into the Mind of God’ suggests a radical 
disjunction between the reasoning powers and what is divine in humanity. As 
we have seen, in the right ‘frame of mind’, the power of natural reason ‘may be 
brought in the kingdom of God, and, in its proportion, render its service unto 
God’. However, Pusey is not clear about the way in which this power shares in 
the restoration of the image of God in humanity. His criticisms of a ‘precise 
and clear and reasoning habit of mind’ do not seem to acknowledge that he 
nonetheless uses such reason to make a case against rationalizing and to lead 
people to appreciate a higher form of reason. (L11) When he wrote in favour of 
evidence-writing, H. J. Rose reminded Newman that all authors need ‘to recur 
to logic, to reason’.137 In this sense, critics of Pusey’s ‘narrow’ or ‘dogmatic’ 
response to rationalism point to a weakness in his argument. 
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3.4 The Spiritual Faculties 
3.4.1 The Moral Sense 
Pusey’s account of the spiritual faculties which enable the soul to know divine 
things extends beyond a consideration of the character of reason or 
understanding. In his Theology of Germany, Pusey referred to Coleridge as 
showing the fault of this approach and as giving ‘seasonable advice to those, 
who think that in the reception of Christianity the intellect alone is 
concerned’.138 In the Theology of Germany, Pusey expressed a similar 
dissatisfaction. He argued that Kant’s limitation of ‘real truth’ to ‘such as can 
be found in human reason’ demonstrates the need for another kind of knowing. 
He writes: 
… by shewing the inadequacy of speculative reason in matters 
uncognizable by sense, it led many, who were not bound by the fetters of 
the new  philosophy, to listen to the voice of nature, the revelation of 
God within them, and to seek as the direct result of consciousness, the 
truths which speculation was unable scientifically to justify.139 
For Pusey, Kant accurately described the limitations of analytic reason, but was 
incorrect with regard to the capacity of the soul to know ‘matters uncognizable 
by sense’ by an intuitive vision. 
In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey describes the way by which the truths of 
revelation, and which speculation cannot justify, are communicated to a 
consciousness which extends beyond mental capacities: 
Our conviction also is of a compound character and made up of various 
emotions: in moral subjects it cannot be mainly intellectual; in Divine 
things, awe, wonder, the absorbing sense of infinity, of purity, and of 
holiness, infuse conviction more directly than reasoning; nay reasoning 
in that it appeals to one faculty only, and that for a time is erected into a 
judge, and so, as it were sits superior, constantly goes directly counter to 
the frame of mind wherein belief is received. The chance sight, so to say, 
of a flower illumined by the sun’s rays, or of the starry heavens, the 
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moon and the stars which God has ordained, impress the feeling of God 
upon the soul more than any artificial reasoning from final causes 
(however clear it may in itself seem to be, as in Paley). Like the 
centurion by the Cross we are awed into belief. (L6) 
This quotation includes many elements which we have already seen in Pusey’s 
description of religious knowledge. This kind of knowing is a type of vision 
which sees God in and through the natural world, even a ‘chance sight’. The 
language of impression suggests that the insight produced is an immediate 
action of God upon the soul, it is ‘infused’. Moreover, this seeing is not the 
result of reason understood as the power of analysis; ‘reasoning’ alone is 
insufficient, it is ‘artificial’ and it ‘appeals to one faculty only’. For Pusey, 
‘moral subjects’ or ‘divine things’ appeal to our sense of fitness or goodness, 
our will or conscience, as well as to the intellect and our sense of 
correspondence or truth. Commenting on the ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin 
maintains that for Pusey it is impossible to ‘reduce the whole economy of 
God’s revelation to conceptual terms’. In the images of the Old Testament, the 
Word of God ‘speaks not to our minds alone, but also to our wills, affections, 
consciences, imaginations’.140 Lewis Ayres’ description of Henri de Lubac’s 
distillation of the pre-modern understanding of the soul in similar terms 
suggests that Pusey is giving voice to a patristic and medieval as well as a 
Romantic sensibility: ‘The soul is the seat of our activities of attention, 
imagination, judgement and contemplation.’141 In the patristic examples to 
which Pusey refers, at least some of the non-conceptual powers or faculties to 
which Ayres refers belong to the reasonable soul made in the image of God.142 
One may see here another sign of the influence of Coleridge, or at least 
an indication of the way in which both he and Pusey attempted to cast light on 
the moral element of conviction. According to Coleridge’s definition, any 
apprehension of Reason, of truths above sense, is an apprehension of 
‘necessary Convictions’ which have ‘their evidence in themselves’.143 
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Moreover, what is perceived addresses our moral sense or conscience. 
Speaking of ‘The Idea of the LIVING GOD’, Coleridge writes: ‘this idea presents 
itself to our mind … with the attributes of Holiness, Providence, Love, Justice, 
and Mercy’.144 In a phrase which articulates well Pusey’s view of the 
importance of wonder in preparing the mind to perceive spiritual things, 
Coleridge describes a sense of wonder as the springboard of thought: ‘In 
Wonder all Philosophy began: in Wonder it ends: and Admiration fills up the 
interspace.’145 In Pusey’s terms, ‘awe, wonder, the absorbing sense of infinity’ 
contribute to conviction because they result from a vision of God rather than a 
neutral reflection on data about God. (L16) 
For Pusey, the moral character of religious knowledge means that 
worship is not simply a form of prayer, but a means of enlightenment and 
sanctification. Awe and wonder ‘infuse conviction’ because they are closely 
related to the attitude of worship which is the correct attitude of the human 
person before God. (L6) In the modern approach, prophecy is adapted ‘to those 
who viewed it from without, amid the glare of robust day, not to those who 
were admittedly within the shrine, contemplated and worshipped’. (L5-6) 
Conviction in divine things is formed when they are known from the inside, 
from ‘within the shrine’, rather than ‘from without’, standing apart from what 
is known or looked for and submitting it to analysis: ‘men argued when they 
should have worshipped’. (L1) The apologetic arguments which Pusey 
criticizes hinder the communion with the divine which is the way to 
knowledge. The arguments from evidence call us back from ‘the contemplation 
of those works to reflect on their own convincingness’. (L6) Worship brings all 
the aspects of the human character, not just the analytic mind or discursive 
reason into relation with divine things. Worship is also an ‘habit of mind’ 
(L29) and attitude which is suited to reach out toward that ‘highest knowledge’ 
which is both ‘most elevated’ and which ‘must most surpass our 
comprehension’. (L2) 
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3.4.2 Feeling as a Spiritual Faculty 
While he never states it explicitly, Pusey uses ‘feeling’ in the ‘Lectures’ to 
describe one of the spiritual faculties of the soul. The soul does not only ‘see’ 
or ‘believe’, it also feels God; it is ‘the feeling of God’ which the vision of God 
in nature impresses on the soul. This feeling is not the same as reasoning, but it 
is still a ‘frame of mind’. (L6) As we saw above, he describes conviction as 
formed of ‘various emotions’ and describes an apprehension of God as ‘the 
feeling of God’. (L6) This ‘feeling’ seems to be a kind of spiritual judgement 
or discernment. When he criticizes the apologetic approach for emphasizing 
prophecy as prediction, Pusey describes prophecy as appealing to ‘feelings’ 
rather than reasons: ‘It is remarkable accordingly how in Holy Scripture, other 
feelings are, throughout prophecy, enlisted, beyond and above contemplation 
of Divine fore-knowledge.’ (L6) For Pusey, the human aspiration after God is a 
‘feeling and following after the Infinite’. (L16) He also describes the people of 
Israel’s understanding of the prophetic content of their rites and institutions as 
‘feelings which were to them as sense’. (L31) In a more negative context, when 
people were not content with the authority of the Church as a guide to reading 
Scripture, they began, not to reason, but to ‘feel their way after some clearer 
and independent evidence for the truth of Holy Scripture’. (L32) 
Pusey never defines what he means by feelings, nor explains how he 
distinguishes feeling from sight. Against the confusions of orthodoxism in 
Germany, Pusey had asserted the principle which he describes as ‘the 
impregnable bulwark of religion’, that ‘the original seat of religion is in the 
feeling, not in the understanding’. He makes this assertion while commenting 
on the work of G. E. Lessing and quotes with approval other remarks of 
Lessing: ‘He, whose heart is more Christian than his head, pays not the 
slightest regard to those objections since he feels what others content 
themselves with thinking.’146 While Pusey does not express himself in exactly 
these terms in the ‘Lectures’ he is clear that religious understanding cannot be 
separated from feeling or feelings.  
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Pusey’s understanding of feelings as a faculty of spiritual discernment 
may have been shaped by the ideas of Friedrich Schleiermacher. During his 
two visits to Berlin in 1825, Pusey attended Schleiermacher’s lectures on the 
Acts of the Apostles and on St. Paul’s Epistles to the Thessalonians and 
Galatians. Schleiermacher also met privately with Pusey and later 
corresponded with him.147 Pusey considered Schleiermacher to be a positive 
influence contributing to the revival of German religious life despite the grave 
errors of his theology. In a letter to Bishop Lloyd about the commentary which 
Schleiermacher planned to publish on St Paul’s Epistles, Pusey described 
Schleiermacher as a scholarly pantheist: ‘Scholarship and thought may be 
expected from the translator of Plato; but of Christianity no more than is 
consistent with Pantheism.’148 Nonetheless, Schleiermacher is ‘that great man 
who, whatever be the errors of his system, has done more than (some very few 
perhaps excepted) any other, to the restoration of religious belief in 
Germany’.149 Liddon says that Pusey admired Schleiermacher for ‘the direction 
in which, on the whole, his mind was moving’, away from a dry religion of the 
mind, rather than for his ‘actual belief’.150 It is remarkable how Pusey’s two-
fold assessment of Schleiermacher, positive in his sensibility but seriously 
misguided in his approach to Scripture, mirror’s Newman’s assessment of 
Coleridge, an assessment which, as we have seen, Pusey seems to share.151  
Pusey’s appreciation of Schleiermacher appears to extend to his 
emphasis on feeling as a faculty of religious knowledge. In a letter to Keble, 
written on Easter Sunday, 1829, Pusey discussed his understanding of feelings 
in religion: 
On the province of ‘feelings’ in Religion, I fear that I shall be widely 
mistaken: it would be almost too much to expect that a distinction should 
be made between ‘feeling’ and ‘feelings’: the one the faculty of the mind, 
the other the outward manifestations of that faculty – the emotions. It is I 
think the employment of the latter as a test of religion which has caused 
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so much mischief and self deception and misery; while the neglect of the 
former appeared to me also to have been injurious to Religion by causing 
the intellect to be alone considered.152 
In his study, ‘“Science” in the Service of Orthodoxy: The Early Intellectual 
Development of E. B. Pusey’, Leighton Frappell argues that Pusey found the 
distinction between ‘feelings’ and ‘feeling’ as a faculty of discernment in 
Schleiermacher. Frappell writes: 
In his Der christliche Glaube, (The Christian Faith), 1821-2, 
Schleiermacher located grounds of religious assent in the feelings, or 
rather in the ‘feeling’ (Empfindung), religious reason, which he 
distinguished from ‘feelings’ (Gefühl), religious sentiment or emotion, as 
well as from the critical faculty. The distinction became important to 
Pusey, as to others, for it provided an answer both to religious 
rationalism and ‘enthusiasm’ by locating religious conviction neither in 
the formal reason nor in the affective sentiments but in a distinct faculty 
which partook of elements of both.153 
Schleiermacher also proposes, in his On Religion (1799), that religion is 
‘rooted in immediate pre-reflexive feeling and intuition’, which in their purest 
forms are united.154 For him the intuition of the infinite is always ‘connected 
with a feeling’ and ‘the strength of these feelings determines the degree of 
religiousness’.155 For Pusey also, discernment without feeling appears corrupt 
or ungrounded. Despite Pusey’s caveat in his letter to Keble that ‘it would be 
almost too much to expect that a distinction should be made’, Pusey appears to 
accept the principle that ‘feeling’ is a kind of religious reason, a ‘faculty of the 
mind’ which discerns or receives religious knowledge. This faculty is not 
simply an expression of affections; for Pusey ‘the employing of feelings as a 
criterion of religion is mischievous, because delusive; unduly elating to some, 
distractingly depressing to others’.156 On the other hand, in the quotation 
above, he refers to those ‘emotions’ which have a necessary role in forming 
conviction and which are guided by genuine spiritual discernment. (L6)  
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Pusey’s account of feeling situates his theory of knowledge in the context 
of the Romantic response to an exalted and Enlightenment view of reason. 
Charles Taylor describes the Romantic ‘striving’ for God in a way that fits with 
Pusey’s treatment of feeling as a sense of God reaching toward God: ‘It is 
through our feelings that we get to the deepest moral and, indeed, cosmic 
truths.’157 However, it is important to see that Pusey understands feeling not 
only through a Romantic lens, but also in relation to the tradition which 
conceives of knowledge as participation with God. A. J. Festugière argues that 
in the Platonist tradition, both Christian and pagan, this participation in not 
simply a fusion of intellect, but a mystical union associated with a kind of 
feeling and delight: ‘the soul “aspires to a knowledge that is a direct contact, a 
‘feeling’ (sentiment), a touching, something seen. It aspires to a union where 
there is total fusion, the interpenetration of two living things.’”158 Similarly, 
Andrew Louth describes Diadochus of Photike (mid 5th c.) and his view of the 
‘soul’s spiritual sense’ in terms of a ‘bold conjunction of feeling and the mind, 
the heart and the intellect’: ‘aisthesis noos, feeling of the mind, aisthesis noera, 
intellectual feeling (or intellectual – or spiritual – sense)’.159 It is not clear 
exactly how Pusey forms his notion of feeling as a faculty of the mind, but in 
describing the soul’s spiritual sense in this way there were a variety of sources 
available to him, near at hand and more remote. 
Andrew Louth’s discussion of ‘the doctrine of the spiritual senses’ in 
Origen and Bernard of Clairvaux suggests another possible source for Pusey’s 
notion of feeling as a spiritual sense and a faculty of the mind. Louth’s 
discussion of this doctrine in Origen is particularly illuminating because it casts 
light on the significance of the language of types and typical interpretation in 
shaping an understanding of the spiritual senses and the feeling of the mind. 
Louth describes the way in which ‘Origen is able to interpret the highly 
sensuous world of the Song of Songs in terms of the love between Christ and 
the Church, the love of the soul for God, responding to His love for her’. 
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Seeing this as a Christian development of the Platonic understanding of the 
ascent of the soul he adds: ‘The doctrine of the spiritual sense is used to 
express the way in which the soul wakes up to the world of inner spiritual 
reality and begins to experience that world by learning to use its new found 
senses.’160 Pusey also uses highly sensuous language to describe the ‘ecstasy’ 
or ‘transport’ of the soul which is ‘caught up’ or ‘present with its Lord … 
penetrated with Him and His Divinity’. (L136:209) Finding support in a typical 
interpretation of the ‘joyousness’ of Joseph’s brothers who ‘drank and were 
inebriated (ורכשי) [yškrw] with him’, (L136:209-10) Pusey draws on the 
Song of Songs to describe the gift of the sacrament of Holy Communion in 
terms of intoxication:  
When, then, in the song of spiritual love, this same word is used in the 
same way, as something over and above ordinary drinking, ‘drink and be 
inebriated, loving and beloved,’ one cannot doubt that it, too, has its 
proper force, and that it designates some gift peculiar to those in Christ’s 
Church, who share the myrrh of His Passion, and ‘eat and drink at His 
Table in His Kingdom;’ and that, in proportion to their love, so are they 
not refreshed only, but inebriated. (L136:211)161 
Pusey transfers terms associated with the most passionate forms of earthly joys 
to what Louth describes as ‘the world of inner spiritual reality’, suggesting that 
as there is an analogy between earthly and spiritual joy, so is there an analogy 
between bodily senses and spiritual senses. He sometimes calls this feeling, 
and sometimes a form of mind, both of which suggest elements of the spiritual 
sense which Louth finds in Origen. 
In his treatment of types, Pusey will emphasize often that God chooses to 
communicate to humanity in an embodied way, in symbols and signs that 
human perception can receive and understand. It is the Spirit added to the body 
as well as to the soul which makes a complete human person.162 So is the 
communication of religious knowledge accommodated to the embodied 
                                                 
160 Louth 1994, 62. 
161 See Gen. 43:34. 
162 Pusey’s discusses Irenaeus’ view of the image of God in humanity: ‘this joint character he 
remarkably expressed by the language, “the spiritual man”, if you detach from him soul and 
body, would be not man, but either “the spirit of man” or “the Spirit of God”’. (L143). See also 
Irenaeus, Against Heresies,V.6.1 in Irenaeus 1872, 460-1.  
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character of our spiritual faculties: ‘spirit is revealed to us in the flesh. We 
perceive by the Spirit, yet not directly, but as things are reflected to us in a 
material mirror.’163 As we will see in more detail in Chapter 5, Pusey’s theory 
of knowledge is incarnational. He conceives of a union of the material and 
spiritual elements of language analogous to the union of the human and divine 
in Christ: ‘And thus our very words are two-fold; they are taken from material 
things, have a material substance, yet act invisibly, have an immaterial 
meaning, as they are received by the eyes and ears but act on the soul’.164 This 
is the form of knowledge which is suited to the character of the human person, 
an embodied soul, not purely spiritual intellect. Donald Allchin emphasizes the 
importance of this part of Pusey’s argument: ‘If we are to know God at all, it is 
with a knowledge in which the body and the senses participate. If we are to 
know the divine, our ears and eyes no less that our hearts and minds must be 
made apt to the perception of heavenly realities.’165 
Another element of Pusey’s treatment of the soul which seems to blend 
Romantic, patristic and scriptural elements is his use of the term ‘heart’. When 
Pusey describes ‘feeling’ as offering insight into divine things, he appears to be 
discussing feelings in a way which has similarities with the Scriptural use of 
the term ‘heart’ as a place or power of discernment and decision. In his 
discussion of the problem of unbelief in the ‘Lectures’ he quotes Scriptural 
passages which speak of the heart as a spiritual faculty, the seat of judgement 
which is in need of proper formation, a heart which understands or is too dull 
or ‘fat’ to understand (Isa. 6:9-10). (L5) In his discussion of image and likeness 
Pusey quotes Clement of Alexandria to describe the ‘true mind’, the restored 
and enlightened human intellect, as ‘φρονησις κατα καρδιαν’, an 
‘understanding heart’.166 (L144) The way this same phrase is rendered as ‘the 
affections of the soul’ in another translation suggests how this conception 
                                                 
163 S-EL, 7. The idea that humankind perceives spiritual or intelligible realities through a 
material mirror is a rich image which is explored helpfully in relation to Coleridge and the 
Platonic tradition by Hedley 2000, esp. Chapter 2, ‘Inner word: reflection as mediation’, 129 
and 109-15.  
164 S-EL, 7. 
165 Allchin 1984, 2. 
166 This is how Butterworth translates Clement’s phrase. Clement of Alexandria, 1960, 214-5. 
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includes an emotional or affective sensibility.167 Pusey does not draw attention 
to this reference to the wisdom of the heart other than by not translating it. 
However, it may be that Pusey avoided the use of ‘heart’ to describe the faculty 
of mind or discernment which perceives spiritual things because of the 
Romantic sensibilities and use of the day would connect ‘heart’ with 
superficial or unstable emotions or passions.  
3.4.3 The Imagination in the ‘Lectures’ and in Coleridge 
In some places in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey describes the faculty which perceives 
correspondences between types and their fulfilment as the imagination. Pusey 
postulates that it is the imagination which discerns the way in which ‘the 
natural works of God’ offer poetic symbols for moral or religious truth. (L15) 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, religious poets show that the 
‘expressiveness’ of types ‘really lies in the objects and is not the work of 
imagination (otherwise than as imagination is employed in tracing out the 
mutual correspondence of images with their reality, or with each other)’. (L16) 
Pusey here distinguishes a fictional ‘work of the imagination’ from the 
imagination as a faculty of discernment, ‘tracing out the mutual 
correspondence of images with their reality, or with each other’. The capacity 
to perceive the correspondence between ‘the stubble before the wind’ and the 
idea of ‘contemptible dispersion or destruction’ is, for Pusey, the same capacity 
which recognizes the correspondences between the types and prophecies and 
their fulfilment. (L16) In the context, once again, of addressing the concern 
that the interpretation of types which the Fathers offer are subjective creations, 
fancies, Pusey describes the faculty which perceives ‘actual resemblances’ as 
the φαντασία, the imagination. In doing this, he distinguishes the sense of 
‘fancy’ as an arbitrary or deluded notion from the Greek root which describes 
‘a making visible’, the power which makes objects present to the mind: 
Harmonies, which to one age or one mind, appear obvious and 
undoubted by another are derided as fanciful; a word which does, in fact, 
admit the existence of the harmony in question, only denies its practical 
importance; and in that they condemn it as fanciful, and not as unreal or 
                                                 
167 Clement of Alexandria 1994, 199. 
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untrue, they are indeed unwilling witnesses to its truth; for the perception 
of these analogies does indeed belong to the φαντασια and they who 
condemn them as fanciful, do at all counts admit actual resemblances, 
only that it is such as cannot (they contend) abide the test of a severe 
reasoning. (L37)168 
The charge that patristic interpretations are fanciful displays the rationalist and 
utilitarian confusion of truth with practical importance that was discussed in 
Chapter 2. If it is difficult to ‘demonstrate the likeness even of a corporeal 
image’, it is more difficult still in matters above sense: ‘How much more in 
spiritual things, which require a more exercised mind to discern, a more fruitful 
discernment, and being spiritual, can only be spiritually understood. And can 
we, at the last, read the characters wherein they are written or have we ever 
tried?’ (L37) This is the work of the imagination, to discern or find ‘in the 
characters’ of the types of Scripture the religious element, ‘in those deeper 
hieroglyphics, which mysterious as they stand, signify far other things than 
would on any superficial acquaintance appear’. (L37) The imagination is the 
faculty which discerns these ‘other things’, the substance or spiritual things 
which are communicated through the images of Scripture.169 In that it 
perceives analogies between supersensual reality or truth and the images of 
Scripture, or images drawn from nature and history, the imagination is a 
mediating faculty in Pusey’s account by which what is known through intuition 
may be communicated in sensible images. 
Pusey seems to be drawing on Coleridge’s notion of the imagination. In 
The Statesman’s Manual, Coleridge juxtaposes the ‘mechanic’ or superficial 
histories characteristic, for him, of the eighteenth century, with the histories he 
finds in the Bible:  
In the Scriptures they are the living educts of the Imagination, that 
reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in 
Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by 
                                                 
168 ‘Fancy’ is a short form of the Middle English ‘fantasie’ which comes into English and 
French through the Latin phantasia, and ultimately from the Greek φαντασία’, ‘a making 
visible’. Skeat 1993, 346. 
169 Allegorical interpretation is a kind of interpretation which discerns these ‘other things’, 
‘allos’ or ‘other’ meanings, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. It is possible that Pusey was 
aware of this allusion. 
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the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a 
system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with 
the truths, of which they are the conductors.170  
For Coleridge biblical history offers ‘a system of symbols’ given in ‘Images of 
Sense’ which correspond to or are consubstantial with spiritual truths, with ‘the 
Reason’. The imagination is the mediating faculty by which the truths of 
Reason are perceived in these symbols and images: ‘In the Scriptures therefore 
both Facts and Persons must of necessity have a two-fold significance, a past 
and a future, a temporary and a perpetual, a particular and a universal 
application.’171 In his study of the way in which Romantic writers like 
Coleridge influenced the Victorian Church, Stephen Prickett describes 
Coleridge’s notion of imagination as a faculty of stereoscopic vision: 
Thus over and over again we find Coleridge describing the ‘Imagination’ 
in terms of the bringing into a single focus two separate levels of 
experience, and seeing them as a coherent whole. His concept of the 
Imagination is essentially ‘stereoscopic’; it stands at the intersection of 
two different perspectives, and so enables us to see ‘in depth’.172 
This is essentially how Pusey describes the imagination, as the faculty which 
enables one to read in images available to the sense, ‘both Facts and Persons’, 
the spiritual truths which they communicate, to trace out ‘the mutual 
correspondence of images with their reality, or with each other’. (L16) Johann 
Semler’s inability to perceive ‘the unity of the same spirit manifesting itself in 
various forms according to the character of the individuals through whom it 
was conveyed’, which we considered in Chapter 2, was the beginning of errors 
of historical interpretation and a failure of imagination.173 Chris Snook 
maintains that Coleridge’s view of Imagination, ‘a faculty that can mediate 
between reason and emotion, and apprehend the spiritual in the material’, is 
similar to Schleiermacher’s conception of ‘religious reason’, and suggests the 
influence of both on Pusey.174 Hedley discusses the way in which Coleridge 
distils the patristic inheritance to which Pusey also looked: ‘The concept of 
                                                 
170 SMan. 28-9. 
171 SMan. 29. 
172 Prickett 1976, 19. 
173 TG-I, 142-5. 
174 Snook 2001, 9.  
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imagination in Coleridge lies rooted in Neoplatonism and, specifically, in the 
Romantic reception of late antique metaphysics of nature and mythology.’175 
The importance of these connections will be more evident when Pusey’s theory 
of type and symbol is considered in the next chapter. 
Coleridge’s description of the imagination can also help one to 
understand Pusey’s view of knowledge as a participation in the divine 
knowledge. Coleridge describes the imagination as ‘a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’.176 The symbolising 
work of the imagination, discovering spiritual truths in the images of sense and 
their relationships with one another, corresponds with the work of God who 
established these correspondences in the work of creation. As we have seen, 
Pusey described human Reason as created to be ‘a mirror of the Mind of God 
… a finite copy of the perfections of the Infinite’.177 When this finite mind 
finds in types and prophecies a reflection of spiritual truth, it mirrors the 
creative work of God who bequeathed to creation its harmony and coherence. 
In this way the work of the imagination both manifests the image of God in the 
soul and shares in the work of restoration accomplished in the reading of 
Scripture. In his book Nicaea and its Legacy, Lewis Ayres describes how the 
work of typical or figurative interpretation involves a participation in divine 
creativity: ‘The figural reader seeks figures within the text both to understand 
the incarnate Word and to participate in the divine speech and action in 
creation.’178 Pusey’s description of the imagination in Coleridgean terms as the 
mediating faculty which perceives spiritual truth through sensible images is 
another example of the way in which Pusey’s theory of knowledge, his 
understanding of the capacities and constitution of the soul, and his 
understanding of type are interwoven. To appreciate the importance of these 
ideas for the ‘Lectures’ it is necessary now to turn to a more detailed 
discussion of Pusey’s understanding of type. 
 
                                                 
175 Hedley 2000, 128. See also 127-30. 
176 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, i, (Oxford, 1907), 202, in Prickett 1976, 20. 
177 AFai., 16. 
178 Ayres 2004, 37. 
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Chapter 4 Types and ‘Typical’ Prophecy  
4.1 The Fathers and the ‘Apostolic mode’ 
This chapter will consider Pusey’s argument that the investigation of Old 
Testament prophecy is primarily an investigation of type and what he calls 
‘typical prophecy’. (L11) The goal will be twofold; to explain Pusey’s notion 
of type and to show that it is the lens through which he understands all 
prophecy. As part of this exposition it will be shown why, for Pusey, reading 
the Old Testament according to the principles which he articulates is necessary. 
Throughout the ‘Lectures’, Pusey contrasts the unscriptural and 
rationalistic approach to prophecy, the ‘modern way’ (L4, 118), with the 
‘undisturbed vision’ (L37) and biblical approach of the Fathers. Pusey draws 
extensively on a wide range of patristic writing, both Latin and Greek. He 
quotes from Augustine more than any other source. Liddon’s description of the 
period when ‘he “lived in St. Augustine,” so that his whole thought became 
saturated with that of the great African father’, seems to apply to the 
‘Lectures’.1 Pusey also seems especially familiar with Chrysostom, whose 
works his father gave to him as a graduation present in 1824 and which, 
Liddon asserts, ‘had guided and fed his veneration for those great teachers’.2 
At the most basic level, Pusey argues that any search for Catholic agreement 
among the Fathers must embrace the Greek as well as the Latin Fathers: 
Our Church … was originally of Greek origin, and then, from the later 
Augustine, had blended with it, more of the character of the Western 
Church, so, in its reformation and its later divines, has it united for its 
model, East and West, the Fathers of all Churches, and formed its 
teaching upon all.3 
                                                 
1 Life, 413. In light of the extensive quotations in the ‘Lectures’ and in the later editions of his 
Tract on Baptism, Liddon’s description of Pusey’s ‘meagre sort of knowledge’ of the Fathers 
at this time seems incorrect, and would probably better describe the period up to 1835, perhaps 
including the period when Pusey wrote the first edition of Tract 67.  
2 Life, 409. Pusey may have received some collection of the Father’s works, not only those of 
Chrysostom. Tuckwell 1900, 138. 
3 Augustine 1838, xvi. For an explantion of the supposed ‘Greek origin’ of the Church in 
England, on the basis of the etymology of the term ‘Church’ (from ‘Κυριακὴ οἰκία, or the 
Lord’s House’), on the early origin of the British Church, its indepedence from Rome, and 
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What Yngve Brilioth says of Pusey’s sermons also describes the ‘Lectures’: 
‘Augustine and the other Latin Fathers (Tertullian, Ambrose, Leo) served 
rather as a channel of the piety of the Greek Church; and proof can be 
abundantly given, that Pusey in his preaching drew directly from Clement of 
Alexandria, Irenaeus, Gregory of Nazianzum, Chrysostom, Cyril, and others.’4 
While Pusey acknowledges disagreements and different emphases among the 
Fathers, he puts more stress on them as embodying a common approach 
distinct from that of the modern Church.  
In the preface to his translation of The Confessions of S. Augustine 
(1838), the first volume of the Library of the Fathers, Pusey offers his most 
developed and systematic statement of his understanding of the authority of the 
Fathers at the time he wrote the ‘Lectures’.5 The Library of the Fathers is one 
of the best-known fruits of the Oxford Movement and an important backdrop 
to the preparation of the ‘Lectures’.6 Its full title highlights again Pusey’s 
emphasis on the common faith of the Fathers over the differences among 
schools and individual authors: ‘A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic 
Church anterior to the Division of the East and the West’. Geoffrey Rowell 
argues that this project ‘undoubtedly gained particular impetus from the 
Hampden controversy’, a description which, as we have seen, applies to the 
‘Lectures’ also.7  
In the preface to the Confessions, which also serves as a preface to the 
Library, Pusey argues that he does not put the Fathers before the Bible but 
rather before the contemporary Church: 
                                                 
from ‘the Asiatic custom in keeping Easter, and in its manner of administering baptism’, see 
Wordsworth 1844, 1-2, 132-133. 
4 Brilioth 1933, 297. Nichols 1993, 121-122, and Chadwick 1990, 39, support Brilioth’s 
assessment. 
5 See Augustine 1838, i-xxxii. See also Pusey’s ‘Prospectus’ for the Library, in Cyril 1839, 
368-70. 
6 For a discussion of the importance of the Library and Pusey’s role in the endeavour, as well 
as a full list of the titles, translators, and prefaces, see Liddon, Life, 433-440, and 445-447. For 
a contemporary assessment of the importance of the Library for Pusey, and for the way the 
Tractarians drew on the Fathers, see Middleton 2001, 267-306, especially, 280-285. See also 
Rowell 1983, 78-79.  
7 Rowell 1983, 78. 
  137 
The contrast, then, in point of authority, is not between Holy Scripture 
and the Fathers, but between the Fathers and us; not between the Book 
interpreted and the interpreters, but between one class of interpreters and 
another; between ancient Catholic truth and modern private opinions; not 
between the word of God and the word of man, but between varying 
modes of understanding the word of God.8 
This is the same argument that Pusey makes in the ‘Lectures’, it is the modern 
system which is most distinct from the Bible, not that of the early Church. 
Only the authority conceded to the Apostles as inspired writers of the New 
Testament prevents people from charging them with the same excess of fancy 
as the Fathers:  
… had it been St. Ignatius, who had professed in his epistles, that the 
care of the priesthood was implied in the comment ‘Thou shalt not 
muzzle the ox, which treadeth out the corn’ … should we not have heard 
much of his undue exaltation of the priesthood, and of fanciful 
allegorizing? And yet, St Paul urges this passage and this as the chief 
meaning of it (1 Cor. 9:9, 1 Tim. 5:18). (L11) 
The similarities between St Paul and Ignatius show the ‘Apostolic’ character of 
the Father’s exegesis:  
This might well awaken the suspicion that theirs not ours, is the 
Apostolic mode, or, at least, approaches the nearest to it. Were their 
system even so defective, it would still remain to be shown how, 
precisely this defect, one which implies a system so wholly different 
from our own could have appeared so early and so universally. (L10) 
The universality of typical interpretation in the early Church is a key part 
of Pusey’s argument. He sees in the Fathers a general agreement on this 
system, whatever the differences in specific interpretations: 
For let any one regard such types as not one or the other father, but all 
agree in, not the later only, but the earlier, writers of different habits, 
independent of each other, and dependent on Scripture and the Apostles, 
and see whether the system which he finds throughout, is not one 
essentially different from that now prevalent, whether it would not, not in 
its details merely, but in its broad outline, be regarded fanciful. (L10) 
                                                 
8 Ibid. iii. See also iv, and p. ii for the importance of the act of  Convocation of AD 1571. See 
also Life, 410-413 (Pusey to W. A. Greenhill, 6 June 1838). 
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In his preface to Augustine’s Confessions, Pusey also emphasizes the 
catholicity of what he calls ‘spiritual interpretation’ or, in the preferred 
terminology of the ‘Lectures’, ‘typical interpretation’: 
At the same time, in this as in other cases, a distinction must be made 
between the general principle, (in this instance, what would to most, as 
being unaccustomed to it, appear an extreme of spiritual interpretation,) 
and the particular applications of it. The first is Catholic, the second may 
frequently be individual, although in the details also there is a Catholic 
system, and fragments of it may frequently be traced.9  
While the system of typical interpretation may be ‘a Catholic system’, Pusey 
cautions that, however eminent, the view of any single author is still only the 
view of a single witness: ‘The words then of an individual Father may be only 
those of an enlightened man; it is only by their harmony or unity with others 
that we ascertain them to be part of the Catholic Verities.’10  
The notable exception which proves the rule of a common and catholic 
system is ‘the school of Antioch’ which Pusey characterizes as the home of 
patristic ‘orthodoxism’ and the only significant aberration in the rule of typical 
or spiritual interpretation in the early Church. (L9-10) Pusey separates ‘not 
Origen and his school only … but St Irenaeus, and all’ from ‘the one Judaizing 
school of Antioch’, (L9) and attributes to this school the same faults and 
heretical tendencies which he finds in the evidence writers and the apologetic 
approach: 
For their inability to perceive the relations of the Old Testament to the 
New Testament was part of its superficial rationalizing character; hard in 
admitting proof, ‘slow to understand’ the spiritual relation of things, 
deficient in contemplation, and in fineness of senses, dry in its theories 
which made it the natural birth-place of Nestorianism, the receptacle of 
Pelagianism. (L10)11 
Another example of Pusey’s emphasis on a common approach in the early 
Church is the way he puts the Antiochean bishop Theodoret’s typological 
interpretation of the crossing of the Red Sea alongside that of his theological 
                                                 
9 Ibid. xv.  See xxv for ‘typical interpretation’ in the preface. 
10 Ibid. vii. 
11 Pusey’s view of the Church of Antioch may be influenced by Newman. See Arians, 3, 25, 
126 and Seynaeve 1953, 307. For a contemporary assessment of the problems with 
characterizing the ‘school of Antioch’ in this way, see Louth 2009. 
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sparring partner Cyril of Alexandria as well as those of Augustine, Ambrose, 
Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Jerusalem: ‘the sea was an image of the 
laver. The cloud, of the gift of the Spirit; Moses, of the Priest; the rod, of the 
Cross; Israel passing through, of the baptised; the Egyptians pursing, of the 
demons; Pharaoh himself was an image of the devil’.12 While Pusey notes 
differences in details (Augustine sees Moses as a type of Christ rather than a 
priest), more important is the general consensus to which these authors witness. 
One could characterize Pusey’s approach to some extent as polemical or 
cavalier, overlooking differences to sharpen his attack on the apologetic use. 
There is, no doubt, a polemical aspect to his emphasis on the undivided 
Church. For example, he finds further evidence of a common system among 
the Fathers in that, according to modern standards, even the ‘unsoundest’ 
interpreters of Antioch see ‘fanciful analogies between the Old and New 
Testaments’. (L9-10) However, while he emphasizes similarities over plurality 
of understandings, he does so with the support of a great deal of primary 
evidence.13 Moreover, although he sees an inherent correspondence between  
typical interpretation and Christian orthodoxy, Pusey’s discussions in the 
‘Lectures’ do not focus on the details of the Christological or Trinitarian 
controversies in the fourth and fifth centuries. Alongside Hampden, for 
example, who suggests that terms such as ‘ὁµοούσιος’ have given occasion for 
theologians ‘to arm themselves in defence of the phantoms thus called into 
being’ and who implies that the language of the Creeds is tainted with the 
injurious confusions of the schoolmen (which in Hampden’s system includes at 
least the Alexandrian Fathers and Augustine as well as Aquinas), one can see 
why Pusey focussed his appeal for recovery at a more general level.14 He 
argues in the ‘Lectures’ that whatever differences exist, one sees in the early 
Church a system markedly different from that of Hampden, Paley or the 
apologetic school more generally. While Pusey did not, in the ‘Lectures’, probe 
the significance of differences among the Fathers, this was not a sleight of 
                                                 
12 Theodoret quoted in T67rev., 315-6 n. 5. See 315 n. 4 for Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine, 
317-8 n. 2 for Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and Cyril of Jerusalem. 
13 See for example, T67rev., 312-20. 
14 HPP, 6 and Hampden 1837, 55, also 82-83. See also DrH., 2-5. 
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hand – those whom he criticized also treated the Fathers as monolithic, with 
Origen perhaps standing out for particular censure.15 Viewed more positively, 
Pusey displays here something of the tendency which Lewis Ayres finds in the 
interpreters of the early Church. On the basis of ‘a complex notion of the 
scriptural text as the primary resource for the Christian imagination’, they were 
willing to explicate it ‘through the use of whatever lies to hand and may be 
persuasively adapted’.16 As Ayres points out, and as will be discussed at the 
end of Chapter 5, it is precisely what counts as ‘persuasive adaption’ that is the 
matter of debate.17 
4.2 Pusey’s Comprehensive View of Type 
4.2.1 The Old Testament’s ‘fulness of type’ 
While the ‘Lectures’ are an investigation of ‘types’, Pusey never offers a 
simple definition of types as he does for prophecy. This lack of definition is in 
itself instructive. Pusey criticizes those who attempt to define narrowly the 
meaning of type and puts forward rather a conception of type that is co-
extensive with prophecy itself. The search for types is a response to ‘our 
Lord’s … last teaching to the Apostles after His Resurrection’, which we 
considered in Chapter 2, that they should seek him in the whole of the Old 
Testament, in the law, the prophets, and the Psalms: ‘It were even to put force 
upon the mind to exhibit one event, or person or institution as a type of its 
Lord, and then refuse it liberty to see a type of Him in another event, or person 
or institution similar to the former. (L12)18 At the most basic level, types for 
Pusey include events, people, or institutions that prophesy or reveal Christ: 
But the Old Testament in consequence of the preparatory office assigned 
to it had in it a fulness of type, which could not exist elsewhere. And 
here, of course, one must in the first instance place the positive 
institutions of God (whether rites or offices) and His direct doings. … In 
these must be accounted principally as of greatest account, the ritual 
ordained by God; but so also other ordinances or orderings of God, as the 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Intro., 607-8, quoted at 4.2.3. 
16 Ayres 2004, 392. 
17 Ibid. See 5.2.2 of this thesis. 
18 See also 2.3.3. 
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sacrifice of Isaac. And these institutions partly represent the Redeemer 
Himself, partly the way in which that redemption is appropriated to us, as 
the sacraments are in the passage of the Red Sea and the Manna. (L26) 
At first glance, Pusey’s description of types seems to fit with the kind of 
definition which K. J. Woollcombe offers in his classic essay on biblical 
typology: ‘Typology, considered as a method of exegesis, may be defined as 
the establishment of historical connexions between certain events, persons or 
things in the Old Testament and similar events, persons or things in the New 
Testament.’19 However, Pusey’s comprehensive notion of type not only 
embraces the common understanding of type but broadens it considerably. The 
sacrifice of Isaac or that of Noah are as much types as the ‘rites and offices’ of 
the Mosaic law. In harmony with his notion of the unity of Christ with his 
body, Pusey sees such ordinances as types or prophecies of the sacraments as 
well as ‘the Redeemer Himself’. In material which appears to be a later draft of 
this section of the ‘Lectures’ Pusey explains further what he means by the Old 
Testament’s ‘fulness of type’: ‘But the whole Old Testament, whether history, 
or character, in word or in action, had in it, by reason of God’s Presence in it, 
fitting it for the preparatory office He assigned it, a fulness of type which could 
not exist elsewhere.’20 It is important to see that Pusey refers to types ‘in word’ 
as well as ‘in action’, sayings as well as things: ‘Besides these physical 
correspondences of things animate and inanimate, there is yet another very 
extensive application: that of words’. (L19) In Pusey’s system, ‘The reproaches 
of them that reproached Thee fell on Me’, is as much a type and prophecy of 
the Redeemer’s Passion as Joseph in prison or the Passover.21  
Whereas many writers take great efforts to distinguish types from other 
kinds of prophecy, for Pusey types and prophecy are synonymous. This is 
crucial to the argument of the ‘Lectures’: 
One type thoroughly developed will throw much light over the whole 
typical character of the Old Testament. It should further be noticed, in 
illustration of the importance and extent of the subject, that types are by 
no means confined to what are usually designated by the name. For types 
                                                 
19 Woollcombe 1957, 39. 
20 S-FTL, 7. 
21 S-FTL, 16. 
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are every where taken up into prophecy itself; its language is mainly 
typical. (L12-13) 
The simple idea which organizes his investigation of prophecy in the 
‘Lectures’ is that prophecy is ‘mainly typical’. ‘Typical’ rather than 
‘typological’ is the most common way Pusey describes prophecy throughout 
the ‘Lectures’ – prophecy is typical, and types are prophetic: 
Israel then was in a three-fold manner typical: First, in its institutions, 
wherein it was to live, until by constantly living in them, it imbibed their 
Spirit, and so became susceptible for the teaching, which unfolded their 
meaning, Secondly, in God’s general guidance, Third, in their own 
particular character and conduct, as a people guided by God. As a people, 
they will be emblematic of the Christian Church, or of the Christian life; 
God’s Providence and His mode of their deliverance, also of His dealings 
with that Church, and in a measure also, as man, of the Head of the 
Church, the Son of man, who is also Son of God, and Institutions would 
be typical of doctrines. (L86) 
Pusey describes the history of Israel as one great system of type and typical 
prophecy.22 In addition to the ‘historical connexions’ between Old Testament 
types and the New Testament antitype which Woollcombe’s standard 
definition includes, Pusey finds correspondences between these types and the 
ongoing life of Christ’s body, the Church. Pusey’s sense of ‘type’ is 
comprehensive not only in what may serve as a type, but in how a type is 
fulfilled. Types are typical of doctrines – not just of the Redeemer’s death on 
the Cross but also of the Atonement; not just of the Resurrection but also of the 
character of eternal life. Pusey evokes Augustine’s classic formula: ‘A deeper 
investigation of type and prophecy would also show them in the Old Testament 
the principal doctrines of the New. “Novum Testamentum in vetere latet, vetus 
in Novo patet”, says St Augustine’. (L36)23 
When Pusey speaks of a type or a typical prophecy, part of what he 
means is that some aspect of its meaning is hidden. To discover what is 
revealed it is necessary to ‘penetrate a little deeper, or lift up the veil a little’. 
                                                 
22 A non-exhaustive list of Pusey’s description of prophecy as ‘typical’ or of ‘typical’ as a 
synonym for ‘prophetic’ includes: L2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 48, 54, 72, 86, 96. 
23 ‘The New lies hidden in the Old Testament, and the Old Testament is opened up in the 
New’. Augustine Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2.73. 
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(L8) The meaning of typical prophecy is a ‘mystical meaning’, a meaning 
which is hidden as well as manifest. (L136, 151) Pusey describes typical 
prophecy in terms of the ‘dark speeches’ of Numbers 12:8, ‘where God 
declares the character of the prophecies of Moses ḥydh “enigma” on account 
of the veil at first cast over them’. (L33-34) The Old Testament is ‘one vast 
prophetic system, veiling, but full of the New Testament’. (L8) The Fathers’ 
expositions of types uncover ‘a hidden treasure, which lies below the surface of 
Holy Scripture; they contained however, even for the present, some full 
although veiled promise’. (L85) Pusey sometimes describes the veiled meaning 
as the ‘higher’ meaning: ‘Many prophecies and especially the Psalms will have 
a higher meaning, than if read in our matter of fact way’. (L28) The higher 
meaning is also deeper, ‘deeper than that which is required for the mere 
context.’ (L39) This deeper or veiled sense is ‘a treasure which God has 
deposited in Scripture below the surface’. (L39)  
All of these expressions not only describe the kind of meaning which 
types offer, but they emphasize that these types may be overlooked or 
misunderstood. Pusey sometimes calls types ‘hieroglyphics’ which need to be 
deciphered: ‘The hieroglyphics which were the deposit of such wisdom appear 
but a confused mass of shapeless and arbitrary signs, to those who can no 
longer decipher them.’ (L10) Richard Hurd whose influence on Pusey we 
considered in Chapter 2, also described ‘the prophetic style’ of Scripture as 
constructed ‘on the symbolic principles of the hieroglyphics; which were not 
vague, uncertain things; but fixed and constant analogies’.24 Pusey found in 
Egyptian hieroglyphics a timely image to describe the ancient language of 
types. Although the Rosetta stone with its inscriptions in hieroglyphics, 
demotic, and Greek was discovered by Napoleon’s troops in 1799, it was not 
until the early 1820s that the work of Jean-François Champollion made it 
possible to decipher the hieroglyphics. For those who could no longer decipher 
the symbolic language of the Old Testament Pusey’s work could serve as a 
typological Rosetta stone. 
                                                 
24 Hurd 1811, Sermon IX, ‘On the prophetic style considered’, 233. 
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4.2.2 The Apologetic Approach to Types  
Pusey distinguishes his comprehensive notion of type and typical prophecy 
from the apologetic approach to Old Testament types. He describes two classes 
of apologetic writing which acknowledge the principle of types but which 
arbitrarily limit them. The first class ‘admits the principle of types, but limits 
their application’, while the second ‘makes it their principle to accept the 
application of types, whereon they have the authority of the New Testament 
but restrain the principle itself.’ (L12) Pusey seems to have in mind the kind of 
definitions and classifications that one finds in Thomas Hartwell Horne’s* An 
Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures 
(1818), a book that was required reading for divinity students in Pusey’s day.25 
Whereas Horne makes it clear that interpreting types is an important part of the 
study of the Old Testament, his precision about what counts as type and what 
does not, and his emphasis on definite or ‘certain criteria’ to determine a sense 
which is ‘sufficiently clear and intelligible’ show why he is a good 
representative of the apologetic approach.26 When Pusey describes errors in the 
modern approach to types, he uses as his examples the very sources Horne puts 
forward to justify his views in his Introduction. For example, in his chapter 
‘On the Interpretation of Types’, Horne quotes extensively from Bishop 
Marsh’s Lectures on Biblical Criticism and Interpretation (1809-16). Herbert 
Marsh* was Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Cambridge from 1807 
until his death, and his lectures were considered to be a classic at the time 
Pusey delivered the ‘Lectures’.27 Although Pusey does not specify in the 
                                                 
25 Landow 1980, 21. While Landow’s discussion of the importance of typology in the 
Victorian period may appear to contradict Pusey’s argument, Landow’s approach is different. 
For example, Landow refers to both Newman and Horne to exemplify interest in types without 
distinguishing their approaches as Pusey does (pp. 20-26). Also, Landow’s view of the 
essentially historical character of biblical types and of the tension between the historical and 
the spiritual differentiates his approach from that of Pusey (pp. 54-57). 
*Horne, Thomas Hartwell (1780–1862). On the basis of Horne’s book, the Bp of London 
ordained him. He was offered the curacy of Christ Church, Greyfriars, in 1819, and in 1831 a 
prebendary in St Paul's Cathedral. 
26 Intro., 604, 608. 
27 *Marsh, Herbert (1757-1839). He was appointed Bp of Llandaff in 1816, and Bp of 
Peterborough in 1819. Before his appointment as Lady Margaret Professor, he studied in 
Germany with J. D. Michaelis, from whom he learned the critical methods of biblical 
interpretation common in Germany at the time. 
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‘Lectures’ the identity of those who limit the principle of types, we know from 
Marshall’s ‘Notes’ that he named Bishop Marsh.28 For example, when Pusey 
censures those who ‘pass by … even some of the New Testament itself’, i.e., 
its types, he appears to have Marsh in mind. (L11) Horne quotes the offending 
passage, but with approval: 
And even when comparisons are instituted in the New Testament 
between antecedent and subsequent persons or things, we must be careful 
to distinguish the examples, where a comparison is instituted merely for 
the sake of illustration, from the examples where such a connexion is 
declared, as exists in the relation of a type to its antitype.29 
Horne also quotes Marsh to illustrate how to distinguish an ‘illustration’ from 
a genuine type:30 
To constitute one thing the type of another, as the term is generally 
understood in reference to Scripture, something more is wanted than 
mere resemblance. The former must not only resemble the latter, but 
must have been designed to resemble the latter … It is this previous 
design, and this pre-ordained connexion, which constitute the relation of 
type and antitype.31  
This principle displays what for Pusey is the evidentialist search for definitive 
proof. For Marsh, the New Testament provides the required evidence of a ‘pre-
ordained connexion’:  
Whatever persons or things, recorded in the Old Testament, were 
expressly declared by Christ, or by his apostles, to have been designed as 
prefigurations of persons or things relating to the New Testament, such 
persons or things so recorded in the former, are types of the persons or 
things, with which they are compared in the latter. But if we assert, that a 
person or thing was designed to prefigure another person or thing, where 
no such prefiguration has been declared by divine authority, we make an 
assertion for which we neither have, nor can have, the slightest 
foundation.32  
                                                 
28 M19. In his letter to Tholuck about English theology (24 May 1830), Pusey writes that ‘Bp 
Marsh has published a set of lectures on the criticism and interpretation of the Bible, but 
having been addressed to younger students of Theology, they are elementary only’. Life, 246. 
29 Bp. Marsh’s Lectures on Biblical Criticism, part III. in Intro., 614. 
30 Intro., 614. 
31 Bp. Marsh quoted in Intro., 614. 
32 Bp. Marsh, Intro., 614 n. 
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In Pusey’s argument this approach represents a widespread practice. Pusey 
points to the Bishop of Durham, William Van Mildert*, as one of those who 
only allows such types as are authorized by Scripture.33 According to Pusey, 
Van Mildert here follows the eighteenth century divine Daniel Waterland*, but 
did not carry the mistaken principle as far as Marsh: 
Fearful of unskilful application, they draw the line as to admit only what 
are types in the New Testament, but leave the rest in abeyance. To this 
school Waterland belonged (Preface to Sacred Scripture Vindicated p. 
18). He will only allow as types those which Sacred Scripture has 
directly or indirectly Typified. This is corrected in a degree by Bishop 
van Mildert though he too in part admits it (Brampton Lecture vii). 
Bishop Marsh carries it still further than even Waterland. This is 
dangerous like all timid policy. It endeavours to get rid of all typology 
and to make us suspicious of them, it draws also an arbitrary line.34 
Horne quotes Van Mildert from the Bampton Lectures of 1814, The General 
Principles of Scripture-Interpretation, the same lectures to which Pusey also 
refers: 
It is essential to a type, in the Scriptural acceptation of the term, that 
there should be a competent evidence of the divine intention in the 
correspondence between it and the antitype, – a matter not left to the 
imagination of the expositor to discover, but resting on some solid proof 
from Scripture itself, that this was really the case.35  
This is a notion of intention which Pusey challenges and which exemplifies for 
him the problem of evidentialist approach to prophecy: ‘brought within the 
compass of a system, all those parts were lost, which lay to the right or to the 
left beyond the circle which men had drawn’. (L3) Pusey faults the approach 
which Marsh, Waterland, Van Mildert, and Horne represent as a species of the 
apologetic approach to prophecy, displaying its ‘precise and clear, and 
reasoning habit of mind’ and ‘entertaining a secret repugnance to the undefined 
                                                 
33 *Van Mildert, William (1765-1836). Van Mildert was appointed Regius Professor of 
Divinity at Oxford in 1813, Bp of Llandaff in 1819, and translated to Durham in 1826 where 
he helped to found the University of Durham. 
34 M18-19.  
*Waterland, Daniel (1683-1740). Waterland especially opposed Unitarianism and deism, 
publishing Scripture Vindicated (1730-32) in response to Matthew Tindal’s Christianity as Old 
as Creation (1730).  
35 Van Mildert, Lecture VII, quoted in Intro., 614. 
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and less exact and more poetical or imaginative and mystical character of 
types’. (L11) 
Pusey’s criticisms of Waterland, Marsh, and Van Mildert suggest the 
controversial character of the ‘Lectures’ which we will consider in more detail 
in Chapter 7. Many High Churchman regarded Waterland as one of those who 
encouraged a lively faith and an appreciation of the Fathers during the dry and 
superficial eighteenth century.36 According to the influential High Churchman, 
J. W. Burgon, Bishop Van Mildert was one of those ‘holy and earnest men’ 
whose work prepared the ground for the Tractarian revival.37 Finally, Bishop 
Marsh was considered by many, in both positive and negative senses, as a 
‘rigidly Orthodox’ champion of religion in Cambridge.38 In those whom the 
historian V. F. Storr describes as ‘lineal ancestors’ to the Oxford Movement, 
including two of the three ‘ablest’ bishops of the orthodox or High Church 
tradition, Pusey uncovered the ‘timid and apologetic tone’ characteristic of 
both the apologetic approach and rationalism.39 Newman shared a similar view, 
and described Waterland as well as George Bull and Van Mildert as 
‘Antiquarians and Doctrinists, not Ecclesiastical Historians’.40 In his study of 
Newman, Ben King argues: ‘What Newman regrets about “Doctrinists,” from 
Bull and Waterland to Van Mildert, is that detail overwhelms plot: they are 
“Antiquarians” who are interested in the past for its own sake, not 
“Ecclesiastical Historians” who tell the story of the past in order to change 
lives in the present.’41 This description brings together elements of Pusey’s 
criticism of the apologetic approach to prophecy and shows how his argument 
was also a challenge to the High Church tradition. Pusey’s willingness to 
mention Marsh, Waterland, and Van Mildert, but not Horne, may be another 
example of his reluctance to mention living authors in some of his works, a 
                                                 
36 Nockles 1994, 4, 235. 
37 Burgon, Lives of Twelve Good Men, in ibid. 11-12, also n. 38. 
38 Nockles 1994, 29 and 102. For Marsh’s orthodoxy, see also 65-66. 
39 Storr 1913, 80, 79 and Life, 413-414. 
40 King 2009, 16, also 15-17.  
41 Ibid. 16. 
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practice to which he refers explicitly in the Theology of Germany, and which 
he seems to adopt, for the most part, in the ‘Lectures’.42  
4.2.3 Types as Guides and the Counter-example of Cain 
Horne cautions his readers against the ‘excess of spiritualizing’ and the 
tendency to ‘seek for mystical meanings in every passage’, which he finds 
‘among many of the fathers, as Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine, and others, and 
particularly in Origen’.43 At the end of his consideration of the ‘Spiritual 
Interpretation of the Scriptures’, he leaves his reader with a warning to ‘adhere 
with jealous care to the plain and unforced dictates of the word of God; lest … 
he should inadvertently contribute to the adulteration of Christianity, and the 
consequent injury which must thence arise to the spiritual interests of his 
fellow-creatures.’44 Pusey turns this kind of criticism on its head and argues 
that it is not the search for hidden meanings which contributes to the injury and 
adulteration of Christianity, but rather rules which limit the principle of types. 
These false limits are dangerous because they create a feeling of suspicion 
toward the Bible and the sacred writers: ‘For this proceeding, amidst its 
apparent modesty, does in fact assume the precariousness of types; its very 
object is to get rid of the question of typology as unsatisfactory and so, it, of 
necessity engenders a suspicious feeling with regard to those which remain.’ 
(L12) One of Pusey’s fundamental principles is that the types which are 
described or quoted in the New Testament are not limits which restrict what 
counts as a type, but rather examples or signposts which reveal the principles 
of typology: 
… what the Apostles took and authorized were not isolated phenomena 
but specimens, as it were, of the rich treasure stored up within it, given to 
kindle our diligence in searching after it, not as the bounds of our search; 
[but] guides to direct where and how to seek, not guards to withhold us 
from prying beyond what it has authoritatively disclosed. (L8) 
                                                 
42 TG-I, 177 n. 1: ‘the mention of living authors has been for the most part purposely avoided’. 
43 Intro., 607-8. 
44 Intro., 608. 
  149 
Whereas for writers like Bishop Marsh, the ‘divine authority’45 of the type is 
secured only by New Testament quotations, for Pusey this divine authority is 
provided through the guidance which the clearest types offer:  
And obviously our wisest course of investigation is to take as our guides 
such types as are pointed out to us in the New Testament to examine their 
principles and character and criteria, and then compare with them those 
generally recognized by the Church or read with eyes so opened the Old 
Testament itself. One type thoroughly developed will throw much light 
over the whole typical character of the Old Testament. (L12) 
New Testament types do not exhaust the storehouse, but rather show how to 
interpret the Old Testament and ‘the system of interpretation which we ought 
to adopt’.46 
With the ‘modest reserve’ that our interpretations cannot claim the same 
authority as those of the Apostles which are given to us in Scripture, Pusey 
writes, ‘it appears more grateful to follow out the hints which God has given, 
and under the guidance, as we might hope, of His Holy Spirit, compare like 
things with like, than simply to keep without increase, the talent committed to 
our care’. (L12) Without stating it explicitly, Pusey implies that refusing to 
look for types deserves the similar stern rebuke of the Lord: ‘Take therefore the 
talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents.’ (Matt. 25:28) The 
description which Reno and O’Keefe offer of the Fathers’ approach sums up 
Pusey’s understanding on this point:  
… they did not view interpretive modesty as a theological virtue. They 
believed that God saturated scripture with a great wealth of truth, and 
zeal was the right disposition to take as an interpreter. ‘Seek and ye shall 
find’, was a basic hermeneutic principle that they felt with existential 
force.47 
In Pusey’s argument, those who fail to see the whole of the Old Testament as 
one great system of typical prophecy fail to do what God has required of them 
and neglect the most basic hermeneutical principle. 
                                                 
45 Bp. Marsh in Intro., 614 n. 
46 M13. 
47 O’Keefe 2005, 113. 
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In a particularly strong and even shocking image, Pusey suggests that 
Cain, the first murderer, is a type or symbol for those who neglect types and 
typical prophecy because they neglect the hints or guides which God has given: 
‘Cain appears, in the first instance, as the type of those, who profanely neglect 
what is not directly commanded them, nor act readily upon the intimations of 
God’. (L53/54) Pusey draws this conclusion on the basis of his interpretation of 
the Fall in Genesis 3.48 Drawing on Ambrose’s homily Paradise, Pusey seeks 
to uncover the deeper meaning of the fig leaves which Adam and Eve sewed 
together to cover themselves, and of the ‘coats of skins’ which God made them 
(Gen. 3:6, 21). In addition to Ambrose, Pusey refers to Irenaeus and 
Chrysostom49 to argue that in the Fall Adam and Eve lost the clothing of virtue 
and the robe of sanctity. (L48) The clothing which God gave them is a sign of 
the mercy of God by which sin is covered or forgiven. Pusey draws on Keble 
to sum up the tradition, in his poem for Sexagesima: ‘Yet mercy hath not left 
us bare: | The very weeds we daily wear | are to faith’s eye a pledge of God’s 
forgiving might.’ (L48)50 
More particularly, Pusey finds in the clothing provided by God a type 
and prophecy of the need for vicarious sacrifice to forgive sin. Abel’s offering 
of the ‘firstlings of his flock and of the fat therefore’ (Gen. 4:4) looked back to 
the gift of skins to his parents and forward to the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, 
the one who would crush the serpent’s head, cover human sin, and provide a 
new and more lasting garment of grace and sanctity:  
And so, in this inexpressible condescension of God lay the foundation of 
all sacrifice; and Abel’s offering looked back to and was a reminiscence 
and recognition of the unspeakable mercy, which lay enveloped in this 
act of God, that by death, man’s shame was covered, as well as forward 
to that vicarious death of the woman’s seed, whereby their enemy was to 
be crushed. We hear not of sacrifices being directly appointed, or that 
these were the skins of beasts offered in sacrifice; and therefore it is best 
not to supply what is concealed: but it is said that God made coats of 
                                                 
48 Pusey used this material in his sermon ‘Eve – The Course of Temptation’, preached at St 
Mary’s Oxford, Lent, 1870. Sermon VI, Pusey 1874, 107-127. 
49 See Paradise, 13.63, in Ambrose 1961, 343. See also Homilies on Genesis, Homily 18.3-4, 
in Chrysostom 1990, ii, 5, and Against Heresies, III.23.5, in Irenaeus 1872, 300.  
50 XnYr., Sexagesima. The italics are in Pusey, not Keble. 
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skin, and so the text presupposes the death of the animals; and Abel in 
sacrificing to God, was imitating this action of God, and setting forth the 
truth therein declared. And sacrifice throughout the world is but the 
indistinct, and often confused, echo of this revealing act of God: and so 
had a root in the human breast, deeper than they who used it, were 
conscious of. (L48-49) 
Since Adam and Eve’s need for clothing was a result of sin, and since 
providing this clothing in the form of animal skins necessitated the death of 
unoffending animals, God’s act in providing clothing for Adam and Eve taught 
that the shedding of innocent blood would be necessary in order to forgive or 
‘cover’ sin. 
Pusey emphasizes that while Abel was not explicitly commanded to 
make a sacrifice, in doing so he imitated God. This reception of what is only 
imperfectly known, and acting on it, is part of the character of faith: 
Abel’s sacrifice carried out into action the promise conveyed by God in 
the death of those unoffending ones, with whose skins God had covered 
our first parents’ sin; not, as far as it appears, by any command, but an 
act of faith, imitating with a childhood-docility the pattern set before 
him. (L53/54) 
If Cain is an emblem of those who ‘profanely neglect what is not directly 
commanded them’, Abel exemplifies the obedient and probing faith which 
Pusey and other members of the Oxford movement hold up as an exemplary 
standard. This kind of faith discovers that which is not explicitly commanded, 
and discerns prophecy which is not clear and verifiable. Abel learned the truth 
of the sacrificial principle which is wrapped up in the provision of skins for 
Adam and Eve. Cain’s first sin was not the murder of his brother, but the 
neglect of the hints which God had given. He failed the trial of prophecy which 
we considered in Chapter 3. By suggesting that Cain’s fault was the emblem of 
those who neglect the principle of typology, Pusey shows how serious he 
believes this error to be.  
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4.2.4 The ‘minute agreement’ of Types 
Pusey emphasizes not only general correspondences between types and their 
fulfilments, but that these correspondences extend to minute particulars. The 
minute correspondence of types, the way in which all the details of a type are 
significant, is another one of Pusey’s fundamental principles. For Pusey, 
nothing is by chance, ‘things, apparently the most minute, were full of hidden 
meaning’. (L12) Having considered the way in which the sacrifice of Isaac was 
emblematic of Christ’s sacrifice, Pusey notes: ‘The history in its minute and 
mysterious particulars must have made a deep impression upon the elder 
inquiring Church and to us, it may, besides its direct instruction, be a warning 
how we reckon any things common or of slight account, which God has 
sanctified.’ (L71) He explains this principle also in later editions of Tract 67: 
‘It is a principle with the ancients, that whether they see the right application or 
no, or only one or more of many right applications, still nothing in His history 
was accidental, nothing without its meaning.’51 Subordinate means or 
incidental details are not just explanations or local colouring, but are 
themselves vehicles of revelation. Pusey argues that failing to consider the 
‘deeper meaning’ of all ‘outward circumstances’, the details of a type is an 
expression of empiricism or epicureanism:  
He willed that His people should enter the promised land through the 
Jordan, though not the obvious way; or He raised the axe's head, though 
(as people would now often speak) it ‘chanced’ that it was by the Jordan 
that the sons of the prophets had, by Elisha’s permission, gone to make 
them a dwelling. The ‘common sense’ view, that such things were ‘by 
chance’ so and so, is a naked Epicureism [sic]; enough for us that they 
were so; and if so, were designed to be so, i.e.: they had a meaning.52 
In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey argues that ‘It is probably one part of the lesson 
intended to us by the minute provisions of the law, not to “despise the small 
things” of the Gospel, but to search in them also, as the Jew did in the law, 
what these things should mean.’ (L92) Once again, O’Keefe and Reno find this 
                                                 
51 T67rev., 272.  
52 T67rev., 347. See also 272-3 for examples: ‘moderns find evidences of the truth of the 
narrators, where the ancients saw doctrine and divine wisdom.’ 
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same principle in early Christian interpretation of the Bible: ‘The dense 
particularity of the two sides of the typological interpretation does all the work 
of illumination.’53  
Pusey points to the example of the Paschal lamb as an example of the 
principle of minute correspondence: 
In the emblem of the paschal lamb we are doubly required to look for a 
minute fulfilment, 1) by the very fact of the minuteness and repeatedness 
of the distinctions, in itself implying importance and significance; 2) by 
the circumstance, that one detail, which to us apparently would have 
seemed most minute, and have been altogether passed over, has been 
singled out by St John as designed with this view, ‘that the Scripture 
should be fulfilled, “a bone of Him shall not be broken”’(John 19:36), as 
if to instruct us that nothing is of little account, or without meaning, for 
certainly we should not [have] seen that this was a portion of the 
completeness of His sacrifice, that it should be perfect when offered, and 
when completed, His holy person, which He offered should retain its 
perfection, as a symbol of its greatness, its completeness, its durability, 
its acceptableness, while out of His pierced side there flowed the blood 
and water; ‘not’, as St Chrysostom says, ‘accidentally or by chance did 
that fountain spring forth from Him, but because through both, His 
Church was founded; and they who are partakers of the mysteries know 
this; for by water being regenerated, by the blood and flesh are they 
nourished.’54 And all this God had in the Passover portrayed long before, 
in the perfection of the lamb, the entireness of its form (and in this 
sacrifice alone were not the bones to be broken, or the hidden marrow 
eaten) and yet the sprinkling of its blood, and the nourishment through it. 
(L125) 
Comparing his ‘matter-of-fact age’ with the ancient Church, Pusey writes that 
‘their thorough conviction of the divinity of every the least jot or tittle, every 
fringe and bell in the rich embroidering of God’s word – that every thing in the 
whole economy had its designs and meanings, – enabled them to use proofs 
which would be closed to moderns’. (L118) 
                                                 
53 O’Keefe 2005, 72. 
54 Chrysostom, Homilies on St John, 85.3, on John 19:34. 
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4.3 ‘Typical’ and ‘Direct’ Prophecy 
4.3.1 The ‘Typical’ Character of All Prophecy  
As we have seen, Pusey does not sharply distinguish type and prophecy: ‘For 
types are every where taken up into prophecy itself; its language is mainly 
typical.’ (L13) Pusey describes ‘typical prophecies’ as the paradigmatic form 
of New Testament prophecy which shows how the Old Testament should be 
read: 
There is, however, another class of prophecies and that the most 
frequently introduced in the New Testament, precisely that sort which 
has most suffered by modern treatment, and which seem inserted, in part 
at least, as a sort of hint, how we may read the Old Testament with most 
fruit – the typical prophecies. (L7) 
The other class of prophecies from which Pusey distinguishes typical 
prophecies he calls ‘direct’ (L7, L29) or ‘simple’ (L33) prophecies in the 
‘Lectures’. He uses the term ‘direct’ in two ways. In a technical or neutral 
sense, direct prophecies are Old Testament prophecies which are fulfilled only 
in Christ, they do not have a secondary or prior fulfilment in the Old 
Testament. Pusey explains his view of ‘direct’ prophecy in a letter to Keble in 
November, 1836, when he was delivering his lectures. Pusey explained to 
Keble the meaning of his ‘denying any typical basis to such places as Ps. 2:4-5, 
and to those parts of Isa. 40-end which relate to our Lord, contrary to modern 
notions which say, This psalm was first fulfilled in David, then in Christ: but I 
think this was intended to be confined to particular places, not in all’.55 In 
Psalm 2:4 – ‘He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh: the Lord shall have them 
in derision’ – there is a direct reference to the Ascended Christ, the ‘Lord’ who 
‘dwelleth in heaven’, words which were not fulfilled in a secondary way by 
David or in any other Old Testament personage. Therefore, it is a direct 
prophecy. However, more commonly in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey uses ‘direct’ in a 
more pejorative sense to describe the label given to those prophecies which 
meet criteria like those of Paley and Davison described in Chapter 2. One finds 
these sorts of prophecies listed at the back of some Bibles under a title like 
                                                 
55 Pusey to Keble, 20 Nov. 1836, LBV-101. See also Liddon, Life, 400. 
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‘Old Testament Prophecies of Christ’. As we have seen already, Pusey 
believed that this approach to prophecy misunderstands the prophetic character 
of the Old Testament: 
Holy Scripture does not favour our mechanical views of prophecy, as 
containing so many items, as it were, as there are striking passages; as 
though prophecies admitted of being counted up, and the entire evidence 
of prophecy was to be weighed according to the number and contents and 
tangibleness of these several predictions. (L7-8) 
Such a mechanical view of prophecy is promoted by the apologetic school 
which uses prophecy as a form of evidence. The implication of terms such as 
‘direct’ prophecy is that this kind of prophecy is the best or definitive kind of 
prophecy, and that other forms are of secondary or uncertain importance. 
Rather, for Pusey, prophecies which are clear serve as guides to the prophetic 
witness of the Old Testament more generally, and the details of even obscure 
prophecies are important (i.e. what he says about types applies also to typical 
prophecy).  
Pusey argues that the distinction between direct and typical prophecies 
serves to obscure prophecy rather than uncover it. Pusey distances himself 
from those who make such distinctions: ‘I would not, then, distinguish, as 
some eminent foreign writers have done, between direct and typical 
prophecies, or again between these and types, otherwise than in form.’ (L33) 
Without mentioning him by name, he refers to the work of his friend August 
Tholuck, whose dissertation ‘On the Citations from the Old Testament 
contained in the New’, was before him at the end of July, 1836, when he was 
preparing the ‘Lectures’:  
I have read your 1st Beilage, and, as whole & in the main I agree with it 
& like it very much: only whereas you point out, that the distinction 
between typical prophecies, which result from the character of the Old 
Testament dispensation, & those, wherein there was a special inspiration 
often melts away and then two classes melt into each other.56  
Pusey repeats this assessment in the ‘Lectures’, where he refers to Tholuck 
cryptically in the class of eminent foreign writers: ‘Rather, as one of these 
                                                 
56 P-Thl., lines 144-148. Geck uses italics to show the letters he adds to fill out Pusey’s 
abbreviations. 
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writers, has himself noticed, the several classes, into which men have 
distinguished prophecy are continually melting into each other; so that e.g. 
although some point more directly to the Christ, others are more veiled’. (L32) 
Alongside his general approval of Tholuck’s exposition Pusey finds in 
Tholuck’s analysis vestiges of the apologetic approach which evaluates 
prophecy by the kind of clear evidence which it can offer: ‘I think namely that 
too broad a distinction is made between direct & typical prophecy: as if after 
all typical prophecy were a lower grade, and a lower grade of evidence and a 
lower value.’57 Typical prophecy seems like a ‘lower grade of evidence’ in 
Tholuck’s argument because Tholuck says that the evidence offered by typical 
prophecies has only a ‘persuasive rather than convincing power’ when 
compared to direct prophecy.58 As we have seen in Chapter 2, Pusey thinks that 
distinguishing prophecy according to standards of clarity and evidence comes 
from focusing on the surface of the prophecy. In his letter to Tholuck, Pusey 
sketches the ideas which he develops more fully in the ‘Lectures’: ‘If the 
typical prophecy be less clear & evident, it is only relatively; if a person can 
look under the veil or look through it, it is as clear & evident as if there were 
no veil; but we have had the habit of fixing our eyes on the veil.’59 The veil is 
what is available to various kinds of empirical study. Focusing on the historical 
context or linguistic questions gives a priority to associations which can be 
analysed or proven with scientific tools. This was Pusey’s point of contention 
with ‘the boasted discovery of modern times, the so-called historico-
grammatical interpretation’ (L39), and with Hampden’s notion of ‘historical 
interpretation’ discussed in Chapter 2. However, simply because this level of 
meaning can be studied or evaluated by categories which modern empirical 
approaches privilege does not mean that it is the only or primary locus of 
meaning: ‘If one realizes to one’s self the whole dispensation of the Old 
Testament as one prophetic system, full of Christ as looking forward to an 
                                                 
57 Ibid. lines 151-154. 
58 Diss., 207. For the distinction between direct and typical in Tholuck, pp. 191-5. 
59 P-Thl., lines 156-158. 
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accomplishment, then one loses the idea of arbitrariness, which people have 
attached to typical prophecy.’60  
Pusey demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing direct and typical 
prophecies according to their clarity or what they reveal by considering the 
different ways in which God’s promises to Abraham, on the one hand, and 
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, on the other, are prophetic. For example, God’s 
promise to Abraham, ‘in thy seed shall all the kingdoms of the world be 
blessed’, could be viewed as a direct, or simple, prophecy. (L31)61 On the 
surface, it may seem to be a straightforward prophecy that some descendent of 
Abraham will be a source of blessing to the peoples of the world, i.e. it 
prophesies the birth of the Messiah. However, for Pusey, the distinction 
between a typical and a direct prophecy does not arise from a Scriptural view 
of the character of prophecy, but from the evidentialist search for clarity and 
perspicuity: 
Yet the whole comparison between the evidence of types and what is 
called ‘direct prophecy’ turns upon this, that men fix their standard of 
clearness and obscurity by that which it would have been to the Jews 
before Christ’s coming; and so e.g. because the promise to Abraham ‘in 
thy seed shall all the kingdoms of the world be blessed’ was beforehand 
clearer than the action of the sacrifice of Isaac, therefore they conclude 
that it is so now and not only so, but turn their mind wholly to the one to 
the exclusion of the other. (L31) 
There are two aspects to this criticism. Pusey argues that the apparent obscurity 
of types results from the erroneous notion that types cannot reveal more to 
Christians that they did to the Israelites.62 Secondly, Pusey insists that even 
prophecies which are clear and evident on the surface also have a depth of 
meaning. Later in the ‘Lectures’, Pusey returns to the promise made to 
Abraham to show that this prophecy is also a typical prophecy. In particular, he 
focuses on the meaning of the ‘seed’ of Abraham in which the world will be 
                                                 
60 P-Thl., lines 162-6. 
61 One finds this reference in Gen. 22:18, 26:4, 28:14, and Acts 3:25. 
62 Andrew Louth argues that Pusey’s argument here supports the view advanced by Hans-
Georg Gadamer and others that ‘the presuppositions of historical criticism are radically 
unhistorical: for they imagine that we, who are engaged in this process of understanding, can 
in some way abstract ourselves from our own historical context’. Louth 1984, 40. 
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blessed. According to Pusey, in Romans 9 and Galatians 3:8-29 St Paul shows 
that the full meaning of this prophecy was veiled and hidden. The promise of 
the ‘seed’ included not only the Redeemer who would be in some way 
Abraham’s descendent, but also ‘the individuality of the Deliverer’, and ‘his 
spiritual birth … not after the matter of men’. (L65) Furthermore, this seed also 
describes the body of Christ, ‘the oneness of the Church’ (L66), and that the 
redeemed become the seed of Abraham by another spiritual birth: ‘In that we 
by baptism are “made members of Christ” and are in Christ so are we in the 
seed of Abraham, and are Abraham’s seed, inasmuch as we are part of Christ, 
who is that seed.’ (L68) Pusey argues that all this typical meaning is 
encapsulated in what is sometimes described as a direct prophecy. 
If what are sometimes called direct prophecies also have a typical 
meaning, then types may also offer as much clarity and precision as any so-
called direct prophecy. To make this point, Pusey considers the sacrifice of 
Isaac. The ancient Church saw in the sacrifice of Isaac a clear type of Christ 
and of his sacrifice:  
The offering up of Isaac, as it was the highest act of faith ever demanded 
by God, so it has by all antiquity been seen to be significant; and since 
the vicariousness of sacrifice was known, and Abraham had before been 
told ‘in Isaac shall thy seed be called’, it represented at once the vicarious 
death of the promised seed, in whom all nations were to be blessed and 
by whom the serpent’s head was to be crushed. (L71) 
For Pusey, the agreement of antiquity is so strong that this typical exposition 
has ‘the same certainty, as for those which bear the Apostolic stamp’. (L12) He 
quotes Origen, Irenaeus, Ambrose, and Augustine as examples of how the 
offering of Isaac is interpreted.63 Origen sees in God’s words to Abraham, 
‘because thou has not withheld thy son, thy only Son from us’, a prophecy of 
St Paul’s description of God in Romans 8:25 as ‘He who spared not his own 
Son, but freely gave him up for us all’. Origen concludes: ‘See God with a 
bounteous liberality rivalling men. Abraham offered to God his mortal son, 
who should not die. God gave to death His deathless Son for all.’ (L70B)64 In 
                                                 
63 Ambrose, On Abraham I.8.66-79. 
64 See Homily 8, ‘On the fact that Abraham offered his son Isaac’, § 8, in Origen 1982, 144.  
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his own words, Pusey summarizes the way in which Abraham’s willingness to 
offer up his son Isaac prophesies the sacrifice of Christ:  
Setting aside, however, how much Abraham saw, the history in itself 
conveys the mystery of the redemption; the very circumstances, and the 
words wherein it is commanded, ‘a father giving his only Son to death’, 
his µονογενης, his Son, born not after the manner or the will of the flesh, 
his well-beloved Son (for we have in the very command not the 
µονογενης only, but the αγαπατος, ‘Thy son, thy only Son, whom thou 
hast loved and whom no other could represent or replace, … not, says St 
Ambrose (de Abraham I.8.67), with any recent impulse of affection but 
with a long-ingrained and tried love a υἱός ἀγαπητός ἐν ᾧ εὐδόκησεν 
(Matt. 3:17, 17:5, 2 Pet. 1:17), the Son, the heir of all things, the often-
promised son, in whom as a representative, all nations of the world were 
to be blessed: again, the Son going as a lamb to the slaughter, slain for no 
sin of his own … communing cheerfully with his Father, bearing his own 
cross, willingly yielding himself a sacrifice, in order to do the will of his 
father, bound on the wood; recalled again the third day from death, as the 
Apostle adds, as in a figure of him who had by a miracle been born, was 
now by a miracle recalled as from death, by the voice of God Himself, 
and on this resurrection, as it were, the promise is renewed and 
confirmed. (L70B-71) 
According to Pusey and with the testimony of the patristic expositions that he 
quotes, the offering of Isaac shows both how much a supposedly ‘indirect’ 
prophecy may reveal, and how important are the details.  
Pusey’s exposition of sacrifice of Isaac is an elaboration of a point he 
makes to Tholuck: ‘The offering of Isaac is a fuller prophecy when understood, 
than Genesis 3:15; and it contains the µονογενης, as scarcely any other 
prophecy does.’65 Pusey’s examples show that prophecy cannot be easily 
divided between what is direct or simple and what is veiled: 
For all these are incidental and temporary distinctions, for them to whom 
they were given. Nor does Scripture make any distinction; but quotes all, 
even that wherein we shall have discovered no prophecy at all, unless it 
had been thus authoritatively declared, and that which we think we shall 
have seen most clearly, as being in the same way and in the same degree 
prophetic. (L32) 
                                                 
65 lines 162-6., line 160-162. Gen. 3:15: ‘And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, 
and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel’. We 
will consider this prophecy in more detail below (4.4.2).  
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For Pusey, first and second-class distinctions display ‘a scepticizing spirit’ 
which searches for ‘some clearer and independent evidence for the truth of 
Holy Scripture’. Rather, prophecy is ‘mainly typical’ and types are the basic 
language of prophecy: ‘we shall find comparatively few prophecies which have 
no typical meaning, i.e. no immediate or secondary purpose’. (L32) 
Having emphasized the typical character of all prophecy, Pusey has ‘no 
objection to dividing it into subordinate classes, even according to accidental 
distinctions, if it be borne in mind, that they are accidental merely’. (L33)66 
Pusey divides prophecy into two broad categories, ‘figurative’ and ‘simple’ or 
‘direct’. While he allows for the possibility of direct prophecy, Pusey 
emphasizes that there is ‘comparatively little’ of such prophecy, and subdivides 
this class no further.67 Pusey focuses on figurative or typical prophecies into 
two categories: ‘in Word’ or ‘in Act’. He often uses some variation of the 
phrase ‘God’s words and works’ to describe the totality of what is prophetic. 
(L5, 12, 16) Pusey describes figurative prophecies ‘in Act’ as ‘Types 
commonly so called’, i.e. prophetic institutions or people. Prophecies ‘in 
Word’ include both sayings and historical descriptions, a category which 
especially melts into types ‘in Act’. Pusey takes his own warning that these 
distinctions or categorizations are merely formal so seriously that having laid 
them out, he does not mention them again in the ‘Lectures’ apart from his more 
general references to prophecies in word or in deed. 
                                                 
66 See Pusey’s chart at the end of this section for Pusey’s ‘subordinate classes’ and ‘accidental 
distinctions’. 
67 M41. 
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68 ‘it may be subdivided in the following way, always remembering, that the divisions are 
merely formal’. M40. 
69 ‘Veiled’ is scored out in the manuscript. 
70 ‘or Direct (of which there is comparatively little)’, M41. 
71 ‘Types commonly so called’, M41. 
72 ‘declaratory’ is scored out in the manuscript. 
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4.3.2 Typical Prophecies ‘in Word’ and the ‘fullest’ Sense 
Focusing on the question of intention, particularly as it applies to typical 
prophecies ‘in Word’ helps to uncover the nuances and significance of Pusey’s 
presentation of types and typical prophecy. He describes words or prophetic 
sayings as types:  
From the typical character of individuals or of the people, follows more 
directly that other sort of type of which I spoke, – the type of words used 
originally with reference to particular events but formed by the Spirit of 
God so as to be able to bear reference to spiritual truths of much higher 
meaning, and belonging most entirely to that, to which they most fully 
correspond, the highest truth. Thus they assume the character of sacred 
proverbs, of manifold application in the same line, and receive their 
importance not from the character or the meaning of him who first 
uttered them, or the immediate occasion upon which they were uttered, 
but from the truth which they convey and the position which they bear in 
the history of God’s dealings. (L28) 
On the one hand, typical sayings cannot be separated from typical history, from 
the ‘particular events’ from which they arise: ‘it should however be noticed 
that since the persons and actions stand in an actual relation to the persons and 
actions of the New Testament, so also do the words often spoken by them, in 
that they concern that which is itself emblematic’. (L75C) In this point Pusey 
agrees with Tholuck or follows him: ‘If Old Testament circumstances and 
events are outward prefigurations of what must be fulfilled in a spiritual sense, 
the men placed in those relations would use expressions, which, in a higher 
sense, would be fulfilled in the representations of the New Covenant.’73 On the 
other hand, Pusey argues that the sense of words cannot be limited by historical 
context, or even what we can know about the intention of the human author or 
speaker. More than people or events, ‘words having in them more of a spiritual 
character, and being less interwoven with human character, and more 
connected with the Divine Word, are more flexible and true representations of 
the Divine meaning’. (L75 C).  
Pusey’s view of the ‘spiritual character’ of words stands out more clearly 
in relation to Tholuck. Looking at Old Testament citations in the New 
                                                 
73 Diss., 193. 
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Testament, Tholuck sought to distinguish between those where there is 
evidence of a veiled meaning, ‘a ὐπονια intended by God’ and those where ‘the 
parallel is rather taken by the author than given by God’.74 For Pusey, this is a 
form of the evidentialist search for definite proof, Marsh’s ‘pre-ordained 
connexion’ or Van Mildert’s ‘competent evidence of the divine intention in the 
correspondence between it and the antitype’.75 It focuses too much on what 
Pusey calls the veil, on the historical context as it is recreated very imperfectly 
by modern exegetes, or on what can be known of the human intentions of the 
author of prophecy or on the human understanding of that prophecy. Pusey 
emphasizes instead that words are not only used in reference to particular 
events, but they are ‘formed by the Spirit of God’. Tholuck had described the 
inspiration of the Spirit as characteristic especially of direct prophecies. 
Considering the way Christ refers to Psalm 110 in Matthew 22:43 – ‘How then 
doth David in spirit call him Lord’ – Tholuck commented that ‘by the phrase ἐν 
πνευµατι [in the spirit] it is declared that David could utter this only in a higher 
state of inspiration’.76 Typical prophecies, on the other hand, do not require 
such inspiration: ‘The expression in the Psalms, cited as typical: “The zeal of 
thy house hath eaten me up,” requires no supposition of a special spiritual 
elevation of the poet in order to explain it’.77 However, in Pusey’s argument, 
the work of the Spirit is evident not in the clarity of the prophecy, but in the 
capacity of the words to communicate a ‘higher meaning’, and this 
correspondence shows that the words ‘belong’ to this meaning. (L28, above) In 
the ‘Lectures’, Pusey fills out what he first wrote to Tholuck:  
Every deep saying must have some central points, to which it applies 
most fully; and when this is found, then it belongs more to this, than to 
any other beside. And so all γνωµαι which had their fulfilments in Christ, 
as ‘The zeal of Thy house & cetera’ was more fulfilled in Him & so 
                                                 
74 Diss., 202. 
75 Bp. Marsh and Van Mildert, both quoted in Intro., 614. 
76 Diss., 191, also Diss., 194. This distinction is not entirely clear in Tholuck, because he also 
refers to the ‘peculiar inspiration’ of Psalms 22 and 40, which he later describes as ‘to be 
reckoned pre-eminently among the typical Messianic Psalms’. Diss., 195, 204-205. 
77 Diss., 195. Ps. 69:9 is quoted in John 2:17 to explain Christ driving the money changers out 
of the temple.  
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belonged to Him more completely, than to him of whom they were first 
spoken.78  
Discussing the way in which Sarah’s description of Isaac and Ishmael is a 
prophecy of Christian liberty, Pusey articulates the fundamental principle: 
The principle, however, which is herein of fundamental importance is 
this, that the words so spoken were not words of Sarah only, but of God: 
as St. Paul quotes them ‘but what saith the Scripture?’ In that they are 
words, spoken with reference to God’s eternal plan and purpose, and as 
such preserved in Holy Scripture, we are to regard them as suggested or 
directed by God, so as in fact to be His words, and as such valid for all 
times. This principle is widely applied to Holy Scripture and would 
naturally be as extensive as the typical personages themselves, speaking 
upon occasions wherein they are typical. (L28-29) 
For Pusey, the meanings of typical words are determined by their religious 
element, ‘the truth which they convey’ (L28, above); this is a teleological 
rather than empirical principle of meaning.  
Rather than speaking about intention, the way Pusey most often 
characterizes the veiled and prophetic meaning of typical words as the ‘fullest’ 
sense:  
In all it is to be remarked that though the words have many meanings, 
they have one eminent and full meaning, but that it is altogether 
accidental whether that meaning be the one intended by him who uses 
them. We find no scruple in remarking to another a meaning which 
people would technically say, ‘his words will bear’, but which in truth we 
remark to him as the true real meaning of the words themselves even 
though, so interpreted, they convey a lesson to himself which he before 
overlooked: and we hesitate not ourselves to acknowledge in the case 
before supposed, that that sense which we afterwards discover to have 
lain in the words which we use, was their real sense, although it was not 
at the time thought by us. The meaning of the words is that which most 
fully exhausts their meaning. (L20)  
This idea of what the ‘fullest meaning’, or the meaning which most fully 
exhausts the sense, is a key concept for Pusey’s understanding of typical 
prophecy. We saw this above, in his comments on ‘The zeal of Thy house’ and 
the truth ‘to which it applies most fully’. Pusey also uses the idea of the 
                                                 
78 P-Thl., lines 177-82. In the supplemental material, Pusey uses the same example; the words, 
‘The zeal of thine house … had their plenary fulfilment’ in Christ. S-FTL, 16. 
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‘fullest’ sense to explain ‘the joy and delight’ which we find in discovering that 
Psalm 34:8 offers a typical prophecy of Holy Communion: 
Thus, when, in the Communion Service, the Ancient Church used the 
Psalm, ‘O taste and see that the Lord is gracious,’ [Ps. 34:8] she gave the 
fullest and most accurate meaning to the word םעט [ṭʿm, taste, perceive], 
and the mind feels a joy and delight, as having a new sense opened in it, 
and acknowledges that the word is thus the most exhausted and fulfilled, 
and all its meaning completed. (L136:206, cf. L22) 
Pusey also uses the concept of the fullest meaning to explain the patristic 
interpretations of the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of God 
which were discussed in Chapter 3 (Gen. 1:24). Commenting on the 
interpretation of the words, ‘Let us make men after our image, and after our 
likeness’, in the Epistle of Barnabas, Pusey writes: ‘St Barnabas not only 
strikingly parallels man’s first creation with his re-creation in Christ Jesus, but 
also points to this our new creation, as the fullest completion of the words, 
wherein the old is related.’ (L139-140) Pusey finds this principle 
acknowledged both in the writings of the Fathers and in the ordered worship of 
the Church:  
A principle of this sort may [be] observed generally in the antient 
liturgies, where by a sort of spiritual tact the Church appears to have been 
guided to recognize the blessings of the sacraments where even mention 
is made of the elements therein consecrated and when we are wont to 
think either of the mere element without the spiritual blessing, or the 
blessing without the elements, to combine both (as in the employment of 
the words, “as the heart panteth after the water-brooks” [Ps. 42:1] “a 
fountain shall be opened for sin and for sin and for uncleanness” [Zech. 
13:1] “Ho, every one that thirsteth come ye to the water” [Isa. 55:1] of 
the Sacrament of Baptism, which at an early period one finds to have 
been universal in the Church). (L22) 
In a question and answer session at the beginning of the fifth lecture, Pusey 
explained that the sense of a passage can be determined objectively by 
considering what it reveals, rather than subjectively by asking how well the 
human author saw the object of revelation: ‘The speaker’s exactest meaning is 
that which he is aware of. Subjectively, the superficial one is the truest, 
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Objectively the fullest’.79 This sense is objective because the meaning which is 
discovered accords with the rule of faith and the doctrine of the Church. 
Pusey’s explanation of the fullest sense supplements and explains his 
critique of Hampden’s notion of ‘historical interpretation’ and helps to bring to 
light the latent empiricism of the apologetic approach. A recent MA thesis by 
Kevin John Boddecker which assesses Pusey’s biblical scholarship on the basis 
of the ‘Lectures’ connects the way in which the modern approach limits the 
notion of intention with the epistemology of John Locke.80 As we saw in 
Chapter 2, Pusey sees Locke’s empiricism as contributing to Hampden’s 
rationalism. For Locke, ‘Words in their primary Signification, stand for 
nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them’.81 When this is 
applied to the words of Old Testament prophecy, the kind of prophecy which 
would meet Davison or Paley’s criteria, then what a prophecy conveys must be 
judged by how well it communicates the ‘Ideas in the Mind’ of the biblical 
writer, effectively limiting the meaning of a biblical passage to what the author 
knows. This denies the possibility that the ‘words we often utter are fuller than 
we ourselves are at the time fully aware’, a possibility which is integral to 
Pusey’s understanding of the fullest sense. (L19) Boddecker assesses the 
impact of Locke’s epistemology on how we conceive of the ‘intention’ of a 
prophecy: 
Now, when this idea about the meaning of propositions was ushered into 
the consideration of prophecy, it meant that if anyone was to speak 
meaningfully about a fulfilment of prophecy, they would have to 
demonstrate that the prophets were in fact predictively describing the 
events which took place in the life of Christ. So, in this way prophecy 
was limited to descriptive prediction.82 
This approach also emphasizes the importance of historical context, because 
only the data of context can furnish the mind with the material of prophecy; the 
notion of illumination, apart from the most instrumental kind of miraculous 
insight, does not fit with this approach. When Pusey challenges the notion of 
                                                 
79 M29. 
80 Boddecker 2010, 17-18. 
81 Locke 1975, III.2.2, 405. 
82 Boddecker, 18. 
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intention which he finds in apologetic writers, explicitly in Marsh or Van 
Mildert, or more subtly even in Tholuck, he unveils the problems associated 
with the influence of Locke’s epistemology. 
4.4 Types and the Archetype  
4.4.1 That ‘wherein the whole substance dwells’ 
The necessity of learning the language of type arises not only from the 
character of the Scriptures, but from the character of reality. We will see in 
Chapter 6 that Pusey finds this principle not only in Scripture, but ‘in the very 
Being of God Himself’. (L152) The fundamental or metaphysical character of 
types, the way they are knit into the order of things, is evident in the way Pusey 
describes the relationship between a type and its fulfilment. Pusey does not 
follow the common practice of describing the New Testament fulfilment of an 
Old Testament type as an antitype. This is how baptism is described in 1 Peter 
3, the ἀντίτυπος or antitype of the flood out of which ‘eight souls were saved 
by water’.83 O’Keefe and Reno describe the importance of this passage for the 
early Church: 
The meaning of anti-type in 1 Peter is the one adopted by the fathers. In 
that context, Christ is presented as the central or disclosing type, the 
pattern of redemptive suffering that organizes and clarifies our 
understanding of Old Testament prefigurations and our current 
experiences or ‘post-figurations.’ The church fathers describe this central 
role as anti-typical, drawing on the sense of ‘in the place of’ or 
‘replacing’ that is the primary meaning of the prefix anti.84 
Horne usually follows this practice and uses the term ‘antitype’ to describe 
what is prefigured by the type.85 However, Pusey almost always speaks of the 
fulfilment of the type rather than of the antitype.86 On two occasions only, and 
                                                 
83 1 Pet. 3:20. Also, v. 21: ‘ὃ καὶ ὑµᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σῴζει βάπτισµα’, ‘The like figure 
whereunto even baptism doth also now save us’. 
84 O’Keefe 2005, 81, cf. Woollcombe 1957, 64: ‘The basic meaning [of ἀντίτυπος] in classical 
Greek is ‘corresponding to’, as an impression corresponds to a seal.’ 
85 See especially Intro.,609-615. 
86 Among many others: L13, 20, 26, 45, 49, 146. 
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one of these is a quotation, does Pusey use the term ‘anti-type’ to describe the 
New Covenant fulfilment of the Old Testament type.87  
 In order to understand Pusey’s terminology, one must look in more 
detail at his description of types and their fulfilment and, especially, his 
understanding of ‘the Archetype’. (L23, 24, 141, 144) The concept of the 
Archetype is an organizing principle in the argument of the ‘Lectures’. That 
which most fulfils the meaning of the types of the Old Testament, and which is 
also the fundamental reality of which they are copies or images, can be 
described as the Archetype or the substance of the type. Speaking of Old 
Testament types as shadows, and their New Testament fulfilment as images, 
Pusey describes the relation of these types to the Archetype: 
Neither these shadows nor our images are of course any thing in 
themselves, but what they are and were, they both derived from the 
Substance, whence they are expressed … the ‘type’ is that which 
contains the substance less fully, than that of which it is the ‘type’ and 
although there can be only one Archetype, that namely, wherein the 
whole substance dwells, there may be many degrees of types, whereof 
the one approaches to the Archetype nearer than the others and of which 
those which are more distant are, in a way, types and figures. (L123) 
For Pusey, the Archetype usually describes the Word and Son of the Father. 
When the prophets ‘spake of Christ more plainly and more fully’, Pusey 
argues, ‘the types receded from their view and the Archetype stands more 
revealed before us’. (L6) Similarly, for O’Keefe and Reno, Christ is ‘the 
master type in which all other types, whether before or after, find their 
fulfilment’.88 For Pusey, the Archetype is ‘“the Image of the invisible God” … 
having in Himself, of the Father, all which the Father hath’,89 he is ‘Light the 
Archetype of Light’. (L144) Therefore, the Archetype is both first type (the 
prototype) and the fulfilment of the type: ‘He was the Archetype of our race, in 
                                                 
87 ‘Abel, again, was the representation of that Just One, since “for a good work” he was slain, 
for obedience to his Father, and for envy, of the ungodly. One difference between the type and 
the anti-type is pointed out in the New Testament, namely that “the blood of Christ spake 
better things than that of Abel”, for Abel’s blood cried out for vengeance, Christ’s for mercy 
even upon His murderers’. (L53/54). Pusey also quotes Gregory of Nazianzus speaking of the 
Eucharistic sacrifice: ‘how should I dare to offer unto Him that sacrifice which is without, that 
anti-type of the great mysteries’. (L118) 
88 See O’Keefe 2005, 81.  
89 S-GC, 1, 3. 
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whom we were to be formed, and being formed in Him and made One with 
Him to be outwardly and visibly conformed also’. (L141)90 We see here the 
integral connection Pusey makes between sanctification and the typical reading 
of Scripture. Humanity is a kind of type destined to be conformed to the 
Archetype in whose image it was originally made. In an analogous way, the 
types which prophecy Christ are, on the one hand, shadows and images of the 
Archetype, deriving whatever substance or reality they have from him, and, on 
the other, are fulfilled when their highest sense conforms to the Archetype.  
 Pusey’s use of the term substance is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish from his use of Archetype. Pusey quotes Irenaeus using ‘the 
Substance’ to describe the nature or being of God which in different measures 
and degrees God imparts to created things: ‘He himself deriving from Himself 
the Substance of things created’. (L140)91 This is the sense of the quotation 
above also where Pusey describes the ‘one Archetype’ as that ‘wherein the 
whole substance dwells’ (L123). He adds that ‘since the substance is come’, 
the types are fulfilled, ‘the outline is filled up’. (L123) However, Pusey also 
uses the word ‘substance’ to describe the religious element of prophecy, the 
truth which it manifests: ‘I would then, at once turn to the history of man’s Fall 
and God’s promise of a deliverer as being, in fact, the substance of all 
subsequent prophecy and containing the germ of all’. (L42B) Similarly, when 
the Old Testament is cited in the New, it is not foreknowledge, but ‘the 
substance which is dwelt upon’. (L6) These two uses of ‘substance’ are not 
opposed, because Christ the Archetype is both the message of prophecy and the 
Word through whom all things are created and given substance or reality. The 
‘substance’ can describe the message of prophecy, the heavenly realities which 
the types reveal, and the life of God which is the origin and being of both. 
These different senses also account for the way Pusey uses both ‘substance’ 
and ‘archetype’ with upper or lower case first letters, depending on whether he 
is using them as a synonym for God, or to describe spiritual truth or reality in 
some way distinct from God.  
                                                 
90 Pusey refers to Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.16.2. 
91 Pusey quotes Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV.20.1. 
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Pusey’s understanding of archetype and substance helps to explain why 
he does not use the language of ‘antitype’. Pusey sees both types and their 
fulfilment in the New Testament as copies of a more fundamental reality. This 
corresponds with K. J. Woollcombe’s basic description of a type: ‘The word 
τύπος is the principal noun formed from the stem of τύπειν, ‘to strike’, and has 
the basic meaning in classical Greek of a ‘blow’, or the ‘mark’ left by the 
blow.’92 In the sense of a mark left by a blow, or a character stamped by the 
typeface, a type is a copy, an impression or image of a pattern. So for Pusey a 
type is the image or the shadow which bears the imprint of the more perfect 
reality. Understood as something secondary or derivative, both τύπος and 
ἀντίτῦπος are copies, types, of what is more true and real. For example, in 
Hebrews 9:24 the ‘holy places made with hands … are figures [or antitypes] of 
the true’ (ἀντίτῦπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν).93 The basic pattern is both the originating 
principle, and the fulfilment, that ‘wherein the whole substance dwells’. This 
two-fold relation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Using the word 
‘anti-type’ could imply incorrectly that it is the type which comes first.94 Also, 
describing prophecy in type-antitype pairs could suggest that there is only one 
fulfilment of any Old Testament type, encouraging the kind of connect-the-dots 
approach to prophecy and fulfilment which Pusey sought to correct.  
4.4.2 The Archetype and Multiple Fulfilments of the Type 
The view that types are copies of an Archetype explains the importance of 
multiple fulfilments of types for Pusey: ‘there may be many degrees of types, 
whereof the one approaches to the Archetype nearer than the others and of 
which those which are more distant are, in a way, types and figures’. (L123) 
Pusey’s reflections on the Lord’s words to the serpent in Genesis 3:15 – ‘And I 
                                                 
92 Woollcombe, 60.  
93 See also Heb. 8:2, where the earthly sanctuary is a copy of ‘the true tabernacle’, ‘τῆς σκηνῆς 
τῆς ἀληθινῆς’. 
94 Woollcombe says that ‘τύπος and ἀντίτῦπος are synonymous in Hebrews, as in many 
patristic works’. (Woollcombe 1957, 64 n. 3). However, Woollcombe differentiates the 
understanding of type one finds in the Epistle to the Hebrews from what he sees as the 
characteristic Pauline use of ‘τύπος in the sense of ‘pattern’ or ‘model’ (p. 67). In this 
conception, τύπος is the primary reality. Pusey’s use follows what Woollcombe describes as 
the Hebrews’ model. 
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will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her 
seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel’ – offer a 
characteristic example of the importance of the notion of multiple fulfilments 
in Pusey’s treatment of typical prophecy:  
The prophecy in its fulfilment, is a remarkable instance, how much and 
how varied meaning is comprised in God’s word, and how manifold its 
fulfilment. Each interpretation has its place; only men err, when they 
mistake the lowest for the highest. Even they, then, who see nothing 
further than that man shall destroy the literal serpent’s actual brood, are 
so far right. The words are even thus fulfilled. (L45)  
Pusey goes on to consider how the word ‘seed’ here is a type which is fulfilled 
not only in Christ but in the Church. This type prophesies the way in which 
‘each victory over Satan in any of God’s faithful servants before the 
Redeemer’s coming’ prophesies Christ’s ‘great conquest’: 
Then, as to the question, whether the ‘seed of the woman’ contain the 
whole human race, or the one who was eminently so, as being the ‘seed 
of woman’ only, it might be safely answered, both; for both are fulfilled, 
and both are in fact one; since we triumph in and through Christ, and He 
in us, His members. And He has deigned to consider His victory over 
death and hell not complete, until what He had done for us, be also 
perfected in us, His Church; so each victory over Satan in any of God’s 
faithful servants before the Redeemer’s coming was a petty type of that 
great conquest, – and an earnest also, in that it shewed that God had not 
forsaken the woman’s seed, but the enmity, which He had placed, He 
was carrying on to victory – every victory since, as it is a fruit, so also is 
it a reflection of that great Archetype, and an earnest also of the 
fulfilment of His promise that His disciples shall tread on serpents and on 
all the power of the Enemy, that God shall bruise Satan under our feet 
shortly. Only, from these words it will appear that they are mainly 
fulfilled in Christ, who is the centre, in Him wholly, in us partially; in 
Him primarily, in us, whether before or after, secondarily and 
derivatively. And in His special and primary fulfilment, it is remarkable 
how words, which in the more general fulfilments have a more general 
meaning, have a closer and more specific meaning. The ‘seed of the 
woman’ in that more general sense, is man in general, born ‘by the 
woman’ (1 Cor. 11:12); in the more specific, our Lord, who was ‘born of 
a woman’ (Gal. 4:4) exclusively through the operation of the Holy Ghost. 
(L45) 
In Pusey’s argument, multiple fulfilments express his understanding of the 
necessary relationship of the Archetype to the types which in different ways 
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prophesy or reveal it. The same eternal purposes or ‘scheme’ are manifest in 
different ways in history, but according to a common pattern or stamp: ‘For 
prophecy is co-extensive with the whole system of God’s Providence and 
Dispensations; for every earlier part of the scheme, in that it is adapted to some 
later part, preparatory for it, corresponding to it, becomes thereby prophetic of 
it.’ (L3) Pusey’s approach argues that such correspondences are not the 
creation of interpreters but expressions of the consistency of God’s purposes 
through time. This is another way in which the origin of the principle of types 
seems to extend to ‘the very Being of God Himself’. (L152) Once we have 
looked at Pusey’s doctrine of creation in Chapter 6, it will be possible to 
consider another element of Pusey’s explanation of multiple fulfilment. 
4.4.3 Shadows and Images of the Archetype 
Pusey’s theory of types does not only describe the relation of the Old 
Testament to the New, but the way in which both Scriptural types and the life 
of the Church express spiritual realities beyond time and history. At the most 
basic level, types are not confined to biblical history. Both the Eucharist, the 
sacrifice of the Church, and the Passover are types: ‘the “type” is that which 
contains the substance less fully, than that of which it is the “type”’. (L123, 
above) Pusey quotes the ‘Second Oration on Easter’ by Gregory of Nazianzus: 
‘We shall partake of the Passover, still indeed typically, although it be more 
open than that of old. For the legal Passover I say boldly, was an obscure type 
of a type.’ (L124A)95 Pusey explains the relationship of Old Testament types to 
New Testament fulfilment according to the relationship of each to the 
Archetype and to a fulfilment which is still to come: 
This relation of the Jewish types to the Christian images we find 
expressed in the fathers, in reference to St Paul’s words, ‘the law having 
the shadow (σκιά) of the good things to come (τῶν µελλόντων ἀγαθῶν), 
not the express image of the things (οὐκ αὐτην τὴν εἰκονα τῶν 
πραγµάτων)’ [Heb. 10.1], and the words certainly express strikingly the 
faint delineation or outline in the shadow of the law, as contrasted not 
only with the things themselves, but with the ‘very image’ or ‘expressed 
pattern’ of the things. Thus Ambrose says ‘The shadow is in the law, the 
                                                 
95 Oration XLV.23, in Gregory Nazianzen 1994, 431. 
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image in the Gospel, the reality in the heavenly place (cælestibus ἐν τοῖς 
ἐπουρανίοις [Eph. 1.3]). Formerly a lamb, a calf was offered, now Christ 
is offered and He offers Himself as a priest, that He may take away our 
sins. Here in an image, there in reality when, as it were an Advocate, He 
intercedes for us with the Father.’ (L124A)96  
This description brings together Pusey’s view that there are multiple 
fulfilments of a type with the idea that that which fulfils the type most 
completely is the Archetype, that wherein the substance dwells most fully: 
Neither these shadows nor our images are of course any thing in 
themselves, but what they are and were, they both derived from the 
Substance, whence they are expressed. But in that ours have the greater 
fulness, in consequence of our Lord’s having actually come, theirs may 
be in a degree, said to be types of ours. (L123) 
The types of the Old Testament are shadows which offer a faint delineation of 
the reality or substance, while the types of the New Testament are images, 
more substantial types, but still types of the Archetype. In his study of ‘figural 
reading’, John Dawson finds in Origen the idea that ‘there is really only one 
Passover of the Lord’, which occurs on different occasions, the ‘most 
complete’ of which is the ‘celestial Passover’.97 In Pusey’s argument, the 
Eucharist corresponds to this celestial Passover, the ‘“very image” or 
“expressed pattern” of the things’. (L124, above)98 As we saw above, Pusey 
draws on the Fathers and the New Testament to describe the unity of substance 
of the Father and the Son in terms of the Son being the express or true image of 
the Father. By describing the Eucharist as the ‘very image’ of ‘the good things 
to come’ Pusey emphasizes the union between the image and the reality, the 
type of the Eucharist and the Archetype which it figures and communicates.99  
                                                 
96 Pusey quotes On the Duties of the Clergy, I.48.248. See Ambrose 1994, 40. In the Davidson 
edition, this is at I.48.239 (i.e., not 248). See Davidson 2001, i, 255. See also ii, 665: ‘the 
inspiration here … comes from Orig. Hom. Ps. 38.2.2’.  
97 Dawson 2002, 67-8. 
98 John Keble’s reflections show many similarities to Pusey’s argument here. See, Keble 1859, 
II.48, 79 and 78-84. 
99 It is interesting to note that for Pusey a proper understanding of the types of the Passover 
will help one to distinguish truth from error in debates about the Eucharist. (L102-125) See 
Douglas 2012 for a reflection on Pusey’s eucharistic theology as it is expressed in the 
‘Lectures’. 
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While Pusey’s reflections on the relationship of Old and New Testament 
Types focus on the Eucharist, he also applies this distinction between the 
multiple fulfilments of a type and the one Archetype more generally:  
This distinction we find expressed frequently among the fathers, so that 
the Jewish figures are (though in a subordinate degree, and in Christ 
only,) looked upon as emblems of things correspondent in the Christian 
Church, which again have their reality in Heaven. Thus the Jewish 
Church was an image of the Christian, which as being imperfect here, is, 
although the commencement, still an image only of the kingdom of 
Heaven, as finally perfected in Heaven. The Jewish Church was a type of 
the Christian Church Militant, and this, of the Christian Church 
triumphant. (L123-124) 
Making the same connection, Woollcombe describes how a Eucharistic 
typology whereby the consecrated bread and wine are seen to participate ‘in 
the being of the object which it symbolized’ also ordered patristic typology 
more generally: ‘The probability is that if it was considered in the ancient 
world that a sign or symbol actually was, in some sense, that which it 
represented, it was also considered that a type or figure actually was, in some 
sense, that which it prefigured.’100 As will be seen in more detail in Chapter 5, 
Pusey offers a sacramental theory of types whereby types, both in Scripture 
and in the life of the Church, participate in the invisible and spiritual realities 
of which they are images. 
4.4.4 Types as Symbols 
The way Pusey uses the language of ‘symbol’ complements his sacramental 
theory of types. In Pusey’s argument ‘symbol’ and ‘symbolic’ are synonyms 
for ‘type’ and ‘typical’. For the Fathers, ‘the language of Scripture … bore the 
stamp of a symbolical character impressed upon it’. (L85) In like manner, a 
                                                 
100 Woollcombe 1957, 74, 75. Woollcombe makes the connection by considering Cyril of 
Jerusalem’s Catechetical Lectures, 22.3, 23.20, and 14.20. At L85, Pusey refers to Cyril’s 
Catechetical Lectures, 12.17, as a witness to the charity required on the part of the faithful 
communicant and in support of the interpretation of Gen. 49:11 as a type of the Eucharist (‘he 
washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of grapes’). Woollcombe also refers 
to Chrysostom to explain the realistic view of symbol in the Fathers: ‘We have already seen 
that Chrysostom believed that the two parts of a type-pair had a common πρᾶγµα [concrete 
reality]; it is therefore likely that he believed in a relationship of being between them, and that 
he called this relationship συγγένια [kinship]’ (p. 75). What Woollcombe calls a common 
‘πρᾶγµα’, or ‘matter’ (p. 73), Pusey calls a common substance. 
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typical prophecy may be described as a ‘symbolic expression’. (L29, 34)101 
The ass on which Christ rode into Jerusalem was ‘a symbol of His humility’. 
(L85) He describes the manna and the brazen serpent both as types and as 
symbols. (L87)102 Christianity is expressed through the ‘symbols’ of the Old 
Testament. (L94) The scapegoat was a ‘great visible symbol’ of the way in 
which the people’s sins were remitted on the day of the Atonement, ‘the 
substitute, upon which they were laid, going far away to carry them, as it were, 
out of sight’. (L96)103 Looked at from another perspective, ‘the two goats … 
manifestly formed part of one symbol’.104 Of this combined type, Pusey writes 
that ‘The symbol speaks almost in the words of St Paul, “He died for our sins, 
and rose again for our justification,” “He ever liveth to make intercession for 
us.”’ (L97) The Passover lamb ‘which was ordered to be roasted whole, was a 
symbol of that offering of the cross, whereby Christ was to suffer.’ (L124) 
Pusey describes the bread and wine of the Eucharist as ‘symbolic of the Body 
and Blood of Christ’ (L104), or as ‘the symbols’ through which the body and 
blood ‘are conveyed.’ (107) The ‘visible star’ which guided the Gentiles to 
Bethlehem was ‘the symbol’ of the ‘hidden star, and pointed out its rising to 
those, whose eyes were opened to see’. (L168) Pusey describes prophecies 
which reveal ‘the universality of Christ's kingdom’ in expressions such as ‘His 
dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the 
earth’, as ‘symbolical prophecy’. (L157) He writes of ‘prophetic types’ that 
‘the appearance of the Archetype illumined their symbolical character’. (L29) 
What Pusey describes as ‘the typical meaning’ of numbers in one place (L160), 
                                                 
101 On some occasions, Pusey seems to use symbolic in a more technical sense, to describe the 
typical meaning of a passage that cannot have a literal meaning, where ‘a physical, or even the 
metaphorical will not stand’. (L85) He speaks of occasions when ‘words in no case admit of 
being literally taken; it is a question only between two figurative meanings, only the one of 
earth, the other of heaven’. (L84) This is another example of a lack of system in the ‘Lectures’; 
much like the Fathers, Pusey uses the same terms in a variety of ways.  
102 ‘Of the same kind as the manna was the other temporary symbol, which was evidently of a 
character to be immediately understood … This was the brazen serpent. L87 
103 Lev. 16:10:‘But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall be presented alive 
before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the 
wilderness.’ 
104 See Lev. 10:15, 20-22. Pusey writes: ‘one was sacrificed to the Lord for a sin-offering, and 
by its blood atonement was made for the whole congregation; over the head of the other all the 
sins of Israel were confessed, and he carried them wholly away; we have death and life joined 
in the work of atonement – death for atonement to God, life for complete remission’. L97 
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he describes as the ‘symbolic sense’ or ‘symbolic character’ of number in 
another. (L152) C. S. Lewis’ description of the sacramental character of the 
language of symbolism helps one to see the significance of this language in 
Pusey: ‘it is possible that our material world in its turn is the copy of an 
invisible world … The attempt to read that something else through sensible 
imitations, to see the archetype in the copy, is what I mean by symbolism or 
sacramentalism.’105  
4.4.5 Coleridge’s Theory of Symbol 
In describing types as symbols, Pusey appears to have been drawing on the 
ideas of S. T. Coleridge as well as the Fathers. Coleridge uses the term 
‘symbol’ to describe the participation of words or things in an eternal reality. 
In Aids to Reflection, which Pusey quotes at least twice in the ‘Lectures’, 
Coleridge refers in passing to ‘Symbols and symbolical expressions; the nature 
of which as [sic] always tautegorical (i.e. expressing the same subject but with 
a difference).’106 With a note after this sentence, Coleridge invites the reader to 
follow the ideas which will be ‘explained at large in the Statesman’s Manual, 
p. 35-38’.107 There, Coleridge writes: 
… a Symbol (ὁ ἔστιν ἄει ταυτηγόρικον) is characterized by a 
translucence of the Special in the Individual or of the General in the 
Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence 
of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the 
Reality it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides 
itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.108 
We considered already Coleridge’s discussion of symbols in relation to 
Pusey’s account of the imagination. It appears that Coleridge influenced 
Pusey’s symbolic theory of type also. Using Pusey’s terms, one could say that 
Coleridge describes how the temporal and individual ‘type’ or ‘symbol’ 
                                                 
105 Lewis 1958, 45. J. Robert Barth discusses how Lewis’ description of ‘sacramentalism’ casts 
light on Coleridge’s theory of symbol in Barth 1977, 113-115. 
106 Aids, 206. 
107 Aids, 206. 
108 SMan., 30. ‘The Greek means “which is always tautegorical’” (p. 30 n. 30). In Aids, 
Coleridge writes: ‘A Symbol is a sign included in the Idea, which it represents: ex. gr. an actual 
part chosen to represent the whole, as a lip with a chin prominent is a Symbol of Man; or a 
lower form of species of a higher in the same kind’. Aids, 263. 
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partakes of the infinite and eternal ‘Reality’ of the Archetype: ‘in all finite 
Quantity there is an Infinite, in all measures of Time an Eternal; that the latter 
are the basis, the substance, the true and abiding reality of the former; and that 
as we truly are, only as far as God is with us’.109 Stephen Prickett who, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, describes Coleridge’s notion of the imagination as 
stereoscopic vision also describes Coleridge’s notion of symbol as stereoscopic 
communication: ‘In a symbol, he suggests, the material and temporal becomes 
as it were a lens whereby we can bring into focus for an instant the eternal 
abstraction of which it is a fractional and incomplete part’.110 The lens which 
Prickett describes is not simply an object, it is a ‘living part of that Unity, of 
which it is the representative’. Pusey uses this kind of language in his 
reflections on Isaiah 4:2: ‘In that day shall the branch of the Lord be beautiful 
and glorious, and the fruit of the lands excellent and comely for them that are 
escaped of Israel’. The branch is not a metaphor, but a living power or symbol:  
Yet if one considers that the ‘branch’ or ‘off-shoot’ is not a mere 
metaphor, passing almost, as among us it does, into a proper noun, but a 
living symbol, then it is nothing at all strange, that as Son of God He 
should be designated as ‘the offspring of Jehovah’, but ‘the fruit of the 
earth’ as to His earthly descent, that Nature, which He was to take of us, 
to give life by death. (L135) 
Pusey’s description of a type as ‘a living symbol’ offers an organic description 
of the way in which types contain the substance of the Archetype, 
distinguishing his view from ‘the mechanical views of prophecy’ which he 
found in the apologetic school. This is Coleridgean language, evoking 
Coleridge’s view of symbol as a ‘living part in that Unity, of which it is the 
representative’. (L8)111 
When Prickett analyses Coleridge’s understanding of symbol, he 
comments that ‘Coleridge’s thought is always basically Platonic’.112 Similarly, 
                                                 
109 Aids, 92. 
110 Prickett 1976, 19. 
111 SMan., 30. 
112 Prickett 1976, 18. 
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Hedley writes that ‘Coleridge’s symbol theory is Neoplatonic’.113 Seeing 
Pusey’s theory of type in relation to Coleridge and a Platonic understanding of 
symbol is helpful in a couple of ways. It demonstrates the importance of 
considering Pusey’s understanding of Scriptural types in the context of a 
broader philosophical and theological framework. In his case, that framework 
includes the Romantic appropriation of patristic sources and elements of 
Christian Platonism which Coleridge appears to have helped to communicate 
to Pusey. We will return to the question of Pusey’s use of Platonic sources or 
ideas in Chapter 6. As a representative of this tradition, Coleridge offers a 
theological and philosophical framework which illuminates Pusey’s theory of 
knowledge and the spiritual faculties, and his understanding of the way in 
which types, or symbols, reveal the eternal in the temporal, or communicate 
spiritual truth through sensible images. His description of a symbol as that 
which ‘partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible’ illustrates Pusey’s 
understanding of type. When he describes Christian types as images of 
heavenly realities, Pusey suggests that at least some types, namely the types 
which are also sacraments, confer a participation in the substance which they 
‘contain’ and from which they are ‘derived’. (L123, above) Pusey offers both a 
Eucharistic theology and a soteriology in the form of typology, and an account 
of types which is both sacramental and sanctifying. The sacramental character 
of types and the theological roots of that idea will is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
                                                 
113 Hedley 2000, 128. Hedley discusses Coleridge’s Platonism at length, pp. 7-12, and with 
special reference to Coleridge’s conception of symbol, pp. 127-136. Hedley, p. 134, writes: 
‘The decisive term “tautegoric” is rooted in the Platonic Sophist where Plato uses the 
categories of identity and difference (ταυτότης and ἑτερότης) along with categories of rest and 
movement.’ 
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Chapter 5 Types and the Mystery of Christ  
5.1 Types and the Incarnation 
5.1.1 ‘Blended as parts of the same Mystery’ 
The investigation of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is an 
investigation of the mystery of Christ. For Pusey, the typical character of 
prophecy is an expression of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and reading 
prophecy typically is a sacramental approach which is a means of participation 
in the Incarnation. In this argument, first, the understanding of type and typical 
prophecy which he advocates is necessarily connected with a proper 
understanding of the person of Christ and the union of the Church with Christ 
through the sacraments. Pusey offers an example of this connection in 
Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 40:  
Christ our Lord speaking sometimes in His own person, sometimes in 
that of His members says ‘Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not’. 
Now then are we now left without a sacrifice? God forbid, for ‘a body 
hast Thou perfected for me’: those thou wouldest not, that Thou mightest 
perfect this; those (sacrifices) Thou wouldest until Thou perfected this … 
In this Body we are, of this Body we are partakers … A Body is 
perfected for us, be we perfected in the Body. (L124-125)1 
According to Augustine, Christ speaks in this Psalm both for himself and for 
the Church, his members. The body which is ‘perfected for us’ is the body of 
Christ in the Eucharist by which we are ‘perfected’ in Christ’s body (the 
Church): 
I have quoted more of this passage than was absolutely necessary, 
because it well illustrates how in these deeper views, our Lord's 
incarnation, His mystical Body in the Eucharist, and the mystical Body 
the Church which is thereby kept alive, and held together, are blended as 
parts of the same Mystery and bear the same name, so aptly might the 
same type under different modifications represent them all. (L125) 
The investigation of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is an 
investigation of ‘the same Mystery’ of Christ.  
                                                 
1 See Augustine 1848, Psalm 40, §12, 144-145.  
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Second, the exploration of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament 
is not only an exploration of the mystery of Christ, but also a means of entering 
into this mystery. Like the ‘holy mysteries’ of Christ’s body and blood, the 
mystery which Pusey describes has an outward and visible element, united 
with an aspect which is spiritual and hidden: ‘its very proportions we can 
discern only here and there as we see “parts of His ways” bearing one upon 
another’. (L2)2 Similarly, Lewis Ayres describes the connection between 
‘figural reading practices’ and the ‘progress of purification or sanctification 
that constitutes Christian life’ as an actualization of ‘the mystery of incarnation 
… by which members of the Christian community are united to the person of 
Christ and purified toward the vision of God’.3 This chapter will show that for 
Pusey, reading the Old Testament typically is a kind of sacramental reading by 
which the reader is incorporated more fully into the body of Christ and so 
united with the head of the Church, Jesus Christ.  
For both these reasons, discovering the typical character of Old 
Testament prophecy is intrinsically connected with discovering the truth of the 
Incarnation and with the way in which members of the Church come to 
participate in the divine nature. This is why typical reading is not an option, or 
a mere curiosity of historical theology. Rather, since it expresses orthodox 
belief and practice, it is a necessary way of reading Scripture. What Ephraim 
Radner says about the ‘unavoidable demand’ of ‘figurative exegesis’ in his 
study of John Keble also applies to Pusey’s argument – if ‘patristic exegetical 
practice’ is rejected, ‘so too must be any pretence to holding orthodox theistic 
convictions’.4 
The combined emphasis on the Incarnation and the indwelling of God in 
the Church by the means of the sacraments is a well-known feature of Pusey’s 
work and the writing of the Tractarians more generally. We considered this in 
Chapter 3 in relation to Pusey’s theory of knowledge as participation in the 
divine knowledge. In his introduction to The Oxford Movement, Eugene 
                                                 
2 For ‘these holy mysteries’ and this description of the sacraments, see ‘Holy Communion’ and 
‘A Catechism’, Book of Common Prayer (1662). 
3 Ayres 2004, 37. 
4 Radner 2004, 88, 87. 
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Fairweather writes: ‘The Tractarians saw the Incarnation, the Church, and the 
sacraments as contiguous and inseparable elements in God’s redemptive 
economy.’5 For Pusey the doctrine of the Incarnation describes not only how 
God took on human nature in Christ, but also how the body of Christ, the 
Church, is united with the divine head. In the ‘Lectures’ Pusey emphasizes that 
the sacraments are the ‘means of union’ between the Church and Her Lord. 
(L12) He finds this idea explicated by St John Chrysostom in his reflections on 
1 Corinthians 10:17, ‘For we being many are one bread, and one body: for we 
are all partakers of that one bread.’ Pusey writes:  
So again, this one image portrays to us the mysterious connexion 
between the Body of Christ, which is His Flesh, and the Body of Christ, 
which is the Church, and how, by partaking of that Body, we ourselves 
become what we partake of. ‘Having said,’ says St. Chrysostom, ‘the 
Communion of the Body, He sought again to express something nearer; 
“For we, being many, are one bread, one body.” “For why speak I of 
communion?” saith he; “we are that self-same body”. For what is the 
bread? the Body of Christ: and what do they become who partake of it? 
the Body of Christ: not many bodies, but one body.’ (L136:199 Letter)6  
For Pusey, the Eucharist is one of the chief means of grace by which a person 
is conformed more and more to the likeness of Christ in whose image he is 
made. He speaks of the Eucharist as a kind of continuation of the Incarnation 
and a means of participation in the Incarnation. 
 There is also a polemical component to Pusey’s contention that the 
Incarnation and the union of the Church with Christ through the sacraments are 
‘blended as parts’ of the same mystery. Pusey finds in Hampden’s conception 
of the sacraments the same rationalist confusions which led Hampden to 
connect the doctrine of participation with pantheism. Pusey paraphrases a 
passage of Hampden’s Bampton Lectures: ‘The ready reception of the theory 
that Christ, as the sole primary cause of grace, conveyed that grace through the 
sacraments … is sufficiently accounted for by the general belief in magic, in 
the early ages of the Church’.7 Whereas for Hampden this ‘theory of 
                                                 
5 Fairweather 1964, 11. 
6 See Chrysostom 1839, 327-328. 
7 DrH, xli, paraphrasing Sch.Phil., 314-5. 
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Sacramental influence’ is an expression of the ‘popular belief respecting the 
power of incantations and charms’, for Pusey it is a necessary expression of an 
orthodox understanding of the Incarnation and, as we shall see, of an approach 
to reading the Old Testament which Pusey characterizes as sacramental.8 When 
Pusey emphasizes the importance of the sacraments as means by which the 
Head is joined with the body and proposes a sacramental theory of types, he is 
responding to the threat of rationalism which he sees inherent in the apologetic 
and empiricist approach to prophecy and theology more generally. 
5.1.2 The ‘compound nature’ of Sacramental Types 
In an important section in the fourth lecture, Pusey describes the types of 
Scripture as a kind of sacrament: 
It has been well said, that God has appointed, as it were, a sort of 
sacramental union between the type and the archetype, so that as the type 
were nothing, except in as far as it represents, and is the medium of 
conveying the archetype to the mind, so neither can the archetype be 
conveyed except through the type. Though the consecrated element be 
not the sacrament, yet neither can the soul of the sacrament be obtained 
without it. God has joined them together, and man may not and can not 
put them asunder. (L23) 
There is a necessary union, a ‘sacramental union’ between the type and ‘the 
archetype’. In the same way that the ‘soul of the sacrament’ cannot be 
communicated without the consecrated bread and wine, so neither may the 
archetype be communicated without the type. Commenting on this passage, 
Brian Douglas notes that ‘Pusey’s use … of sacramental realism assigned an 
important place to the type.’9 In his study of the ‘Lectures’, Donald Allchin 
argues that the struggle ‘to bear witness to the unity of all things in God … 
was, Pusey believed, being worked out in the nineteenth century, in his attempt 
to reassert the essentially sacramental nature of God’s revelation in Scripture 
and tradition alike’.10 For Pusey the principle of typology is fundamentally a 
                                                 
8 Sch.Phil., 315 in DrH, 58. As an example of the influence of magic, Hampden quotes 
Augustine’s Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to St. John, Tractate 80.3: ‘Accedit 
verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum [The word is added to the element, and there results 
the sacrament].’ 
9 Douglas 2012, 208. 
10 Allchin 1967, 69, see also pp. 68-71.  
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sacramental principle by which spiritual or eternal truth is communicated by 
typical elements consecrated through Christ’s self-emptying in the Incarnation. 
Having specified the danger of his age as the danger that of attempting to 
grasp the truth of God and his ways without revelation, Pusey explains ‘the 
sacramental union’ between a type and its fulfilment as an expression of the 
doctrine of the Incarnation. The sacramental principle and the incarnational 
principle belong together in typology as they do in the mystery of Christ: 
The whole system of religion, contemplative and practical, is one of 
God’s condescension: God cometh down to us, not we mount up to God. 
Its cornerstone and characteristic is ‘God manifest in the flesh.’ And with 
this, as God has appointed it, all is in keeping. Neither the letter without 
the Spirit, nor yet the Spirit without the letter – prayers, which God 
cometh into the midst of us to hear; earthly Sacraments, yet full of 
Heaven, earthly words, yet full of the Word, λογοι proceeding from and 
setting forth the Λογος. (L23) 
In the same way that God is manifest in the flesh when Christ takes on human 
nature, so is the Divine Word, the Λογος, manifest in the earthly words and 
typical prophecies, the λογοι, of Scripture. The doctrine of the Incarnation 
serves as the model by which Pusey understands both the union and distinction 
of the divine and human elements of typical prophecy.11 Pusey maintained that 
rationalism subtly undermined an apprehension of this union. In his study The 
Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist, one of the first studies which 
brought the ‘Lectures’ to public attention, Alf Härdelin sees the emphasis on 
type as part of Pusey’s response to both ‘the intellectualism of older 
orthodoxy’ and to rationalistic abstraction:  
Viewed in a wider historical context, this insistence on the living Word is 
a manifestation of the ‘romantic’ reaction against the preceding 
classicism and neology; it is the vital and concrete over against the static 
and abstract. The time had come for a new appreciation of Biblical 
language, and for the typological, or ‘allegorical’ exegesis of the 
Fathers.12 
                                                 
11 Tholuck referred to this approach in Pusey’s thought when he told Pusey that he was a 
scholar who loved not only the ‘λογοι’ but also the ‘λογος’ in them. Geck 2009, 36. 
12 Härdelin 1965, 32-3. 
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The permanence of the union of the human and divine in Christ is also a 
key part of Pusey’s theory of type. Pusey criticizes attempts to distil a spiritual 
essence from types or typical language as a kind of pseudo-spiritualism which 
seeks to know God without revelation: ‘the pseudo-spiritualist would behold 
Him whom “man cannot see and live”, the “Light inapproachable, whom no 
man hath seen or can see”’. (L24) For an example of the pseudo-spiritualist 
tendency to abstraction Pusey looks to ‘a book once popular, Dr. Campbell’s 
On the Gospels’. (L24) This is George Campbell’s translation of the Gospels, 
The Four Gospels, Translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations 
and Notes Critical and Explanatory (1789). Campbell (1719-1796) was a 
Scottish enlightenment theologian and philosopher who was profoundly 
influenced by the empiricism of John Locke. As such, he represents the 
tendencies or the principles which Pusey finds in the apologetic school. 
Attempts to express the embodied and particular images of Scripture in more 
abstract language are not only translations but distortions: 
Translate, as moderns have been wont to do, ‘new-birth’ into ‘change of 
state’, ‘the word which I have spoken to you’ (John 15:3) into ‘the 
instructions which I have given you’, ‘abide in me’ into ‘adhere to me’ or 
‘abide by me’. ‘What I have heard of the Father’ into ‘What I have 
learnt’, ‘He whom God hath sent’, into ‘Whom God hath commissioned’ 
… or again ‘renovation’ into ‘ammendment’ [sic], ‘to be in Christ’ into 
‘a Christian’, ‘a member of Christ’ into ‘a member of the body of 
Christians’, and by translating God’s language into man’s you will not 
have changed the type into the archetype, but have stripped the type of 
that whereby it resembled the Archetype, – that in it which was divine. 
‘God chose’, says a thoughtful German, ‘yea the figuration or picture-
language of the East was the very choice of God, in order to reveal 
Himself: why should we be wiser than He and paraphrase His language’. 
(L24)13 
                                                 
13 Pusey’s discussion of type and typical prophecy includes a discussion of the characteristics 
of Hebrew and Greek which make them particularly suited to serve as the languages of 
revelation: ‘The peculiarities of Hebrew as a language are its picture-character and its 
undefinedness. Thus, even when metaphor is not prominent, its language, not being bound 
down to one meaning, is applicable, with different degrees of precision, to different though 
allied subjects. This admission of degrees furnishes the very character of a type’. (S-EL, 1) He 
also argues that classical Greek was humbled and shaped to enable it to serve this purpose as 
well: ‘The language of Greece, powerful and rich and copious and clear in expressing the 
refinements of human thought, was not in itself His choice, but He made the ambition of 
empire and the chastisement and wilfulness of His own people the means of bringing the 
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Both the neglect of types and what Pusey calls the ‘translation’ of them is 
another form of rationalism which seeks a pure and reasonable religious truth 
abstracted from the peculiarities of culture, history, and even dogma: ‘When 
moderns then attempt to translate into plain terms the figurative language of 
Holy Scripture, and to substitute abstract, and as they would fain have it, 
clearer terms for the types or typical language of the Old Testament, they 
uniformly by this transmutation evaporate much of their meaning.’ (L24)  
Pusey argues that Christian doctrine is embodied in the peculiarities of a 
particular form of revelation which cannot be left behind. In the last chapter, 
we considered this emphasis on minute particulars as characteristic of Pusey’s 
theory of type and saw how this belonged to the same Platonic understanding 
of symbol to which Coleridge gives expression. A. H. Armstrong’s 
characterization of Platonism helps to explain why, for Pusey, the particular 
details of a type, ‘every the least jot or tittle, every fringe and bell in the rich 
embroidering of God’s word’, (L118) enable it to communicate spiritual truth: 
‘It is important, if you are to understand Platonism at all, to understand that it is 
by being themselves that things image their archetypes.’14 In the same way, 
Pusey describes the concrete and particular imagery of the type as ‘that 
whereby it resembled the Archetype, – that in it which was divine’. (L24, 
above) Even now that the prophecies of the Old Testament have been, at least 
in part, fulfilled, humans cannot dispense with means or instruments by which 
that prophecy was delivered, any more than they could receive the gifts which 
the sacraments convey without the means or instruments by which they are 
conveyed: 
The knowledge of these types is obviously of importance to the Christian 
for the understanding of the Gospel now that it is given, as to its practical 
                                                 
simplicity of their language in contrast with the subtlety of Greek, and the rod of Moses 
swallowed up the rod of the wise men; Greek, debased in the eyes of men, and in a form no 
longer intelligible to the philosophers of this world, but, in truth, anointed and penetrated with 
a Divine spirit, through the Hebrew element infused into it, became the chosen vessel to bear 
His truth throughout the world. (S-EL, 3). For a consideration of ‘the Semitic quality of 
Pusey’s thought’, see Rowell 1999, ‘“Making Church of England Poetical” Ephraim and the 
Oxford Movement’. In considering the influence of Ephraim on Pusey, Rowell highlights the 
importance of reading the Bible in the language of type for Pusey. See also L60, L24. 
14 A. H. Armstrong quoted in Hedley 2000, 129. 
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apprehension beforehand, since it is in its language that much of the 
mysteries of the Gospel are still shadowed out to us: we know definitely 
to what the language applies, which they did not; but what is figured in 
that language, precisely we know not: we are still in the land of shadows. 
(L94) 
Pusey’s emphasis on the minute details of types and their enduring importance 
expresses his understanding of the Incarnation. The human words of the Old 
Testament are inseparably joined to the Eternal Word and cannot be laid aside. 
Pusey also describes the necessity of types in terms of the ongoing necessity of 
mediation and a Mediator: ‘Nor is the whole office of the types concluded, 
although their preparatory ministry is at an end; our eyes still need the 
mitigated light, that we may contemplate the Eternal Light under more 
varied aspects’.15 In Pusey’s analysis, holding a correct view of the 
Incarnation does not only require assent to an orthodox statement of faith. An 
orthodox belief in the Incarnation will express itself in a theologically 
grounded understanding of hermeneutics and a sacramental and incarnational 
understanding of Old Testament prophecy. 
Pusey also describes the union of the material and immaterial elements of 
language as a kind of sacramental union. As God is manifest in the flesh of 
Christ and in the body of the Church, so is he manifest in the fleshy or material 
elements of language:  
While in the flesh, our sight, hearing, knowledge of God can only come 
to us mediated through the flesh. Throughout hath God reference to our 
compound nature; there is an outward form allied to our material nature, 
an inward spiritual meaning, addressed to our spirit. Through bodily 
senses, in bodily forms, our spirits receive what is spiritual.16 
Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine may serve as a guide for Pusey here. 
Augustine offers an analogy of the Incarnation to describe how words 
communicate thoughts: ‘How did He come except that “the Word was made 
flesh, and dwelt among us?” (1 Cor. 1.21) It is as when we speak. In order that 
what we are thinking may reach the mind of the listener through the fleshy 
                                                 
15 T67rev., 390 
16 S-EL, 7.  
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ears, that which we have in mind is expressed in words and is called speech.’17 
Typical prophecy is a means of communication which is ideally suited to 
address the human spirit through forms suited to our material nature.18 
For Pusey, as we have seen, the connection between the type and the 
reality which it communicates or embodies can be understood by analogy with 
the sacraments of the Church and the union of the human and divine in the 
Incarnate Christ. Pusey sees an analogous union of the material and spiritual 
not only in the message of words, but in the character of language:  
And thus our very words are two-fold; they are taken from material 
things, have a material substance, yet act invisibly, have an immaterial 
meaning, as they are received by the eyes and ears but act on the soul, so 
that we may in some states of mind, lose all consciousness of seeing or 
hearing them.19 
A typical understanding of language and Scripture allows language to fulfil its 
purpose of communicating an inward and spiritual meaning through a kind of 
material form. The movement from the literal or obvious sense to the various 
kinds of typical or spiritual meaning that is expressed in language is the 
movement of sanctification which itself foreshadows and prophesies the 
transformation which shall be realize at the Awakening ‘when the body is 
glorified into the nature of spirit.’ (L131) 
5.1.3 The Old Testament as the ‘living and true Body’ of the Lord 
On the basis of his incarnational and sacramental understanding of Scripture, 
Pusey describes the Old Testament as the living body of Christ. He emphasizes 
that Christian life cannot leave this body behind: ‘The Old Testament is not to 
the New like the chrysalis, out of which the living ψυχη, has burst, and is now 
                                                 
17 Augustine 1958, I.13.12, 4. 
18 S-EL, 7: ‘When God the Son appeared to Men of old, it was in a material form; even the 
blessed Angels whom He hath made to be “spirits” came in the form of flesh; when we saw 
‘the glory of the Only Begotten, full of grace and truth’ he had ‘become flesh’: when God 
spake, it was as thunder; when He revealed Himself to his servants the prophets, it was in 
visions, and dreams, and enigmatic or emblematic speeches; prophets were entitled ‘seers’ as 
‘seeing’ in figurative forms the truths of God.’ 
19 S-EL, 7. 
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only a lifeless casement.’ (L24)20 While the body of the Old Testament is not 
left behind, like the body which Christ took on it is both raised and 
transfigured: 
The Old Testament is not to the New like the chrysalis, out of which the 
living ψυχη, has burst, and is now only a lifeless casement; rather is it 
like the personal appearance of Him, who had in man’s sight ‘no form or 
comeliness’, but which, when He appeared in His glory, was 
transfigured, and shone transparently, with a portion of that Majesty 
which was veiled within it: or so again, that His risen Body, still bore the 
print of the nails and of the spear, and could be handled, although it was 
no longer subjected to the laws of flesh, but shewed itself to be a 
‘glorified Body’, and what before seemed the exception and a miracle, 
when It walked on the water, now appeared as the rule; and Jesus came 
and went uniformly after the manner of a Spirit, to accustom us to think 
on His Body as spiritualized, yea Deified and yet a Body, so should we 
regard the Old Testament, not as the dead body of our Lord, to be 
embalmed with honour, and laid with the dead, but as a living and true 
Body, which it hath pleased God to take, in order to be accessible to us; 
and wherein alone we can see Him ‘Full of grace and truth.’ (L24) 
The Word, having taken on a human body, is forever united with that body. In 
the same way, the humble earthly words of the Old Testament are forever 
united with the Spirit of Christ and the Word which speaks in them. Before the 
light shining from the glorified body of Christ illuminated the literal or lettered 
body of the Old Testament, it appeared in the lowly form of Christ’s human 
nature, having ‘no form nor comeliness … no beauty that we should desire 
him’ (Isa. 53:2). However, in the same way that Christ’s human body was 
transformed and glorified by the resurrection, so too was the body of the Old 
Testament transfigured by the light which shines in it through the Spirit of the 
risen Christ. Rather than a lifeless casing which may be cast aside now that the 
revelation has come, the Old Testament shines ‘transparently, with a portion of 
that Majesty which was veiled within it’, it is shown to be ‘a ‘glorified Body’. 
As the Son was revealed in the body which also veiled his Godhead, so is the 
truth of the New Testament revealed in the types of the Old Testament which 
                                                 
20 Here Pusey challenges the view of his friend and colleague August Tholuck: ‘The substance 
of the Messianic prophecies is the Psyche of the New Testament, hidden under the chrysalis 
envelopement of the Old Testament … the prophecies wear an envelope, which they can be 
divested of only by him who perceives their historical fulfilment’. Diss., 189-190. 
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also veil a portion of His Majesty. In reading the Psalms, for example, one 
ought not to look only at the surface, but rather to contemplate ‘Him, the Sun 
of Righteousness, Who, before He rose on our worlds, tinged it with His own 
rich heaven-born hues, and since He has shone upon it, has filled all things 
with His life and light.’ (L134) Like the Risen body of Christ, the Old 
Testament joined with the New Testament and read according to the Spirit in 
the Church is ‘spiritualized, yea Deified and yet a Body’; the Old Testament is 
‘the living and true Body’ of the Lord.  
5.1.4 Reading Types as a Means of Communion 
Reading the types of the Old Testament not only communicates knowledge, 
but it is also a means of communion or participation in the divine life. 
Discovering the express image of God in the images or types of Scripture is the 
way by which the image of God in humanity is deepened and we are returned 
to the Archetype. The most focussed exposition in the ‘Lectures’ of the doubly 
sacramental character of the Old Testament, both as revelation and as a means 
of communion, comes in Pusey’s discussion of the Psalms. On the basis of the 
doctrine of the Incarnation and the unity of the human and divine in Christ, 
Pusey emphasizes that the Psalms prophesy both Christ and his Church: ‘Since 
then He has taken our nature, and joined it to Himself, it is nothing strange but 
rather in harmony therewith, that the words wherein He speaks, should so 
include us, as at times to belong to us rather than to Himself.’ (L133) On the 
basis of the union of the head and the body, Christ and the Church, Pusey 
argues that ‘thus now may be read the Psalms as never without ourselves, 
never without our Lord’. (L133) One hears here again Pusey’s emphasis on the 
permanence of the union of the human and divine in both Christ and the 
Scriptures; this sacramental union cannot be undone. The Psalms describe both 
the life of Christ and the life of the Church:  
[1] They speak of afflictions – in Him, those He bore for us; in us, the 
‘due reward of our deeds;’ [2] of sinking in depths of mire – in Him of 
suffering; in us, of defilement; [3] of God's ‘forsaking,’ – Him, in the 
mystery of the Cross; in us, for trial or humiliation; [4] of being saved 
from the pit – in Him, the Resurrection on the third day; in us, 
deliverance from Hell; [5] of Holiness and faithfulness to the will of God 
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– in Him, perfect obedience; in us, imperfect yet acceptable through Him 
in whom it is wrought. (L133)21 
Understanding typical prophecy requires seeing the way in which the type 
describes both Christ and the Church, and how the prophecy applies differently 
to Christ and the Church. According to the sacramental understanding, the type 
is both like and unlike that which it represents and communicates. The capacity 
of bread to nourish is part of its capacity to serve as a type of spiritual food, yet 
partaking of the sacrament implies both a different kind of eating and a 
different kind of nourishment.22 Both identity and distinction are part of the 
sacramental character of typical prophecy. In Coleridge’s terms which we 
considered in Chapter 4, types, like symbols, are ‘always tautegorical (i.e. 
expressing the same subject but with a difference)’.23 
Pusey’s description of how the Psalms are both the prayers of Christ and 
the prayers of the Church is not an original one. At this point in the ‘Lectures’, 
he is practically paraphrasing Augustine’s Expositions on the Psalms, from 
which he quotes extensively:  
‘Christ,’ says St Augustine, ‘many times speaks sometimes in His own 
Person, i.e. as our Head … sometimes in ours, i.e. His members; 
inasmuch as these also when He said, ‘I was hungry and ye gave Me to 
eat,’ He speaks in the Person of His members, not His own. And when 
He cried, ‘Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?’ the Head cried for the 
members and yet He said not ‘Why persecutest thou my members’ but 
‘why persecutest thou Me’.’ (L133) 24 
Pusey quotes Augustine not only to establish that Christ speaks both for 
Himself and for the members of His body in the Psalms, but also that this 
possibility for such dual meanings in the Psalms comes from the fundamental 
union of the Church and Christ:  
Why speak as one? Because He says, ‘They two shall be one flesh.’ 
‘This’ saith the Apostle, ‘is a great mystery but I speak of Christ and the 
Church’ – If then Himself said, ‘they are no more two but one flesh’, 
                                                 
21 The numbers have been added and the punctuation reorganized to make it easier to follow.  
22 For this idea see also L136:200-1. 
23 Aids, 206. 
24 Augustine 1848, on Psalm 40, §5, 134-5 
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what marvel if there be one flesh, one tongue, the same words, as of one 
flesh, of the Head of the body?25 
According to Pusey ‘our Lord’s incarnation, His mystical Body in the 
Eucharist, and the mystical Body the Church … are blended as parts of the 
same Mystery and bear the same name’. One could reasonably add as another 
element of this mystery, ‘His mystical Body in the Old Testament and in the 
Psalms’, i.e., the typical reading of the Old Testament and of Holy Scripture. 
(L125) 
In a beautiful passage, Pusey links the principle of the Incarnation with 
the capacity of the Psalms to belong to Christ and the Christian. He emphasizes 
that through this union the Psalms have a sacramental force or a sanctifying 
power ‘lifting us up to Him our Head’. Such a typical reading of the Psalms 
both displays and effects this union, ‘He in us, or we in Him:’ 
Through this mysterious union of the members with the Head, it is 
nothing precarious or arbitrary that those words either on their surface 
may belong to us, which in their full and deep truth they speak of our 
Head, or that He, while speaking in them of Himself, in some places 
speaks rather of His members than of Himself. For so are they more 
adapted to our use, lifting us up to Him our Head, and yet not forgetting 
ourselves our infirmities and sins. Still it is one system, one history, one, 
through this gracious and mysterious union, whether the shadow be cast 
forward or backwards, foreshadowing or reflecting: He in us, or we in 
Him; one history of trust in God, whether in Him of Whom the taunt was 
spoken, ‘He trusted in God that he would deliver Him’, or in the Martyr’s 
sufferings or in daily trials; one, of purpose to do God’s will, of setting 
God always before Him, of being hated causelessly by the world and 
perfected through suffering. (L134) 
Pusey encourages the reader not only to see how prophecy reveals the mystery 
of Christ, but how types and prophecies are means or instruments of that 
mystery. In a sacramental reading of the Psalms, the reader is invited to discern 
the Lord’s body in a way analogous to the worthy communicant of the Holy 
                                                 
25 Pusey quotes Psalm 38:6. See Augustine 1848, Psalm 40, §12, 144-145. ‘Whence then come 
the sins, but from the Body; which is the Church: Because both the Head, and the Body of 
Christ, are speaking. Why do they speak as if one person only? Because they twain, as Gen. 2, 
He hath said, shall be one flesh. This (says the Apostle) is a great mystery; but I speak 
concerning Christ’. 
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Eucharist who is exhorted both to ‘be in perfect charity with all men’ and to 
discern the Lord’s body in the sacramental types of bread and wine.26 
Christ is the goal of prophecy in a two-fold way. The prophecies of the 
Old Testament reveal Christ, and reading the Psalms as a prophecy of Christ 
also effects a deeper union with Christ: 
And this gives a mysterious virtue to the Psalms, and may help to shew 
how, by the Divine wisdom, they suit the manifold worshippers, whom 
the Church contains within her bosom, and who pray in her courts. They 
suit the highest saints, and have even been the words, in which they 
poured forth their souls to God, in life or in death, for they being, by 
growth in holiness, fitted to receive the mind of the Spirit, understood 
them more as He did, whose voice they are; and we, the more imperfect 
members of Him and of the Church, can use them, as they speak more 
upon the surface; and to both they have a Sacramental force as being 
used in Him, and being His words in us, addressed to the Father as the 
words of the Son. And, thus we may use them, as we do the Prayer of our 
Lord, untiringly, rather one might say, gathering fresh strength from the 
frequency of its and their use, as never more hoping to be heard than 
when praying the Father in the Lord's own words. (L133)27  
The ‘mysterious virtue’ of the Psalms means that the grace they communicate 
is inward and spiritual, not that it is uncertain or based on a subjective 
emotional state. The mysterious virtue of the Psalms is the inward and spiritual 
grace communicated through earthly elements or words. The Psalms have a 
‘sacramental’ force or power to make the readers partakers of the divine life. 
Pusey says that this ‘sacramental force’ comes from praying the words of the 
Psalms ‘in Him’, in Christ. As such, they are ‘His words in us, addressed to the 
Father as the words of the Son’. Sharing in the Son’s communication with the 
Father in the words of the Psalms is a sacramental way of reading by which the 
members of the body grow in holiness and are ‘fitted to receive the mind of the 
Spirit’. We have seen in Chapter 3 that Pusey describes the renewal of human 
nature in terms of having the mind of God shaped in us. In this light, it is 
                                                 
26 See 1 Cor. 11:27-30 and the third ‘Exhortation’ which the rubric directs to be read ‘At the 
time of the celebration of the Communion’, in ‘Holy Communion’, The Book of Common 
Prayer (1662).  
27 my italics  
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significant to note that Pusey argues that reading the Psalms can give a special 
access to the mind of Christ and hence to the mind of God:  
They, so to say, are the very thoughts of our Redeemer, as He was man; 
other prophecy delivers to us the fruits of His coming; the Gospels relate 
to us His acts for us, tell us of His Passion, and His doctrine, report to us 
His words and commands; the Psalms (to speak reverently) shadow forth 
to us a reality beyond all thought, the thoughts with which He communed 
with His Father. (L133) 
Reading the Psalms typically enables us to share in the thoughts of Christ and 
so to have his thoughts shape our minds. This is one of the ways by which the 
image and likeness of God in us ‘may endlessly deepen, until it could be finally 
perfected’. (L145) 
5.2 Typical Prophecy and Allegory 
5.2.1 The Problem with the term ‘Allegory’ 
I have been arguing that Pusey advocates an approach to the Old Testament 
and the Scriptures which is fundamentally shaped by his understanding of the 
prevalence of type. Pusey’s investigation of types and typical prophecy is an 
investigation of the way in which a sacramental reading of the Old Testament 
both expresses and leads the reader, both the individual and the collective 
ecclesial reader, more deeply into the mystery of Christ. A typical reading is 
Christological, ecclesial, and sacramental. In order to understand what Pusey 
means by a ‘typical’ reading of the Old Testament, and as well, more basically, 
what he means by type and typology, it is important to distinguish his approach 
from contemporary discussions about typology and allegory. Many 
contemporary writers sharply distinguish typology from allegory, arguing that 
typology offers a more biblical, historical, or straightforward kind of 
interpretation, while allegory is more literary, creative, or obscure. 
Approaching the ‘Lectures’ through the lens of this modern-day discussion 
could lead one to misunderstand Pusey’s argument. On the basis of 
terminology, one might assume that Pusey’s investigation of type and typology 
is something distinct from allegory. However, Pusey’s investigation of types 
and prophecies of the Old Testament is an investigation of what many writers 
would call an allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament. In order to 
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understand the fundamental connection Pusey makes between a ‘typical’ 
reading and the mystery of Christ, it is necessary to look beyond terminology 
to consider his exploration of the different senses of the typical meaning of Old 
Testament passages, those ‘which most fully exhausts their meaning’. (L20) In 
order to do this, it is helpful to consider first why Pusey does not use the term 
allegory, and then to look at his arguments in the light of contemporary 
discussions about the distinction between allegory and typology.  
Even a consideration of etymology shows the difficulty of excluding any 
notion of the allegorical from Pusey’s understanding of typology or typical 
prophecy. In his study of typology, A. C. Charity points out that the word 
‘typology’ does not appear in Latin (typologia) until 1840, or in English until 
1844.28 However, Pusey uses the word ‘typology’ seven times in the Lectures 
in the autumn of 1836, apparently earlier than any published use of ‘typology’ 
in English. (L9, 11, 12, 29)29 At the time when Pusey gave the ‘Lectures’, 
‘typology’ was a new term, if not an innovation. This suggests the difficulty of 
approaching the ‘Lectures’ using a sharp distinction between allegory and 
typology. His description of typical interpretation describes what, up to that 
time, was usually characterized as allegory. 
Pusey rarely uses the term ‘allegory’. Once he quotes Coleridge who uses 
‘allegory’, in this instance at least, as a synonym for ‘myth’. (L46) Twice he 
describes how modern commentators characterize the interpretations of the 
Fathers as ‘fanciful allegorizing’ or ‘undue allegorizing’: ‘It is too notorious 
that persons in these days would condemn all of the fathers for undue 
allegorizing or an excessive typology’. (L11, 9) He refers on two occasions to 
the ‘allegorical’ interpretations offered by Jewish commentators. (L79, 169) In 
his most positive use of the term, he connects ‘the αλληγορουµενον of Hagar 
and Mount Sinai’ with the ‘Apostolic mode of interpretation’. (L11) The best 
clue we have as to why Pusey does not use the term allegory to describe the 
                                                 
28 Charity 1966, 171 n. 2. See also Martens 2008, 300 n. 66 and Louth 1989, 118. ‘Typology’ 
and ‘typological’ (which Pusey does not use) come into common usage with the Scottish 
theologian Patrick Fairbairn’s still-reprinted book, The Typology of Scripture (1845). 
29 See also M19, describing the apologetic approach: ‘It endeavours to get rid of all typology 
and makes us suspicious of them’. 
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interpretation of type and typical prophecy comes in Marshall’s ‘Notes’ for the 
eighth lecture. This is the same lecture in which Pusey referred to Coleridge’s 
analysis of the role of evidence in relation to the Champion at a Coronation. In 
this lecture Pusey appears to have drawn on material which did not become 
part of the manuscript. Marshall records that Pusey criticized the unhistorical 
and allegorical approach that Augustine followed in On Genesis against the 
Manichees. Pusey faulted Augustine for disregarding the literal or historical 
sense: 
Compare the different tone of St. Augustine in his work De Genesi ad 
Manicheos written soon after his conversion from Manichaeism in De 
Genesi ad Litteram written some time after. He first had recourse to the 
Allegorical method of interpreting the account of the Fall, to the 
exclusion of the Literal; but he afterwards adopted the latter. He 
embraced the former to explain that which he did not at first understand. 
He knew it required a more diligent search to interpret God’s word as it 
stands, than to affix to it a meaning of our own. It has a Figurative, and a 
Literal because it stands written. He united both together. What Sacred 
Scripture relates, as a fact, is such. The typical meaning does not 
interfere with the literal. If Adam was a man, who lived and died as other 
men, why should not Paradise be a spot of ground, a certain definite 
place?30  
Pusey argues that the account of the Fall in Genesis is a true history and that 
the literal or historical meaning of the text cannot be set aside. The reference to 
Paradise as ‘a definite space’, a ‘spot of ground’ is a criticism of the suggestion 
that one finds in De Genesi ad Manicheos that Paradise was a spiritual state 
signifying the happy life. Augustine writes of Eve, ‘For perhaps she was not in 
paradise according to place, but rather according to the disposition of 
happiness’.31 Pusey’s criticisms follow the description Augustine himself 
offers in his Retractationes where Augustine admitted that he did not consider 
himself capable of the ‘more diligent search to interpret God’s word as it 
stands’ at the time of writing De Genesi ad Manicheos.32 For Pusey, and the 
                                                 
30 M55-56. Pusey finds support for his approach in references to the history of Genesis 1-4 in 
Rev. 22:2-3 (the ‘tree of life’ and there being ‘no more curse’ in the new Jerusalem) and 
because ‘our Saviour’ alludes to the ‘first murder’ in John 8:44. M57. 
31 Augustine 1991, II.14.20, p. 116. See also II.9.12, pp. 112-3. 
32 M55. Pusey refers to Augustine, Retractions, I.17. See Augustine 1991, 42: ‘After I had 
compared the two books of On Genesis, against the Manichaeans, and had explained the 
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later Augustine, ‘The typical meaning does not interfere with the literal’, and 
cannot be set aside; God ‘united both together’. This is the same point that 
Pusey makes elsewhere in the ‘Lectures’, ‘we shall find that humbler and more 
obvious meaning also involved and wrapped up in the other’. (L10) When he 
considers Augustine’s reflections on the union of ‘the sacrifice of Christians … 
in the sacrament of the altar’ with the offering of Christ ‘in His Passion for us’, 
Pusey articulates a principle which he applies to the interpretation of types: ‘St 
Augustine does not mean so to identify these sacrifices, as to merge in the 
lower the mystery of the higher, but rather represents the lower as contained in 
the mystery of the higher’. (L108) It is a basic principle for Pusey that the 
typical or spiritual sense begins with the plain sense, and that this plain sense 
cannot be discarded or neglected. Pusey appears to associate allegorical 
interpretation with this kind of neglect.33 
The cultural milieu of the day also would have made the use of the term 
allegorical problematic for Pusey. In the nineteenth century ‘allegory’ was 
most commonly associated with fictional writing that used personifications or 
metaphors to teach a lesson or to make a point rather than with the patristic 
interpretation of Scripture.34 For Pusey’s contemporaries, allegory was not 
primarily a way, good or bad, of interpreting the Bible (or other writings), but a 
form of composition, allegoric writing.35 In Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress the 
character ‘Christian’, and those whom he meets, like ‘Goodwill’ or ‘Sloth’ are 
allegorical personifications. However salutary the purpose of such writings, the 
literal or historical element, which for Pusey must be united with a legitimate 
typical interpretation of the Bible, is absent. Pusey would have been familiar 
with Coleridge’s view that whereas ‘the translucence of the Eternal through 
                                                 
words of Scripture according to their allegorical meaning, not presuming to explain such great 
mysteries of natural things literally – that is, in what sense the statements there made can be 
interpreted according to their historical significance – I wanted to test my capabilities in this 
truly most taxing and difficult work also.’ 
33 For a consideration of the negotiation involved in the notion of the ‘plain sense’ in early 
Christian exegesis, see Ayres 2004, 39-40. 
34 For examples and further discussion, see Kelley 1997, 70 and Lewis 1958, 45. 
35 For the difference between ‘allegorical interpretation,’ which ‘claims to discover the truth 
hidden beneath a text,’ and ‘allegorical composition,’ which ‘personifies abstract concepts and 
fashions a narrative around them,’ see Whitman 1987, 3-5. For a description of the wide range 
of literary works that can be described as allegorical, see Fletcher, 1964, 1-23.  
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and in the Temporal’ characterizes the symbol, ‘an allegory is but a translation 
of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an 
abstraction from the objects of the senses’.36 A symbol or a type embodies and 
communicates what is real and universal, whereas allegory is a confection, an 
elaborate and somewhat frivolous creation. When commentators in Pusey’s 
day applied the term ‘allegorical’ to the interpretation of Scripture, it was 
usually to describe the interpretation of purely metaphorical sayings or as a 
derogatory term to criticize those who neglected the historical or literal 
meaning of the text.37  
5.2.2 The Apologetic Distinction between Allegory and Typology  
In his article, ‘Revisiting the Allegory/Typology Distinction: The Case of 
Origen’, Peter W. Martens reviews the scholarly debate over the past sixty 
years about the usefulness and accuracy of sharply distinguishing allegorical 
and typological interpretation in the Fathers.38 He focuses on Origen 
scholarship, but he situates this in the context of a more general discussion 
about the way in which allegory and typology are understood. He shows how 
the terms and trajectory of this discussion were guided by the debate between 
the French writers Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. In a series of articles and books, Daniélou distinguished typology, 
a truly biblical, patristic, and catholic form of spiritual exegesis, from the 
allegorical approach which he saw as subjective and based on ephemeral or 
extraneous ideas or practices, especially ‘the rabbinical, Philo’s, and the 
gnostic’.39 While de Lubac acknowledged the need to differentiate legitimate 
or catholic readings from literary creations, he argued that Daniélou’s 
distinction between allegory and typology was neither biblical nor an 
                                                 
36 SMan., 30. See also Coleridge’s fuller description in an 1818 lecture in Barth 1977, 107. 
37 For example, Intro., 401-2. 
38 Martens 2008, 283-317. See also Burghardt 1950, 78-116. Burghardt provides a useful 
summary, contemporary with the beginning of the debate between de Lubac and Daniélou, of 
studies of the spiritual exegesis in the Fathers and the distinction between allegory and 
typology. For a consideration of patristic exegesis through the lens of the term ‘figura’, see 
Auerbach 1984, 28-60, esp. 47-9. 
39 Daniélou 1955, 174 and 174-199 for a detailed description of these three extraneous 
influences. For Daniélou’s understanding of typology, see Daniélou 1946, 199-202. For its 
distinction from allegory, Daniélou 1951, 416, and Daniélou 1955, 174 and 174-199. 
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expression of the catechetical tradition of the Church. De Lubac maintains that 
St Paul and the Fathers use allegory to describe what Daniélou means by 
typology:  
 … on devra donc dire que l’interprétation allégorique, en son idée 
traditionelle, consiste à discerner les types ou les figures qui, en Israël 
annonçaient le Christ, – dans tout Israël, tout le Christ. Elle établit le 
rapport de la figure à la vérité, de la lettre à l’esprit, de l’ancien au 
nouveau.40 
According to this view, allegory is not distinct from typology, but it is the 
search for the meaning of the type. 
Martens summarizes how the debate between Daniélou and de Lubac set 
the course for scholarly debate about the usefulness and legitimacy of allegory 
and typology:  
The ‘two things’ that had to be clearly distinguished, for Daniélou, were 
the successful and the unsuccessful nonliteral interpretations of Scripture, 
‘typology’ and ‘allegory’ respectively. This concern would prove 
portentous. Over the course of the next half-century, a dominant 
trajectory of the scholarship would insist, with him, that ‘typology’ and 
‘allegory’ ought indeed to serve as markers for the better and worse 
forms of nonliteral exegesis.41 
The trouble with this distinction, Martens argues, is that what counts as a 
successful or non-successful form of non-literal exegesis is defined in different 
ways. For example, Daniélou treats the ecclesial or eschatological meaning of a 
type as part of the typological sense while others describe such interpretations 
as ‘allegorical’ in a negative sense, i.e. subjective, or ahistorical.42 Martens 
states that the scholarly consensus these days supports distinguishing allegory 
from typology, although there is a significant dissenting minority.43 Martens 
sides with the minority view because the terms have been understood 
                                                 
40 Lubac 1947, 185. See also pp. 180-181, 200. Lubac 1989, 132 offers a translation: ‘it 
designated little more than the first of these contrasting terms [or, better, of two opposed terms] 
for which “allegory” was the vital connection….allegorical interpretation, in the traditional 
sense, consists of discerning the types and figures that, in Israel, announced Christ – in all of 
Israel, all of Christ’.  
41 Martens 2008, 288. 
42 Martens 2008, 289. 
43 Martens offers an extensive list of those who take different views of this subject. Ibid. 285 n. 
4. See also Ayres 2004, 31 n. 66. 
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differently in different ages as well as by the contemporary scholars, and 
because scholars do not agree on what constitutes a ‘successful nonliteral 
scriptural interpretation’.44  
This debate helps one to see the way in which Pusey’s understanding of 
typology includes what often goes by the name allegory. Interpreters who 
distinguish allegory from typology and put forward typology as the 
authentically Christian form of figurative exegesis generally argue that 
typology is more faithful to historical or narrative context. According to this 
view, a typological interpretation depends on historical or contextual 
similarities between the type and the anti-type, while allegory, on the other 
hand, treats the figure – whether a saying, person, or event – as floating more 
freely from both history and literary context.45 This distinction is sometimes 
framed in terms of relative clarity. In Sanctified Vision, John J. O’Keefe and R. 
R. Reno, for example, argue that the connection between the elements that 
constitute a type and its fulfilment is fairly obvious: ‘If successful, the 
association of the two elements discloses the shared type, and that shared type 
becomes visible and persuasive to the reader or listener.’46 In the case of 
allegory, this connection is much less clear or definitive:  
Unlike typologies, allegories require significantly more interpretive 
investment capital. The reader must outline the reality for which the text 
is a map, explaining the coding system of the text so that the message can 
be read. For this reason, an allegorical interpretation often seems a 
reading laid over the text rather than a reading in the text.47  
According to this view an allegorical interpretation requires knowledge of a 
reality external to the scriptures, which appears to be imposed on the text. The 
text appears to be a code rather than a veil. Types on the other hand are more 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 315 and 284. See also Burghardt 1950, 111-115. 
45 See Martens 2008, 293-4, Hanson 1959, 7, 128, Young 2002, 162. Auerbach also contrasts 
the ‘realistic, historical and concrete’ from the ‘purely ethical and allegorical’. Auerbach 1984, 
42. 
46 O’Keefe 2005, 72. See Chapters 4 and 5, ‘Typological Interpretation’ and ‘Allegorical 
Interpretation’, respectively. 
47 O’Keefe 2005, 90. In the case of allegory, events, words, or characters ‘stand for something 
else.’ 89. 
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transparent to the reality which they figure, and so the connection is more 
obvious.  
In the terms of Pusey’s argument, this kind of distinction between 
typology and allegory is a species of the apologetic approach which attempts to 
establish prophecy on the basis of clear evidence and criteria. While O’Keefe 
and Reno do not use the language of the apologists, their characterization of 
the obvious links between a type and its fulfilment recalls Horne’s insistence 
that it is necessary and possible to distinguish between a genuine analogy 
based on ‘the exercise of legitimate reasoning and deduction’ and ‘the crude 
notions urged by every person of warm devotional feelings or vivid 
imagination’.48 As we have seen already, Pusey cautions against any attempt to 
define prophecy or types according to such standards of clarity. Describing 
typology as a kind of interpretation which gives proper weight to history or 
context, or which is clearer, simply shifts the ground of the debate. 
For Pusey, how one distinguishes between a likeness which is a 
confection versus one that is real and inherent, or in O’Keefe and Reno’s 
terms, between ‘a reading laid over the text rather than a reading in the text’, is 
not straightforward: ‘For nothing is more difficult, than to prove the 
correspondence of things which to a mind, that is formed to receive it, requires 
no proof, but are rather perceived by a sort of intuition.’ (L36) Here Pusey 
focuses on the very doubt or uncertainty which accompanies some 
interpretations as a kind of witness to an analogy or resemblance, even if that 
analogy cannot ‘abide the test of a severe reasoning’. Pusey recognizes that 
some types are clearer than others. However, as we say in Chapter 2, it is part 
of his basic argument that the judging of typical prophecy according to 
standards of clarity is based on empiricist and rationalist assumptions. For 
Pusey, those types which are clear invite the reader to search and to seek those 
which are more veiled. The distinction between clear types and unclear 
allegories is another form of the false distinction between simple or direct 
prophecy on the one hand, and veiled or typical prophecy on the other. 
                                                 
48 Intro., 615. 
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Moreover, as we have seen already, this lack of clarity is inevitable, a result 
both of the distinction between the divine and the human, and of impairment 
which sin causes to human spiritual eyesight. Like O’Keefe and Reno, Pusey 
emphasizes the importance of knowing ‘the reality for which the text is a map’. 
However, if it appears that this reality is a map laid over the text, external and 
extraneous, rather than the fulfilment of the meaning inherent in the text, it 
may be because the powers of sight by which types are recognized has been 
weakened by poor habits of reading and false assumptions: 
… who could undertake to demonstrate the likeness even of a corporeal 
image? One will pronounce it like and the other unlike; not as if there 
were no certainty to be obtained; but because one … may have formed to 
himself a wrong ideal of what a likeness ought to be, or have been unable 
to enter into the full character of the original. One should not in each case 
go about to prove the beliefs, nor should we be disturbed, that we could 
not, or feel the likeness less strong, if we felt assured that we ourselves 
knew well the original. For on this at last the question mainly turns. 
(L37)  
The sense of a lack of correspondence in the text may be the result of a more 
basic lack of correspondence between the reader and what the text reveals or 
symbolizes. If one does not know well enough ‘the original’ which the type 
reveals, even a genuine and illuminating typical interpretation will appear to be 
laid over the text. The fact of experience that some types have ‘more evidence 
to us’ is not conclusive. (L8) As was discussed in Chapter 3, the knowledge of 
types is a function of the formation or sanctification of the whole person. To 
know the reality, one must be able not just to see in a superficial way, but to 
‘enter into the full character of the original’. (L37) The sense that a reading is 
laid over the text may reflect the character of the reader who is still too unlike 
the original, God, to recognize the likeness. As we saw in Chapter 3, O’Keefe 
and Reno are aware of what Pusey describes as the necessity of spiritual 
discernment: ‘Vision must be sanctified if one is to see rather than be blinded 
by the mystery of God.’49 However, in the terms of Pusey’s argument, they 
have not applied this understanding to the distinction they make between 
allegory and typology. Pusey accepts the genuineness of interpretations which 
                                                 
49 O’Keefe 2005, 139.  
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will not be obvious to all readers, and which some would describe as fanciful 
or allegorical in a pejorative sense. For Pusey this lack of clarity does not mean 
that the meanings which are discovered are strained or read into the text, but is 
an inevitable result of the character of human understanding. 
Whatever the meaning or usefulness of the distinction between allegory 
and typology in current literature, and despite Pusey’s preference for the term 
‘typical’ over ‘allegorical’, one will understand Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ better if one 
adopts the approach suggested by de Lubac and considers allegory and 
typology to be synonyms. Andrew Louth, like de Lubac, points out that when 
early and medieval Christian writers refer to allegory they mean what Daniélou 
calls ‘typology’, ‘and we are all set to misunderstand them if we restrict the 
reference of the term “allegory” to something opposed to typology’.50 In the 
same way, we are likely to misunderstand Pusey if, when he speaks of typical 
interpretation, we imagine that he means something opposed to allegorical 
interpretation, or that all that is called allegory is excluded from his study. 
Appreciating the mystery of Christ, and entering into that mystery through 
sacramental reading, requires the exploration of senses which are necessarily 
elusive and will appear to some as obscure. 
5.2.3 Allegory and the Mystery of Christ 
De Lubac offers both a vocabulary and an argument which helps one to see 
how Pusey’s investigation of type and typical prophecy was a response to the 
apologetic approach and the dangers of rationalism and empiricism. In Pusey’s 
argument, the symbolic form of typical prophecy mirrors the union and 
distinction of the divine and human natures in Christ. There is a human 
element, a history lived by a particular community and words written by 
human authors, and yet this same history reveals the character of God and 
manifests his over-ruling providence. History has an internal and spiritual 
component as well as an external and visible one. The text of the Bible and the 
history which it proclaims are on the one hand available to study and 
investigation by all people, the good and the bad, those with faith or without, 
                                                 
50 Louth 1989, 118. 
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and with the use of specialized historical, linguistic, or literary tools. On the 
other hand, biblical history is also typical prophecy which conveys a spiritual 
truth which must be spiritually discerned by faith and with the eye of the 
sanctified soul. The hidden treasure veiled and communicated in the history 
and the letter can only be seen by eyes illuminated by faith and comprehended 
by a mind conformed to the divine mind. The truth which types reveal is not 
accessible to analytic reason alone. In making this argument, Pusey understood 
himself to be moving contrary to a growing consensus – the idea that ‘a sense 
is to be sought and found in words and phrases, deeper than that which is 
required for the mere context … is clean contrary to the boasted discovery of 
modern times, the so-called historico-grammatical interpretation’. (L39) 
Like Pusey, de Lubac also finds allegorical interpretation to be 
intrinsically connected to the Incarnation, and the hiddenness of the allegorical 
sense as corresponding to the way in which the divine is veiled by the human 
both in the Incarnation and in the literal body of Scripture: ‘The spiritual sense 
of Scripture is clothed by the letter as the divinity of Christ is clothed in 
flesh.’51 The metaphor of Scripture as the flesh of Christ requires attention to 
be paid both to the external form and to the reality which it contains or 
communicates: ‘just as the Word of God clothed with flesh in Mary came into 
the world … so here is He covered with the veil of the letter: as the letter is 
seen as flesh, whilst the hidden spiritual sense within is sensed as divinity’.52 
De Lubac’s description complements Pusey’s understanding of the Old 
Testament as the living body of the Lord, having no form or comeliness, yet 
nonetheless the body in which his divinity is made manifest: 
Now there is here something more than a comparison; ‘letter’ and ‘flesh’ 
are not only alike in that they are both likened to a ‘veil’; for, according 
to Scripture itself, one can say that ‘The Word of God has been 
incarnated in two ways,’ since at bottom it is one and the same unique 
Word of God who descends into the letter of Scripture and into the flesh 
of our humanity, into this ‘weak and unbeautiful’ flesh, to hide itself 
there and to manifest itself there all together.’53  
                                                 
51 Lubac, 2000, 108. 
52 Lubac 2000, 108, quoting Claudius of Turin. 
53 Lubac 2000, 61. 
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Quoting F. J. A. Hort (1828-92), Andrew Louth offers a similar image of the 
Old Testament as a risen body animated by the life of Christ: ‘Out of Christ all 
that is behind is dead … But in Him the whole dead past becomes alive again: 
it is part of His body and His life flows through every part.’54 Interacting also 
with de Lubac’s work, Louth describes the character of Scripture in relation to 
the Incarnation: ‘The Old Testament builds up a context, a matrix, in which the 
mystery of Christ can be incarnated.’55 In Pusey’s words, in reading the Old 
Testament one ought not to look only at the surface, but rather to contemplate 
‘Him, the Sun of Righteousness, Who, before He rose on our world, tinged it 
with His own rich heaven-born hues, and since He has shone upon it, has filled 
all things with His life and light’. (L134) 
De Lubac’s argument complements Pusey’s emphasis that prophecy and 
type cannot be limited to what can serve as definite evidence. The humble or 
historical sense cannot fully exhaust the meaning of anything which points to 
Christ. To the extent which one finds Christ as the subject of prophecy, one 
will also emphasize the elusive character of that knowledge:  
No more than life in Christ is the knowledge of Christ accessible to the 
natural man, the one who confines himself to mere appearances even in 
his deepest reflections. Interior and spiritual, the object of allegory is by 
that very fact a ‘hidden’ object: mysticus, occultus. It conceals itself from 
carnal eyes.56  
The Incarnation is real, ‘But precisely its reality is of an infinitely deeper 
nature than that of a simple historical fact, observable from the outside’, a 
description which recalls Pusey’s image of ‘dwelling’ in the house of divine 
truth.57 De Lubac, like Pusey, offers an explanation about why a sense which is 
elusive, a typical or mystical sense, is not subjective or uncertain: 
Mystical is the doublet either of ‘allegorical’ or of ‘spiritual’ in the most 
general sense, but not of ‘spiritual’ in the individual or subjective sense. 
The mystical meaning is the meaning relative to the ‘mystery’, the one 
                                                 
54 Louth 1989, 120.  
55 Ibid. Louth refers also to Lubac 2000, 105. 
56 Lubac 2000, 107.  
57 Lubac 2000, 97 and 3.1 of this thesis, L30-1. 
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that contains the fullness of the doctrine. ‘Typical’ and ‘mystical’ are 
directly correlative.58  
In Pusey’s terms, it is the meaning which is both ‘higher’ and ‘deeper’ that 
communicates this ‘fullness of doctrine’. As we saw in Chapter 4, Pusey also 
maintains that the fullest sense is also the objective sense.59  
Pusey’s emphasis on the seriousness of drawing the circle too narrowly, 
or of neglecting what can only be discerned in faith rather than proved, can 
sound dramatic or exaggerated. However, one finds in de Lubac the same 
insistence that it is precisely the element which is hidden or elusive which is 
the sense which promises salvation: ‘the object of allegory, that is, the New 
Testament, consists in facta mystica. These are “hidden” facts, which have an 
inside, and it is this inside which makes of them salvific, absolute, definitive 
facts’.60 In de Lubac’s terminology, allegory is ‘the doctrinal sense par 
excellence’, or ‘the Christian sense of Scripture’.61 De Lubac writes: 
By means of the words of Moses God ‘instructs the holy Church 
allegorically.’ One can therefore define the Christian faith as ‘allegorica 
doctrina.’ In fact, ‘what is allegory but the mystic doctrine of the 
mysteries?’ Its content is exactly ‘the doctrine of the holy Church.’ The 
allegorical sense of Scripture is ‘the Catholic sense.’ 62 
If one takes allegorical as a synonym for typical, this explains why Pusey 
suggested that those who failed to accept the typical interpretation of the Old 
Testament were in danger of undermining Christian faith, or, in Radner’s 
terms, of giving up ‘any pretence to holding orthodox theistic convictions’.63 
One finds the equation of typical reading with orthodoxy in Daniélou’s 
book on Origen, where he divides the senses of Scripture into a literal sense 
and a typological sense. He argues that the typological sense can also be called 
the Christological sense, and that it has ‘as many subdivisions as there are 
facets in the Christus totus’.64 In relation to the argument being made here, the 
                                                 
58 Lubac 1989, 144 n. 83, translating Lubac 1947, 199 n. 77. 
59 M29 quoted in 4.3.2. 
60 Lubac 2000, 98. 
61 Ibid.109, 123. 
62 Ibid. 109  
63 Radner 2004, 87, quoted at 5.1 above. 
64 Daniélou, 1955, 191. 
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neglect of the typological sense would be a neglect of the Christian or 
Christological meaning of a passage:  
It could be said that essentially there are only two meanings in Scripture, 
the literal and the Christological. But the Christological meaning can in 
turn be subdivided into as many sections as there are aspects in Christ 
himself. Christ may be considered either as a historical Person manifest 
in the events recorded in the Gospels, or as living a hidden life in the 
‘sacraments’ of the Church which is his body, or as appearing at the 
parousia at the end of the world and reigning in glory. Further, these 
three advents themselves, to use a term of St Augustine’s, have more 
than one side to them. In the historical Christ we may consider either the 
external actions of his earthly life or the spiritual content of its mysteries. 
In the mystical Christ, again, we may consider either the collective 
aspect, which is the whole Church, or the separate members of that 
Church, each of whom has to ‘put on’ Christ (Rom. xiii. 14, Gal. iii. 
27).65 
Daniélou and de Lubac help one to see that Pusey’s emphasis on the necessity 
of typical interpretation is not a narrow response to a nineteenth century 
debate, but an attempt to elucidate the exegetical consequences of the doctrine 
of the Incarnation. It is fascinating also to note the number of ways in which 
Pusey’s discussion of the errors of the apologists and his examination of the 
typical character of Scripture explores theological issues which writers like 
Daniélou and de Lubac treat as fundamental to the project of ressourcement, ‘a 
work of retrieval and renewal’ in which Pusey also engaged.66 
                                                 
65 Daniélou, 1955, 161. For a description of the unity of the Christological and Ecclesial senses 
of allegory which fits well with Pusey’s argument, see Lubac 2000, 90-93, and Lubac 1947, 
193. 
66 For Robert Louis Wilken on the ressourcement, Lubac 1998, xii. 
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5.2.4 Moving through the Senses from Image to Likeness 
As we have seen already, Pusey does not offer a systematic discussion of the 
different senses of Scripture. However, considering his investigation of typical 
prophecy alongside de Lubac’s study of the different senses of Scripture in the 
ancient Church enables one to see how for Pusey a typical reading of Scripture 
is inextricably connected with an appreciation of the mystery of Christ. Pusey 
describes two primary senses of Scripture – on the one hand, the typical, 
spiritual, higher, or mystical meaning and, on the other, the obvious, plain, 
historical, or superficial meaning. This division fits well with de Lubac’s 
account of the basic twofold of meaning of Scripture which he offers in his 
authoritative work on allegorical interpretation, Medieval Exegesis: 
There are, then, basically only two senses of Scripture recognized 
everywhere in the ancient tradition: the one, which consists in the history 
or the letter; the other, which is more generally named spiritual, or 
allegorical, or mystical. The letter signifies one thing, mystic discourse 
another.67 
In the context of the basic two-fold division of meaning, allegory designates all 
the different levels of the spiritual or typical sense. De Lubac also considers in 
detail the different ways the tradition develops this basic division of sense into 
a four-fold division of meaning, where allegory is distinguished both from 
history or the letter, and also from tropology and anagogy.68  
At the beginning of Medieval Exegesis, de Lubac offers the oft-repeated 
distich to describe the four senses of Scripture and their proper relation to one 
another: ‘Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, | Moralis quid agas, quo tendas 
anagogia’ or ‘The letter teaches events, allegory what you should believe, | 
Morality teaches what you should do, anagogy what mark you should be 
aiming for.’69 The typical interpretation of the city of Jerusalem offers a classic 
                                                 
67 Lubac 2000, 25. De Lubac’s italics quote Jerome, 245, n. 112. 
68 Lubac, 1998, 90-115, also Lubac 2000, and Lubac 1947, 187.  
69 Lubac 1998, 271, n. 1, and 1. Lubac 1947, 192. The distich is often attributed to Nicholas of 
Lyra, but de Lubac argues that it was written by the Dominican Augustine of Dacia around 
1260. Lubac, 1998, 1. See Lubac, 1998, 115, for an explanation of this form as the classic four-
fold division. For a detailed discussion, and for the problem with alternative forms, see pp. 96-
115 and Lubac 2000. 
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example of this four-fold development of sense: ‘la cité sainte des Juifs, qui 
figure l’Église avant de figurer l’âme chrétienne et enfin la cité céleste’.70 
Jerusalem is both an historical city and, in the allegorical or dogmatic sense, a 
type of the Church.71 The history of Jerusalem prophesies the life and character 
of the Church. The type has a moral or tropological sense also. Since Jerusalem 
figures the ideal Christian city, it represents the kind of life the Christian 
citizen is called to live; it describes not just the soul as one finds it, but the soul 
reordered by grace to become like God. Finally, Jerusalem is the eschatological 
city, the heavenly and eternal city which is the destination for which these 
same citizens look and strive. For de Lubac, this four-fold formula is the 
mature expression of a properly Christian exegesis. It unfolds the meaning of 
the text. What one believes, i.e. allegory, arises from what happened; the 
spiritual and the historical are closely linked. Allegory is not a subjective 
embellishment, but rather reveals the meaning of the history. Tropology, what 
one does, results in the proper order of things not just from what happened, but 
from a proper interpretation of what happened. Morality is applied or lived 
doctrine. In the anagogical sense, the promise is fulfilled and the allegorical 
and moral sense are united – what allegory reveals will finally become the 
reality in which one lives. In Pusey’s words: ‘There will “God” indeed be “the 
portion” (Ps. 142:6) of His saints, there will they indeed “walk before the 
Lord” (Ps. 116:9) … [in] the True land of the living, when this mortal shall put 
on immortality, and this corruption put on incorruption.’ (L130) 
Pusey’s view of the higher or fullest sense is also multi-layered. 
Although he does not formally discuss a four-fold division of sense, we can see 
in Pusey’s exposition of the history of ‘the brazen serpent’ the senses which de 
Lubac describes. (L87-90) Pusey begins by describing the event itself, the 
obvious and historical meaning of Numbers 21:4-9:  
Fiery serpents had been sent as the punishment of their last and worst 
rebellion, wherein they spake against God as well as Moses (Num. 21:5) 
                                                 
70 Lubac 1947, 193. For a fuller discussion of Jerusalem as the classic type, see Lubac 2000, 
199-207.  
71 ‘Aussi l’allégorie se présente-t-elle comme le sens dogmatique par excellence: quid credas 
allegoria’. Lubac 1947, 193. 
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and much people died. Then God commanded Moses to make a fiery 
serpent and put it on an ensign, and it shall come to pass that ‘every one 
that is bitten when he looketh upon it, shall live’. In itself, it was a trial of 
faith, and so the direct cure of their former disease – faithlessness. Yet 
this accounted not for the use of a symbol, especially in Israel, to whom 
the use of all symbols was forbidden and least of all, of such as a symbol 
as this. (L87-88) 
The fiery serpent is a symbol of the one who led the first parents of the 
children of Israel to sin and who continued to bruise their heel, ‘at first the 
seducer and afterward the tormentor of man’. (L88)72 The reason for which the 
fiery serpents were sent among the people was, Pusey says, ‘evidently of a 
character to be immediately understood’. (L87) Since the sin which occasioned 
the punishment was a lack of faith in the Lord who brought them up out of 
Egypt, the remedy is following Moses’ instructions. This is the superficial 
meaning of the history, what Pusey sometimes calls the ‘plain meaning of the 
prophecy’. (L81, 84). What can be ‘immediately understood’ is ‘the obvious 
historical sense’ or ‘that which is required for the mere context’. (L39) This is 
the sense which the young Augustine neglected in his commentary On Genesis 
against the Manichees. However, even in ‘the obvious historical sense’ of the 
account of the brazen serpent, there are clues to suggest that there is a veiled 
meaning to be sought out. Pusey points out that it was a strange thing that a 
people to whom symbols were forbidden were required to look upon a kind of 
graven image. It was even stranger that healing would come by looking on a 
symbol of the evil one. Even without St. John’s account of Christ’s application 
of this history to his own work, this strangeness would be enough of a clue to 
suggest that one ought not to rest in the superficial sense but seek a higher one 
also.  
The history of the brazen serpent declares ‘the Mystery of Redemption’. 
(L89) The revelation is a mystery – the visible history both conceals and 
reveals a spiritual reality.73 This is the mystical or typical sense in Pusey’s 
terminology, or the allegorical or doctrinal sense for de Lubac. The details of 
                                                 
72 ‘And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it 
shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.’ Gen. 3:11. 
73 See also Daniélou 1951, 202: ‘le serpent du désert figure le mystère de la rédemption’. 
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the history prophesy and foreshadow ‘how sin might be pardoned and the 
source of sin destroyed’. (L88) The pole or standard on which the brazen 
serpent was placed is a type both of the cross and the victory which Christ wins 
on the cross: ‘The cross and standard combined spoke beforehand in great 
words εν τουτω νικα’, in this sign conquer. (L88) Pusey explores what he calls 
the ‘Catholic interpretation’ of this subject, citing Barnabas, Cyril of 
Alexandria, Chrysostom, and Gregory of Nyssa. (L89-90) With different 
emphases, they consider how the fiery serpent prophesies both Christ’s death 
and the defeat of Satan. Pusey quotes Cyril of Alexandria: ‘God the Word 
therefore came in the likeness of sinful flesh that he might condemn sin in the 
flesh.’ (L90)74 However, this typical or allegorical sense is not a simple or 
univocal sense. What we are to believe may be diversified according to the 
different aspects of the person of Christ. Chrysostom, for example, emphasizes 
not ‘the likeness of sinful flesh’, but how the difference between the serpents 
which attacked the Israelites and the brazen serpent reveals Christ’s 
sinlessness: ‘the serpent which destroyed had venom, but that which saved was 
free from poison. For death which destroyed had sin as the serpent’s poison, 
but that of the Lord was free from all sin, as the brazen serpent was of venom’. 
(L90)75 The life-destroying venom of the fiery serpents is an emblem of sin. 
Christ was without sin, as the brazen serpent was without venom. This is all 
part of the typical or allegorical sense.  
The history of the brazen serpent not only prophesies salvation in Christ, 
but teaches how our lives are to be conformed to the life of Christ. Pusey offers 
an exposition of what de Lubac would call the moral or tropological sense: 
The sum of all which is believed in the mystery of our faith is a looking 
to the Passion of Him, who for us took on Him the Passion. But that 
Passion is the Cross. So that whoso looketh to Him, as the history 
sheweth, is not hurt by the venom of lust. But to look to the cross is this, 
to make one’s whole life as it were dead to the world, crucified, fixed in 
virtue, unmoveable to all sin, as saith the prophet, crucifying our own 
                                                 
74 Pusey refers to Cyril’s commentary on the Gospel of St John, on John 3:14, 15. 
75 Pusey refers to Chrysostom, ‘Homily 27’ of his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John, on verse 
3:15. 
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flesh by the fear of God. But the nail which restraineth the flesh, is self-
command. (L90)  
Before Pusey offers a moral lesson, he begins with what the history teaches us 
to believe or, in de Lubac’s terms, the allegorical sense of the type: ‘The sum 
of all which is believed in the mystery of our faith is a looking to the Passion of 
Him, who for us took on Him the Passion.’ What we believe leads to what we 
do: ‘to make one’s whole life as it were dead to the world, crucified, fixed in 
virtue, unmoveable to all sin’. In his account, the details are essential to the 
capacity of the history to serve as a genuine type: the venom symbolizes sin 
and the nails which fix Christ to the cross are the nails of self-command which 
attach us to the life of virtue. Speaking about the passage through the Red Sea 
and the way that ‘the history of the Jewish church, in a derived and secondary 
way , shadow[s] out God’s dealings with the several human souls’ (L27), 
Pusey offers an evocative image to describe the capacity of historical types to 
offer a moral sense: ‘Whence a true philosopher has strongly said, “Every 
history in the Bible is a prophecy, which is fulfilled throughout all centuries 
and in the soul of each individual. Each history bears the image of man, a 
body, which is earth and ashes and worthless, the outer letter; but also a soul, 
the breath of God’.76 
Pusey also offers an anagogical or eschatological interpretation of the 
history of the brazen serpent by unfolding the fullest sense of the expressions 
which have the idea of ‘life’ as their root:  
‘Whoever looked upon the brazen serpent, with his heart fixed on the 
Name of the Word of the Lord, he lived’, says a Jewish paraphrase. And 
how inexpressibly great is the simplicity of the Hebrew expression ‘he 
lived’, ‘he who looketh thereon shall live’, not simply, ‘shall be made 
whole’, ‘shall be cured of his plague’, but ‘shall live’. The great, because 
absolute and unlimited promise, was the fitter organ to convey the idea of 
that life, which is absolutely opposed to all death.’ (L89)  
                                                 
76 Pusey quotes here Johann Georg Hamann (1730-88), from the motto prefixed to his 
‘extensive lyrical commentary on Scripture’ (Betz 2012, 39), Biblische Betrachtungen eines 
Christen, Biblical Reflections of a Christian. Tholuck quotes the same passage, Diss., 190, but 
in a shorter from than one finds in the ‘Lectures’. For Hamman’s Biblical Reflections, See 
Smith 1960, 117-39. Pusey appears to draw extensively on Hamann’s ideas about the Bible, 
history, prophecy, and nature. For example, Pusey seems to adopt Hamann’s idea of prophecy 
springing out of the future in his idea of Israel existing ‘for the future’ (L26). Smith 1960, 91. 
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This passage is characteristic of a number of passages in the ‘Lectures’ where 
Pusey speaks of the promise of being given ‘life’ as a typical prophecy of the 
promise of eternal life, that life ‘which is absolutely opposed to all death’. For 
Pusey, the life opposed to all death describes first the life of Christ, and 
derivatively the life of the saints who share that life. In his comments on Psalm 
143:8 and related passages Pusey develops this anagogical or eschatological 
sense: 
… and so again words denoting our ‘life’, ‘ the land of the living’, ‘our 
days’, relate to that life, which we hope to live in Him, the body of this 
death being laid aside. All life is typical and an efflux of real life, and so 
our shadowy life, as opposed to death, is an emblem of endless life. 
(L130) 
The life which is promised to those who look on the serpent is, in a veiled 
form, a promise of endless life, our ‘real’ life. Although Pusey does not 
develop this sense in detail in his brief comments on the ‘life’ which is 
promised to those who look at the fiery serpent which will be ‘set on a pole’ 
(Num. 21:8), this is obviously the sense which he is evoking. In the promise 
that ‘he who looketh thereon shall live’, Pusey finds a prophecy of both 
Christ’s conquest over death and of the eternal life which that victory offers.  
Although Pusey does not discuss a particular hierarchy or order of sense, 
the multiple senses that one finds in his expositions correspond to the different 
elements of the mystery of Christ which has been the subject of this chapter. If 
the types of the Old Testament prophesy the whole Christ, body as well as 
head, and if their fulfilment is both historical and eschatological, then one 
ought to expect to find something like de Lubac’s four senses in Old Testament 
prophecy. The movement from one sense to another, the unfolding of the 
fullest meaning inherent in the type, is a fundamental principle in Pusey’s 
conception of the sacramental character of the Old Testament. A typical 
reading both discovers the mystery of the whole Christ, Christ in his 
Incarnation, Christ in the Church, Christ in the sacraments, and is a means of 
participation in this mystery. Pusey emphasized that understanding prophecy is 
not a matter of intellect alone but a response of the whole person to God. The 
movement from the historical sense to the fullest sense is the movement of 
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sanctification from the image to the likeness of God. Andrew Louth describes 
the elaboration of the moral sense of Scripture in this way: 
This movement from faith to understanding is not simply an intellectual 
process; it is not simply a matter of the development of doctrine. It is a 
matter of realizing our participation in the mystery of Christ. This has a 
dogmatic dimension, certainly, and this is the first to be developed. But 
these dogmas are not lifeless propositions: they disclose to us the 
lineaments of the mystery of Christ; and that mystery draws us to itself, 
that mystery invites our response. The allegorical sense leads into the 
moral sense. ‘Historia et parabolis nutrimur; allegoria crescimus; 
moralitate perficimur’ (by history and parables we are nourished; by 
allegory we grow; by morality we are perfected).77 
The unfolding of the different layers of the meaning of types and typical 
prophecy expresses the movement by which the soul and the Church are drawn 
deeper into the mystery of Christ. The plain sense of the history is not left 
behind. Rather, ‘we shall find that humbler and more obvious meaning also 
involved and wrapped up in the other’, the higher meaning. (L10) Pusey’s 
Tractarian colleague Isaac Williams argues that the interpretations of the 
‘Ancient Church’ reveal how the words of Scripture have an inherent potential 
of signification which sweeps toward an eternal fulfilment:  
… the words of Divine truth … contain greater meanings than we can 
fathom; and therefore amplify and extend their significations as if they 
were advancing onward, (like the interpretations and various fulfilments 
of prophecy,) into deeper and higher meanings, till lost in ever 
increasing, and at length infinite light and greatness, beyond what the 
limited view of man is capable of pursuing.78 
According to Pusey’s argument the meaning of the history or the plain sense is 
perfected in an eternal and eschatological fulfilment which redeems and unites 
all the senses of the type. 
                                                 
77 Louth 1989, 120. Lubac 2000, 33. 
78 T87, 21-2. 
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Chapter 6 Procession and Return: Typology and Cosmology 
6.1 ‘Every thing is a Type’ 
6.1.1 Creation as the Offspring of God (Hooker and Ambrose) 
‘The world is full of types; and it were probably true to say, “every thing is a 
type”, if we could see it.’ (L14) In order to understand Pusey’s description of 
typology and prophecy, it is necessary to understand the theological foundation 
of this basic principle. Pusey’s argument extends beyond the reading and 
interpretation of the Old Testament. What Pusey says about the typological 
character of the Bible expresses a comprehensive vision of the creation and 
redemption of all that is made, earthly and heavenly, visible and invisible, 
material and spiritual: ‘What then appears to me of primary importance as a 
corrective of this narrow view of prophecy is to have well impressed on the 
mind the significant character of every thing, which came from God.’ (L14) . 
The movement from unity to multiplicity and back to unity, a movement of 
love and sacrifice, which expresses the inner life of God the Holy Trinity, also 
establishes the inherent capacity of all things to serve as types or symbols of 
spiritual truth and invisible or eschatological realities. The principles of 
typology ‘lie in the very being of God Himself’. (L152) 
Quoting at length from the section of Richard Hooker’s Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity where Hooker considers the Incarnation and the 
sacraments, Pusey explains how all created things are God’s offspring and bear 
the stamp of their creator: 
For as Hooker says (Ecclesiastical Polity V.56.5), ‘All things being 
partakers of God’ in that ‘God hath his influence into the very essence of 
all things, without which influence of Deity supporting them, their utter 
annihilation could not choose but follow’, ‘they are his offspring’, and as 
being such they must (in so far as they have not been marred and 
deformed by sin) bear a certain impress and image of Himself and an 
analogy, or proportion, or relation to other existences derived from God. 
(L14)1 
                                                 
1 Laws, V.56.5. The core of Hooker’s treatment of the Incarnation and Sacraments is found in 
V.50-60. 
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Even if the way ‘all things’ are God’s offspring is distinct from the relationship 
of the Son with the Father, ‘because their substance and his wholly differeth, 
their coherence and communion either with him or amongst themselves is in no 
sort like unto that’, nonetheless all created things have an organic and inherent 
relationship with God who created them.2 Pusey quotes Hooker at length:  
All things which God in their times and seasons hath brought forth, were 
eternally and before all times in God, as a work unbegun is in the 
artificer, which afterward bringeth it into effect. Therefore whatsoever 
we do behold now in this present world, it was enwrapped within the 
bowels of Divine Mercy, written in the book of eternal Wisdom, and held 
in the hands of omnipotent Power, the first foundations of the world 
being yet unlaid. ‘So that all things which God hath made are in that 
respect the offspring of God’; (Acts 17:28-29) they are in Him, as effects 
in their highest cause, He likewise actually is in them, the assistance and 
influence of His Deity being their life. (L15)3 
The divine ‘artificer’ sustains his offspring by a kind of participation, ‘He 
likewise actually is in them’. Pusey’s account of creation fits with his account 
of knowledge and, in Charles Taylor’s conception, a ‘substantial’ view of the 
relationship of God and the natural world.  
Hooker’s description of the things of ‘this present world’ as ‘written’ 
first in God’s timeless purposes, ‘in the book of eternal Wisdom’, and only 
then in time, is particularly important for Pusey’s theory of types. Hooker gives 
voice here to the Platonic conception that what we see in the sensible world 
mirrors an ideal order of things, the ‘thoughts of God’ or eternal and heavenly 
realties.4 This is the broader context of Pusey’s description, which we 
considered in Chapter 4, of the various degrees of type and their relation to the 
one Archetype: ‘the shadow is the law, the image in the Gospel, the reality in 
the heavenly places’. (L106) Pusey argues that while ‘man only’ is called ‘the 
image of God in this lower world’, still ‘The other visible creatures of God’s 
Word and the efflux of his Spirit, do, in fact, present a continual harmony with 
an order of things above them; they possess in themselves a relation to things 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Bradatan 2006, 20, 29 for a discussion of this Platonic theme. 
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unseen’. (L14) Keble describes this principle in his description of what Hooker 
finds in the Fathers:  
Thus in a manner they seem to have realized, though in an infinitely 
higher sense, the system of Plato: every thing to them existed in two 
worlds: in the world of sense, according to its outward nature and 
relations; in the world intellectual, according to its spiritual associations. 
And thus did the whole scheme of material things, and especially those 
objects in it which are consecrated by scriptural allusion, assume in their 
eyes a sacramental or symbolical character.5  
We will see the importance of this idea for Pusey’s theory of types below. 
6.1.2 Creation and Redemption as Procession and Return 
The idea that creation is an emanation or procession from the One, and that 
redemption is the return of all things to this Triune Unity is of fundamental 
importance for the ‘Lectures’ and Pusey’s treatment of types. While Pusey 
would have found this view of creation in many of the patristic and medieval 
authors to whom he looked, in the ‘Lectures’ he refers explicitly to Hooker 
and, as we shall see below, to Ambrose. Torrance Kirby argues that the idea of 
procession and return guides Hooker’s treatment of Eternal Law, Natural Law, 
and Divine Law: ‘Just as Neoplatonic cosmology accounts for the genesis of 
the world by means of a downward procession or emanation from the One, so 
also Hooker derives a diverse hierarchy of laws from the one Eternal Law.’6 
Hooker’s understanding of created things as the offspring of God which ‘are in 
Him, as effects in their highest cause’ follows this pattern: ‘for Hooker the 
creation of the world is an “outward procession” or exitus from the divine 
unity’.7 Likewise, the restoration and perfection of this order is a movement of 
return: ‘A complete restoration of the order is provided directly by God himself 
in the divine act of Redemption, “in himselfe prepared before all worldes.” The 
redemption is a reditus or “return” to God of all creation by “a way mysticall 
and supernaturall” (Lawes, I.11.6 …).’ In Hooker’s account, no part of the 
created order falls outside the movement of creation and return: ‘In this process 
                                                 
5 Laws, i, xci. 
6 Kirby 1998, 50. 
7 Ibid. 51. 
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of going out from and returning to God who is “the Eternal himselfe,” nothing 
created can be said to fall outside the original order established in the one 
Eternal Law.’8  
Hooker emphasizes that the origin and end of creation is not simply the 
‘One’, but the One in Three, God the Holy Trinity. In the same section from 
which Pusey quotes extensively, Hooker writes: ‘Whatsoever God doth work, 
the hands of all three Persons are jointly and equally in it according to the 
order of that connexion whereby they each depend upon other.’9 Kirby 
emphasizes the importance of understanding Hooker’s notion of procession 
and return in Trinitarian terms: 
The works of both creation and redemption are linked to God’s own 
Trinitarian self-reflection. All things proceed from and return to God by 
the divine Word. The utterance of the Word brings the world into being. 
(Laws, I.3.2 … ) The divine work of redemption ‘God in himselfe 
prepared before all worldes.’ (Laws, 1.11.6 …) God is thus an end to 
himself in the process of both exitus and reditus. The seemingly endless 
and immeasurable diversity of life in its many forms is stabilised and 
contained by an order which is nothing less than the divine self-
identity.10 
The importance of this view, in terms of Pusey’s treatment of types, is that it 
holds together the diversity of natural and verbal signs, God’s works and 
words, with ‘the divine self-identity’ of the Archetype. 
6.1.3 Principles which ‘lie in the very being of God Himself’ 
Pusey situates his treatment of types and prophecy in the context of this same 
all-embracing understanding of creation and redemption as procession from, 
and return to, the one God, the principle of unity. Pusey develops this idea 
especially in the later sections of the ‘Lectures’ (‘On Prophecy’ and 
‘Numerology’) and in the supplemental material, i.e. in those sections where he 
expands on the ideas which he sketches more briefly in the pages where he 
quotes Hooker. Pusey emphasizes that creation has its origin in divine oneness. 
Commenting on the ‘divine character of numbers’, Pusey describes how the 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 52. 
9 Laws, V.56.5. 
10 Kirby 1998, 52. 
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number ‘one’ represents or ‘shadows’ God: ‘One expresses the absolute Unity 
and perfection, and so has every where been accounted to represent God 
Himself. … Holy Scripture sets forth “the Lord our God as One Lord” and 
realizes His Unity in the Oneness which He causes, while it shadows Him.’ 
(L152) All creation is an emanation or an efflux from this ‘absolute Unity’: 
‘Divine Creation must be the expression of something within God, because He 
is Infinite, the Only Original, embracing all things, and without Him there is 
nothing.’11 As we will see below, what God gives of himself to created things 
is what enables those things, words and works, to figure God.  
Pusey turns to Ambrose’s exposition of the six days of creation in his 
Hexameron for assistance in articulating the principle of unity as the origin of 
all created things. Pusey sees the ‘in the beginning’ of Genesis 1:1 as referring 
not to a starting point in time, but to the principle, or Archetype, of all creation, 
the divine Word, the Son of the Father:  
… one meaning of these much-containing words ‘In the Beginning’ 
doubtless is that ‘God created heaven and earth’ in ‘Him’ Who is ‘The 
Beginning’ (as He calleth Himself, ‘The Beginning’ and again ‘I am the 
Beginning and the End, The First and The Last’) and we know that ‘by 
Him God made the worlds’.12  
In Ambrose’s account, the Creator is the Son who tells the Jews in John 8:25, 
‘I am the beginning, I who speak with you’.13 Pusey goes on to speak of 
creation as a procession from this principle of unity, the beginning, to the 
many: 
As St. Ambrose says, ‘There is One Word, Which worketh in each, and 
wherever He worketh in each, He “worketh all things in all”. This Word, 
with the Father, One, has diffused Himself into many, because of His 
fullness have all we received. Therefore if Thou viewest each several 
thing of all things, which were created in Himself, thou wilt see that in 
each is there what in all is One Word, of Whom according to our 
capacity we are partakers.’ ‘From Him, in Him and to Him are all 
                                                 
11 S-BN, 1. 
12 S-BGW, 1. See Rev. 22:13, Heb 1:2, John 1:3, Col. 1:16. See also Ambrose 1961, 
Hexameron, I.2.5, 5. 
13 Ibid. I.2.5, 5 (cf. I.8.29, 32).  
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things,’ by Him created, by Him preserved, and both for His glory; begun 
in Him, in Him continued; in Him the end.’14 
We see in this quotation not only a description of creation as a diffusion to the 
many of what belongs to the One, but how this kind of description of creation 
is intrinsically connected to a movement of return into unity; ‘in Him 
continued, in Him the end’. 
In the same way that Pusey describes creation as a movement from One 
to many, he represents redemption as a movement of return to God:  
… we shall, in one way, all be one, in that ‘God will be all in all’, 
knitting ‘all things in Heaven and in Earth’ in one by His all-pervading 
Spirit, which maketh all one when he entereth, maketh all Christians one 
temple here, and shall make all one celestial City; yet not in the 
Pantheistic way, as though all were to be dissolved and absorbed into the 
essence of God, but after the likeness of the Mystery of His own Nature, 
there shall be unity of being, in that all shall live by His Life and 
inflowing Essence, with plurality and distinct personality. (L151) 
Pusey describes this movement of return to unity by drawing on a quotation of 
Francis Bacon, which he repeats twice in the ‘Lectures’:  
Thus One represents absolute Unity and perfection, and so God Himself. 
The tendency of all things toward God, is, as in an image set forth, in the 
tendency of all things to meet together in unity. ‘God,’ says Bacon, ‘is 
holy in the multitude of his works, holy in their order, holy in their 
unison. Wherefore the speculation of Plato and Parmenides (although in 
them it was a bare speculation) yet was excellent; ‘that all things as by a 
ladder rise up to unity’.(L18)15  
When Pusey repeats this reference to Bacon in the section of the ‘Lectures’ 
where he gives a much longer, fuller treatment of numerology, he adds the 
comment that ‘The tendency to unity is a tendency toward God’. (L152)  
Pusey appears to see Bacon at least in some measure as Coleridge did, as 
‘the British Plato’, and as the advocate of a philosophy which ‘sees nature as 
the mirror of the spirit’.16 In a similar way, in a letter to Pusey, his Tractarian 
colleague Benjamin Harrison* appealed to Bacon to argue for the necessity of 
returning to ‘the higher symbolical and typical interpretation’ of the Fathers: 
                                                 
14 S-BGW, 1, and L15. 
15 Bacon 1974, Book II.7.6, 93. 
16 Hedley 2000, 206, 213. 
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‘there seems to be a sort of philosophia prima in the interpretations of Scripture 
not less than in that of Nature which seems to put one on the level of a higher 
science, and so to further the more “perfect discovery” of which Bacon 
speaks’.17 Bacon’s ‘ladder’ by which all things ‘rise up to unity’ pictures both 
the return of creation to God as a movement of ascent and also describes the 
movement from the literal to the higher sense. Pusey’s comprehensive view of 
types mirrors his comprehensive notion of procession and return. The common 
origin and destiny of all things is the fundamental reason that the ‘world is full 
of types’ and that prophecy, in ‘Scripture’ and in ‘Nature’, comes in the form 
of types or typical prophecy.  
In Pusey’s account, like that of Hooker, the One from whom creation 
proceeds and to which it returns is the One in Three and Three in One. 
However much Pusey describes creation as the work of the Divine Word, the 
principle of unity and the creation is God the Holy Trinity. As we saw above, 
the Son who creates, the ‘One Word, Which worketh in each’ is not alone, but 
‘with the Father’. In Ambrose’s treatment also, the ‘One’ is not the Father 
only, but both the Triune God and any One of the Persons in whom all the 
fulness of the Godhead dwells. Alongside the Scriptural witness to the creative 
speech of the Word who is ‘the Beginning’, Pusey writes that ‘the operation of 
the Holy Ghost also is declared expressly: “The Spirit of God brooded upon the 
form of the deep”, ordering and breathing His Life into the formless mass’.18 
Following Ambrose again, Pusey asserts: ‘The agency of the Son and Holy 
Ghost in the Creation is declared in the Psalms “By the Word of the Lord were 
the heavens made and all the host of them by the Spirit of His mouth”’.19 Of 
‘the book of God’s works’, and ‘the book of His word’, Pusey writes, ‘Both 
                                                 
17 B. Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug. 1835, LBV-47. See Bacon 1974, I.5.5, 34. Bacon argues that 
the loss of a ‘philosophia prima … cannot but cease and stop all progression. For no perfect 
discovery can be made upon a flat or a level’. See Betz 2012, 136, for Hamann’s view, 
following Bacon, that historical or literary tools can ‘never exhaust a text that prophetically 
encompasses all ages’.  
*Harrison, Benjamin (1808–1887). Fellow at Christ Church from 1828-48 and domestic 
chaplain to Archbishop Howley from 1838-48, and the author of four of the Tracts (nos.16, 17, 
24, 49). After moving to Lambeth, Harrison became less sympathetic to the Oxford Movement. 
18 S-BGW, 1 
19 Ibid. See Ambrose, Hexameron, 1. 8.29 
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were spoken through His Word, by His Spirit. Both reveal the unseen God 
being spoken in Him, “Who is the bright Reflection of His Glory, and the 
Expressive Image of His Person” through the Spirit.’20 Pusey describes the 
movement of creation and return, in Kirby’s expression, as a form of 
‘Trinitarian self-reflexion’:  
Thus, in the union of Three in One (in form tercary, in essence one) it has 
been observed this is the most frequent figure which we find in nature, 
and enters most into intricate harmony. And God has (one may venture 
perhaps to say) impressed this form upon nature, and given us an 
inclination to rest therein, as an impress of His own perfect Triune 
existence … For the thoughtful Ancients could not fail to see how deeply 
this same number was impressed on the human frame, man’s mind, the 
structure of the Universe. (L154) 
In this passage from his discussion of the typical character of number he directs 
attention not so much to the common work of the persons of the Trinity as to 
the stamp or impress of ‘the union of Three in One’ which the created order 
manifests.21 The way in which Pusey connects his account of types so closely 
with the work of the Trinity in creation and ‘the deepest mystery of the 
Godhead’ (L151) suggests how the principle of types is not only knit into the 
order of things but expresses the life of God. What Pusey says about the 
‘symbolical character of numbers’ applies more generally to his treatment of 
types: ‘The principles seem to lie in the very being of God Himself’. (L152) 
6.1.4 Christian Platonism and the World of Types 
The way Pusey draws on Ambrose to articulate an account of creation and 
redemption as procession and return is another example of the way in which 
elements of Christian Platonism shape his account of types and typical 
                                                 
20 S-BGW, 1. 
21 L154: ‘But indeed for instruction alone, it is impressive, how God has made all things to 
reflect His own image to man. Heathenism knew and felt three worlds, Heaven, Earth and Hell; 
three divisions of our world, earth, sea, and sky; three times, past, present, and future; three 
parts of every action, beginning, middle, end; each examination of human thoughts is analysed 
into three elements; whereas ordinary habit would speak of man as two-fold only, soul and 
body, they saw more deeply that he was three fold in nature, although that third principle they 
could not see … yet they approached here to the truth, now declared that man is one, yet three-
fold, body, mind and spirit.’ 
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prophecy. Kirby points to the ‘Neoplatonic Logic’ in Hooker in the very 
passages which Pusey cites to explain how creation is an ‘efflux’ of God:  
In the circular process of emanation and return, Hooker places his 
argument in a theological tradition which harks back to the early 
centuries of the Christian era. Even before this pattern of processio et 
reditus was taken up by Christian theologians, Plotinus argued that the 
One is the terminus of all striving in the world because it is the 
originative first principle.22 
This idea of creation striving to return to ‘the One’ is also implicit in Pusey’s 
account of the soul which is made in the image of God and which seeks to 
return to the source from whence it came. Describing how Plotinus’ notion of 
emanation and return shapes Augustine’s presentation of the soul’s ascent to 
God, Andrew Louth writes that the image ‘longs for its archetype’, a 
characterization that fits precisely with Pusey’s account.23  
We have seen in previous chapters how Pusey draws on Platonist ideas 
and the importance of Coleridge as a point of contact with this tradition. 
Hedley’s analysis of Coleridge emphasizes the way in which Coleridge draws 
on the Cambridge Platonists and George Berkeley (1685-1753) as bearers of a 
tradition of ‘Neoplatonism’ reaching back to Plotinus and to Plato.24 In 
particular, Hedley argues that ‘Coleridge belongs to an Idealistic tradition in 
Berkeley’s sense of “those who make all corporeal things to be dependent upon 
Soul or Mind”, i.e. in the broad meaning of anti-naturalistic’.25 In Hedley’s 
terms, Pusey is also an anti-naturalist, as one opposed to scientism or 
naturalism as discussed in Chapter 2, and an idealist, as one who argued that 
‘we still live in the land of shadows’ as discussed in Chapter 5, shadows cast 
by more real and enduring spiritual realities. (L94) 
 Hedley’s reference to Berkeley’s importance for Coleridge points to 
another important source for Pusey. As we saw in Chapter 2, Pusey’s most 
explicit criticism of Locke is made in the form of a juxtaposition with 
                                                 
22 Kirby 1998, 51.  
23 Louth 1981, 147. On the importance of these ideas in Plotinus see pp. 38, 36-51. 
24 Hedley 2000, 6-7, 61, 106, 289-90. See also Newsome, 1974 for a consideration of the 
influence of Platonism on Coleridge and the Romantics, suggesting ways that this tradition 
shaped the ‘Lectures’. 
25 Hedley 2000, 23.  
  223 
Berkeley: ‘For one Plato one has many Diogenes; for one Berkeley many 
Lockes, for one Athanasius many Arius.’ (L61) This quotation implies an 
approval not only of Berkeley, but of Plato alongside of Athanasius. Pusey also 
made the connection between Berkeley and Plato when he criticized the 
dominance of the common-sense philosophy and empiricism in Oriel 
examinations for fellowships: ‘I should like gradually to introduce 
Metaphysics, i.e., Butler, Clarke, Berkeley, not the modern trash which in 
Messrs Stewart and Reid has assumed the name. But we must begin, I suppose, 
with Plato.’26 The Berkeley to whom Pusey appealed is not the Berkeley 
conceived of as ‘nothing more than a convenient bridge between Locke and 
Hume, a natural logical step in the development of British empiricism’, but 
rather Berkeley the Platonist.27 Costica Bradatan argues that this ‘other Bishop 
Berkeley’ posits ‘a fundamental likeness and similarity of function between the 
human mind and the divine mind’; sees the works of creation as an expression 
of divine archetypes, the ‘thoughts of God’; and finds in ‘the whole system of 
Nature … a system of signs, a visual divine language, speaking to our minds of 
God’.28 In a recent article, ‘Newman and Christian Platonism in Britain’, Mark 
McIntosh considers the influence of Berkeley on Newman’s understanding of 
‘the visible world [as] the instrument, yet the veil, of the world invisible’.29 
McIntosh’s analysis of Platonist influences on Newman suggests parallels with 
Pusey and areas of possible cross-fertilization where Berkeley, either directly 
or through Newman, may have influenced Pusey’s theory of types.30 McIntosh 
describes Berkeley as a critic of ‘the naturalizing tendency of the new science 
                                                 
26 Pusey to Newman, 17 Mar. 1828, Newman 1979, 63. See also McIntosh 2011, 346-7 n. 7. 
Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) ‘attempted to defend rational theology against the empiricism of 
Locke’ (McIntosh 2011, 346). For ‘Messrs Stewart and Reid’, see Chapter 1. 
27 Bradatan 2006, 22. 
28 Ibid, 24, 29, 39, also 23-39: ‘Platonism in Berkeley’s early Philosophical Writings’. 
29 McIntosh 2011, 358. 
30 Ibid. See especially 350, 356-7. McIntosh acknowledges that Newman is often read ‘against 
the background of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume’, i.e., in relation to the empiricist 
tradition (p. 344). This aspect of Newman’s thought is considered in depth in Cameron 1962 
and 1967. In light of McIntosh’s article and the sources to which he points, it is difficult to 
agree with Cameron’s conclusion that ‘we may be grateful that he [Newman] was never 
touched by idealist metaphysics’. Cameron 1967, 96. 
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and the new philosophy’, connecting his view with Pusey’s criticism of 
naturalism and rationalism in the ‘Lectures’ also.31 
Pusey was aware of the Platonic associations of his ideas in the 
‘Lectures’. However, he also wished to differentiate his approach from pagan 
philosophical models. Following Ambrose again, he distinguishes the Creator 
who is the beginning, the Archetype, from the Platonic demiurge: ‘What God 
hath created must, one may boldly say, express God; since God has no copy 
external to Himself as Plato imagined, which He could copy as an archetype’.32 
Also, the pages in which Pusey refers to Ambrose are especially replete with 
biblical references. He seems to wish to emphasize that this understanding of 
creation and redemption is primarily Christian and biblical. Still, he maintains 
that Plato and the greatest pagan philosophers discern ‘shadows of Christian 
truth’.33 Pusey, like his Tractarian colleagues, viewed the ‘deepest 
philosophies’ of the Greeks as having been spoken ‘by an inspiration of God’, 
and as a preparation for the Gospel.34 As much as Plato or the Platonists 
articulated the relationship of the temporal and the eternal or the finite to the 
infinite, or bore witness to the unity of intellect and character, Pusey saw them 
as forerunners of Gospel truth, uncovering fragments of the order of things to 
which the Fathers gave a properly Christian expression. The importance of 
seeing Pusey in relation to the tradition of Christian Platonism extends beyond 
a consideration of the origin of his ideas. Rather, it shows again that Pusey’s 
argument involves recovering not only an exegetical approach but the 
theological vision within which the typology of the Fathers makes sense. It is 
                                                 
31 McIntosh 2011, 352-3. See Newsome 1974, 61-72 and 85 for the idea that Newman was ‘a 
man of Platonic temper and disposition who had acquired the training of an Aristotelian’, 
suggesting a possible cause of divergence with Pusey who fits perhaps more closely with 
Newsome’s description of Platonism. See also Nockles 1997, 210-1. 
32 S-BGW, 1. See Ambrose 1961, Hexameron, I.2.5, 5. See also Kirby 1998, 55, 64 for 
Hooker’s consideration of Plato’s demiurge. Andrew Louth describes the importance of 
consigning the Word ‘to the realm of the (now strictly) divine’ for the development of Nicene 
Orthodoxy in the context of the Arian controversy. Louth 1981, 76.  
33 S-FTL, 4. He also quotes Keble’s assessment of these ‘high spirits of old’ in Xn.Yr., ‘Fourth 
Sunday after Trinity’, 142. 
34 S-BN, 1. For the Tractarians’ approach to the idea that Greek philosophy is a preparation for 
the Gospel, see Newman 1967, 34, and McGrath 1997, 45-50. For Keble, Laws, xci-ii (quoted 
above) and Keble 1912, ii, 475-477. See also Williams 1846, 225 and B. Harrison to Pusey, 26 
Aug. 1835, LBV-47. 
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by seeing Pusey’s notion of type within this over-arching system that one can 
appreciate why reading the Old Testament in what he calls ‘the Apostolic 
mode’ is necessary for him, and also can see both the strength and weaknesses 
of his argument. 
6.2 The Book of God’s Word and the Book of God’s Works 
6.2.1 ‘Syllables of that Eternal Voice’ 
Pusey’s description of God’s words and works as the speech of the divine 
Word connects his presentation of creation and redemption as procession and 
return directly with his theory of type: ‘The world then is one word of God; by 
His speech was it made, “He spoke the word and it was” (Ps. 33:9).’35 The 
‘world’ which was spoken is also a ‘word’. With Ambrose’s words and 
allusions in his mind, Pusey continues: 
All things then are His word, for His word was their being; in and by His 
Word were they made; by the utterance of His ‘word of power’ doth that 
Word still ‘uphold them’ in being [Heb. 1:3]; they then as uttered by 
God, speak of Him Who spoke them; they are syllables of that Eternal 
Voice which spake them. Each word was a work, and each work a word, 
as again when the Word was made flesh – words and works – with Him 
were one; ‘His word was with power’ (Luke 4:3) ‘The words that I speak 
unto you, I speak not of Myself, but the Father That dwelleth in Me, He 
doeth the works’ (John 14:11). And so, as ‘day unto day uttereth speech; 
and night unto night sheweth knowledge’ [Ps. 19:2]; they speak in that 
they are; their existence is their speech.36  
The ‘syllables of that Eternal Voice’ belong to a typical and figurative 
language whose grammar is the purposes of God or the order of the divine life. 
This speaking does not just pass on information, it is a form of divine self-
communication: ‘All things then are His word, for His word was their being’. 
Therefore creation is not simply a past event, and the works of God are not a 
lifeless text. Rather, the works continue to speak and the Word by which they 
were made upholds them. This means also that God’s speaking constitutes the 
movement of return as well as the work of creation:  
                                                 
35 S-BGW, 1. 
36 Ibid. 
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To speak was to create; and so creation was His speech, as re-creation 
shall be another word when He shall say, ‘Come again, ye children of 
men’ (Ps. 90:3) where the Holy Spirit shall be also present, as it is said, 
‘Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit, they shall be created; and Thou shalt 
renew the face of the earth’ (Ps. 104:30).37 
The movement through the senses of typical prophecy which aids the soul in its 
journey from the image to the likeness of God mirrors the movement of return 
to God by which the whole creation is renewed. 
Pusey describes creation and the natural world not only as speech, but a 
kind of book which offers a form of revelation analogous to that of the Bible: 
The book of God’s works thus, and the book of His word correspond, 
because they both are emanations of His Word, ‘without Whom was not 
every thing made, which was made’. Both were spoken through His 
Word, by His Spirit. Both reveal the unseen God being spoken in Him, 
‘Who is the bright Reflection of His Glory, and the Expressive Image of 
His Person’ through the Spirit.38 
Pusey emphasizes that there is a correspondence between Scripture and the 
‘Book of God’s work’. Since both have the same author, they communicate the 
same message. On the one hand, ‘the book of Nature’ offers a ‘commentary to 
revelation’ and harmonizes with it. (L17) On the other hand, Scripture also 
interprets the book of Nature: ‘He stamps in the book of His Word the meaning 
of the book of His works’.39 Before considering in more detail ‘the book of His 
works’, it is important to consider first the principles which Pusey offers and 
by which what is written therein may be interpreted. 
6.2.2 Types as Partakers of Divine Qualities 
On the basis of this understanding of the creation as the speech and offspring 
of God who ‘bear a certain impress and image of Himself’ Pusey establishes 
the principle of analogy. (L14) This principle is fundamental to Pusey’s 
understanding of typology. Pusey sets out the principle as follows: 
But that, wherein God is, must in some first way express the character of 
God, Who is in them; and must bear some relation to those other 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. Pusey quotes the Hexameron I.9.33, 38. Also L16: ‘The book of God’s works and the 
book of His Word correspond because they are both emanations of His Word’. 
39 Pusey 1853, 30. 
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offspring of God; so that as an analogy in the physical structure of all 
constructed things from the highest to the lowest is widely perceptible, 
there should also be some analogy between their moral significancy, as 
far as each is capable of expressing it. (L15)40 
In his description of analogy here, Pusey emphasizes two sorts of likeness or 
relations. The first is the way in which a common source of creation, a 
common creator, establishes a likeness between different created things, what 
he calls ‘an analogy, or proportion, or relation to other existences derived from 
God’. (L14) This principle explains how the connections and associations 
between created things in Scripture serve as a system or web of meaning and 
signification: ‘This relation between animate and inanimate, rational and 
irrational creation, is expressed by the very word “imagery”, which implies that 
one class, whereon these qualities are less forcibly impressed, furnishes as it 
were “images” or representations of that higher class, which possesses these 
qualities more fully.’ (L15) As will be discussed below, this also suggests the 
different ways or degrees in which things may be related, and hence the 
possibility of one object or type may have multiple meanings. 
The second sort of analogy is between the physical and moral character 
of a created thing. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Pusey’s understanding of 
analogy is shaped by Bishop Joseph Butler. Butler states this idea succinctly: 
‘There is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral 
world than we are apt to take notice of … This is a particular instance of that 
general observation of the Son of Sirach: “All things are double one against 
another, and God hath made nothing imperfect.”’41 The works of God have a 
‘moral significancy’ (L15, above) because something divine is given or 
imparted to them: ‘Divine creation must be the expression of something within 
God’.42 Pusey describes how ‘abstract words’ in Scripture such as wisdom, 
                                                 
40 See also S-FTL, 9, below, in relation to the ‘Great Chain of Being’. Pusey may be drawing 
on Augustine’s description of Hilary, in On the Trinity, X.10.12, Augustine 1994, 103: 
“Therefore, all these things which are made by divine skill, show in themselves a certain unity, 
and form, and order’. 
41 Butler 1897, Sermon 6, 92. Pusey quotes this passage from the Son of Sirach to illustrate the 
‘harmony in the ordinances of God’. L3 
42 S-BN, 1. 
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righteousness, peace, and strength are nonetheless typical, because wherever 
we find these qualities, they speak to us of that ‘something within God’:  
There is, however, a very solemn way in which Holy Scripture teaches us 
to look on these also as typical, i.e. as far as they relate to qualities, 
which are attributes or effluences from God. For all virtue and power and 
might being from God, all which hath it, so far represents God … Much 
more then, when the qualities are mentioned in the abstract in Holy 
Scripture do they relate to Him in Whom they intrinsically exist. To this 
Holy Scripture itself guides us; when it foretells that our Lord should be 
called, ‘The Lord our righteousness’, or declares that ‘He is our peace’, 
or that He is of God made unto us ‘wisdom and righteousness and 
sanctification and redemption’, or that He is ‘the Power of God and the 
Wisdom of God’. (L136)  
Pusey maintains that to say that qualities are an effluence of God means more 
than that they describe God or are metaphors. Rather, qualities, in their fullest 
sense, are of the essence of God: ‘He is Himself what He gives, for His gifts 
are Himself, by His Spirit Who is the Gift, “We have,” says St Ambrose, “all 
things in Christ – Christ is all things to us.”’43 For Pusey, the unity of God and 
His gifts is a consequence of the unity of the Divine Nature:  
… the attributes or qualities of God are not some thing distinct from God, 
but they are Himself, in those several relations; for to think otherwise 
were to derogate from the simply Unity of the Divine Nature, as though 
God were not One simple perfect Essence, but Essence and Qualities 
existing therein or added thereto.44 
We saw in Chapter 3 that the idea of the unity of the attributes of wisdom and 
holiness shaped Pusey’s account of knowledge as participation and of the 
moral character of knowledge. In an analogous way, since divine attributes, ‘all 
virtue and power and might’, are part of what Pusey calls ‘the imparted 
divinity of nature’, then all that is created by God bears a sort of moral stamp 
or character: ‘All nature is an image of good, or evil; good as far as it is an 
effluence of God, and retains His life, evil whensoever it had pleased Him to 
                                                 
43 S-GC, 7. 
44 S-GC, 7. See also Pusey 1853, 29-30. Pusey may be drawing on Augustine’s discussion, in 
On the Trinity, of divine attributes or qualities as being one with God: ‘Further, if we say, 
Eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, righteous, 
good, blessed, spirit … whatever seems to be predicated therein according to quality, is to be 
understood according to substance or essence.’ See On the Trinity, XV.5.8, Augustine 1994, 
203. Also, V.10.11, 93. 
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withdraw Himself’.45 Although he cannot claim an etymological basis for 
doing so, Pusey argues from a theological perspective that all good necessarily 
comes from God, and that what is good in one part of creation has the capacity 
to represent or serve as a type of good found elsewhere: 
God and Godly is equivalent to good and goodly; every thing which is 
good is an efflux of God and represents Him in its way, and so also 
mutually reflects itself, (i.e. every thing which is good represents other 
things which are so, from their mutual relation to God). Whence again 
each several good serves as an image to the others. (L16)46 
As much as something exists at all, it exists by the goodness of the God who 
created and sustains it. However, as we will consider more fully below, God’s 
works serve as an image of what is evil also. Ultimately, it is the presence or 
absence of God and divine attributes which determine the typical character of 
nature: ‘Thus, as in nature, things are significant whether by the presence of 
God or by His absence, so in the history of His grace.’47 
Pusey’s analysis of the way divine qualities are of the substance of God, 
and therefore reflect God wherever they are found, also explains his 
understanding of the ‘fullest’ sense of Old Testament sayings, and how Christ 
is prophesied in the whole of the Old Testament, in sayings as well as in events 
and people: ‘words, descriptive of a high degree of divine qualities, whatever 
their context be, have necessarily their fulfilment in Him’.48 Pusey writes: 
Thus, to take a few instances in which the Fathers so read the Old 
Testament; whom Simeon saw [‘mine eyes have seen Thy Salvation’], 
they prayed for, so often as they prayed, ‘Shew us Thy Mercy, O Lord, 
and grant us Thy Salvation’; that ‘thy way (i.e. He who is The Way) may 
be known upon earth, and among all nations Thy Salvation’; for Him the 
Patriarch waited when he said ‘I have waited for Thy Salvation, O Lord’ 
for Him the Psalmist, ‘I have longed for Thy Salvation, O Lord’ (L136) 
                                                 
45 S-BN, 1, 3. 
46 This passage is repeated in S-BN, 1. 
47 S-FTL, 7. See also S-EL, 7: ‘Such then being the ground of the moral significance of nature, 
the presence of God or His absence, His creative Hand, or corruption through sin, we come 
back to the same conviction, which the sight of nature itself and the way in which it is 
decyphered by poets impresses upon us, that, could we read it, every thing has a meaning and 
that this meaning is real, inherent in the things themselves.’ 
48 S-GC, 9. 
  230 
Pusey’s notion of the ‘fullest’ sense of a passage is based not on the subjective 
inclinations or notions of the interpreter, but on the principle that all good 
qualities both come from God and speak of God. Pusey does not simply copy 
Butler’s principle of analogy, but gives both that principle and his notion of the 
‘fullest sense’ a more comprehensive theological foundation by drawing on 
Hooker and Ambrose, among others, and developing their consideration of 
creation as the offspring of God sharing in divine attributes.  
According to Pusey’s understanding of the mystery of Christ, his 
principle that ‘words, descriptive of a high degree of divine qualities, whatever 
their context be, have necessarily their fulfilment in Him’, teaches us to expect 
that qualities typical of Christ will also be found in His body: 
Since God only is Light and Love and Wisdom and Truth absolutely in 
Himself, since they are of God… so does it add intensely to our 
conceptions of the condescension of God, that they are to us Light, and 
Life, and Love, and Wisdom, not merely by qualities conferred upon us, 
but through Sacramental participation of Themselves, by virtue of the 
Incarnation. Not in a metaphor, but in reality is Christ our Life and Light 
and Wisdom and Righteousness and Sanctification; since all these are 
what He is, they are ours, from His Indwelling in us through the Spirit.49  
Pusey’s investigation of the typical character of divine attributes expresses his 
understanding of the Incarnation and of the sacramental principle, how the 
manifestation of God in the flesh describes both the Incarnation and the 
communion of the members of the body with their head. The way in which 
types share in the substance of the Archetype also describes the divine 
indwelling of Christ in the Church. Qualities fulfilled in Christ are fulfilled in a 
lesser extent in the disciples: 
Here again as those of old foreshadowed Him, does He deign to be 
reflected in His saints, so that the same titles in different degrees belong 
to Him and His. ‘Great’ says St. Ambrose, ‘is the grace of Christ, Who 
hath given almost all His titles to His disciples. “I am” He saith “the 
Light of the world” and yet that name wherein He sheweth His own 
glory, He allowed to His disciples, saying, “Ye are the Light of the 
world”. “I am the Living Bread” and “We all are one Bread”. “I am the 
true vine” and to them He saith “I planted there a fruitful, wholly and 
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true vine.” Christ is a Rock; “for they drank of that spiritual Rock which 
followed them and that rock was Christ.” To His disciples also He 
refused not the grace of this title, that he too be Petras, as having from 
the Rock, the solidity of constancy, the firmness of faith, strive thou too 
to be a rock’.50 
The exploration of typology is an exploration of the mystery of Christ. Pusey’s 
theory of types explains not only how the Old Testament prophesies Christ and 
the Church, but also that participation in Christ implies a participation in the 
qualities which are part of the divine unity. Seeing these divine attributes 
means seeing both how they are imparted in creation, and how the promise 
which they figure is fulfilled in a redemptive return to God. 
6.3 The Moral Significance of Nature 
6.3.1 Nature as a Biblical Commentary 
Pusey’s analysis of the way in which all created things share divine attributes, 
to different degrees and in different ways, helps one to interpret ‘the book of 
God’s works’. (L16) Quoting ‘a philosophic German’, almost certainly J. G. 
Hamann (1730 - 1788), Pusey maintains that ‘the book of Nature’ offers a 
‘Poetry of Metaphysics’ and a ‘commentary to revelation’. (L17)51 To illustrate 
this, Pusey recalls how early Christian interpreters found types of Christ’s 
‘birth of a Virgin, and of the Resurrection from the dead’ in the cycle of 
germination, by which the earth blossoms in return for the rain of heaven.52 He 
focuses in particular on Psalm 85:11, ‘a Psalm which the Church selects for the 
festival of our Lord's Nativity – “Truth” is it said, “shall spring … out of the 
earth and righteousness shall look down from Heaven.”’53 Pusey comments on 
the ‘combination of Heaven and Earth to produce men’s salvation’ which he 
                                                 
50 S-FTL, 6. Pusey quotes Ambrose, ‘in Luc. vi § 98’. 
51 On Hamann’s view of the revelation offered ‘in nature and in His Word’, see Betz 2012, 46, 
87, 136-9. 
52 Pusey quotes Irenaeus, Against Heresies, III.5.1. This section is part of the portion of the 
‘Lectures’ which Pusey quotes in his A Letter to the Right Hon. and Right Rev. the Lord 
Bishop of London, but which comes before the missing section which is found only in the 
Letter. Most of Pusey 1851, 195-6 is also found on L135. See Chapter 1.2 of this thesis for a 
discussion of the significance of the Letter. 
53 Pusey 1851, 196-7. 
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finds in the images of Psalm 85, first in his own words, and then quoting 
Augustine’s commentary on this verse: 
A Heavenly descent of Righteousness, the earth open to receive It; and 
through both these issues from the earth, Salvation; – who other than He, 
who is the Branch of the Lord, the Root of David (Rev. 5:5), the off-
shoot from the stem of Jesse (Isa. 11), the sucker out of a dry ground (Isa. 
53)? A heavenly original, an earthly birth, that He might die for us. 
‘What is Truth? The Son of God. What is earth? The flesh. Ask whence 
Christ is born, and thou seest that Truth sprung out of the earth. This 
Truth, which sprung of the earth, was before the earth, and by it was 
made Heaven and earth. But that Righteousness might look down from 
heaven, i.e. that men might be justified by the Divine grace, Truth was 
born of the Virgin Mary.’ (L135)54 
According to Pusey’s account, ‘from things earthy is a real correspondence to 
things spiritual’, and by this correspondence earthy things assist our 
apprehension of the greatest spiritual mysteries. 
The correspondence between the two books of the divine Word means 
that the created thing, the natural type, is an independent and objective voice. 
The meaning such types offer is more than metaphorical, it has a securer 
foundation than poetic or artistic convention. Referring to Job 21:18 which 
says of the wicked, ‘They are as stubble before the wind, and as chaff that the 
storm carrieth away’, Pusey writes: 
His natural works also, in numerous instances convey the same truth 
which He afterwards expressly declares, only that man has not of himself 
wisdom to understand it. So that the relation between the image 
employed by revelation and the truth declared is an inherent 
correspondence, not a mere external likeness: to take but a slight and 
brief instance; the stubble before the wind, or the small dust before the 
whirlwind, exhibit in themselves the idea not simply of unresisting, 
powerless, and contemptible dispersion or destruction – powerless 
notwithstanding their multitude – before one all-powerful but invisible 
Agent, but wherein the moral character displays itself, – the intrinsic 
emptiness and worthlessness of the thing so tossed: so that the mind as 
soon as the thought is suggested to it, at once sees a number of real 
analogies between the ‘stubble before the wind’ and the destruction of 
the wicked and these the more forcible because real – because the 
                                                 
54Pusey quotes Augustine’s commentary on Ps. 85 § 13, in Augustine 1850, 180. 
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physical object does declare the same moral lesson, although we should 
not have perceived it. (L15-16) 
The author of Job is not imposing moral categories on amoral nature, but he is 
discerning the moral significance of creation. What Scripture adds to nature is 
a revelation of the correspondences which are there, but which are nonetheless 
inherent in the natural works before this revelation.55 When he discusses the 
appropriateness of water to serve as the material element of spiritual cleansing 
in Holy Baptism, Pusey describes the purposefulness of this correspondence 
more fully:  
There is in the Ancient Church what by moderns would be condemned as 
Realism, or Materialism, or Mysticism. Their view seems to have been of 
this sort; that, since GOD had appointed the use of water for Baptism, 
there must have been an appropriateness in it, which there was in no 
other element; that there was an analogy between His physical and moral 
Creation, and that not only imaginative but real; that in forming the 
Physical, He had respect also to the purposes which He designed in His 
Moral creation, and imparted to the physical agent properties 
corresponding to its moral uses; that in His earlier dispensations He had 
regard to the latter, and not only taught man beforehand what should be, 
but, in a manner, by employing His creature in the subordinate offices of 
the former, imparted to it a fitness to serve in the latter and greater.56 
Pusey evokes here again the inherent correspondences by which the book of 
Nature complements the book of Scripture. More radically, he also argues that 
the way natural types serve in sacred history in different but analogous ways 
over time witnesses to the providential ordering of all things within which the 
meaning of types are discerned. These different appearances of the same type 
in different circumstances is part of the way they speak. Like any language, the 
language of type develops associations and nuances over time which the native 
speaker recognizes. Christopher Seitz sees Pusey’s notion of ‘figural 
interpretation’ and the idea that there is ‘a surplus of intended meaning in every 
divine revelation’ as having ‘a basic theological grounding, involving a 
                                                 
55 L18: ‘A clear transparent stream impresses on the mind involuntarily the idea of guileless 
purity, the cloudless sky, of pure encompassing love; the bursting bubble, of vanity, what is 
physically crooked of what is so morally, what is rigidly straight’. 
56 T67rev., 361. 
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doctrine of providence’.57 Pusey describes this idea of providence also in terms 
of divine government: ‘There is then an analogy between the natural works of 
God among themselves, and again, since they come from the same Author, 
between His natural and revealed works, as between His natural and revealed 
Government.’ (L15)58  Once again, we see that Pusey’s theory of types arises 
out of an all encompassing, and providential, vision of creation and 
redemption.  
Pusey emphasizes the way in which the revelation which nature offers is 
an independent witness to the same revelation which Scripture offers by 
illustrating it with an example from Arabic poetry. During his first seven years 
as Regius Professor of Hebrew he spent a considerable portion of his time 
finishing an Arabic catalogue for the Bodleian Library, a task left incomplete 
by his predecessor Alexander Nicoll. Pusey had studied Arabic intensively 
during his second trip to Germany in the hope that it would help him to 
understand Hebrew better, a view which he later considered misguided.59 This 
may be the only place in the ‘Lectures’ where Pusey brings his knowledge of 
Arabic to bear directly on the subject of types and prophecy: ‘And this analogy 
the more thoughtful of the Arabian poets have exultantly expressed by the 
phrase lisan al-hal, literally, “tongue of the condition”, i.e. “what each object 
expresses by being what it is”’. (L16)60 The contemporary Iranian scholar 
Nasrollah Pourjavady translates lisan al-hal as ‘the language of the state of 
being’. He describes it as a literary device ‘where nonhuman or inanimate 
objects’ speak through a silent language.61 Lisan al-hal is the kind of language 
where things speak by being what they are or whereby mystics speak through 
or from their mystical experience. When the created world glorifies the 
                                                 
57 Seitz 2001, 32-3. See also Auerbach 1984, 59. 
58 For the possible connection with Hooker, see Kirby 1998. See also Pusey 1853, 30, on the 
‘orders and ranks of earthly polity’ which ‘proceed from Him and reflect Him’. 
59 For a discussion of Pusey’s study of Arabic, and of the immense labour and scholarship 
required to complete the Arabic Catalogue, see Life, 96-7, 203-7, 323. 
60 Pusey renders lisan al-hal in Arabic script. 
61 For the importance of this literary device in Persian literature, see Pourjavady 2005.  
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Creator, for example, it does so in “lisan al-hal”, simply through being what it 
is.62 
Pusey finds further testimony to the objective character of the moral 
meanings offered by the book of Nature in the agreement of different peoples 
and ages:  
This reality is again attested by the universal agreement of all minds in 
all nations as to the meaning of certain appearances in nature. Thus a 
broken flower, as designating one untimely cut off; mown corn as 
manhood cut down; the course of a river as time; a bubble, as vanity; 
spring, as youth; winter as old age; and the like, will be found in every 
language, in every nation these analogies have been perceived and held 
to be true.63 
Pusey argues also that ‘these religious meanings were not arbitrarily affixed by 
their own minds, but that they arose out of, and existed in, the things 
themselves.’64 Pusey calls upon Isaac Williams and William Shakespeare to 
witness to the way in which natural objects speak. He says that ‘one great poet 
of nature exhibits a thoughtful character finding sermons in a stone’, a 
reference to As You Like It: ‘And this, our life, exempt from public haunt, finds 
tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in 
everything.’65 Pusey also refers to Isaac Williams describing how the whole of 
creation serves as a mirror which reflects eternal things, and how each object 
becomes ‘a speaking sign’: 
As evening clouds oft shadow things of earth.  
Obscure and transient, yet as by they sail,  
There the full heart reads many a solemn tale;  
Each object seen becomes a speaking sign.  
Which with a finger points to things divine,  
A mirror wherein things celestial pass.  
Eternity discerned as in a glass.66  
                                                 
62 I am grateful for the description in these last two sentences to Dr Alexander Treiger, 
Assistant Professor, Religious Studies at Dalhousie University, Halifax. 
63 S-FTL, 13. The beginning of this text follows the ‘Lectures’, then it diverges. 
64 S-FTL,13. 
65 S-FTL, 17. 
66 Williams 1846, 225 quoted in S-FTL, 14. 
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Williams evokes here the conception of the world or time as a ‘moving image 
of eternity’.67 Pusey maintains that not only particular works, but processes or 
change in the created world can serve as types of spiritual realities: 
How strange, as bearing on the depth of the mystery of man’s 
Redemption, that law of vegetable nature inculcated by our Lord 
Himself, that life is through death! ‘Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except 
a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, 
it brings forth much fruit (John 12:24).’ (L135) 
In all these ways, the ‘creatures of God’s Word and the efflux of his Spirit, do, 
in fact, present a continual harmony with an order of things above them’. (L14) 
This view reflects not only the way the best of the Greek philosophers, ‘high 
spirits of old’, discerned ‘Streaks of a brighter heaven’ behind the ‘murky 
blind’ of the book of Nature,68 but more importantly, in Pusey’s account, the 
teaching ‘inculcated by our Lord Himself’ about the relation of the lower and 
higher world: ‘It is our Lord’s own parable, the grain of mustard-seed which is 
again Himself’. (L135) 
6.3.2 The Poet as a Moral Philosopher 
Pusey’s comprehensive theory of type is also displayed in the way that he 
describes the interpretation of the book of nature by religious poets in the same 
terms as he describes the interpretation of Scripture. These poets discern the 
religious element in the typical prophecy of the natural world: ‘the province of 
the true poet has been not to invent likenesses, but to trace out the analogies, 
which are actually impressed upon the creation. He is, (so to speak) the moral 
philosopher, or again the historian of the moral character of nature.’ (L15) 
Poets who discover the God-given language of nature are not simply creating 
works of fiction, they are moral philosophers who perceive what the Archetype 
teaches through analogies with the natural world: ‘when religious poets (as 
Wordsworth or the author of the Christian Year) have traced out such 
correspondence, the mind instantly recognises it as true, not as beautiful only 
and so not belonging to their minds subjectively, but as actually and really 
                                                 
67 For a brief discussion of this idea in Plato’s Timaeus and in Hooker’s Laws, see Kirby 1998 
55 and 64. 
68 S-FTL, 4, quoting Xn.Yr., ‘Fourth Sunday after Trinity’. 
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existing (objective)’. (L16-17)69 Keble himself also describes the poet as a kind 
of divine in his Lectures on Poetry (1832-41):  
For, once let that magic wand, as the phrase goes, touch any region of 
Nature, forthwith all that before seemed secular and profane is illumined 
with a new and celestial light: men come to realize that the various 
images and similes of things, and all other poetic charms, are not merely 
the play of a keen and clever mind, nor to be put down as empty fancies: 
but rather they guide us by gentle hints and no uncertain signs, to the 
very utterances of Nature, or we may more truly say, of the Author of 
Nature. And thus it has come to pass, the great and pre-eminent poets 
have also been ranked as representatives of religion, and their sphere has 
been treated with religious reverence.70 
Not only do the book of God’s works and the book of God’s words 
reveal the same thing, they must also be read in the same way, not stopping at 
the plain or superficial sense, but looking for the deep things waiting to be 
uncovered: ‘in deciphering Nature’s outspread pages, just as a superficial 
meaning of any deeper passage will present itself at the first glance, it is on 
reflection, then in different degrees, that its further bearings are discovered’.71 
When these further bearings are traced out, it will be found that they lead to 
Christ. Pusey refers to Williams again: ‘Wisdom’s self descending from the 
sky | Shall train thy heart to glad philosophy | And Christ Himself upon the 
way appears, | In things of Heaven to school thine eyes and ears’.72 
Furthermore, it is what is divine in the interpreter or poet which discerns the 
spiritual character of nature: ‘Hence too those whose office has been in any 
degree to read it, have even, which in any degree true to their office, been 
accounted to have something Divine, to speak by an inspiration of God, and 
have been the moral teachers of their people’.73 In the dedication of his 
Lectures on Poetry, Keble describes Wordsworth in these terms as a ‘true 
philosopher and inspired poet who by the special gift and calling of Almighty 
                                                 
69 Pusey refers to Xn.Yr., ‘First Sunday after Epiphany’: ‘Every leaf in every nook | Every 
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call ye sense or learning, | Instinct pure, or Heaven-taught art?’ 
70 Keble 1912, ii, 481. See also S-FTL, 13: ‘few can see them although when once pointed out, 
they are acknowledged by all’.  
71 S-FTL, 13. 
72 S-FTL, 14, referring to Williams 1846, 225.  
73 S-BN, 1. 
  238 
God whether he sang of man or of nature failed not to lift up men’s hearts to 
holy things’.74  
Like reading the book of God’s Word, reading the book of nature comes 
with a kind of trial. The temper of mind which despises small things and ‘will 
not bend itself to the lowly portal … which in Naaman, despises slight visible 
means, or in Saul, slight shades of duty, or with Gallio ‘questions of words and 
names (Acts 18:12-15)’ will not be able to see ‘tokens of Him in every foot-
track of His Providence, each work of His Hands’.75 Once again, Pusey makes 
the failure to discern the meaning of types an example of the gravest forms of 
biblical disobedience or faithlessness. Careful attention to nature helps the soul 
to ‘bend itself to the lowly portal’; it is a means of sanctification. The 
knowledge which the book of nature imparts is also a moral knowledge: 
‘Again, all of a right moral character can read something of nature’s 
meaning’.76 The principle that ‘like knows like’, applies to reading the book of 
God’s works as well as the book of God’s words: 
With this Divine character of nature it corresponds, that its book is best 
read by the purest and most divine. In it too ‘the pure in heart see God’. 
To the worldly or sensual it is a sealed book. What is Divine in it can be 
read only by what is Divine in man. To those of the earth, it is earthly; 
the Spirit in man deciphers to man what is spiritual in nature.77 
As we saw above, for Pusey, ‘the book of Nature’ offers a ‘Poetry of 
Metaphysics’. (L17) Geoffrey Rowell stresses the poetic character of the 
theology of the Oxford Movement: ‘It is no accident that Keble, Newman and 
Isaac Williams were all poets; or that Keble’s earliest and most famous work is 
The Christian Year (1827), the whole purpose of which is to set out in poetry 
some of the major themes of the Christian festivals and services.’78 While 
Pusey was not a poet, he also suggests that emphasizing the typical character of 
the Old Testament means emphasizing its ‘more poetical or imaginative and 
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the purity of each’. 
78 Rowell 1999, 112. See also Härdelin 1965, 63. 
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mystical character’. (L11) The poetry of type is God-given, part of the 
character of revelation in Scripture and in Nature. 
6.3.3 Diversity of Meaning and Minuteness of Sense 
Pusey’s account of creation as an efflux which is spoken by God in word and 
in work offers a theological grounding to elements of his theory of type which 
were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The argument that divine attributes are 
manifest in different ways in the works of nature, in people, in animals, in 
objects, or in sayings, explains Pusey’s understanding of the multiple meanings 
or senses of typical prophecy. Having set out the principle of analogy by which 
all created things are related to one another due to their common origin, Pusey 
makes this principle the basis for the interpretation of Scripture: 
Thus, further, in the interpretation of Holy Scripture itself, several 
important principles are involved in this reality and minuteness of the 
relation of things, words and persons to others, higher or lower than 
themselves. 1) Since this relation is inherent in the things themselves, it 
will be present, wherever that occurs in which it is embodied; i.e. the 
symbol is significant in itself, antecedent to the consideration of the 
context or circumstance in which it is found. 2) Since things possessing 
these relations are thus various, and different things or persons possess 
the same qualities in different degrees, each will have not one only but 
various relations and stand in different degrees of nearness to the rest, 
according as they possess more or less of this same quality. Hence, 
prophecy will have not only a double, but a manifold sense and 
fulfilment.79 
These principles apply to typical words or sayings as well as to typical things 
or people: ‘One might even say that no deep saying was ever uttered which 
was not capable of many applications and a variety of meanings, which might 
very possibly float before our mind together or severally, of which one remains 
the highest and of that one the rest are fainter and inferior representations.’ 
(L19) Since different qualities are evident in different degrees in people or the 
words they speak, in the types of Scripture and nature, there are many possible 
connections or references: 
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So full are all things of manifold meaning; words or actions, things in 
nature or art; human characters or events; singly or together, with simple 
reference or of complex significance, all has a varied meaning; represent 
each other, or the lower the higher and the higher a higher still; yet all 
knit together and thereby attesting themselves of one great family.80 
We see here again the way in which Pusey connects his theory of types with a 
hierarchical view of nature (material and immaterial) joined ‘as by a ladder’ 
(L18, above) or knit together in a great chain of being. In a section of the 
supplemental material where he elaborates his understanding of the analogy 
between the ‘the physical structure of all constructed things’ and their ‘moral 
significancy’ (L15, above), he describes this chain or ladder in terms both of 
the connection of the highest and lowest, and in terms of time, the beginning 
and the end:  
… so that while each in a degree reflects the highest, yet each is 
significant also of those immediately above it, and nature images man’s 
moral nature, and man retains some image of God (and thereby some 
traces of the truth and its wiser minds were illumined by it, to mitigate 
the darkness), and Heathenism preserves some echoes of Paradise and 
shadows out, in parts, the older dispensation, and the Jewish, both in 
outline and depth of shadow, though both indistinctly, portrays the 
Christian Church, and the Christian Church the Church triumphant, and 
earth Heaven, wherewith in Christ it is already knit together in one.81 
The replacement of this theological, organic, and substantial idea with a more 
mechanistic approach both to Scripture and to creation is part of Pusey’s 
criticism of rationalism and the Spirit of the Age.82 
As created things express divine attributes in different ways, the same 
type can express different meanings: ‘and if a different meaning is found in the 
same object, this will be, because in fact each thing contains several such 
relations, or has several such characters impressed upon it, whereof according 
to their peculiar character or susceptibility, different minds have perceived 
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Pusey was ‘against a double sense’. See Keble to Pusey, 14 Nov. 1836, LBV-97. 
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different sides’. (L16) The way in which a lion can represent different kinds of 
greatness, great good or great evil, is an example of this principle: ‘Hence a 
lion in that it has uncontrollable passions is an emblem of the Enemy of souls; 
in that it has a royal might, the Lion of the tribe of Judah is our Lord’. (L136)83 
With the help of Tertullian, Pusey also considers the different ways birds serve 
as types in the Bible:  
Again, how the same object, in different relations, has altogether a 
different aspect. ‘The bird escaped out of the snare of the fowler’, is an 
image of the soul free from Satan’s enthralments; soaring aloft. And as 
Tertullian notices, borne on the form of the cross, of faith mounting 
heavenwards; the same birds bent downwards and gathering up the good 
seed sown, of evil spirits; in their untoiling ways, ‘they sow not, neither 
do they reap, nor gather into barns’, of unanxious reliance on God's 
Providence; lodging and living among (Psalm 104:12) the branches of 
that which God had planted, of the thankful praising refrain of the 
nations from every side within the Church; the Eagle again of 
contemplating faith which gazes or the Sun of Righteousness.84 
These examples show what Pusey means when he writes that the Fathers, 
‘(unlike our dry, hard way of treating things) had the several bearings of the 
same subjects continually in their mind and passed rapidly from the one to the 
other’. (L117-118) His description of the mutual relations of all things to God 
and to one another through the divine qualities imparted to them offers the 
principle which gives a theological grounding to this observation.  
Pusey describes the different fulfilments of prophecy in terms of 
perspective; types have ‘a nearer and a background’. The description evokes 
the stained glass of Abraham van Ligne (fl. 1623-42). Some of his windows 
present Old Testament stories in a single light or pane, where chronology is 
represented by perspective, with different parts of the story in the foreground 
or background. So, for example, in the typological east window (1631) at 
Lincoln College Chapel, Oxford, Elijah’s ascension in a flaming chariot (2 Kgs 
2:11), his disciple Elisha’s parting the river Jordan (v. 13), and Elisha’s 
                                                 
83 See 1 Pet. 5:6, Rev. 5:5, Gen. 49:9. 
84 S-FTL, 8. See Tertullian 1842, ‘Of Prayer’, § 29, 321: ‘Nay, even the birds, now as they 
soar, lift up themselves to Heaven, and stretch out the cross of their wings for hands, and utter 
somewhat, which may seem a prayer’. Pusey wrote the preface to this volume. 
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encounter with the youth who mocked him (vv. 23-4), are represented in the 
same pane or light like different frames of a film.85 The representation of 
events in time by their place in the background or foreground makes visual 
depth or perspective an analogy for chronology, adding a fourth dimension to 
the glass. Pusey uses such a visual image to explain the multiple fulfilments of 
types in words:  
This admission of degrees furnishes the very character of a type. It gives, 
as it were, a nearer and a background; a nearer to which the words might 
superficially appear to bear the closer resemblance, and a further and 
deeper to which, on account of their undefinedness they would 
correspond, and which in that it is deeper, does in fact more fully 
correspond with them. Thus, the same word nepeš signifying ‘life’, 
‘soul’, the words, ‘the waters are come in’ ʿad-nāppeš [to neck/soul, Ps. 
69:1] might be used of temporal danger, [but] their meaning is more fully 
expressed by one verse ‘even unto my soul’; thus ‘many say to my soul, 
there is no help for him in his God’ [Ps. 3:2], express that they ‘say it so 
as to reach the very soul’, say that as to his very life, temporal or 
spiritual, God has forsaken him … Again how varied the words napĕšô 
bĕṭôb tālîn ‘his soul shall dwell in good’ [Ps. 25:13]; in their lowest 
sense, they may mean present rest of mind or estate, ‘his soul shall dwell 
at ease’; in their highest they mean, ‘that his soul shall dwell in Him that 
is “Good that is God”’ … amid the night of trouble should he rest and 
find refuge in God; and higher yet, yet describes Him “Who was with 
God and was God”, and “was in the bosom of His Father”.’86 
The different fulfilments of the types are like vignettes in Van Linge’s glass, 
manifesting different fulfilments of the Archetype which belong together in the 
same story. Moreover, Pusey’s discussion of how divine attributes are 
communicated in different degrees and way pertains not only to typical things, 
but also to typical sayings and the attributes which words evoke. Types 
communicate by their place in foreground or background of the masterwork of 
God’s providence. 
The view that ‘divine Creation must be the expression of something 
within God’ also provides theological explanation for Pusey’s emphasis on the 
                                                 
85 For Abraham van Ligne as connected with the Lincoln College Chapel glass, see Alexander 
Faludy, ‘Linge, Bernard van (b. 1598, d. in or after 1644)’, ODNB. Other windows of this sort 
by Van Ligne can be found in the chapel of University College, Oxford. 
86 S-EL, 1. See also L10. 
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significant character of the most minute details of a type.87 To authors like 
Thomas Horne, only ‘fanciful expositors’ find meaning in the number of the 
boards of the tabernacle.88 However, in his analysis of the typical character of 
numbers, Pusey connects these ‘10 boards and the length of each board 10 
cubits’ (Exod. 26:18) with his consideration of the mystical meaning of ‘ten’: 
‘the symbol of completion … “the perfect number, as comprising all numbers 
in itself” … an acknowledgement that all came from God and was due to Him’. 
(L160)89 For Pusey, the emphasis on the minuteness of meaning of Scriptural 
types is the working out of his understanding of creation as the offspring of 
God which is stamped by God and reflects God:  
Only now we see the ground of what impresses itself on the simple mind 
as intuition. We seem to see that every thing, however minute, has a real 
meaning of its own; we know now that it must have it, because all is as it 
came from Him, or as it has been corrupted and has its meaning by virtue 
of one of those relations … For since the meaning is inherent, then it is 
present, wherever that occurs wherein it is embodied; and the minuteness 
of the significance of God’s works corresponds with and illustrates that 
of His word. There is an analogy between the minuteness of God’s 
Providence, which numbers the very hairs of our head and the cubits of 
our stature and counts our steps one by one, ordereth our goings, the 
allotment of our days, and the minuteness of significance in His 
ordinances, the fringes of the High Priest and the number of the boards of 
the tabernacle, in nature and in His word.90 
In the same way that all things have their being in the creative movement out 
of God, so are all things gathered together in the redemptive return to God. To 
deny the significance of even little details would be to suggest that they fall 
outside of God’s providential ordering. 
It is worth noting that the arguments considered in this chapter draw 
especially on the material which Pusey wrote after he first gave the course of 
lectures on types and prophecy in 1836-7, i.e. in the later sections of the 
                                                 
87 S-BN, 1. 
88 Intro., 615-616. For Horne, see 4.2.2. 
89 The idea of the ‘perfect number’ may be a reference Hippolytus 1994, chapter 51, 45, where 
Hippolytus attributes this idea to Pythagoras of Samos (c. 570-495 BC). 
90 S-EL, 7. 
  244 
‘Lectures’ and in the supplemental material.91 He appears to have been probing 
for the principles which his observations or intuition, especially in the 
prolegomenon in the ‘Lectures’, had suggested. As he told Keble in the autumn 
of 1836, his ‘notions of types have been gradually expanding for a good many 
years’.92 His later work, in the supplemental material and later sections, brings 
to light these ideas. These principles connect Pusey’s theory of types with 
matters of cosmology, anthropology and epistemology. 
6.4 The Longing of Creation 
6.4.1 The Restoration of Defaced Types 
Pusey’s account of the Fall fundamentally shapes how he describes types, and 
his account of redemption is always an account of how the meaning and 
promise of types are fulfilled. The work of redemption is the work of God 
directing what is marred or incomplete toward perfection. In the ‘Lectures’, 
Pusey does not explain how creation was affected by the Fall, the mechanism 
or the way by which human sin affected the whole created order. He assumes 
this, but his understanding of analogy suggests this connection. He emphasizes 
the inter-connectedness of things and suggests that nothing exists apart from 
moral categories or moral signification. Creation has moral signification built 
into it. A catastrophe in one part of the order or system of things reverberates 
to affect another. Pusey refers to Romans 8:20, ‘For the creature was made 
subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the 
same in hope’, to justify his view of both the corruption of nature and its 
inherent goodness: 
Although then, the creation, being, against its will ‘been made subject to 
vanity’, that fuller likeness, which originally it bore, when ‘God saw 
every thing which He had made and behold it was very good’, is, in a 
measure, defaced, it is not effaced; as far as it has life and remains good, 
it retains the impress of God.93  
                                                 
91 Supplemental material in ‘Types and Prophecies’ in ‘Pusey Papers: EBP Biblical MSS’. 
92 Keble to Pusey, 14 Nov. 1836, in LBV 97. See also Life, 400. 
93 S-BN, 1. See also L16. For a fuller consideration of Pusey’s understanding of both the 
subjection of creation to vanity and its restoration, see ‘Sermon XVII’, in Pusey 1883, 304-26. 
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For Pusey, understanding the significant character of all things means both 
recognizing the image of God in the book of his works and seeing how that 
image has been marred or corrupted: 
This significance of the divine part of nature is forcefully illustrated by 
the contrasted meaning of that which is corrupt and debased. For thus is 
the significance of the whole contemplated. All nature is an image of 
good, or evil; good as far as it is an effluence of God, and retains His life, 
evil whensoever it had pleased Him to withdraw Himself, or that curse 
extends, under which for men’s sin He laid the earth, and which implies 
the withholding of that influence, whereby all will be, as He made it, 
good. The same creation which, as far as it retains the moulding of His 
Hands represents Himself, does, as far as He has withdrawn Himself, 
represent that which is opposed to, or destitute of, Him. As far as it is 
destitute of Him, it is death; as far as it is a perversion, evil.94 
Pusey offers the classic Augustinian account that evil does not have an 
independent existence but is rather a perversion or negation of the good.95 
Insofar as a created thing continues to exist at all, continuing to bear some 
resemblance to its Creator, the image is effaced, not defaced. On the one hand, 
‘the history of mankind, in general, is typical, far more than we even now 
understand’ (L25), while on the other, ‘being mostly the history of man’s sins, 
has in itself little of Divine meaning’.96 The image of God in humanity was 
most gravely marred by the Fall as having been both in the highest way ‘the 
image of God in this lower world’, and as the agents of the subjection of 
creation, human and non-human, to vanity. (L14) The Fall does not mean that 
creation became evil, but that the created world no longer offers images of its 
maker in so straightforward or transparent a way: ‘Nature although suffering 
through man’s fall, breathes more of Heaven than fallen man.’97 Pusey’s view 
of the Fall accounts, in part, for his view that types are necessarily veiled. 
Pusey’s discussion of types includes a description not only of how the 
image of God has been defaced in his offspring, but of how that image will be 
restored. Even in what is debased or sinful one discerns the image of God, and 
                                                 
94 S-BN, 3. 
95 See, for example, Augustine, On Free Will, 3.1.1. 
96 S-FTL, 11.  
97 S-FTL, 12. 
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the image in all created types, however marred, longs for the Archetype. 
Comparing the Christian sacrifice of the Eucharist with the sacrifices which the 
Jews offered, Pusey describes the hope for the perfect fulfilment of the 
sacrificial types of the Old and the New Covenants: ‘And ours have their 
longing expectation too; only, until they be fulfilled, i.e. filled up completely 
by the presence of Him whom they fore shadow; for ours also fill up a period 
of looking-onward, until a greater glory be revealed’. (L123) Even those types 
which are tainted by human sin display this expectation: ‘For, one may say, all 
things debased are not inventions, but spurious imitations of the truth. “Souls” 
says St Augustine, (de Trin. XI.5.8), “in their very sins seek but a sort of 
likeness of God, in a proud and perverted and so to say slavish freedom”.’98 
Pusey illustrates this idea from Augustine’s Confessions, arguing that the 
‘tendernesses of the wanton’ do not only imitate love but seek genuine love.99 
Pusey’s argument that there is no place to retire from God means that all things 
are caught up in this movement which is a movement toward the unity of God: 
‘What is imperfect, in God’s world, in itself tends to and prophesies of what is 
perfect. Every thing is tending somewhither, and by its tendency, force, tells 
that whither it is tending. Imperfect good, by its very existence, speaks of its 
completion somewhere; growing evil of its consummation.’100  
Pusey offers a typological account of redemption, arguing that the 
evidence of divine qualities even in human sins shows that nothing falls 
outside of the movement of creation and redemption. Again, he draws on 
Augustine:  
And thus the Unity of God in attested even by this perversion of His 
gifts, ‘Even by thus imitating Thee, they imply Thee to be the Creator of 
all nature; whence there is no place whither altogether to retire from 
Thee.’ Amid apparent confusion there is a higher Unity, since things in 
their distortion preserve the trace of the original; in their abuse their use; 
in their counterfeit their first image.101 
                                                 
98 S-BN, 3. 
99 S-BN, 3, quoting Augustine 1838, II.6.13, 25. 
100 S-FTL, 10. 
101 S-BN, 3. See Augustine 1838. II.6.14, 26. 
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In Pusey’s account, the movement from the plain sense of a scriptural or 
natural type through the different kinds of meaning, typical or allegorical or 
moral, to the fulfilment or perfection of the type in an eschatological sense 
mirrors the longing of creation for its creator and the image of God, in 
humanity and in all created things, for the Archetype. Again, he calls on Keble 
as a witness to this longing:  
In the words of a Christian poet: 
It was not then a poet’s dream…  
Which bids us see in heaven and earth, 
In all fair things around, 
Strong yearnings for a blest new birth. 
With sinless glories crown’d; 
Which bids us hear … 
In the low chant of wakeful birds,  
In the deep weltering flood, 
In whispering leaves, these solemn words– 
‘God made us all for good.’102 
According to Pusey, ‘Sacred history is the key to profane. The veil is there 
raised, which ordinarily covers the connexion of events with God, their First 
Cause, and the meaning and significance of those events in themselves and 
their relations with each other.’ (L25) With that assistance, one may discern 
signs of these ‘strong yearnings for a blest new birth’ in all people in all ages, 
but especially in Israel: 
The kingdoms of the world shadowed out the world and its never-ceasing 
distinction of good and evil; the people of Israel shadowed out besides, 
the kingdom of Christ. It existed for the future; yea the better among 
them in the future. And as in their degree, the whole race of men since 
the fall, as many as lost not the traces of their first estate, were ‘viri 
desideriorum’ men of longing, men of the future, looking forward to the 
completion of the primaeval Gospel; and thus themselves calculated to be 
images of the future. (L26)103 
This desire of God’s people reflects the desire of the type to return to the 
Archetype. 
                                                 
102 Xn.Yr., ‘Fourth Sunday after Trinity’. 
103 Pusey appears to be developing Tholuck’s description of this longing in the people of Israel. 
See Diss., 190. 
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Pusey’s account unites the first stirrings of the hope for ‘the completion 
of the primaeval Gospel’ with its completion. He connects the promise that the 
seed of the woman will bruise the serpent’s head (Gen. 3:15) with all the 
partial fulfilments of the hope in various deliverers of the Old Testament, with 
the Christ’s victory won for himself and for his body, with the perfect 
fulfilment of the type in eternity: 
This first promise, then, contained in its compass the whole Gospel: the 
whole history of Redemption is involved in it, it reaches from the gates 
of Paradise, within which it was uttered, to the final consummation of all 
things at the coming of our Lord, when death and hell shall be cast into 
the lake of fire: all other subsequent more definite prophecies are but a 
supplementary of it, filling out the one or other part of its outline. (L45) 
In Pusey’s account, the end is there in the beginning. 
In a similar way, Pusey maintains that we not only look forward to ‘the 
sinless Paradise, our Zion of eternal and heavenly blessedness’, but we 
remember it: ‘yet is it Jerusalem and the Lord’s song, which we remember’. 
(L131) Evoking William Wordsworth’s ‘Intimations of Immortality’, Pusey 
associates this remembering with the knowledge of a child, ‘so lately come 
from its Maker’s hand’. (L14, M21) In Wordsworth’s words, ‘Our birth is but a 
sleep and a forgetting … But trailing clouds of glory do we come | From God, 
who is our home’. What the child remembers is what was first written in the 
book of eternal wisdom before it was in some sense engraven in his mind.104 
The idea that what we know is a kind of remembering what God has imparted 
to the soul fits with the scheme by which the end toward which both creation 
and the meaning of all types tend is also a restoration. Discerning the meaning 
of typical prophecy involves seeing the origin of all things in God as well as 
their unity in Him. The future entrance into the land of the living is both a 
                                                 
104 For a consideration of the Romantic adaption of the Platonic understanding of anamnesis, 
see Newsome 1974, 25-40 and for Wordsworth’s Ode, p. 26 (for this idea in Keble, see Xn.Yr., 
‘Third Sunday in Lent’). Newsome considers the significance of this idea for Schleiermacher 
as well as for Wordsworth and Coleridge, and the child as a representative of an ideal of 
knowledge with many resemblances to Pusey’s account: ‘Its sense of wonder, its capacity to 
marvel, and – above all – its recognition of the wholeness of things, or its intuitive perception 
of the one behind the many’ (p. 32). For the wisdom of a child praised in the High Church 
tradition, see Nockles 1994, 203. 
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return and a progression toward a new creation which is the result of the work 
of Christ in time and from eternity.  
The period of longing for this return is not something that is over and 
past. According to the mystery of Christ, the words which were shaped by the 
Spirit to speak of the Son’s first coming are given to the Church to enable her 
to pray and seek for His second coming: ‘Whom in His first Advent, they thus 
looked for, longed for, prayed for, fainted for, we, using their words confess 
what we look for in His second, when to those who look for Him, He, our 
Salvation shall appear without sin unto salvation.’ (L136) The longing of the 
saints of the Old Testament is a type of the longing of the saints of the New for 
the perfect fulfilment of the eternal Day. In one sense, the words of the 
Psalmist, ‘so shall I live and keep thy words’ can speak to us of life in the 
present, life in communion with the Risen Christ. In another sense, Pusey notes 
that the Psalmist speaks ‘not in the present but in the future’. (L130) Drawing 
on the image of ‘dwelling in a house’ that we considered in Chapter 3, Pusey 
says that the true Christian knows himself to be living as a pilgrim waiting to 
inhabit an eternal dwelling in the ‘Zion of eternal and heavenly blessedness’: 
‘Then, since that is our house, here we are but strangers … words which speak 
of our “going forth” and “entering in” most fully relate to our “going forth” 
from the body (Ps. 121.8) and this world and entering into Paradise.’ (L131) In 
this restored and redeemed order, all types are fulfilled and become 
superfluous: ‘and then shall our images be swept away, when sight succeeds to 
the reflection in the mirror as were their shadows by the first coming of Him, 
the Substance’. (L123) 
6.4.2 The Necessary Imperfection and Death of Types 
The search for the meaning of the type is part of the way by which we live out 
this longing for union with God which is both a present reality and something 
to be fulfilled. For Pusey, the longing of creation, human and non-human, is 
intrinsically connected with the idea that the type seeks or longs for the 
Archetype. In Pusey’s account, the incompleteness or imperfection of the type 
both reveals the insufficiency of all that is not God to satisfy human hope and 
expectation, and also stirs up the longing which is both a search for salvation 
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and for the meaning which exhausts the sense of the type. Therefore, Pusey’s 
view of the necessity of type is also a theory of the necessary incompleteness 
of any one type. It is only in the combination of type that the imperfect can 
represent the perfect: ‘Thus things imperfect were blended together in order 
that they might represent that which was perfect; lest the shadow should have 
too much honour’. (L125) Different types figure different aspects or qualities 
of the Archetype; only God can contain the perfection of all qualities. Pusey 
illustrates this idea by considering how, for example, Moses and Joshua serve 
as types of Christ. Each of them is inadequate to prophesy Christ in his fullness 
– one prophesies the cross, the other Christ’s name and victory: 
Justin Martyr says of Moses and Joshua, ‘one of them stretching out his 
hands remained on the hill until evening, his hands being borne up, 
which exhibits no other figure than that of the cross; but he who was 
made to bear the name of Jesus, began the battle and has prevailed, but it 
may be observed that this took place through both those holy men and 
prophets of God united because one of them was not equal to support 
both mysteries, the image of the Cross and the bearing of the Name. For 
this right is and was and shall be that of One alone, whose Name also all 
principalities and powers fear, dreading to be destroyed by them’. 
(L125)105 
However, even the cross alone is so great a mystery that Moses is not sufficient 
to represent it by himself, but only with the assistance of Aaron and Hur (Exod. 
17:12). Pusey quotes Chrysostom, ‘And again on Mount Sinai when Amalech 
warred with the Hebrews the hands of Moses were steadied, being supported 
by Aaron and Hur standing on either side; but Christ when He had come, 
Himself by Himself stretching forth His hands held them out on the Cross.’ 
(L32)106 That different types represent different elements of the great mysteries 
of faith arises from the inadequacy of human language to render these great 
spiritual truths. While this introduces an element of uncertainty, the search for 
clarity here would lead to an apologetic or evidentialist foreclosure on the 
truth; in becoming clear, we would also become shallow.  
                                                 
105 See Justin Martyr 1861, Dialogue with Trypho, § 111, 208.  
106 See Chrysostom 1994, ‘Homily 14’, on John 1:16, 50. Justin Martyr’s reflections on Aaron 
and Hur are virtually the same. See Justin Martyr 1861, § 90, 186-7.  
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The other part of Pusey’s account of the necessary incompleteness of the 
type is the way this incompleteness serves to fix our attention on our 
destination, ‘the sinless Paradise’. Compared to this reality, ‘our best praises 
are but songs in the night, melody in heaviness’. (L131) In the course of his 
treatment on numerology, Pusey discusses the character of imagery more 
generally. Although he describes the imperfection of types partly by the Fall 
and sin, he dwells more on the distinction between God and anything created, 
and on the way in which the same qualities which renders types capable of 
mediating between the eternal and the temporal also make them inadequate to 
fully express or symbolize God and heavenly realities: 
For in all imagery, however perfect, there must not only be a falling-short 
of expressing spiritual things, but, in part, an actual inappropriateness, as 
in all comparison … They ‘prophesy in part’ only. All things, which are 
like, are unlike also, else they would be not like only, but the same … 
nature, besides that, as being finite and material, it can but inadequately 
express the Infinite and Spiritual, partakes also of the effects of man’s 
fall, and hath on it the sentence and trace of decay and fleshyness, which 
unfits it for picturing the perfect and abiding. It images forth the Object 
of love, but because it too is lowly as reflecting Him, it bears on it the 
marks of imperfection and transitoriness, lest we transfer to it the love 
and reverence, due to our One Creator Alone. In St Augustine’s 
language, ‘hushed’ be ‘the images of earth, and waters and air, hushed 
also the poles of heaven, hushed – every tongue and every sign, and 
whatever exists in transition, since, if any could hear, all these say, “We 
made not ourselves but He made us that abideth for ever.” – Hushed be 
they having roused only our ears to Him who made them, and He Alone 
speak.’107  
Pusey argues that the imperfections which disqualify some types in the 
apologetic approach to prophecy have a teaching office, demonstrating that the 
object of faith and hope is beyond all earthly things. The images, the works of 
God, are a kind of speech, but in order to say what they mean, they must fall 
silent. Andrew Louth’s description of the importance of the principle of 
‘reserve’ in the ‘Lectures’, of Scripture’s ‘tendency to conceal’ as well as 
                                                 
107 Pusey quotes Augustine’s Confessions, IX.10.25, where Augustine describes his vision at 
Ostia. Talking with his mother, they ‘did by degrees pass through all things bodily … [to] 
arrive at that region of never-failing plenty … where life is the Wisdom by whom all these 
things are made’ (Ibid. IX.24). 
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reveal, also points to this kind of apophatic moment: ‘What is expressed in 
Scripture is veiled by reserve, surrounded (to use a phrase of Vladamir 
Lossky’s) by a ‘margin of silence’.108  
The typological displacement of attention does not only address the mind 
by teaching us what to value most, it also has a sanctifying effect by 
transferring our desire from earthly to heavenly things. Rowan Williams 
describes this divine purpose in the necessary imperfection of type in his 
analysis of Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine:  
The Word incarnate and crucified represents the absence and deferral that 
is basic to signum as such, and represents also, crucially, the fact that 
absence and deferral are the means whereby God engages our desire so 
that it is freed from its own pull towards finishing, towards presence and 
possession.109 
We saw above that Pusey describes the deferred fulfilment in terms of 
‘possession’. (L123, above) Speaking of Christ, Williams’ idea also mirrors 
that of Lossky, ‘He is God’s speech because he is worldly “silence”’.110 In a 
similar manner as Pusey had described the Old Testament, as having ‘no form 
or comeliness’, yet still being the ‘living and true Body, which it hath pleased 
God to take’ (L24), Williams suggests that signs, like the Incarnate God, are 
present in the world ‘in death, in weakness, inactivity, negation, the infirma 
divinitas of Confessions VII.18’.111 In order to release their saving efficacy, the 
types of the Bible need to undergo a kind of death which parallels the death of 
Christ and which enacts the believer’s death to creaturely attachments: ‘Cross 
and resurrection, to which all scriptural signs lead us, free us once and for all 
from the threat of an idolatry of signs. They are both inescapable and 
provisional.’112 Pusey makes the same point, arguing that types are only 
shadows of a ‘Heavenly rest and pure delight’ which warn us by fading away 
                                                 
108 Louth 1984, 37. For ‘reserve’ as the ‘tendency to conceal’, see T80, 3. 
109 Williams 1989, 148. 
110 Ibid. 144. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 148. 
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‘that they and our earthly existence are alike shadows, that not they, but He 
whom they represent is our rest’. (L151)113 
6.4.3 The Real Life to which Types Lead 
While Pusey maintains that types only inadequately symbolize the substance 
which they figure, Pusey uses the language of typical prophecy in the Psalms 
to describe the eternal realities which are both their fullest sense and the 
destination of our redemptive return to God. As we have seen already, the 
spiritual or eternal world is a more real world, a world with more substance, 
than the world which is accessible to empirical or historical investigation: 
All life is typical and an efflux of real life, and so our shadowy life, as 
opposed to death, is an emblem of endless life. Yet our days are not 
really here, but there: ‘the land of the living’ is not this land of darkness 
and gloominess. But where light and life are one is the Source of both. 
(L130) 
Pusey expresses here a form of the fundamental Platonic idea that ‘this world 
we perceive through the senses and about which we hold a variety of opinions, 
is the not the real world.’114 At the same time, to appreciate Pusey’s account, it 
is helpful to have in mind what Hort said of Coleridge, that he did not look 
upon the world of sense, ‘trees and rocks, as so many empty phantoms’. 
Rather, ‘the visible world was most thoroughly substantial to him, because he 
believed it to be sustained by an unseen world’.115 In Pusey’s terms, ‘every 
thing which is good is an efflux of God’. (L16) 
Considering expressions relating to ‘sleeping’ and ‘waking’ in the 
Psalms, Pusey finds typical prophecies of an ‘Awaking’ which is more real and 
permanent than what we know in the present: 
‘Sleeping’ and ‘awakening’ being then the daily image of death and 
Resurrection, and ‘sleep’ having been in the New Testament consecrated 
as the very title of death, ‘awaking’ of the bursting of the sleep of the 
grave, then Psalms which speak of ‘awaking’ will, in their highest 
meaning, belong to The Awaking. (L129) 
                                                 
113 Pusey quotes Williams 1846, ‘Image the First’, 12 (‘Heavenly rest and pure delight’). 
114 Louth 1994, 54. 
115 Hort 1856, 334. See also Hedley 2000, 129. 
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‘The Awaking’ here refers in its first sense to the Resurrection of Christ, and 
secondarily to the resurrection of each Christian in Christ. While the Christian 
has already been raised with Christ, a full sharing in that resurrection is still 
future. Pusey describes ‘the Awaking’ as the time when the image of God in 
humanity will be perfected. Commenting on Psalm 17:15, ‘As for me, I will 
behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy 
likeness’, Pusey writes: ‘according to the fullness of the Hebrew meaning, 
awakening as the image of God, he shall be filled with it; filled with it, he 
should be himself again that image’. (L129) Pusey finds the fullest sense of 
this verse expressed better in the translation of the Book of Common Prayer 
where, ‘it is happily rendered … “when I awake up, after Thy likeness”’. 
(L129) This translation emphasizes that the likeness cannot be external to the 
one who enjoys it. The true Awaking comes not from merely beholding God 
more openly, but by becoming like what we behold in the sense of 1 John 3:2, 
‘we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is’, or ‘after thy likeness’. 
Pusey’s description also emphasizes that the promise of salvation is fulfilled in 
a perfect participation in the Godhead. This is what it means to be ‘filled with’ 
the image of God, to be filled with the substance which belongs to the 
Archetype. In like manner, Pusey describes the eternal separation of the saved 
and the lost in terms of the image not being filled up, and so remaining a 
shadow even after the day has dawned and the eternal morning has come. The 
Psalms prophesy of those ‘who shall awaken to shame and everlasting 
contempt; ‘“as a dream, when one awaketh, shall Thou, O Lord, in The 
Awakening, despise their image”, their shadowy being, which, as devoid of 
God, was a vain unreal shew’. (L129) 
By way of analogy with the full meaning of Awaking, Pusey argues that 
expressions in the Psalms about the ‘Morning’ prophesy the morning of the 
resurrection of Christ and of the Christian’s resurrection in Him.116 At the 
                                                 
116 L129: ‘Since sleep is an image and name of death, waking of the Resurrection, the words “I 
laid Me down and slept; I awaked, for the Lord sustained Me”, (Ps. 3:5) most fully speak of 
His Resurrection which alone is past, as those of the next Psalm, “I will both lay me down in 
peace, and sleep: for thou, Lord, only makest me dwell in safety” (Ps. 4:8) which say nearly the 
same in the future, express most fully our hope of ours in Him.’ 
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Awaking, the promise which is enjoyed in some degree already will become a 
perfect possession: ‘“The morning” is that which shall have no evening, when 
the sun shall no more go down, the Morning of the One Day of Eternity.’ 
(L129) Pusey describes how this Morning is distinct from all the partial 
fulfilments of the prophecy:  
… when he says, ‘I shall sing of thy might, I shall sing joyously of Thy 
passion in The Morning, for Thou hast been a fortress for me, a place to 
flee unto, in the day of my trouble’, [Ps. 59:16] he speaks of one endless 
hymn of praise, when the troubles and temptations and assaults of this 
life [are] over … the Morning, when the night of this world shall have 
passed away, the Morning, when we fear no longer the besettings of 
sorrow, and of the devil and his angels; the Morning, when we wake no 
more by the light of prophecy, but contemplate the Word of God Himself 
our Sun. (L130) 
Referring to Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 90:15, ‘We are satisfied with 
Thy mercy in the morning’, Pusey emphasizes that this satisfaction fulfils the 
longing of humankind for presence and possession which is also the longing 
for the full meaning of the type:  
… when they who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be satisfied, 
compared with which all fulness now is but emptiness, when ‘Thou shalt 
make me full of joy with thy Countenance’, when He shall show us the 
Father and it shall suffice us, Which until it be accomplished, no good 
sufficeth us, nor ought to suffice us, lest our longing stop short in the 
way, which must be stretched forth until it attain. (L130)117  
There is an important connection between the fulfilment of human longing in 
the eternal morning, and the principle of typology. The types which can only 
be read with a sanctified mind are fulfilled when righteousness is joined with 
the vision of God which is communion with God. Likewise, the prophecy of 
the eternal Morning and Endless Day is a prophecy of the restored unity of the 
redeemed created order which has returned to God. Reading the Old Testament 
typically means seeing the relationship of the events, people, words, and 
institutions of the Old Covenant not simply to the New, but to the end which 
gives them the fullest sense which completes and perfects all the meaning of 
                                                 
117 Pusey quotes Augustine 1850, on Ps. 90 § 15, 279, referring also to Acts 2:28 which quotes 
Ps. 16:11 in the LXX version. 
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types and typical prophecy: ‘that God would be all in all things, then all good 
would find its end and perfection in Him, being complete and perfected in 
Him’.118 One again we see that Pusey offers a typological account not only of 
the reading of the Old Testament, but also of creation, sanctification, and of 
redemption, according to principles which one can trace up to the Trinitarian 
being of God. 
                                                 
118 S-FTL10.  
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Chapter 7 The Triple-Cord and the High Church Tradition 
7.1 The Soil from which the Oxford Movement Grew 
7.1.1 The Triple Cord 
It is not generally appreciated that in the early and most creative years of the 
Oxford Movement, the sort of typological and allegorical interpretation of the 
Scriptures that one finds in the Fathers occupied not only Pusey, but also 
Newman and Keble. Newman’s Arians of the Fourth Century (1833) and 
Keble’s Tract 89, ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the 
Church’ (1841) serve as book-ends to a period during which Pusey, Keble, and 
Newman, as well as those who worked with them, wrote and lectured on the 
importance of allegorical or typological interpretations of the Scriptures. This 
investigation involved not only a description of typology or allegory, but a 
consideration of the principles which were implied and embodied in this 
practice. Pusey wrote the ‘Lectures’ in the context of this common project, a 
project which served as the soil from which grew the fundamental ideas of the 
Oxford Movement. The extent to which this work was a shared endeavour 
serves as another kind of witness to the necessity of typical interpretation for 
Pusey and also reveals the importance of this idea in the Oxford Movement. 
At the time the ‘Lectures’ were written and delivered, Pusey, Keble, and 
Newman were working so closely together that it is often hard to distinguish 
their ideas or to know who was influencing whom, particularly on the subject 
of typological, allegorical or mystical interpretation.1 They all emphasized the 
necessary connection between holy living and interpreting the Bible, and 
criticised the evidential theology of the previous century: ‘The last century, a 
time when love was cold, is noted as being especially the Age of Evidences’.2 
At the same time, their approach to patristic interpretation displays different 
                                                 
1 Allchin 1967, 52. Seynaeve 1953, 221, quotes Newman’s correspondence showing that 
during the early to mid-1830s he was working out Keble’s convictions as much as his own. 
2 ‘Sermon X: Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind’, in Newman 2006, § 42, 140, 
and § 35-45, 136-142. In the same volume, see xxxviii-ix and ‘Sermon XIII: Implicit and 
Explicit Reason’, § 17-18, 181, § 33-35, 187-8. For the ‘evil frame of mind’ produced by ‘the 
Evidences’, see Life, 301. For Keble on evidence, see T89, I.4,5 and Beek 54.  
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emphases. In the ‘Lectures’, Pusey the Professor of Hebrew focuses more than 
do Newman and Keble on a close reading of the text as well as investigating 
Jewish interpretations of the passages which he examines. Also, the way his 
encounter with German rationalism guides both his criticisms of the apologetic 
school and his advocacy of patristic interpretation, distinguished his approach 
from that of his colleagues. Pusey avoids the adjective ‘allegorical’ to describe 
the Fathers’ approach, whereas Keble and Newman use the term more freely. 
In his book on the Arians, Newman considers in more detail than does Pusey 
the connections between different kinds of interpretation and orthodox or 
heretical forms of belief.3 Keble the Professor of Poetry addresses the poetical 
elements of mystical interpretation. 4  
We can see the way in which the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared project 
in correspondence between Keble and Pusey during the winter of 1837. A 
fortnight before Pusey resumed his course of lectures on types and prophecies 
at the beginning of the Lent Term that year, Keble writes to Pusey about the 
paper, ‘On the Mysticism imputed to Early Christian Writers’, which he was 
preparing to give to the Theological Society which met in Pusey’s lodgings at 
Christ Church. The eight papers which Keble presented on the typical 
interpretations of the Fathers over the next four years formed the basis of his 
Tract 89, ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church’ 
(1841).5 Keble writes: ‘I have had a little scruple, from the thought that 
whatever I might say well I should only be going over the ground which you 
have been and are handling more considerately and better’. His letter 
emphasizes his unity of purpose with Pusey – it is ‘good to have two or three 
independent witnesses to the same truth’.6 On Easter Tuesday, two months 
later, Keble tells Pusey that he is working on ‘the continuation of the Paper on 
the Fathers’: ‘The subject, I think, will be the Limitation of the Figurative 
Interpretation as received by them: as that it did not trench on [encroach upon] 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Thomas 1991, 109-11,165-170. 
4 See for example Keble 1912, ii, 481, quoted below. 
5 Keble delivered his papers on 27 Jan., 12 May, and 8 Dec. 1837; 16 Mar. 1838; 13 Mar., 12 
June 1840; 12 May, 18 June 1841. See ‘Theological Society, 1837-41’ in ‘Pusey Papers: 
Various’. See also Life, 335. 
6 Keble to Pusey, 18 Jan. 1837, LBV-97. 
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the Letter – that it does not affect the Ethics of the Old Testament in such cases 
as, e.g., the history of Lot & c. [etc.]’.7 Referring to another idea we have 
already considered, he tells Pusey that he will also address the origin of 
‘Figurative interpretation’, and show ‘that it cannot be accounted for as an 
accommodation to the Rabbis, or the Platonists and c. [etc.]’ In the same letter, 
he also praises Newman’s ‘Lectures on the Rule of Faith’. He appears to refer 
to one or more of the latter lectures in Newman’s Lectures on the Prophetical 
Office of the Church (1837).8 While Newman’s Lectures do not have as their 
primary subject the mystical or typological reading of Scripture, Newman puts 
forward ideas common to both Keble’s papers on ‘Mysticism’ and Pusey’s 
‘Lectures’. Newman speaks of the ‘emblematic actions’ and ‘typical miracles’ 
of ‘our Saviour’ and quotes Basil who advocates that we do not interpret these 
words and deeds ‘in a simple or carnal manner’, but rather ‘enter into the 
depths of His contemplation’ and ‘become a communicant in truths mystically 
delivered’.9 In his letter to Pusey, Keble comments that he wishes that he had 
seen Newman’s Lectures before writing a particular sermon.10 Keble’s letter 
indicates how much the three men were working together at the time. Keble 
writes to Pusey about the paper, ‘On the Mysticism imputed to Early Christian 
Writers’, that he was scheduled to give while Pusey was offering his course of 
lectures on typical interpretation. In the same letter, Keble expresses his keen 
interest in another series of lectures by Newman which touches on the same 
topic. These three works, Keble’s Tract 89, Pusey’s work on types, and 
Newman’s Lectures on the Prophetical Office, emerged from the shared study 
of the allegorical and typological interpretations of the early Church.  
The way in which Pusey, Keble, and Newman worked together on the 
Library of the Fathers also shows how the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared 
project and the importance of that project to the Oxford Movement. The idea of 
                                                 
7 Keble to Pusey, Easter Tuesday [28 March], 1837, LBV-97. 
8 Newman 1839a. At the beginning of Lecture XI, ‘On Scripture as the Record of Faith’, 
Newman states that he will discuss in that lecture and the following two ‘what is sometimes 
called the Rule of Faith’. Newman dates the preface 24 Feb, 1837. 
9 Lect. XII, ‘On Scripture as the Record of our Lord’s Teaching’, Newman 1839a, 358. See 
also his reference to the ‘hidden sense’. Lect. XIII, 398. 
10It is not clear to which sermon Keble refers here. 
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producing the Library of the Fathers seems to have taken ‘definite shape’ at a 
meeting between him and Newman on 24 August, 1836, i.e. the same period 
during which Pusey was preparing the ‘Lectures’. After that meeting Pusey’s 
letters to Newman ‘are full of the scheme’.11 A month later Pusey and Newman 
wrote to Keble to propose that he join them, a proposal to which Keble 
agreed.12 In his letter, Pusey draws on Ecclesiastes 4:12, ‘a threefold cord is 
not quickly broken’, to describe their common purpose: 
I have actually sent your name as a joint editor, waiting only for your 
formal sanction of it. 
I hope that you will not think it very bold; but, you know, ‘a treble cord’ 
& c. [etc.]’: and last year you and Newman left me to write my tracts ‘On 
Holy Baptism’ by myself, and to bear all the brunt of the Record; so this 
year I have intertwined your and Newman’s names so fast that I hope 
they will not easily slip away.13 
This is not the first time that Pusey referred to the three of them as a ‘treble’ or 
triple cord. The year before, he wrote to Newman: ‘Best of all I should like to 
see our triple cord restored, “Keble, Newman, Pusey on Baptism.”’14 As we 
have seen already, Pusey’s Tracts ‘Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism’ are a 
companion piece to the ‘Lectures’, rehearsing many of the same principles and 
examples of typology. Pusey’s description of the triple cord is, therefore, also a 
reference to the way in which the three men were grappling with theological 
questions by investigating early Christian interpretation of Scripture. 
7.1.2 Newman on Allegory 
Newman’s discussion of allegorical exegesis in Arians of the Fourth Century 
(1833) offers a witness from the early years of the Oxford Movement of the 
shared project of which the ‘Lectures’ are a part. In the section on ‘The Church 
of Alexandria’, Newman describes the allegorical reading of the Scriptures not 
as an issue of historical concern only, but as a matter of primary and abiding 
                                                 
11 Trench 1900, 104. 
12 Life, 424-428. 
13 Pusey to Keble, 22 Sept. 1836, LBV-101, and Life, 425. To this letter from Pusey, Newman 
added his own appeal: ‘You must not think we are hurrying you into a plan of our own. Of 
course nothing shall be done about your name till we hear from [you].’  
14 Pusey to Newman, 21 Oct. 1835, LBV-117. See also Trench 1900, 88. 
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theological importance. Newman argues that the allegorical reading offered by 
the Alexandrians arises necessarily when one understands the ‘inspired 
writings’, the Scriptures: ‘Those writings themselves have certainly an 
allegorical structure, and seem to countenance and invite an allegorical 
interpretation.’15 Moreover, for Newman, this allegorical structure is 
inextricably related to what and how Scripture communicates, to its message 
and form:  
Thus there seemed every encouragement, from the structure of Scripture, 
from the apparent causes which led to that structure, and from the 
purposes to which it was actually applied by its Divine Author, to induce 
the Alexandrians to consider its text as primarily and directly the 
instrument of an allegorical teaching.16  
If it is God’s purpose to use allegory to teach the message of the Bible, then 
this must concern the Church in every age. Years later, in An Essay on the 
Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman stated succinctly the view that he 
shared with Pusey, only substituting ‘mystical’ for Pusey’s ‘typical’: ‘it may 
almost be laid down as a historical fact, that the mystical interpretation and 
orthodoxy will stand or fall together’.17  
Newman’s sermons and some of his other writings during the decade 
following the publication of the Arians in 1833 show that he shared with Pusey 
the view that the Old Testament was one great system of mystical, allegorical, 
or in Pusey’s terms, ‘typical’, prophecy of Christ and the Church. In ‘The 
Gospel Feast’, a sermon given in May 1838, the year after Pusey delivered his 
‘Lectures’, Newman writes: ‘Now the Old Testament, as we know, is full of 
figures and types of the Gospel; types various, and, in their literal wording, 
contrary to each other, but all meeting and harmoniously filled in Christ and 
His Church.’18 He continues, ‘All that our Saviour has done is again and again 
                                                 
15 Arians, 1 § 3, 63. 
16 Ibid. 66. See King 2009, 38-42 for a consideration of the importance of allegory in Arians. 
17 Newman quoted in Seynaeve 1953, 320. Seynaeve maintains that Newman, generally during 
his whole life and especially during his ‘Anglican period’, preferred the kind of ‘mystical 
interpretation’ practised by the Alexandrian school over a more ‘critico-historical and literal 
method’ (p. 311-312). 
18 N-PPS-vii, 163 ‘The Gospel Feast’ May 20-28, 1838. For the date, Seynaeve 1953, 214. 
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shadowed out in the Old Testament.’19 In Tract 85, ‘Lectures on the Scripture 
Proof of the Doctrines of the Church’ (1840), Newman writes: ‘is not the 
whole of the Bible, Old and New Testament, engaged in a system of outward 
signs and hidden realties under them?’20 Describing Christ as the focus of the 
Scriptures and the life of the Church, Newman adds that ‘every part of the 
Dispensation tends to the manifestation of Him who is the centre’.21 
Like Pusey, Newman also describes a typical reading as a ‘Sacramental’ 
reading. The language of type is not ‘merely figurative’ even if we do not 
understand entirely how the type will be fulfilled:  
And, since we do not know, we will studiously keep to the figure given 
us in Scripture: we will not attempt to interpret it, or change the wording 
of it, being wise above what is written. We will not neglect it, because 
we do not understand it. We will hold it as a Mystery, or (what was 
anciently called) a Truth Sacramental; that is, a high invisible grace 
lodged in an outward form, a precious possession to be piously and 
thankfully guarded for the sake of the heavenly reality contained in it.22 
The types of Scripture are sacraments which participate in the reality which 
they figure and which communicate an invisible grace to the Church. In his 
Lectures on the Prophetical Office, Newman writes: ‘Every word of revelation 
has a deep meaning. It is the outward form of a heavenly truth, and in this 
sense a mystery or sacrament.’23 Like Pusey, Newman describes the grace 
which comes from the typical reading of Scriptures as analogous to that which 
comes from sharing in the ‘Heavenly Feast’ of Holy Communion:  
And if they are blessed who shall eat and drink of that table in the 
kingdom, so too blessed are they who meditate upon it, and hope for it 
now, – who read Scripture with it in their thoughts, and endeavour to 
look beneath the veil of the literal text, and to catch a sight of the gleams 
of heavenly light which are behind it’.24  
                                                 
19 ‘The Gospel Feast,’ N-PPS-vii, 165. 
20 Quoted in Seynaeve 1953, 316. 
21 ‘Saving Knowledge’, Jan. or Feb. 1835, N-PPS-ii, 155. For the date, Seynaeve 1953, 208. 
22 N-PPS-ii, 211, Sermon 18, ‘Mysteries in Religion,’ on the Ascension of Christ, from the end 
of 1834.  
23 Lecture X, ‘On the Essentials of the Gospel’, Newman 1839a, 314. 
24 N-PPS-vii, ‘The Gospel Feast’, 162 . 
  263 
For Newman, this approach expresses his understanding of the ‘Sacramental 
system; that is, the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and the 
instruments of real things unseen’, a system which he learned through his study 
of the Alexandrian Church, but first from Bishop Butler and John Keble, and 
which we find also in Pusey.25 Moreover, the language of type cannot be left 
behind even when the antitype is come or revealed. If we seek to probe the 
meaning of Christian doctrine, to know, for example, ‘why was it that Christ 
ascended on high, or with what object’, we cannot explain this in abstract 
language: ‘Instead of explaining, Scripture does but continue to answer us in 
the language of the type; even to the last it veils His deed under the ancient 
figure.’26 
7.1.3 Keble and a Mystical Reading 
Keble’s primary work on the typical or mystical interpretation of Scripture was 
published as Tract 89 of the Tracts for the Times, ‘On the Mysticism attributed 
to the Early Fathers of the Church’. In it, Keble sets out to investigate ‘the 
universal adoption by the early Christian writers of the allegorical way of 
expounding the Old Testament’.27 For Keble, as for Pusey, the study of 
mystical interpretation must include the search for the first principles, the 
grammar or rules of allegorical interpretation, which the best interpreters knew 
by a kind of instinct. Keble cautions those who limit the principle of 
‘Mysticism’, which is synonymous with Pusey’s use of type or typology:  
Here, as in every part of our patristical studies, it may be well to bear in 
mind the dream of Jacob, that we may not to our fear and shame have to 
awake by and by, and say, ‘Surely the LORD was with us in so many 
places, betokened by so many of His creatures, and we knew it not, but 
treated the thought unworthily.’28 
Like Pusey in the ‘Lectures’ when he refers to Cain’s neglect of a typical 
reading of the coats of skins, Keble offers a mystical interpretation of Jacob’s 
                                                 
25 Newman 1967, 28. For ‘sacramental’ interpretation as a synonym for figurative, typological, 
allegorical, spiritual, or mystical interpretation for Newman, see Seynaeve 1953, 309. 
26 N-PPS-ii, 211, Sermon 18, ‘Mysteries in Religion,’ on the Ascension of Christ, from the end 
of 1834. In a note, Newman refers to Rev. 8:3-4. 
27 T89, II.1, 14. 
28 T89, VI.21, 162. 
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vision to urge the importance of typical interpretation more generally. 
For Keble, as for Pusey and Newman, the whole of the Old Testament is 
prophetic of Christ, both directly and indirectly: ‘In the Old Testament the 
leading idea is, that the Church, whether diffusive, or embodied in her anointed 
members, king, priest, or prophet, is every where the type of Christ’.29 Keble’s 
Tract puts forward many of the ideas found in the ‘Lectures’. He criticizes the 
utilitarian tendencies of modern apologists, for whom ‘common sense and 
practical utility are the very idols of this age’.30 He argues with Augustine and 
the Fathers that, ‘so far as they are figurative’, the histories of the Old 
Testament prophesy Christ and his Church: ‘to Christ only, and His Church, 
the City of God, are they to be referred in every instance’. 31  
Like Pusey, Keble connects the interpretation of the Book of God’s word 
with learning to read the Book of Nature: ‘the Fathers passed from one branch 
of mysticism into another, from allegorizing the word of God, to spiritualizing 
His works’.32 For Keble this means that ‘we have the sum of this visible world 
declared to be an index or token of the invisible’.33 Moreover, as well as 
speaking in a way analogous to the words of Scripture, these signs have 
something of the character of sacraments: 
 … the works of God in creation and providence, besides their immediate 
uses in this life, appeared to the old writers as so many intended tokens 
from the Almighty, to assure us of some spiritual fact or other, which it 
concerns us in some way to know. So far, therefore, they fulfilled half at 
least of the nature of sacraments, according to the strict definition of our 
Catechism: they were pledges to assure us of some spiritual thing, if they 
were not means to convey it to us. They were, in a very sufficient sense, 
Verba visibilia.34  
Keble also follows Pusey in discussing Ambrose’s Hexameron and the idea 
that the ‘beginning’ of Genesis 1:1 is not a beginning in time, but an evocation 
of the Archetype, what Keble calls ‘the chief point, or head, as if one should 
                                                 
29 T89, V.19, 129. 
30 T89, I.2, 4. 
31 T89, II.29, 38. Keble quotes Augustine, The City of God, XVI.2. 
32 T89, II.23, 29. For an example from the ‘Epistle to Barnabas’, see II.19, 26. 
33 T89, VI.12, 152. 
34 T89, VI.8, 148. 
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say in Latin, summa operis’.  
What Keble says about natural signs also applies to Scripture – a 
mystical interpretation is also a sacramental reading. ‘Sacramentals’ was the 
original title for the papers on ‘Mysticism’ which he gave to the Theological 
Society.35 As a characteristic example of the mysticism of the Fathers, Keble 
points to Ambrose and Chrysostom, who encourage the reader of the Old 
Testament to apprehend the ‘sacramental nature’ of the histories of the 
patriarchs: ‘consider not simply what was done, but look to the purpose’.36 
Keble refers also to Augustine who writes: ‘Such is the letter of the Old 
Testament, clothed with the wrappings of carnal sacraments, or tokens; but if 
you once come to its marrow, it nourishes and satisfies.’37 The importance of 
this sacramental principle is emphasized by W. J. A. M. Beek, who argues that 
for Keble the main criterion of a living faith is ‘belief in the reality of the 
supernatural and its sacramental representation in the natural’.38 For Keble, 
Beek writes, ‘man’s symbolical sense is sacramental, because it enables him to 
regard all nature as a mystical manifestation of God’s presence’.39 Keble 
describes the sacramental character of natural or literary signs and symbols in 
his lectures on poetry: ‘In short, Poetry lends Religion her wealth of symbols 
and similes: Religion restores these again to Poetry, clothed with so splendid a 
radiance that they appear to be no longer merely symbols, but to partake (I 
might almost say) of the nature of sacraments.’40 
7.1.4 The Theological Society 
The Theological Society which Pusey founded in 1835 was an important forum 
for the Tractarians’ study of the typological and allegorical interpretations of 
                                                 
35 Keble to Pusey, 18 Jan. 1837, LBV-97. 
36 T89, IV.18, 92. Keble quotes, first, Ambrose, Jacob and the Happy Life, Book II.2.6, 
describing how Rebecca offered her ‘righteous’ son to the Lord, and then Chrysostom’s 
reflections on the meaning of the account, Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis, Homily 43. 
37 T89, V.12, 121. 
38 Beek 1959, 102. 
39 Ibid. 115. 
40 Keble 1912, ii, 481. See also Laws, xci-ii, where Keble discusses the Father’s interpretation 
of natural symbols: ‘the whole world, to them, was full of sacraments’. 
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the Fathers.41 From 1836 to 1841, the society met three, four, or even six times 
per term in Pusey’s house in Christ Church. While the purpose was a general 
one – ‘To promote the study of Theology, according to the peculiar character 
of our Church, by combining the study of Christian Antiquity with that of Holy 
Scripture’ – many papers bore more or less directly on the patristic 
interpretation of the Bible. As we have seen already, Tract 89 is one example 
of those projects for which the Theological Society was the initial impetus.  
Tracts 80 (1838) and 87 (1840) by Isaac Williams, ‘On Reserve in 
Communicating Religious Knowledge’, offer together another example of the 
way in which the ‘Lectures’ were part of a shared project. Pusey considered 
these Tracts, based on papers which Williams gave during the Lent Term of 
1837 for the Theological Society, as ‘the most valuable in the whole 
collection’.42 In them, Williams discusses the purposeful obscurity of 
revelation which is given through types and figures: ‘there appears in God’s 
manifestations of Himself to mankind, in conjunction with an exceeding desire 
to communicate that knowledge, a tendency to conceal, and throw a veil over 
it, as if it were injurious to us, unless we were of a certain disposition to 
receive it’.43 The way Williams unites an account of the ‘reserved’ or veiled 
character of revelation with the idea that genuine knowledge of spiritual things 
is a function of sanctification makes this a helpful concept with which to 
approach Pusey’s argument in the ‘Lectures’ and the Tractarian investigation 
of patristic interpretation more generally. While Pusey does not use the term 
‘reserve’, we have seen that the ideas which this principle draws together are 
important for the ‘Lectures’.44 Likewise, Keble, in many ways the embodiment 
of reserve, argues that an appreciation of this principle is necessary in order to 
interpret or understand the Fathers’ mode of expression:  
                                                 
41 See ‘Theological Society, 1837-41’, ‘Pusey Papers: Various’. All references to the dates and 
titles of papers come from this source. See also Life, 334-5. 
42 For the importance of the Tracts, see Pusey to Dr. Hook, 12 Aug. 1838, LBV 95. Williams 
gave his papers ‘On the Reserve of Holy Scripture and the Early Church in treating sacred 
subjects before persons unprepared to receive them’ on 3 and 17 Feb., 1837. 
43 T80, 3. See also pp. 5-6, 12, 27. 
44 See Louth 1984, 37-38 for a discussion of ‘the doctrine of reserve’ and the ‘Lectures’. 
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… a little ecclesiastical knowledge will suggest to us another 
consideration, very needful to be borne in mind, when we are estimating 
the value of their concurrence in any point within their sphere, I mean the 
reverential reserve, which undoubtedly they practised in every part of 
religion, in proportion to its sacredness.45  
Newman also discusses this ‘reverential reserve’ extensively in The Arians of 
the Fourth Century in relation to the ‘disciplini arcani’ of the Fathers.46 
Harrison, whose involvement in the Theological Society will be considered 
below, tells Pusey that he finds in the Fathers’ expositions of Scripture ‘a kind 
of veiling which, on the principles of Williams’ Tract, seems almost 
necessary’.47  
As has already been noted, Pusey corresponded with Williams on the 
subject and material of the ‘Lectures’ some years after they were given. On 28 
February, 1840, Williams gave another paper which bore directly on the 
subject of the ‘Lectures’ at the Theological Society, ‘The Rule of Scriptural 
Interpretation furnished by our Lord’. While that paper does not appear to be 
preserved, his Devotional Commentary on the Gospel Narrative, published in 
eight volumes between 1841 and 1850, suggests that ‘the Rule’ was one that 
emphasized typological or figurative interpretation:  
Our Lord had been pleased to reveal Himself to the Jews of old in a dark 
and mysterious manner, speaking to them through the medium of type 
and figure … So also in the Gospels does our Lord frequently use dark 
sayings, and figures which were not understood at the time by those to 
whom He spoke.48 
In the same commentary, Williams emphasizes that understanding the 
fulfilment of prophecy requires a searching out of the hidden meaning: ‘our 
Blessed Lord alludes to expressions or events in the Old Testament, which 
might be considered figurative or allegorical; of which He has shewn the 
fulfilment, not after a literal, but in a spiritual and high sense’.49 With Pusey, 
                                                 
45 T89, I.9, 13. Keble discusses the principle of reserve and its connection with the ‘principle of 
piety’ in his lectures on poetry. Keble 1912, ii, 482. For Keble’s reserved character, see Wood 
1909, 226-8. 
46 Arians, 55-61, in relation to allegory, 62-68. See also King 2009, 52. 
47 B. Harrison to Pusey, 4 Jan. 1838, LBV-47. 
48 Williams 1870, 109.  
49 Williams 1870, 193. 
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Williams was a key co-worker in the endeavour to recover a patristic reading 
of Scripture.  
During the Lent term of 1837, at the same time that Pusey was delivering 
his ‘Lectures’, another of the Tractarians, Benjamin Harrison, gave the first 
two of three papers on ‘The Alexandrian School’.50 From 1835, the year before 
Pusey began to work on his ‘Lectures’, through to the beginning of 1838, 
Harrison corresponded with Pusey about the typological expositions of this 
school.51 As we saw in the last chapter, Harrison stressed the importance of 
recovering ‘the higher symbolical and typical interpretation’ of the post-
Apostolical Fathers. He also reflected Pusey’s impatience with limiting the 
typological principle:  
I have been following out a good deal the subject of the typical meaning 
of the Old Testament: and this has led me to rather a wide range, because 
in typical expositions I have always felt, if this be true as well as 
ingenious, it ought to extend much further – there should be an analogy – 
Vitringa’s interpretation of Samson and Joseph seems to leave one 
suddenly where he ought to go on.52  
He went on to urge the importance of ‘an entire return’ to the system of the 
Fathers. Like Pusey, he saw the typical interpretations of the Fathers as a 
general or catholic principle misunderstood or scorned in their day: ‘In 
studying Scripture typically, I thought one seemed to view it under a light 
which the early Church seemed systematically and uniformly to apply; and for 
the neglect of which made all their whole system of interpretation seem 
fanciful and absurd to modern readers.’53 The way in which the Theological 
Society provided a forum in which the Tractarians furthered the investigation 
of patristic exegesis and the theological principles which these practices 
expressed and developed show the importance of the argument of the 
                                                 
50 10 Mar. and 26 May 1837. The third paper was given the next year on 30 Mar. 1838. 
51 See Harrison to Pusey, 13 Sept. 1836, on the doctrine of the Logos and the necessity of 
going back to the ancients, 7 July 1837, on the relationship between the image and prototype in 
creation, and 4 Jan. 1838, commending I. Williams’ principle of reserve. LBV-47. 
52 Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug, 1835. Harrison refers to the Dutch theologian Campegius 
Vitringa (1693-1723) known especially for his Commentary on Isaiah. 
53 Harrison to Pusey, 5 Jan. 1836, LBV-47. 
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‘Lectures’ for the Tractarians.54 
7.2 The ‘Lectures’ and the High Church Tradition 
7.2.1 The Hackney Phalanx and the Hutchinsonians 
Despite the critical attitude which Pusey and his colleagues had for some 
aspects of the High Church or orthodox tradition in the decades preceding the 
Oxford revival, it is nonetheless from this tradition which the Oxford 
Movement emerged, and whose distinctive theological emphases are evident in 
the ‘Lectures’. Liddon describes Pusey’s regard for High Churchmen who 
witnessed to the communion of faith between the Caroline divines and the 
early Church: 
Side by side with Evangelicalism there were also convictions which had 
been handed down across the dreary interval of the eighteenth century, 
and which here and there found expression in the lives of holy men, who 
taught a generation of Latitudinarians and Methodists how the great men 
of the Caroline age in the Church of England had believed and lived and 
died. Such men as Jones of Nayland, and Dr. Sikes of Guilsborough, and, 
at a somewhat later period, Mr. Norris of Hackney, and Mr. Joshua 
Watson, were of this company. The first two were theologians, inheriting 
and contemplating truths on which the Non-jurors had laid stress, and 
living in communion of thought and sympathy with the ancient Church.55 
One of those who Liddon singles out is ‘Mr. Norris of Hackney’ (1771-1850), 
the most influential clerical member of ‘the Hackney School, to which Pusey 
used often to refer’.56 The ‘Hackney School’, or the ‘Hackney Phalanx’ was a 
group linked by common ideas, friendship, family, and patronage with the 
merchant Joshua Watson (1771-1855), another one of those to whom Liddon 
refers, and his brother Archdeacon John Watson (1767-1839), the rector of the 
village of Hackney in North East London.57 In a letter to Joshua Watson after a 
visit to him in Brighton in September, 1839, Pusey reveals his sense both of the 
importance of the connection with at least some elements of the High Church 
                                                 
54 Newman also presented at least two papers to the Society, on 3 Nov. 1837, ‘On the Heresy 
of Apollinaris’, and on 14 Feb. 1840, ‘On the Monophysite Heresy’. 
55 Life, 256. For Pusey’s regard for Dr. Thomas Sikes, the rector of Guilsborough, see Life, 
257. 
56 Life, 258. 
57 For the importance of the Hackney Phalanx, see Nockles 1994, 14-15 and Hylson-Smith 
1993, 101-120.  
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tradition, and of the strains caused, in part, by what Watson saw as the 
Tractarians’ party spirit and innovations: 
We seem to have been plying against wind and tide of late … One had 
become so much the object of suspicion, that I cannot say how cheering 
it was to be recognised by you as carrying on the same torch which we 
had received from yourself and from those of your generation, who had 
remained faithful to the old teaching. We seemed no longer separated by 
a chasm from the old times and old paths, to which we wished to lead 
people back; the links which united us to those of old seemed to be 
restored.58  
Pusey’s view of the faithfulness of his group did not prevent him, however, 
from criticizing in the ‘Lectures’ the apologetic approach to prophecy which he 
found in William Van Mildert, one the members of the Hackney School. 
Liddon’s reference to ‘Jones of Nayland’ (1726–1800) as one of those 
who lived ‘in communion of thought and sympathy with the ancient Church’ 
points to another current of thought which is important to the ‘Lectures’. 
William Jones, from 1777 perpetual curate of Nayland, in Suffolk, was 
associated with the Hutchinsonians, the name given to a group of mostly High 
Churchman who developed the ideas of the naturalist and theologian John 
Hutchinson. Hutchinson* combined ‘a mysterious veneration of the Hebrew 
language with a fundamentalist opposition to Newtonian science’ and he 
criticized both ‘the materialism of the philosophers of their time and the 
humanism of the Latitudinarian divines’.59 In this approach he foreshadowed 
Pusey who combined an esteem for Hebrew, the ‘picture-language of the East’ 
(L24), God’s own language, ‘formed through His Spirit by His prophets as the 
tables of His law were “written by His finger”’, with his criticism of the 
scientism of the evidence writers.60 In addition to promoting ‘High Church 
                                                 
58 Pusey to J. Watson in Churton 1863, 236-7. See also Life, 259: ‘As Pusey said shortly before 
his own death, these men “must have prepared the ground for the Tracts.”’ 
59 Mather 1992, 10. See also Mather’s description of Bp Samuel Horsley on pp. 205, and 
Nockles 1994, 204.  
*Hutchinson, John (1674-1737). He wrote his best known work Moses Principia (1724, 1727) 
in response to Isaac Newton’s Principia. He furthered his investigations in natural philosophy 
by travelling extensively in England and Wales in the employ of the duke of Somerset. 
60 S-EL, 3. Pusey writes that through ‘the ambition of Nebuchadnezzar and Alexander [the 
Great] … The Hebrew spirit was infused into the body of the Greek, and He “turned to the 
  271 
ecclesiastical, political and sacramental principles’, Nockles argues that 
‘Hutchinsonian High Church rhetoric against the contemporary cult of human 
reason strikingly prefigured that of the Tractarians’.61 For the Hutchinsonians, 
religious knowledge is not addressed primarily to the intellect but rather 
‘requires a preparation of the heart, a welcome by the whole person’, another 
important theme in the ‘Lectures’.62 
In the works of William Jones, one finds important elements of Pusey’s 
argument. Jones emphasizes that spiritual understanding is confused by corrupt 
affections as much as imperfect argument: ‘our religious differences … 
proceed from the blindness and corruption of the human heart, increased and 
cherished by some false principle that suits with its appetites’. The solution is 
not better arguments, but the transformation of the whole person by the grace 
of humility and obedience: ‘Where that is suffered to enter, and the heart, 
instead of persisting in its own will, is surrendered to the will of God, the 
whole gospel is sufficiently clear, because no text of it is any longer 
offensive.’63 This emphasis on faith as the capacity which perceives and 
approves spiritual things is an argument about epistemology as well as 
sanctification, a combination we have considered in relation to the ‘Lectures’.64  
Some of the Hutchinsonians encouraged the consideration of the kind of 
typical or allegorical interpretations which Pusey advocates in the ‘Lectures’. 
Of course, there are numerous and rich sources in English theology which may 
have shaped Pusey’s understanding of patristic interpretation. Keble discusses 
the way in which ‘Hooker’s sympathy with the fourth century rather than the 
sixteenth is perpetually breaking out’, and suggests that this shows itself in an 
appreciation of the Fathers’ sacramental approach to the types and figures of 
                                                 
nations a pure language”, His own, which, as far as it was a written language, was formed 
through His Spirit …’. 
61 Nockles 1994, 13, 203, also 204-5. See also Hylson-Smith 1993, 89-94. 
62 Tavard 1978, 255.  
63 William Jones, The Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity, New York (1813), quoted in Tavard 
1978, 255. Nockles also finds High Church precursors for the doctrine of reserve, although the 
examples he gives generally focus on temper or character rather than the connection of this 
principle with biblical obscurity. See Nockles 1994, 198-200. 
64 Tavard argues that the Hutchinsonians ‘anticipated some of the major conceptions of John 
Henry Newman’s epistemology’. Tavard 1978, 257. 
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Scripture and of nature: ‘And thus did the whole scheme of material things, 
and especially those objects in it which are consecrated by scriptural allusion, 
assume in their eyes a sacramental or symbolical character.’65 Nicolas Lossky 
finds a patristic approach to Scriptural allegory, according to which the 
scriptural or sacramental symbol participates in the reality which it figures, in 
the sermons of Lancelot Andrewes as well.66 We have also seen that Bishop 
Butler’s articulation of the correspondence between natural and revealed 
religion profoundly influenced Pusey and his fellow Tractarians’ sense of the 
sacramental or typical character of the two books of God.  
In the decades prior to the Tractarians’ efforts to recover a patristic or 
‘Apostolic’ way of reading the Bible, it was the Hutchinsonians who bore 
witness to ‘the old teaching’ to which Pusey ‘wished to lead people back’.67 
For example, Bishop Samuel Horsley (1733-1806), using ‘poetical’ as a 
synonym for symbolic or allegorical, wrote that ‘the far greater part of the 
prophetical writings, and all the psalms without exception, are poetical’.68 
Edward Churton, who had studied at Christ Church with Pusey and been the 
curate of J. J. Watson in Hackney, likewise saw a connection between patristic 
interpretation and the Hutchinsonians. When Churton wrote to Newman about 
his hope ‘to analyse the principle of the Allegorical Interpretations of the 
Fathers’, he asked, ‘how far does their Allegorical System resemble the 
Hutchinsonian?’69 Pointing to the Hutchinsonians, Nockles argues that ‘the 
                                                 
65 Laws, xci. 
66 Lossky 1986, 70:  ‘Le significant, l’image par exemple, participe à la réalité signifiée.’  
67 Churton 1863, 237. Quoted in full above. 
68 Horsley quoted in Mather 1992, 206. If it is correct to see Horsley as a precursor to the 
‘Lectures’, it appears that Pusey’s opinion of the Hutchinsonian approach changed in the early 
1830s. In his letter about English theology to Tholuck in May 1830, Pusey described Bp 
Horsley as ‘too rash a critic, too much of the conjectural school, and a Hutchinsonian’. Life, 
244. 
69 Churton to Newman, 2 Feb. 1838. See ‘Newman Papers: “British Critic”, 1836 – 1841’. 
Speaking of Churton, Nockles writes, ‘It was he who first drew up a patristic theory of 
scriptural allegory with reference to earlier Hutchinsonian notions’, and adds that Churton 
dropped the subject in favour of Keble (Nockles 1994, 208). However, it would probably be 
better to say that Churton witnessed to the need for such a theory, apparently after the 
Tractarians had already undertaken the task, but did not formulate one himself. In his article, 
‘Use of the Fathers’, Churton speaks in general terms about the character of the Fathers’ 
writings, their witness to the ‘depth and compass in the divine word, far different from the 
shifting interpretations learnt in the diluted theology of later days’, but he does not offer a 
detailed exposition of their interpretations (Churton 1838, 47). He tells Newman that he hopes 
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patristic theory of sacramental symbolism was implicit in the writings of 
numerous pre-Tractarian High Churchmen’.70 
7.2.2 Jones of Nayland and the Figurative Language of Holy Scripture 
One of the fullest treatments of the typological interpretation of the Bible in the 
fifty years before the ‘Lectures’ was offered by William Jones in A Course of 
Lectures on the Figurative Language of Holy Scripture, and the Interpretation 
of it from Scripture Itself (1786).71 To this Jones added A Discourse on the Use 
and Intention of Some Remarkable Passages of the Scripture, explaining some 
portions of his argument in the Lectures. Nockles argues that in Jones’ Course 
of Lectures, ‘the argument of Pusey’s Lectures on Types of half a century later 
was strikingly prefigured’.72 Jones himself connects his work to the 
Hutchinsonian school, criticizing those, ‘who ought to know better’, for 
‘ascribing things to Hutchinson, which were borrowed from Origen’. (J273)  
Jones begins his Lectures on the Figurative Language of Holy Scripture 
by addressing the obscurity of Scripture, ‘how the language of the Scripture 
differs from that of other books; and whence its obscurity arises’. (J5) He 
traces this obscurity to an inability to interpret types and to perceive ‘that sense 
of the scripture which is hidden under the signs and symbols of it’. (J22) He 
also describes the types of Scriptures by analogy with the sacraments; they 
‘reveal some sacred and heavenly doctrine under some outward and visible 
sign of it’. (J22) As Pusey will in the ‘Lectures’, Jones maintains ‘That there is 
both a plain and a figurative sense in the language of the scripture’, ‘a literal 
sense of the words, and a deeper sense of their general intention, called the 
spirit, which the letter cannot always reach’. (J25-6).  
                                                 
‘some Oxford man would take this subject’, being prevented in Crayke, North Yorkshire, by 
his want of books and also his want of a theory from doing more: ‘I had begun to make 
collections for an article on Origen, purposing to analyse the principle of the Allegorical 
Interpretations of the Fathers. But here again I am stopped for want of books: and in fact I am 
without a Theory about it at present’ (Churton to Newman, 2 Feb. 1838, cf. 9 Dec. 1837). 
Nockles’ dating of the letter of 2 Feb., signed ‘Crayke. Purif., B.V.M. 1838.’, to 6 Jan. appears 
to be an error. Nockles 1994, 208 n. 6. 
70 Nockles 1994, 207. 
71 Jones 1801. Page numbers to Jones’ sermons will be given in the text following an uppercase 
J, e.g. (J1) for page one of Jones’ lectures in the edition above. 
72 Nockles 1994, 207, and 208-9.  
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In addition to describing the figurative language of the Bible, Jones 
explains how the book of God’s word is written in signs from the book of 
God’s works: 
the Scripture is found to have a language of its own, which doth not 
consist of words, but of signs or figures taken from visible things. It 
could not otherwise treat of God, who is a spirit, and of the spirit of man, 
and of a spiritual world; which no words can describe. Words are the 
arbitrary signs of natural things; but the language of revelation goes a 
step farther, and uses some things as the signs of other things; in 
consequence of which, the world which we now see becomes a sort of 
commentary on the mind of God, and explains the world in which we 
believe. (J11) 
In Jones’ description we hear Pusey’s view that ‘“every thing is a type,” if we 
could see it’. Whereas Pusey describes God’s works as syllables, Jones says 
that all created things are letters: ‘all the objects of sense in heaven and earth, 
and under the earth, are as the letters of a universal language, in which all 
nations have a common interest’. (J72) Jones also connects the capacity of the 
‘world which we now see’ to serve as a ‘commentary on the mind of God’ with 
an inherent correspondence between the two: ‘the visible world throughout is a 
pattern of the invisible’. (J32) Also significant in terms of the relationship to 
Pusey’s argument, Jones refers to how Clement of Alexandria sees shadows of 
Christian truth in the ‘barbarous philosophy’ which describes the ‘intellectual’ 
world as ‘being the archetype or original’ of the sensible world, which is an 
‘image or copy of it’. (J73)73  
One also finds in Jones the idea of the need for spiritual faculties in order 
to perceive spiritual things: ‘For spiritual truth there must be a spiritual sense; 
and the scripture calls this sense by the name of faith’. (J17) Jones does not 
investigate further the ‘sense or capacity in the intellect, by which the invisible 
                                                 
73 Jones quotes Clement’s Stromata or Miscellanies, V.14 describing how the Greeks borrowed 
their philosophy both from the Hebrews and the Gentiles: ‘There is a barbarous philosophy, 
(i.e. a foreign philosophy) “which hath a knowledge of the sensible and the intellectual worlds; 
the one being the archetype or original, the other an image or copy of it” … This barbarous 
philosophy, so called by Plato, whose doctrine is here repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, was 
no where to be found but in the bible’. (J73) This quotation comes from the paragraph before 
the passage which Pusey quotes on ‘the divine and royal Word … and the image of the image 
is the human mind’ (L145) which is discussed in Chapter 3. See Clement of Alexandria 1994, 
466, also I.16, 317-318. 
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things of the spirit of God are admitted and approved’. (J18, 17) However, like 
Pusey, he insists that unbelief is a moral as much as an intellectual problem 
which the appeal to evidence cannot solve:  
Some speculative writers have treated of credibility and probability, and 
the nature, and force, and degrees, of evidence, as if we had rules for 
weighing all truth to a single grain with mechanical certainty: whereas in 
fact, man, with all his boasted balancings of reason, can resist a proof 
that would confound a devil … Vicious inclinations and habits of sin, 
which render truth disagreeable, are sure to have the effect of weakening 
and perverting the judgment. (J19-20) 
Like Pusey, and probably following Butler, Jones maintains that the difficulties 
the Bible poses are a form of trial: ‘The bible has farther difficulties arising 
from another principle. For it pleased God, for wise ends, to exercise the faith 
and devotion of his people with a system of forms and ceremonies, which had 
no value but from their signification’. (J15) 
 While Jones does not work out a theory of the spiritual faculties in detail, 
he does offer a brief sketch of a theological or epistemological basis for the 
necessity of typical or figurative language in a similar way to Pusey in the 
‘Lectures’:  
This method is necessary to assist the mind in its conceptions, and supply 
the natural defect in our understandings. Being men, invested with an 
earthly body, which hath a sense of nothing but material things, we 
cannot see truth and reason, in themselves, as spirits do: these things are 
of a different nature from our sight; and therefore we are obliged to 
conceive them as they are reflected to us in the glass of the visible forms, 
and sensible qualities of outward things. (J238-9) 
Types and typical language are a necessary form of mediation which cannot be 
left behind even in the time of the Gospel dispensation: ‘For truth, as we have 
often observed, does not enter into men’s minds in its own abstracted nature, 
but under the vehicle of some analogy’. (J252-3) Jones calls this ‘the sacred 
style’ and urges all preachers to adopt the ‘symbolical language of the bible’. 
(J252, 255) 
The extent of the similarities between Jones and Pusey could lead one to 
overlook important differences. Jones’ Lectures lack the polemical edge of 
those delivered by Pusey fifty years later. Although Jones’ approach is 
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different from those in which Pusey finds symptoms of rationalism, Jones does 
not seek to emphasize where his approach corrects or challenges what Pusey 
calls the apologetic use. Jones’ argument that ‘This hidden wisdom of the 
scripture is to be considered as treasure hid in the earth, for which men must 
search with that same zeal and labour with which they penetrate into a mine of 
gold’ (J24) reminds one of Pusey’s description of types as ‘hidden treasure, 
which lie below the surface of Holy Scripture’. (L85) However, having stated 
the principle, in the more than two hundred pages that follow, Jones discusses 
types which are authorized explicitly by the New Testament rather than the 
‘hidden wisdom of the scripture’. For example, he devotes the longest section 
to considering the teaching of 1 Corinthians 10 which makes the crossing of 
the Red Sea and the journey through the wilderness types of baptism and the 
Christian life. (J134-143) He also reflects on the flood as a type of baptism, as 
taught in 1 Peter 3:20-21, (J126-7) and on Joseph as a type of Christ with the 
support of St Stephen in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 7:9). (J52, 181-3). One 
exception to this pattern, in the Discourse which he wrote to supplement his 
Lectures, is his consideration of the account of the borrowed axe-head which 
one of the ‘sons of the prophets’ lost in the river Jordan (2 Kgs 6:1-6). Jones 
examines the significance of the minute details of this history: the way in 
which ‘the head of the axe, being the better part of it’ corresponds to ‘the soul 
or spirit of man, the better part of him’, and how the axe-head being borrowed 
figures the soul belonging to God. He goes on to describe the raising of the 
axe-head as a prophecy of the raising up of human nature which was 
accomplished when ‘the branch of the stem of Jesse was cut down, and cast 
with us into the waters of death’ (J287-8). This passage would not be out of 
place in the ‘Lectures’, and it is one of the very few places where Jones refers 
to a patristic interpretation, in this case suggesting that the reader consult 
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Book V.17.4, but without exploring the reference.74 
However, the rarity of this example shows the difference from the ‘Lectures’ 
and the Tracts on Holy Baptism which are replete with such examples. 
                                                 
74 See Irenaeus 1872, Against Heresies V.17.4, 491. Jones adds considerably here, in the 
fashion Pusey does, to what Irenaeus says was ‘shewn typically’ by ‘the Prophet Elisha’. 
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In a similar way, Jones, like Pusey, suggests the importance of 
considering the meaning which the details reveal: ‘if we descend to an actual 
examination of particulars, we find it assisting and leading our faculties 
forward’ (J12). However, he does not generally show examples of this beyond 
what the New Testament offers. For example, having commented briefly on St 
Stephen’s words, ‘the patriarchs, moved with envy, sold Joseph into Egypt’ 
(Acts 7:9), he adds: ‘Much more might be said to shew how exact the parallel 
is between the history of Joseph and the history of Christ, if we were to pursue 
it’ (J183). He even repeats this possibility on the next page: ‘Some things 
which have passed before us in the present lecture would suggest many 
profitable reflections, if I had time to insist upon them’ (J184). Yet this is 
precisely the kind of investigation which Pusey pursues: 
In the next generation, one is again singled out as the emblem of the 
Christ; well-beloved of His father; appointed by God, to honour and for 
that appointment envied of his brethren when he declared it unto them, so 
that they would have slain him, his brethren who gave him up, providing 
that their hands should not be upon him; rejected by them as a false 
prophet –‘behold this dreamer cometh’, ‘This is written of Joseph but 
fulfilled in Christ, when the Jews said of His Passion “If He be the king 
of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe 
Him.” (St Ambrose, [On Joseph], 3.12); sold for the price of a slave (20 
pieces of silver) by Judah without any fault of his own; accused as 
unfaithful to his earthly master (Luke 23, 2 John 19:12), yet raised to 
kingly power by the very means which they had taken to depress him; 
according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, raised 
from amidst malefactors to the right hand of power; feeding with the 
bread of life the people who were made subject unto him; he manifested 
himself to them who asked not after Him, and at last also to his brethren 
to whom on their repentance and in their anguish he gradually made 
himself known; not by messengers but by Himself, he forgave them, for 
they knew not what they did; yet not until they had ceased to make 
excuses for themselves and confessed their guilt, sorrowfully confessing 
‘We are verily guilty concerning Him, who was not ashamed to call us 
brethren. Therefore is this distress come upon us’ (Gen. 42:21); then he 
admitted them also under his rule and sustained them; fed them freely, 
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gave them the best of the land and kept them by Him for ever. (L74, 
75C)75 
In comparison with Pusey’s exegesis, Jones’ approach calls to mind Harrison’s 
description of Campegius Vitringa, as one who ‘seems to leave one suddenly 
where he ought to go on’.76  
Perhaps the most significant form of Jones’ restraint comes in his 
discussion of what Pusey would call the sacramental character of Scripture. 
Commenting on 2 Corinthians 3:18, ‘We all, with open (that is unveiled) face, 
beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, 
from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord’ (J249), Jones argues that 
‘the spirit of those figures under which the bible delivers to us the things of 
God, has a power of raising and glorifying, even in this life, the spirit of man’ 
(J247). This evokes Pusey’s description of the ‘Sacramental force’ (L133) of 
the types of the Old Testament. Likewise, for Jones, those who see the light of 
God ‘reflected as in a glass from the figures and ceremonies of his law, are 
changed (Gr. transfigured) into the same image, from glory to glory’ (J249). 
Jones’ description illustrates well what Pusey means by knowledge as 
participation, and by sanctification as a form of deification.77 However, 
because Jones does not make this connection explicitly and explain how his  
exegesis arises from the doctrine of participation, his interpretation can still be 
read as a merely metaphorical reflection, a homiletical illustration of the way 
reading the Bible can change us.  Jones’ account is stirring, but because he 
does not unite the figurative character of Scripture with the doctrine of the 
Incarnation, the Church, the sacraments, and creation in the way Pusey does, it 
lacks the theological force of Pusey’s argument. Since Pusey does not address 
                                                 
75 Pusey also quotes Ambrose at length to argue that the explanation which Joseph’s brothers 
gave to Joseph’s steward about the money they found in their sacks is a prophecy of 
humankind’s rejection of ‘free grace’ or ‘free gifts’ in favour of human merit or justification: 
‘He it is who seeketh not your money but giveth his own. He gave you money in your sacks – 
Christ is the joyous gift; He is your silver, He your price. The Lord requireth not of you the 
price of his corn, seeketh not your weight of silver. Your silver is reprobate, the silver of the 
sack is not good.’ L75A, quoting On Joseph, 9.47-48 and 9.50, Ambrose 1972, 221. 
76 Harrison to Pusey, 26 Aug. 1835, quoted above. 
77 This is another of the few places where Jones quotes a patristic source. In this case, he finds 
the same doctrine of transfiguration through reading Old Testament types in Irenaeus’ 
reflections on Daniel 12:3, ‘That men of understanding shall shine as the brightness of the 
firmament’. See Irenaeus 1872, Against Heresies IV.26.1, 384-5 and J250 note. 
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Jones in the ‘Lectures’, this description is somewhat speculative. However, 
Pusey’s approach to the evidence writers and to Hampden suggests that there 
are occasions when, for him, ‘reserve’ about principles is inappropriate and  
the exigencies or dangers of the times require an elucidation of problems. 
Jones’ approach is not apologetic in the pejorative sense in which Pusey 
uses the term; he does not seek to limit the consideration of the figurative 
interpretation of Scripture according to strict categories and, particularly with 
regard to what he says about types in the natural world, he encourages the 
reader to see how types and figurative language are knit into the order of 
things. Pusey’s argument is a natural though significant development and 
exploration of the principles in Jones’ ideas. However, one could read Jones’ 
Lectures alongside Marsh’s work or that of Van Mildert on the interpretation 
of types without the clear sense that they were advocating a radically different 
kind of approach, whereas this is not possible with Pusey’s ‘Lectures’. 
Although one finds many elements of Pusey’s account in Jones’ Lectures, and 
Jones suggests the necessity of figurative interpretation, his argument does not 
put forward this necessity with the same clarity or force as Pusey. Pusey’s 
suggestion that Cain’s first sin was not murder, but the refusal to read the 
history of his parents typically, would seem out of place in Jones' Lectures, 
whereas it is entirely in keeping with the sense of urgency and the polemical 
edge of the ‘Lectures’. Pusey develops the principles which Jones mentions in 
a way that Jones does not. Whether or not Jones would agree with this 
development, it is difficult to say, but, as we shall now see, even many 
supporters of the Movement did not. 
7.2.3 The ‘Lectures’ in conflict with the High Church tradition 
If recognizing the influence of High Church ideas on the ‘Lectures’ is 
illuminating, the way in which High Churchmen were disturbed by this part of 
the Tractarian project is also instructive. In addition to those who saw the 
Tractarians as unnecessarily polemical or out of step with their distinguished 
forebears, or others who saw them as dangerous Romanizers, even many of the 
allies of the Oxford Movement were critical of the way they looked to the 
Fathers and brought forward early Christian interpretation of the Bible. We 
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have already considered in Chapter 2 how H. J. Rose disagreed with the 
Tractarians’ assessment of evidence writing, an assessment which is a key part 
of the argument of the ‘Lectures’. In correspondence with Newman in May, 
1836, Rose also emphasized that the Tractarian appeal to the Fathers must be 
guided by the formularies of the Church of England: ‘We are going on no 
voyage of discovery. We know exactly the extent of the shore.’78 Newman 
would express a contrary view in Tract 90 in his warning that if, in reading the 
Fathers, ‘a man begins by summoning them before him, instead of betaking 
himself to them, by seeking to make them evidence for modern dogmas, 
instead of throwing his mind upon the text … he will to a certainty miss their 
sense.’79 Bearing more directly on the ‘Lectures’, in 1899, Edward Marshall 
asked F. E. Brightman, one of the first librarians of Pusey House and a 
renowned liturgical scholar, if his notes on Pusey’s lectures on types, taken 
sixty years, before might be published.80 After consulting with the principal V. 
S. S. Coles, Brightman hoped that Marshall would let his ‘Notes’ ‘find a 
permanent home in this library’, but added that ‘the publication might not be 
very successful’. With the recent publication of ‘the five volumes of the Life 
and the Letters’, and with another biography forthcoming by Mrs. Trench, 
Brightman thought that ‘perhaps people could feel overwhelmed by more 
Pusey literature’.81 In a sentence which appears to be the key to the others he 
adds, ‘And besides the subject matter being what it is, their publication might 
revive discussions which have been more or less lulled of late.’ Brightman 
clearly implies that he does not think it would be a good thing to rekindle the 
sort of discussions which the ‘Lectures’ might encourage. In this context, 
Brightman’s comments earlier in the letter that ‘the notes seem to represent a 
                                                 
78 H. J. Rose quoted in Nockles 1994, 117. See Nockles 113-9 for the ‘contrast between an 
essentially conservative High Church theory of Tradition and a more dynamic Tractarian 
theory’ (p. 113). 
79 Ibid. 114. 
80 F. E. Brightman (1856–1932) to Marshall, 3 Feb. 1899, appended to ‘Notes’, Marshall’s 
notebook. Since ‘no other memoranda of the Lectures are available in print’ the notebook ‘may 
be of interest as well for their value as for the view which they give of the Lecturer’s method of 
Instruction at this early period of his career’. M-Obs, preface. 
81 Brightman refers to Liddon’s Life and Pusey 1898, The Spiritual Letters of E. B. Pusey. Mrs. 
Trench, the daughter of Abp Trench of Dublin, wrote The Story of Dr. Pusey’s Life. 
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side of Pusey’s teaching which is not so fully represented’ and that ‘they 
belong to a period early in his career’, seem to be a kind of disavowal, a 
dissociation of the views which one finds in the ‘Lectures’ from Pusey’s 
mature position. One assumes that the Principal with whom he consulted 
shared this view, or at least acquiesced in it.  
While Liddon sometimes adopts a reverential approach to his subject, he 
is more guarded about Pusey’s efforts to revive a patristic interpretation of the 
Old Testament types and prophecies. When compared to the attention which he 
devotes to Pusey’s Tracts on the subject of Holy Baptism, or even his books on 
German theology, Liddon barely mentions the ‘Lectures’, explaining that they 
were never published because their author ‘was never sufficiently well satisfied 
with them, and they only exist in a fragmentary and imperfect form among his 
papers’.82 This comment, standing alone as it does, does not adequately 
describe the serious labour which the ‘Lectures’ represent, or their place either 
in Pusey’s thought or in the work of the Oxford movement. Liddon’s 
description of Pusey’s lack of satisfaction with the ‘Lectures’ appears to 
represent his own view, not just of their form, but of their contents, suggesting 
Andrew Louth’s assessment that Liddon found the ‘Lectures’, ‘it would seem, 
much too strange and disturbing’.83 This suspicion partly explains why 
Marshall’s ‘Notes’ were never published and Pusey’s ‘Lectures’ were virtually 
unknown until Alf Härdelin discussed their importance in his book on The 
Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist (1965) and Donald Allchin made 
them the focus of his essay ‘The Theological Vision of the Oxford Movement’ 
(1967).84  
One can assess the possible responses to the ‘Lectures’, had they been 
known more widely, by considering how other publications which were part of 
the Tractarians’ effort to revive patristic interpretation and a patristic mind 
were received. Richard Church*, one of the leaders of the younger generation 
of the Oxford Movement and a close friend of Newman, offers such an 
                                                 
82 Life, 399. 
83 Louth 1984, 31. 
84 Härdelin 1965 and Allchin 1967. 
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example.85 In his sympathetic treatment of the Oxford Movement, Dean 
Church argues that Keble’s Tract ‘On the Mysticism attributed to the Early 
Fathers of the Church’ and Williams’ Tracts ‘On Reserve’ were ‘out of place’ 
and became ‘potent weapons against Tractarianism’. While Church calls these 
two Tracts ‘innocent in themselves’, his assessment does suggest serious 
criticism: ‘The cause of the movement needed clear explanations; definite 
statements of doctrines which were popularly misunderstood; plain, convincing 
reasoning on the issues where we raised by it’. While Keble met this need in 
‘masterly exposition of the meaning of Tradition’, his Tract on mysticism was 
of an entirely different character.86 Church writes: 
It was hardly what the practical needs of the time required, and it took 
away men’s thoughts from them; the prospect was hopeless that in that 
state of men’s minds it should be understood, except by a very few; it 
merely helped to add another charge, that vague but mischievous charge 
of mysticism, to the list of accusations against the Tracts.87 
Keble was well aware of the dangers of being associated with mysticism: ‘it 
touches the very string, which most certainly moves contemptuous thought, in 
those who have imbibed the peculiar spirit of our time’.88 However, Tract 89 
endeavours to show precisely why it was necessary to address this accusation. 
Moreover, as we have seen already, Keble’s Tract was part of a project of 
rediscovery which was the forum in which the Tractarians developed ideas 
central to their thought. Without the kind of investigation in which they were 
engaged, the attempt to promote patristic biblical interpretation would simply 
be an unsubstantiated assertion of one part of the tradition over another. 
Moreover, Pusey argues in the ‘Lectures’, as does Keble in Tract 89 and 
Newman in sermons and Tracts, that there was a danger in doing what Dean 
Church advocated, offering ‘plain, convincing reasoning on the issues’. The 
Tractarians argued that one of the chief problems of the day was an over-
                                                 
85 *Church, Richard William (1815-90). Charles Marriott introduced Church to Newman and 
Keble in 1835. He was elected to a fellowship at Oriel in 1838. After twenty years in the 
‘obscure Somerset parish of Whatley’ he was appointed Dean of St Paul’s, London, from 1871, 
when H. P. Liddon was a member of the chapter. G. Martin Murphy, ‘Church, Richard 
William (1815–1890)’, ODNB. 
86 Church 1897, 263. He refers to Keble 1836. 
87 Church 1897, 264. 
88 T89, I.2, 3. 
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reliance on such plain-reason, and that an appreciation of this problem must 
inform both theological argument in general and the interpretation of the Bible 
in particular. Dean Church’s assessment rejects that connection.  
The second Tract that Church criticizes was, as we have seen, another 
one directly connected to the argument of ‘Lectures’ and to the Tractarians’ 
efforts to recover and promote patristic exegesis more generally. Church 
describes Isaac Williams’ first Tract ‘On Reserve in Communicating Religious 
Knowledge’ as ‘written in the most devout and reverent spirit by one of the 
gentlest and most refined of scholars, and full of deep Scriptural knowledge’.89 
However, despite its commendable qualities, Church argues that ‘it could well 
have been spared at the moment, and it certainly offered itself to unfortunate 
use’.90 Due to Williams’ Tracts on Reserve, critics of the Oxford Movement 
could accuse its adherents of trying to keep back the ‘whole counsel of God’ 
and of promoting ‘secret and crooked methods’. Church believed that such was 
the opposition to Williams’ ideas that he had come to be regarded ‘almost as 
the most wicked and dangerous of the Tractarians’.91 The assessment of the 
evangelical journal The Record, the same journal which had criticised Pusey’s 
Tracts on baptism, shows the accuracy of Church’s description: 
… the character of these tracts is mysticism rendered plausible by 
metaphysical and sophistical reasoning. The temper and spirit is Gnostic 
and superstitious. Everything mysterious is almost too sacred to be 
handled. The reverence expressed is morbid, quite alien from the 
healthful spirit of the Scriptures but in harmony with that of the ascetics 
and contemplative devotees.92 
H. J. Rose had predicted such an assessment. In the letter to Newman where he 
urged the usefulness of evidences, Rose also questioned the expediency of 
‘adopting mystery in any shape we can get it as a counterpoise to 
                                                 
89Church 1897, 264. 
90 Ibid. 265. 
91 Ibid. 76. 
92 The Record (27 Aug. 1840) quoted in Boneham 2009, 58. For further examples of the 
condemnation which Williams’ Tracts aroused, see pp. 57-63. For similar criticisms of 
Newman’s principle of disciplini arcani, see King 2009, 132-5, 253-4. 
  284 
utilitarianism’.93 Rose added his prescient caution ‘I doubt the expediency – for 
it obviously lays us open to very plausible misrepresentation’. 
While Rose and Church were obviously correct about the ‘plausible 
misrepresentation’ of the Tracts written by Keble and Williams, their 
conclusion that they could be ‘kept back’ displays a gulf of understanding 
between Rose and Church on one side, and the Tractarians on the other, about 
the importance of typical or mystical interpretations of Scripture, as well as the 
theological framework to which such interpretations inevitably belong. As we 
saw above, Pusey saw Williams’ Tracts on the principle of reserve as the most 
important of the Tracts for the Times. The idea that the communication of 
religious knowledge in a veiled way is providentially ordered by God to 
address the necessary conditions of spiritual knowledge is fundamental to 
Pusey, Newman, and Keble’s description of typology and allegory. Moreover, 
Church’s view of Keble’s Tract 89 that ‘It was hardly what the practical needs 
of the time required’ is the opposite of the view which Pusey takes in the 
‘Lectures’, that the dangers facing the age were best exposed and addressed 
through urging the necessity of recovering both the exegetical practices and the 
theological vision of the early Church.  
Whereas Church’s assessment was in accord with that of Brightman 
about the merits of leaving the ‘Lectures’ unpublished, lest they ‘revive’ 
unwelcome discussions, Church’s mentor Newman saw the ‘Lectures’ as 
exactly what the needs of the age demanded. In September, 1839, Newman 
wrote Pusey about David Friedrich Strauss’s radical reconstruction of the New 
Testament accounts of the life of Christ in his Leben Jesu (1835).94 In it, 
Strauss attributes the supernatural elements of the Gospels to the myth that 
developed between the death of Jesus and the writing of the Gospels at a later 
second-century date. To address the challenge of Strauss’s book Newman 
                                                 
93 H. J. Rose to J. H. Newman, 11 Oct. 1838, ‘Newman Papers: “British Critic”, 1836 – 1841’. 
Rose refers to an article in the British Critic: ‘It is as clearly the Church’s time to be 
mysterious now, as it was its part to be enlightened in the middle ages. Mystery fits in with this 
age exactly; it suits it; it is just what the age wants, if it only knew what its wants were.’ Anon. 
1838b, 397. 
94 David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74). Appointed Lecturer on Hegelian philosophy at Tubingen 
University in 1832. He was influenced by Schleiermacher and later Hegel. 
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proposes, not an apologetic demonstration of the weaknesses of Strauss’s 
argument, but rather Pusey’s account of typological interpretation in the 
‘Lectures’: ‘Strauss’s book is said to be doing harm at Cambridge. The only 
way to meet it is by your work on Types. I think so.’95 The argument of this 
thesis is that, according to the terms of the ‘Lectures’ and the project of which 
they are a part, it is Newman’s assessment, not Church’s implied one, that is 
correct.  
7.3 The Typological Integration of Theology and Spirituality 
One clue to the issues which might be involved in the suspicion which the 
Tractarians’ study and use of patristic theology aroused, and which also 
connects the project of the ‘Lectures’ with issues of our day, may be found in 
the way very little attention is given to how Pusey or the other Tractarians 
interpreted the Bible. In his study of the Oxford Movement, Brad Faught 
emphasizes the importance of biblical scholarship for the Tractarians: ‘the 
Tractarians’ view of Scripture was of vital importance to the development of 
the Movement, and in the hands of John Henry Newman, Edward Pusey, and 
John Keble especially an identifiable position can be discerned’.96 In the light 
of both Keble’s Tract 89 and Pusey’s ‘Lectures’, Andrew Louth argues that 
with the ‘question of the interpretation of Scripture … we touch the very nerve 
of the Oxford Movement’. He writes: ‘to address ourselves to the subject of 
“the Oxford Movement, the Fathers, and the Bible” is far from being a curious 
and somewhat arbitrary inquiry, but one that goes right to the heart of the 
innermost concerns of the Oxford divines’.97 Nonetheless, not much is written 
specifically about how Pusey or the other Tractarians interpreted the Bible 
compared to the attention given to other matters. Brad Faught writes: ‘While 
very much has been written about its leading personalities and the intensity of 
the controversies they provoked, very little work has been done on the way in 
                                                 
95 Newman to Pusey, 12 Sept. 1839, in Newman 1995, 145. See also Pusey’s response to 
Newman, 18 Sept. 1839 (p. 146). 
96 Faught 2008, 135-146, 136. 
97 Louth 1984, 31. 
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which the Oxford men … viewed and handled Scripture’.98 This echoes the 
assessment of Andrew Louth: ‘The Oxford Movement was not noted for 
Biblical scholarship’.99 Nockles discusses the way in which the Tractarians 
understood the rule of faith in relation to Scripture, but primarily in terms of an 
historical rather than theological assessment of how they drew on patristic 
antiquity.100 As we have seen, in the 1830s Pusey, Keble, and Newman worked 
out their understanding of the interpretation of the Bible through the study of 
the typological and allegorical interpretations of the ancient Church. It is 
precisely because of this approach to the Bible, what Pusey called a catholic 
principle, that theology students today are unlikely to encounter careful study 
of Augustine or Origen, Irenaeus or Chrysostom, as part of introductory 
courses to biblical studies. Mainstream trends in biblical scholarship since the 
days of the Tractarians suggest that modern historical, textual, literary, or 
linguistic analyses offer access to objective truth in a way the Fathers 
cannot.101  
Seeking further, a clue which may explain, at least in part, the scholarly 
neglect of the Tractarians as interpreters of the Bible is William Sanday’s 
separation of ‘science and adequate knowledge’ from ‘innate kinship of Spirit’ 
in his description of what is needed to write a modern life of Christ.102 As we 
saw above, this division suggests that ‘kinship of Spirit’ is a pietistic attitude 
distinct from knowledge rather than, according to the understanding of 
knowledge as participation, an epistemological necessity. The separation of 
theoretical knowledge from sensibility or a pattern of life is symptomatic of 
what Mark McIntosh in his book Mystical Theology: the Integrity of 
Spirituality and Theology, describes as a kind of ‘divorce’ between theology 
and spirituality and between doctrine and prayer which he suggests has been 
                                                 
98 Faught 2008, 135. 
99 Louth 1984, 30. 
100 Nockles 1994, 20, 113-8. 
101 See Ayres 2004, 31-2 for his comments on ‘negative judgements about fourth-century 
exegesis’ and the need to understand early Christian exegesis ‘outside explicit or implicit 
comparison with modern academic practices’. 
102 Sanday 1906, 240, discussed at 3.3.1. 
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common since at least the second half of the twentieth century.103 McIntosh’s 
assessment is shared by many other scholars. Andrew Louth has written about 
this in terms of a ‘dissociation between thought and feeling, between the mind 
and the heart’ which characterizes ‘modern culture and society’.104 This 
dissociation of sensibility manifests itself, Louth argues, in terms of ‘the 
division between theology and spirituality, the division between thought about 
God and the movement of the heart towards God’.105 Rowan Williams suggests 
that this split has even earlier sources, arguing that the ideas of medieval 
nominalism made it more difficult to give voice to the view ‘that Christian 
speculation is properly inseparable from engagement with the paradoxes of the 
cross and resurrection’.106 In his examination of the apophatic tradition, Denys 
Turner finds the division between theology and spirituality evident in the 
modern search for ‘a “mystical” equivalent to sense experience’ which is 
distinct from and more ‘first-order’ than ‘second-order theoretical reflection 
upon the language of experience’, which Turner also calls the ‘the verbose 
element of theology’.107 Partly because of this artificial separation, the 
apophatic language of the mystical tradition is psychologised and reduced to 
the descriptions of inner states which belong to one side of the modern division 
of sensibility. Ironically, by this move the apophatic encounter with God is no 
longer conceived as a negation of experience which ‘decentres’ or 
‘disintegrates the experiential structures of selfhood’, but rather as a 
foundational subjective experience.108 In Pusey’s terms, this form of spiritual 
empiricism is dangerously anthropocentric and needs to be decentred so that 
we may see ‘the order and correspondences and harmonies of things … from 
the centre, which is God Himself’.109 
                                                 
103 McIntosh 1998, 4, 10. 
104 Louth 1989, 1. 
105 Ibid. 2. 
106 R. Williams quoted in McIntosh 1998, 75. 
107 Turner 1995, 262, 20. 
108 Ibid. 251. Drawing on MacIntyre 1984, Lewis Ayres similarly describes the way 
‘“emotivism” hides itself under the the guise of a language from an older era’. Ayres 2004, 
402. 
109 Scr.HB., 5. See also L2 above. 
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One way of reading the ‘Lectures’ would be to consider Pusey as 
attempting to offer a form of marriage counselling in the early stages of the 
divorce between theology and spirituality and theological anthropology and 
cosmology. In this sense, Sanday’s description of the need for a union of 
‘kinship of spirit’ and ‘science’ is a description of a modern tragedy. In the 
approach which Pusey advocates in the ‘Lectures’, wonder, reverence, and a 
feeling mind are together essential elements of spiritual vision and adequate 
knowledge. Scientific tools are helpful, especially in order to investigate the 
human and earthy elements of the medium of revelation. However, no adequate 
knowledge of God and His ways is possible without the transformation by 
which a person becomes like God. Pusey’s account of knowledge as 
participation assumes that a God-given and ongoing kinship of spirit is the 
beginning of any study of Scripture and the search for the religious element or 
substance of prophecy. 
It may be that the integrated theological vision which the ‘Lectures’ offer 
contributed to the disquiet which Pusey and his colleagues’ efforts to revive the 
patristic interpretation of the Bible encountered among sympathizers, as much 
as the more obvious and easily accessible concerns about authority and 
tradition. We have seen that ‘this system of the Ancient Church … perceives a 
harmony in Holy Scripture that this system allows no word of God to “fall to 
the ground,” but gathers up all diligently that “nothing be lost”’. Pusey finds an 
analogy between the harmony in Scripture and God’s ‘scheme of Creation’ by 
which ‘the lowest things bear a certain relation to the highest, attesting the 
unity of their Author’.110 According to this view, Pusey argues: ‘it is agreeable 
to the connection of His Word with his word, that this should, even in what 
seems the most incidental and insignificant detail of it, speak of Him, Who 
spoke it, be penetrated with Him, Who is its and our Life’.111 The details of 
which Pusey speaks include not only the typical people, events, or words of the 
Bible, but also types in the natural world and in human history. Pusey’s theory 
of type and typical prophecy is all-encompassing, linking the types and 
                                                 
110 T67rev., 389-90. 
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prophecies of the Old Testament with an account of the soul and all created 
things, which are also, in different ways and degrees, types and images. These 
types are providentially knit together and seek, by the work of the Spirit which 
completes and gives reality to the type, an eschatological fulfilment in the 
Archetype who is the express image of the Father. While this Christian, 
Platonic, and Romantic longing for union represents one important current of 
thought shaping both the modern sense of identity and theological study, it is 
also one that moves against the ‘Spirit of the Age’ represented in the 
separation, for example, of theology from biblical studies and spirituality, or of 
science from religion.112 In his study of Keble’s account of the mystical 
interpretation of the Fathers, Ephraim Radner asks a question which displays 
Pusey’s sense of the necessity of typical interpretation: 
Can one hold to the breadth of Scripture’s revelatory reach, bow to the 
creative sovereignty of God within our temporal lives, embrace the 
coherent character of nature’s divinely transparent sheaths, and run after 
the transforming allure of the purified soul – can one inhabit this vision 
of the world without traversing Scripture’s figurated terrain?113 
Radner’s response, that ‘An answer to this kind of question is not easily 
offered’ and comments also that such an approach can seem ‘intrinsically 
unnatural, foreign, and perhaps even dangerously ideological’, is revealing.114 
He brings out well the sense of disquiet or incomprehension which the project 
of the ‘Lectures’ aroused in the mid-nineteenth century and which the 
advocacy of allegory as a serious form of biblical study can still stir up now. 
Pusey’s account of type and the theological vision in which it makes sense is, 
no doubt, incomplete and displays many imperfections. However, the 
‘Lectures’ offer a coherent argument for the importance of a typological or 
allegorical approach to reading both Scripture and the book of God’s works, as 
well as for approaching theological questions more generally. Pusey’s 
argument also suggests the elements which will be part of any endeavour to 
                                                 
112 See Ayres 2004, 392-404 for the development of ‘the common modern fourfold division of 
theology into four sub-fields of systematics, Church history or historical theology, biblical 
studies, and practical or pastoral theology’. 
113 Radner 2004, 88. 
114 Ibid. 88, 80. 
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rediscover the necessary unity of theology and spirituality, placing an account 
of the soul alongside the interpretation of the Bible, and suggesting the 
importance of seeing these elements in the context of an all-embracing view of 
creation and redemption which ‘allows no word of God to “fall to the ground,” 
but gathers up all diligently that “nothing be lost”’. 
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